The localisation of a global management control system

This study examines how the management control system designed at the head office of an increasingly globalised hotel chain was enacted within one of its sub-units; a joint venture operating in the hospitality industry in Portugal. We found that the practices which comprised the global management control system were reproduced within this joint venture. Yet, at the same time, its managers made the global system ‘work’ for them, thereby producing variety. Albeit our findings are in line with Barrett, Cooper, and Jamal’s (2005) study, which was inspired by [Giddens, 1990] and [Giddens, 1991], we interpret them somewhat differently as we draw on the work of [Robertson, 1992] and [Robertson, 1995]. We view localisation as a process through which heterogeneous practices can emerge to facilitate the homogenising tendencies of globalisation by complementing, rather than undermining or opposing, it. As a result, the local can differentiate itself from the global. Also, by linking our findings to the notion of situated functionality in Ahrens and Chapman (2007), we argue that this heterogeneity can be produced when organisational members, whatever their level in the organisation, seek to achieve both the corporate and their own specific objectives.     

How past becomes prologue: a sensemaking interpretation of the hindsight-foresight relationship given the circumstances of crisis

Foresight is rooted in deep understanding [A.N. Whitehead. Lecture notes from address to the Harvard Business School, 1931]. Such understanding requires that we shall have first looked back to the past before venturing forward into the future. This paper uses Weick’s and colleagues’ sense making perspective in order to explore this critical relationship between the past and the future [[2], [3], [4], [5], [6] and [7]]. In particular, key sense making properties will be applied to a crisis, an occurrence of school-place violence that occurred in the United States in 1999. We shall then ask how this organization and its diverse external stakeholders used their understanding of this event to learn how to prevent such crises from occurring in the future. In other words, how capably was hindsight constructed and then how was it used to strengthen foresight into the future? This paper will conduct a theory-based empirical examination of a crisis event and its aftermath to understand how hindsight can be sharpened and then used to improve organizational foresight.     

The happy story of small business financing

We examine two data sets, one from the UK (n = 15,750) and one from the US (n = 3239), to show that SME financial behaviour demonstrates substantial financial contentment, or ‘happiness’. We find fewer than 10% of the UK firms seek significant growth and only 1.32% of US firms list a shortage of capital other than working capital as a problem. Financial performance indicators (growth, return on assets, profit margin) were not found to be determinants of SME financing activities, as might be expected in a ‘rational’ risk–return environment. Younger and less educated SME owners more actively use external financing – even though more education reduces the fear of loan denial – while older and more educated (‘wiser’) SME owners are found to be being less likely to seek or use external financing. The contentment hypothesis for SME financing also extends to high-growth firms in that we show that they participate more in the loan markets than low-growth firms. By way of contrast to the finance gap hypothesis, the contentment hypothesis observes the importance of social networks (connections) [for finance] and confirms the ‘connections – happiness’ linkage in the literature on happiness while doubting the theoretical suitability of Jensen and Meckling [Jensen, M., Meckling, W., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305–360.] base-case analysis for SMEs.     

The challenge of the future and the institutionalization of interdisciplinarity: notes on Herman Kahn’s legacy

This article is an attempt to explore Herman Kahn’s foundational contribution to the development of what he called “broad studies”, a combination of futures research and public policy analysis. In Kahn’s view, decision making and policy processes pose two crucial problems that the scholarly research is rarely forced to face: (1) the need to have and operate with a broad, multifaceted vision of phenomena and (2) the issue of coping imaginatively and realistically with future circumstances and conditions that can only vaguely be distinguished in the present. Implied in these two is the need to develop new methods and approaches fitted to the charges imposed by them. The paper discusses Kahn’s work as an integrated solution to these problems: The definition and advocacy of broad and future-oriented studies, his concept on how these studies should be institutionalized in interdisciplinary organizational systems, and the crucial position scenarios and propaedeutic and heuristic methodologies have in this context. A special attention is given to two methodological approaches he developed to cope with these challenges: Scenario Building and the Method of Classes of Variables.When twenty years ago, on July 7, 1983, Herman Kahn died suddenly at age 61, both friends and intellectual adversaries recognized that “the world lost one of its most creative and best minds” [1] and [2]. By that time Herman Kahn was one of the preeminent and best known Futures Studies scholars, a founding father of the field, with extensive and vital contributions in Strategic Studies, an area where he was also considered a founding figure and a leader [3] and [4]. His work was followed all over the world and the directions he traced in the public debate on very sensitive issues of crucial public concern have continued to be unaltered today, twenty years after his unexpected and premature death. Yet in spite of the incessant influence of his arguments and ideas, today his intellectual legacy is still to be accounted for and the breath and depth of his contributions are still to be reviewed and analyzed in a systematic way. This paper is an attempt to explore only one dimensions of this legacy: Kahn’s foundational contribution to the development of what he liked to call “broad studies”, a combination of futures research and public policy analysis.The two decades that have passed since his death allow us today to approach his work undisturbed by the “sound and fury” of the many public debates and controversies he participated in and to focus on some of the deepest and most enduring dimensions of his intellectual contributions. However while doing that, we should keep in mind that for Kahn the public policy process shaping the future and the public debate associated to it were always the focal points and the ultimate ends of his efforts. Indeed, probably the best approach to Kahn’s work is to see it in the light of his continuous concern for the practical relevance of the social research. For him the research process was always action-oriented and its ultimate test was its relevance for policy and social action. As a result, the most promising starting point for any overview of Kahn’s thought and work should be a set of crucial conclusions he reached about the policy making process and decision makers early in his career.     

