The Board of Directors and The Adoption of Quality Management Tools

Abstract

The article examines the role of the board of directors in Local Public Utilities (LPUs). It aims at verifying empirically if a correlation exists between specific characteristics of the board of directors and the adoption of innovative arrangements addressing emerging needs of users and citizens (i.e. quality). By means of applying multivariate statistical methods to a random sample of sixty Italian LPUs, this study finds the relational capital of the boards affecting the take up of quality-oriented actions by LPUs. These results support the resource-dependence theory, neglected by mainstream literature.     

Book Reviews

Abstract

The system for monitoring, regulating and reporting on the way in which UK government ministers make appointments to the boards of public bodies is a relatively neglected area of public management. A decade after the establishment of the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments (OCPA), little attention has been paid by academics to the functioning of this agent of accountability (a particularly British device), despite the importance of transparency and accountability for the new public management and modernization. This article seeks to examine the key issues surrounding the Commissioners for Public Appointments as agents of accountability, by examining the tensions in the relationship between OCPA and the executive, variations in the governance arrangements for the Commissioners across the devolved polity and the key findings and recommendations of a number of official reports, while locating these issues in the context of current debates about modernization and ‘representativeness’ in public bodies.     

Boards’ Response to Shareholders’ Dissatisfaction: The Case of Shareholders’ Say on Pay in the UK

Abstract

In 2002, the UK adopted a regulation allowing shareholders to cast non-binding (advisory) votes on their firm's Directors' Remuneration Report during annual general meetings (the ‘Say-on-Pay’ rule). This study evaluates a decade of this regulation and examines how it affected the behavior of shareholders and boards in a sample of Financial Times Stock Exchange 350 firms during the period 2002–2012. I find evidence that shareholder dissatisfaction increases with excess Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation. This relationship does not exist for the expected level of compensation, suggesting that shareholders take a sophisticated approach when casting their vote. Boards do not appear to respond to shareholder dissatisfaction systematically; however, they do respond selectively by reducing the excessiveness of CEO compensation when performance is poor. Boards also seem to respond swiftly to shareholder dissatisfaction. There is evidence that the probability of CEO turnover increases with shareholder dissatisfaction. Overall, the evidence suggests that ‘Say-on-Pay’ regulation addressed regulatory concerns about transparency, accountability, and performance linkage.     

The Association between Board Composition and Different Types of Voluntary Disclosure

Abstract

This study examines the association between board composition and voluntary disclosure in annual reports. In particular, it addresses the incentives within the agency theory framework for both inside and independent directors to disclosure additional information voluntarily. Further, it provides evidence on the relation between the overall total voluntary disclosure and the components of voluntary disclosure, such as forward looking, strategic, non-financial and historical financial disclosures and board composition. Our sample is based on 181 Australian companies. We have developed and hand-collected 67 items from annual reports to develop the total voluntary disclosure index and the sub-indices of voluntary disclosure. Using two-stage multivariate analyses, our results provide some important insights. First, we find that there is a positive association between board composition and the voluntary disclosure of information in annual reports. Second, we also find that independent boards provide more voluntary disclosure of forward looking information and strategic information. However, board structure has no bearing on the voluntary disclosure of non-financial and historical financial information. Our findings are enhanced by different empirical specifications and sensitivity tests.     

RECEIPT OF INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE OVER DECISIONS IN HOSPITALS BY THE BOARD, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND MEDICAL STAFF

This article examines relationships between receipt of internal administrative information in hospitals, influence over general management decisions, and the extent to which certain organizational characteristics predict the receipt of information by each of the three major groups in hospitals: the board, the CEO, and the medical staff. Using a US national sample of 287 non-profit community hospitals, CEOs were found to receive the greatest amount of information and had highest influence while medical staffs were lowest on both measures. of five major organizational characteristics, hospital size emerged as the single strongest predictor of receipt of information for both boards (beta =?0.28, p 0.001) and medical staffs (beta =?0.42, p 0.001). Overall, the five dependent variables explained 18 per cent of the variance in receipt of information by boards and 28 percent of the variance for medical staffs.     

