The U.S. left behind? Financial globalization and the rise of IPOs outside the U.S.

From 1990 to 2011, the share of world IPO activity by non-U.S. firms increased because of financial globalization and because of a decrease in U.S. IPO activity. Financial globalization reduces the impact of national institutions on domestic IPO activity and enables more non-U.S. firms from countries with weak institutions to go public with a global IPO. U.S. IPO activity does not benefit from financial globalization. Compared to other countries, the rate of small-firm IPO activity in the U.S. is abnormally low in the 2000s. This abnormally low rate cannot be explained by the regulatory changes of the early 2000s.     

How do corporate websites contribute to the information environment? Evidence from the U.S. and Taiwan

We study corporate website disclosures in the U.S. and Taiwan, two countries with different regulatory and market environments, to provide insights into the uniformity of website content and its contribution to the information environment. We observe significant variation in content both within and between the two countries. U.S. firms with higher analyst following tend to create more transparent financial information environments and provide disclosures that are complementary to analysts’ analyses through their corporate websites. They also tend to provide easier access to investor relations (IR) services if analyst coverage is light or nonexistent. However, neither effect is true in Taiwan where the securities analysis industry is less mature. Individual investors have greater ownership share in U.S. firms with more information about IR services on their websites; however, their ownership share drops as financial disclosure on the firm’s website increases, consistent with institutions diluting individual ownership in firms with more transparency in financial reporting. In Taiwan, however, institutions dilute individual ownership share in firms with less financial information and more trading information on their websites. These results are consistent with Barber et al.’s (2009) findings that institutions find Taiwan firms that attract the aggressive, speculative trading of individuals to be extremely profitable investments. Website disclosures in both countries have some effect on the stock-price response to mandatory earnings releases, but their impact is greater in the U.S. Our findings indicate that website disclosures contribute to the information environment and are related to the degree of interest in the firm by sophisticated market participants. Thus, they provide insights to regulators of both countries as they seek to improve disclosure and “level the information playing field.”     

How wide is the gap between IASC and U.S. GAAP? impact of the IASC comparability project and recent international developments

The objectives of this paper involve determining the significant areas of difference between International Accounting Standards (IASs) and U.S. GAAP following the IASC’s Comparability Project and the most recent IASC and FASB projects on these issues. In addition, the paper assesses the consistency of U.S. practice with the IASs revised via the Comparability Project. For this purpose, the 1996 annual reports of 38 large multinational U.S. companies are examined and an empirical analysis of reporting practices is carried out. Finally, the remaining gap between IASs and U.S. GAAP is evaluated and policy implications are considered for the IASC and FASB. It is concluded that while there are still some significant issues to be resolved, notably relating to the determination of net profit/loss for the period, research and development, changes in foreign exchange rates, and business combinations, these differences are not insurmountable.     

The Structural Dynamics of U.S. Output and Inflation: What Explains the Changes?

We examine the dynamics of U.S. output and inflation using a structural time-varying coefficients vector autoregression. There are changes in the volatility of both variables and in the persistence of inflation, but variations are statistically insignificant. Technology shocks explain changes in output volatility; real demand disturbances variations in the persistence and volatility of inflation. We detect important time variations in the transmission of technology shocks to output and demand shocks to inflation and significant changes in the variance of technology and of monetary policy shocks.     

Deposit Insurance and Risk Management of the U.S. Banking System: What is the Loss Distribution Faced by the FDIC?

We examine the question of deposit insurance through the lens of risk management by constructing the loss distribution faced by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). We take a novel approach by arguing that the risk management problem faced by the FDIC is similar to that of a bank managing a loan portfolio, only in the FDIC’s case the risk arises from the potential for loss of the individual banks in its portfolio. We explicitly estimate the cumulative loss distribution of FDIC insured banks using two variations of the Merton model and find that reserves are sufficient to cover roughly 99.85% of the loss distribution, corresponding to about a BBB+ rating. However, under different stress scenarios (higher correlations, fat-tailed bank returns, increased loss severity) that level can be much lower: approximately 96% corresponding to about a B+ rating.JEL classification: G210, G280.Any views expressed represent those of the author only and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.     

What Is the Importance of Monetary and Fiscal Shocks in Explaining U.S. Macroeconomic Fluctuations?