Futurist networks: cases of epistemic community?

This article analyses the concept of epistemic community focusing the attention on two aspects, which contribute to define this ‘actor’: knowledge and capacity of acting under the conditions of uncertainty. The link between these two issues and the ‘nature of future studies’ is considered and the possibility of considering some organisations and institutions as future epistemic communities is explored. The case of the World Futures Studies Federation is examined in detail.In 1992, Peter Haas defined an ‘epistemic community’ as follows: “an epistemic community is a network of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; shared notions of validity—that is, inter-subjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and a common policy enterprise—that is a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence” [1].In ancient Greek, the term ‘episteme’ has a meaning which belongs to the philosophical sphere; ‘community’ is a concept which comes from the religious tradition and, more recently, has been the objective of sociological studies. Epistemic community links the two terms to indicate a ‘new’ and in some aspects, atypical political actor. At etymological level we already have a first sort of indication with respect to what is meant: politics as a synthesis of religion (faith), sociology (the decisions taken by policy makers have consequences on the whole society) and philosophy (intended as Weltanschaung). The German term Weltanschaung means the idea, concept or the ‘vision’ of the world and life. It is the way in which an individual or a social group considers the position of the human being in the world and the attitudes and actions they develop on the basis of a particular vision of the cosmos.In addition to this formal definition, Haas identifies other characteristics: “members of an epistemic community share inter-subjective understandings; have a shared way of knowing; have shared patterns of reasoning; have a policy project drawing on shared causal beliefs, and the use of shared discursive practices and have a shared commitment to the application and production of knowledge” [1].This definition could be analysed in several ways with particular attention to one or more of the indicated criteria. We could assume that the expression ‘possible policy actions and desired outcomes’ is to be understood as the ‘long term implications, expected, possible, probable and desired’ of a decision taken or that which will be taken, and this would already represent a linkage between the policy, the futures studies and an epistemic community; moreover, usually ‘the policy choices concern consequences, which can only be partially anticipated’ [2]. This gives rise ‘to the desire for information, which is not so much based on purely technical knowledge but rather information, which is the product of human interpretation’ [1]. Epistemic communities, national or trans-national, are one possible provider of such information.At this stage, and considering only this aspect of the whole definition, we could argue that a network of experts active in the field of future studies would represent the perfect portrait of what we are looking for: a multi-person actor able to ‘anticipate’, using knowledge, various backgrounds and expertise. To anticipate, in this context, might be specified as to understand or comprehend global and local changes. In general, futurists work within the framework of complexity and uncertainty, try to re-define problems in broader context and attempt to comprehend ‘change’ using knowledge.An example could be helpful: the change we are experiencing in Eastern European countries appears as multi-dimensional: in less than 15 years those countries have moved from a

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socialist economy (closed and planned), to a

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‘Western economy’ (the so-called market economy), to a

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technological one as a consequence of globalisation and, lastly,

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to the learning economy.