Private demands for public capital: evidence from school bond referenda

This paper develops a framework for estimating demand for school infrastructure investment that is financed through local bond referenda. Our framework takes explicit account of the irregular and discrete nature of local capital investment and the objective functions of local school boards. Our empirical model consists of a three-equation system composed of a proposed spending equation, a vote equation, and a selection equation. Estimated income and price elasticities of demand for school infrastructure are similar to those found in studies of current school spending. We also find that school boards act like risk-averse, budget-maximizing agenda-setters.     

The Governance of Accounting Academia: Issues for a Debate

Abstract

Philosophy and sociology of science have devoted significant attention to processes which define what counts as valid scientific knowledge thus making the producers of such knowledge legitimate academics at the expense of those who do not conform to the cliché. In accounting, too, a vibrant debate has augmented our understanding of the conditions which make certain kinds of accounting knowledge more acceptable than others. The debate included, but was not limited to, issues such as, the institutional arrangements of accounting academic associations and doctoral training regimes and how these shape journals' editorial boards and the selection of published articles. This introduction aims to reopen that debate on the two realms of institutions and practices. In terms of institutional arrangements, we note relevant changes in the forces which contribute to define the quality and relevance of accounting knowledge. We discuss the institutional space towards which accounting departments and scholars are increasingly migrating, that is, business schools. These are often separated from universities and operate under pressures which are sometimes only marginally academic in nature. In terms of practices, we observe changes in academic training regimes which favour the proliferation of opportunistic behaviours. These changes call for a debate on the governance of accounting academia, if academia is to be a knowledge and ethical, and not simply rather a business enterprise.     

Board Effectiveness and CEO Pay: Board Information Processing Capacity,Monitoring Complexity,and CEO Pay‐for‐Performance Sensitivity

We have developed an information processing theory of board effectiveness to examine board‐chief executive officers (CEOs) pay relations. We theorize that CEO pay reflects the information processing context of boards. Boards have limited information processing capacity and therefore prefer to use outcome‐based CEO pay when they have difficulty in processing information for monitoring their CEOs. Using a longitudinal sample of Standard and Poor's (S&P's) large‐, medium‐, and small‐cap manufacturing firms in the United States from 1998 through 2005, we found support for our theory. Large boards and boards in less complex monitoring contexts tend to link CEO pay less tightly to firm performance by providing less stock‐based incentives, and the tendency of large boards to decrease outcome‐based CEO pay is even greater when boards are not busy or when boards are in less complex monitoring contexts. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The relationship between board characteristics and performance of bank holding companies: before and during the financial crisis

We examine the relationship between performance of the bank holding company and several board characteristics. We find that board size, CEO tenure and board tenure enhance bank performance. However, we find no evidence that board structure or CEO power influences bank performance. More importantly, we show that the effect of board characteristics during the crisis is quite different. During the crisis, board size has a negative effect on Tobin’s Q and the non-performing asset ratio, which supports Jensen’s (1993) argument that large boards are less likely to function effectively. Further, we report that the non-performing asset ratio decreases with board independence during the crisis.     

Extending design-optimality from an initial model to augmented models

We consider an initial linear model E(Y)=B a and an augmented model E(Y)=B a+C b. We show that, if a design is optimal for estimating K a in the initial model, then there exists a matrix L such that this design is also optimal for estimating K a+L b in the augmented model. Received: December 1998     

Multivariate L1 mean

The center of a univariate data set {x ₁,…,x _n} can be defined as the point μ that minimizes the norm of the vector of distances y′=(|x ₁−μ|,…,|x _n−μ|). As the median and the mean are the minimizers of respectively the L ₁- and the L ₂-norm of y, they are two alternatives to describe the center of a univariate data set. The center μ of a multivariate data set {x ₁,…,x _n} can also be defined as minimizer of the norm of a vector of distances. In multivariate situations however, there are several kinds of distances. In this note, we consider the vector of L ₁-distances y′₁=(∥x ₁- μ∥₁,…,∥x _n- μ∥₁) and the vector of L ₂-distances y′₂=(∥x ₁- μ∥₂,…,∥x _n-μ∥₂). We define the L ₁-median and the L ₁-mean as the minimizers of respectively the L ₁- and the L ₂-norm of y ₁; and then the L ₂-median and the L ₂-mean as the minimizers of respectively the L ₁- and the L ₂-norm of y ₂. In doing so, we obtain four alternatives to describe the center of a multivariate data set. While three of them have been already investigated in the statistical literature, the L ₁-mean appears to be a new concept. Received January 1999     