This paper analyzes the importance of monetary and fiscal policy shocks in explaining U.S. macroeconomic fluctuations, and establishes new stylized facts. The novelty of our empirical analysis is that we jointly consider both monetary and fiscal policy, whereas the existing literature only focuses on either one or the other. Our main findings are twofold: fiscal shocks are relatively more important in explaining medium cycle fluctuations whereas monetary policy shocks are relatively more important in explaining business cycle fluctuations, and failing to recognize that both monetary and fiscal policy simultaneously affect macroeconomic variables might incorrectly attribute the fluctuations to the wrong source.     

U.S. Money Supply and China’s Business Cycles

This article models the U.S. dollar as a world currency in a global DSGE framework, and investigates the spillover effects of the U.S. money supply shock on China’s economy. Exchange rate targeting and capital controls in the context of dollar hegemony are investigated. Given a positive U.S. money supply shock, both the inflation and real GDP of China will be below their steady-state levels in the medium term; while for the U.S. there is no inflation pressure. The spillover of liquidity effect exists. Cost-push effects and relative price effects are employed to discuss the transmission mechanism. Under the U.S. money supply shock, a fully liberalizing reform with no capital controls and a floating exchange rate of Renminbi is not the best reform for China.     

Is the grass on the other side greener? Testing the cross-border effect for U.S. acquirers

Why do U.S. acquirers fare worse when acquiring targets in foreign countries than when acquiring domestic targets? This paper investigates reasons for the so called “cross-border effect” by examining the influence of target public status and competitiveness of the takeover market in the target country. Our findings show that the listing status of the target drives the cross-border effect in two opposite directions: acquirers of private targets fare worse in cross-border takeovers, while acquirers of public targets experience significantly higher gains in acquisitions of foreign targets. The positive cross-border benefit for acquirers of public targets is more pronounced if the target is from a country with a less competitive takeover market.     

Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A Study of Defaults in France,Germany, and the U.K.

Using a sample of small firms that defaulted on their bank debt in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, we find that large differences in creditors' rights across countries lead banks to adjust their lending and reorganization practices to mitigate costly aspects of bankruptcy law. In particular, French banks respond to a creditor‐unfriendly code by requiring more collateral than lenders elsewhere, and by relying on collateral forms that minimize the statutory dilution of their claims in bankruptcy. Despite such adjustments, bank recovery rates in default remain sharply different across the three countries, reflecting very different levels of creditor protection.     

Will the U.S. bank recapitalization succeed? Eight lessons from Japan

During the financial crisis that started in 2007, the U.S. government has used a variety of tools to try to rehabilitate the U.S. banking industry. Many of those strategies were also used in Japan to combat its banking problems in the 1990s. There are also a surprising number of other similarities between the current U.S. crisis and the recent Japanese crisis. The Japanese policies were only partially successful in recapitalizing the banks until the economy finally started to recover in 2003. From these unsuccessful attempts, we derive eight lessons. In light of these eight lessons, we assess the policies the U.S. has pursued. The U.S. has ignored three of the lessons and it is too early to evaluate the U.S. policies with respect to four of the others. So far, the U.S. has avoided Japan's problem of having impaired banks prop up zombie firms.     

Does risk management matter? Evidence from the U.S. agricultural industry

This article constructs triple-difference tests around shifts in the supply of risk management instruments available to agricultural producers to reveal a positive relation between risk management and productivity. This relation is more robust when producers adopt instruments with payoffs linked to group performance and weaker when payoffs are linked to individual performance. Additionally, productivity is particularly high among risk-managing producers in counties containing high levels of bank deposits, a proxy for access to finance. Overall, this article illuminates the relation between hedging and real firm outcomes as well as the interaction between access to finance and firms' risk management choices.     

What Accounts for the Changes in U.S. Fiscal Policy Transmission?

Using vector autoregressions on U.S. time series for 1957–79 and 1983–2004, we find government spending shocks to have stronger effects on output, consumption, and wages in the earlier period. We try to account for this observation within a DSGE model featuring price rigidities and limited asset market participation. Specifically, we estimate the structural parameters of the model for both periods by matching impulse responses. Model‐based counterfactual experiments suggest that most of the changes in fiscal policy transmission are accounted for by increased asset market participation and the more active monetary policy of the Volcker–Greenspan period.     