The retention of CEOs that make poor acquisitions

Does the failure to replace CEOs following a bad takeover represent a cost-effective strategy or a failure of boards of directors and the market? We study 104 white knight contests to examine why poorly performing firms retain their CEOs. We find the majority are poor performers before they enter the control contest (q?相似文献   

Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay‐for‐Firm‐Performance

Whether voluntary or mandatory in nature, most recent corporate governance codes of best practice assume that board structural independence, and the application by boards of outcome‐based incentive plans, are important boundary conditions for the enforcement of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay‐for‐firm‐performance; that is, for optimal contracting between owners and executive agents. We test this logic on a large Australian sample using a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach to dynamic panel data estimation. We find that Australian boards exhibiting best practice structural arrangements – those chaired by non‐executives and dominated by non‐executive directors at the full board and compensation committee levels – are no more adept at enforcing CEO pay‐for‐firm‐performance than are executive‐dominated boards. These findings suggest that policy makers' faith in incentive plans and the moderating influence of structural independence per se may be misplaced. Our findings also hold significant implications for corporate governance theory. Specifically, the findings lend further support to a contingency‐based understanding of board composition, reward choice and monitoring; an approach integrating the insights afforded by behavioural approaches to Agency Theory and by social‐cognitive and institutional understandings of director outlook, decision‐making and behaviour.     

Who Appoints Them,What Do They Do? Evidence on Outside Directors from Japan

Although reformers often claim Japanese firms appoint inefficiently few outside directors, the logic of market competition suggests otherwise. Given the competitive product, service, and capital markets in Japan, the firms that survive should disproportionately be firms that tend to appoint boards approaching their firm‐specifically optimal structure. The resulting debate thus suggests a test: do firms with more outsiders do better? If Japanese firms do maintain suboptimal numbers of outsiders, then those with more outsiders should outperform those with fewer; if market constraints instead drive them toward their firm‐specific optimum, then firm characteristics may determine board structure, but firm performance should show no observable relation to that structure. We explore the issue with data on the 1000 largest exchange‐listed Japanese firms from 1986 to 1994. We first ask which firms tend to appoint which outsiders to their boards. We find the appointments decidedly nonrandom. Firms appoint directors from the banking industry when they borrow heavily, when they have fewer mortgageable assets, or when they are themselves in the service and finance industry. They appoint retired government bureaucrats when they are in construction and sell a large fraction of their output to government agencies, and they appoint other retired business executives when they have a dominant parent corporation or when they are in the construction industry and sell heavily to the private sector. Coupling OLS regressions with two‐stage estimates on a subset of the data, we then ask whether the firms with more outside directors outperform those with fewer, and find that they do not. Instead, the regressions suggest—exactly as the logic of market competition predicts—that firms choose boards appropriate to them.     

Robustness issues in structural equation modeling: a review of recent developments

In structural equation modeling the statistician needs assumptions inorder (1) to guarantee that the estimates are consistent for the parameters of interest, and (2) to evaluate precision of the estimates and significance level of test statistics. With respect to purpose (1), the typical type of analyses (ML and WLS) are robust against violation of distributional assumptions; i.e., estimates remain consistent or any type of WLS analysis and distribution of z. (It should be noted, however, that (1) is sensitive to structural misspecification.) A typical assumption used for purpose (2), is the assumption that the vector z of observable follows a multivariate normal distribution.In relation to purpose (2), distributional misspecification may have consequences for efficiency, as well as power of test statistics (see Satorra, 1989a); that is, some estimation methods may bemore precise than others for a given specific distribution of z. For instance, ADF-WLS is asymptotically optimal under a variety of distributions of z, while the asymptotic optimality of NT-WLS may be lost when the data is non-normal     

Insider Trading, Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence Based on Hong Kong Firms

We document positive association between earnings management and insider selling after the fiscal year‐end for Hong Kong firms. This positive association is especially evident before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Our findings suggest that Hong Kong executives manage reported earnings to maximize their private benefits from insider selling. Additionally, we find that a higher proportion of independent directors (INED) on corporate boards moderate the positive association between insider selling and earnings management. Stricter monitoring of earnings management by INED is especially evident when no member of the family with majority ownership is present on corporate boards as a director. This suggests that the presence of family members with majority ownership on corporate boards significantly reduces INED's monitoring effectiveness. Our findings suggest that strict regulations are needed to control insider trading, and independence of corporate boards is important for monitoring of earnings management associated with insider trading. Furthermore, appointment of family members with majority shareholdings should be avoided to enhance independence and to monitor effectiveness of corporate boards.     