Activity-based costing in the U.K.’s largest companies: a comparison of 1994 and 1999 survey results

This paper reviews the results of two U.K. surveys of activity-based costing (ABC) in the U.K.’s largest companies. These provide an opportunity to assess the changes that have occurred in the ABC adoption status of companies over a recent 5-year period. For the ABC users, some comparative information is provided on the nature of the ABC systems in use, their designers, the uses to which they have been put and the levels of success and importance that participants attribute to them. For the non-users, the reasons for their lack of commitment to ABC are explored.     

Public Pensions and U.S. Infrastructure Investment: The Perfect Partnership?

Public pension funds have been passive investors in U.S. infrastructure projects for years, serving primarily as limited partners in designated infrastructure funds. However, the continued maturation of U.S. public‐private partnerships, combined with pension funds' need for yield to match future liabilities, has prompted the funds to take a more active role in infrastructure investment. In recent years, many pension funds have built internal teams to make direct (as opposed to indirect and for the most part passive) investments in infrastructure projects. Governments in particular should pay close attention to the emergence of pension funds as direct infrastructure investors. With OECD pension assets totaling $10.6 trillion at the end of 2010, the world's pension funds offer governments a strong value proposition. Given the fixed nature of their pension liabilities, pension funds emphasize yield and long‐term appreciation, and are likely to accept rate of returns in the neighborhood of CPI + 5%. Infrastructure investments, which generate highly stable cashflow and enjoy high barriers to entry, are ideally suited to meet these criteria. Also of particular significance to governments, pension funds have two bottom lines. First is expected yield and returns; second is their desire to invest in projects that meet a mission of social responsibility. Pension investors prefer, when possible, to invest in projects that promote government objectives such as reduced congestion and clean air. Taking account of pension funds' double mission can help governments capture opportunities to develop infrastructure through meaningful partnerships with like‐minded investors.     

What drives cross-segment diversity in returns and risks? Evidence from Japanese and U.S. firms

The usefulness of segment reporting is grounded on the presumption of diversities of returns and risks across reported segments. We examine the effect of country-specific factors, reporting incentives, and choices on an ANOVA-based measure of cross-segment diversities (CSD) in risk and returns for a sample of Japanese and U.S. multi-segment firms. We find that, in contrast to our expectations, Japanese firms exhibit greater CSD than U.S. firms. Moreover, we find that in both countries CSD is driven especially by reporting incentives associated with profitability and foreign sales, but not by proprietary costs. Further, the manager's choice of the number of reported segments is an important factor affecting CSD.     

Did the U.S. Treasury’s capital purchase program (CPP) help bank lending and business activity?

The 2008 financial crisis led the U.S. Treasury to implement the capital purchase program (CPP) to revive commercial bank lending and hence stimulate business activity. Employing dynamic panel techniques and methodologies from the bank lending channel literature we find that after controlling for asset size, bank capital, and macroeconomic variables (real GDP growth rate and interest rate spreads), the impact of the CPP program is statistically significant only for money center banks. However, over our sample period from 2008Q3 to 2009Q4 we find a very modest impact on lending by only the largest banks. Overall, our results suggest that CPP’s business objective to boost loan growth and hence business activity during the crisis remained unfulfilled.     

Does intraday technical analysis in the U.S. equity market have value?

This paper investigates whether intraday technical analysis is profitable in the U.S. equity market. Surveys of market participants indicate that they place more emphasis on technical analysis (and less on fundamental analysis) the shorter the time horizon; however, the technical analysis literature to date has focused on long-term technical trading rules. We find, using two bootstrap methodologies, that none of the 7846 popular technical trading rules we test are profitable after data snooping bias is taken into account. There is no evidence that the market is inefficient over this time horizon.     

Obama＇s Remarks on the U.S.-China Relationship（abridged）

Today, we look out on the horizon of a new century. And as we launch this dialogue, it is important for us to reflect upon the questions that will shape the 21 s, century.
First, we can cooperate to advance our mutual interest in a lasting economic recovery. The current crisis has made it clear that the choices made within our borders reverberate across the global economy - and this is true not just of New York and Seattle, but Shanghai and Shenzhen as well. That is why we must remain committed to strong bilateral and multilateral coordination.