Immobiliencontrolling — Optimierung der immobilienbezogenen Kosten durch Gründung einer Generalmietgesellschaft

Ohne Zusammenfassung Dipl.-Ing. (univ.) Michael Belau ist Director und Head of Rental Management Dipl.-Wirtschaftsing. (FH) Michael Schildger ist Vice President und Head of Finance Dr. Verena Sturm ist Manager Corporate Real Estate Services     

A THEORY OF GOVERNING THE PUBLIC'S BUSINESS: Redesigning the jobs of boards,councils, and commissions

The job of the board of directors is the least developed element in enterprise, whether public, business, or nonprofit. Incorporating insights from Mill, Hume, and the social contract philosophy of Rousseau, as well as the servant-leadership concept of Greenleaf, the author's Policy Governance® model constitutes a theory of governance applicable to any governing body. The model enables public boards to govern by making public values explicit, crafting the expression of those values for practical managerial effect. The new governance model compels radical change in the way boards conduct their business. One effect is more authoritative boards and more empowered management simultaneously; another is greater integrity in the relationship between the public and its boards.     

Customers satisfaction in pediatric inpatient services: A multiple criteria satisfaction analysis

ObjectiveTo assess customer satisfaction determinants in a public pediatric inpatient service and propose some strategies to enhance the consumer and customer experience.MethodsWe applied a Multiple Criteria Customer Satisfaction Analysis to estimate the value functions associated with each satisfaction (sub)criterion and determine the corresponding weights. We characterized satisfaction criteria (according to the Kano's model), estimated the customers' demanding nature and the potential improvements, and proposed strategic priorities and opportunities to enhance customer satisfaction.Main findingsStrategies for satisfaction enhancement do not depend solely on the criteria with the lowest satisfaction levels and the estimated weights, each criterion's nature, the customers' demanding nature, and the technical margin for improvements.ConclusionsAreas deserving attention include clinical staff's communication skills, the non-clinical professionals' efficiency, availability, and kindness; food quality; visits' scheduling and quantity; and facilities' comfort.     

Application of optimal control in man power planning

Many techniques are met in the literature (see for instance Bartholomew and Forbes (Statistical Techniques for Manpower Planning. wiley, New York 1979); Gunz (Organiz. Stud. 9(4), 529–554, 1988); Becker and Huselid (Human Resour. Manage. 38, 287–301, 1999); Wagner et al. (J. Manage. Med. 14(5/6), 383–405, 2000); Harris and Ogbonna (J. Business Res. 51, 157–166, 2001); Rogg et al. (J. Manage. 27, 431–449, 2001), among others), for planning the manpower resources. However, we haven’t seen in the literature an empirical study regarding the proper application of optimal control, which considered to be the most efficient method for multi-objective programming. With this in mind, we analyse in this paper the way of applying optimal control for manpower planning. For this purpose, and in order to facilitate the presentation, we first adopted a comparatively simple dynamic system (plant), with analytical presentation of stocks and flows. Next we proceed to the formulation of an optimal control problem, aiming to achieve in the most satisfactory way some preassigned targets. These targets mainly refer to a desirable trajectory of the plant stocks over time, in order to fully satisfy the needs for human resources over the planning horizon. Finally we present a method of solution of the formulated control problem which is based on the use of the generalized inverse Lazaridis (Qual. Quan. 120, 297–306, 1986). We believe that it is very important for successful management, that the policy makers have to know the effect of their polices and to determine the optimal path of the state variables (i.e. the ones describing the system) before the realization of the plan, so as to be able to reform their strategies, reallocate the resources and arrange the infrastructure accordingly, if all these are necessary, as it can be depicted from the optimal control solution.