The first step (socialist economy), recalls other sectors in which the ‘ideas’ were closed and planned. The society was divided into classes and the dominant concept was ‘war’. In this context, every single action was intended as a possibility to demonstrate the points of strength of a system: sports, culture and economy were part of the battle and the vision of the future was mostly influenced by the possibility to destroy or to be destroyed. Examples of these considerations could be seen in the choice made by the USA government in its participation at Olympic Games in Moscow (1980), the USSR’s answer in 1984 (Los Angeles Olympic Games) and the proliferation of nuclear holocaust movies such as The Day After. These ideas were strongly present amongst the people of the Eastern countries, but after 1989, things changed and ‘gradually’ the new paradigms based on ‘Western values’ and, for a few, Western lifestyles, emerged. Probably these changes caused shocks in the local societies, shocks that have had consequences also in the way these societies now see their futures. The third step, the shift to a technological economy, has been faster and wider, thanks largely to the new communication technologies and the Internet. In understanding and developing alternative futures for Eastern Europe, futurists have to take account of the fact that all the three economies exist side by side—Eastern Europe does not represent one or the other economies, it is a complex mix of all the three economies. This complexity is further augmented by the fact that Eastern European societies have not had enough time to understand their present in order to be able to desire possible, alternative futures. Further, economic competitiveness is now based more and more on the capacity to develop and apply knowledge [3]. Thus, futures of Eastern Europe are a function of its capacity to develop relevant new forms of knowledge. Futurists cannot afford to ignore this connection between the knowledge and alternative futures.Thus, the concept of epistemic community and the theory of ‘knowledge economy’ have a great deal in common. If we consider that the so-called ‘decision-makers’ are (in democratic countries) elected by the people, we can argue that that section of the people able to disseminate consciousness of problems, possible solutions and long term implications, posses a form of power. Without engaging with this power, we cannot shape viable and meaningful futures.Are there any trans-national networks of expert where it is possible to identify these characteristics of an ‘embryonic’ epistemic community? In some respect this could be the case of the World Futures Studies Federation (WFSF), or of the Washington-based World Future Society (WFS) or, at regional level, of the Namur-based euroProspective or the Finland Futures Research Centre, where we have structured networks of the experts coming with different experiences, from different backgrounds, a common interest (to analyse the society from different perspective, but all future oriented), a shared task (to disseminate the use of futures studies not only as a tool but also as a way of thinking) and diversity in knowledge, which is what keeps them together. Moreover, for most of the members, the idea of knowledge economy is already their reality and the capacity to understand trends, possible (or even better) probable futures is the aim of their professional activities.If we briefly consider those organisations, we could assume that they already posses some aspects related to the concept of epistemic community: the WFS for example “strives to serve as a neutral clearinghouse for ideas about the future, membership is open and the Society includes 30,000 people in more than 80 countries from Argentina to Zimbabwe. Members come from all walks of life, they include sociologists, scientists, and educators” [4]. If the WFS’s main strength is in trans-national partnership and different backgrounds of its members, the regional experience that euroProspective is carrying out is mostly based on the construction of a European network of experts. The inter-exchange of ideas and a common ‘mission’ are the two elements, which could let us consider this organisation as futures epistemic communities. Another example, at national/regional level, is the one provided by the Finland Futures Research Centre; the link with epistemic community is offered by the activity and the nature of some projects of this institution such as ‘sustainable energy development in developing countries’, ‘Russian energy and global climate’, ‘collisions of nature and culture in transport policy’, ‘professional delphiscan, an expert system’ [5]—all of these projects or tools (delphiscan is a software) are aimed at producing a relationship between political power and future and knowledge power.There are several reasons why we cannot consider the WFSF by itself as an epistemic community. Perhaps the most important is that it does not have a direct link with the political power; neither does the Federation seek any kind of influence on public authorities or on the decision-making process. But in as much as the Federation is concerned with managing change, it could be considered as an actor able to help people and the institutions understand the on-going processes of change. In the coming years, it will probably be forced to become an epistemic community as it will be necessary to ‘represent and clarify the relation between knowledge management, ICT usage and experts in futures studies as mediators between the complexity of political decision and the tendency of institutions to became advanced learning organisation’ [6] and [7].We also need to study the role the futures studies can play in clarifying those ‘shadow zones’ between the political power and the complexity of the decision-making processes. In this respect, it has to be underlined that the demand for the expert advice is a common phenomenon in policy-making processes, at local, national and international level. All this processes have a concrete objective, which would offer the possibility to exploit the added value of a ‘federation intended as a sort of epistemic community’: the credibility of the futures studies and, consequentially, the credibility of the experts active in this field, depends on this. The debate and the progress of these considerations should be developed in a multi-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary way with respect to several subjects and research areas, but this is only a logical consequence of the ‘nature and the different backgrounds’ already represented in the Federation.A theme (which emerged during the conference held in Brasov), which allows us to identify a relationship between an epistemic community and the social needs is globalisation. While globalisation is difficult to pin down, it is quite evident that we are living through a phase of transition. But as futurists and a potential epistemic community, our goal ought to be to develop an understanding of, and perspectives on, post-globalisation societies. This suggests that we need to identify the relationships between an epistemic community, the futures studies and the organisations active in this field such as WFSF and euroProspective.The analytical tools offered by the concept of epistemic community seem appropriate under the current prevailing conditions of uncertainty and ignorance. Understanding uncertainty and bringing multi-faceted expertise and knowledge to analyse difficult problems and propose future solutions are the two fundamental characteristics of futurists. The constitution of a network of experts coming from different backgrounds is already a reality inside the Federation but, at the moment, there is no linkage with the traditional and democratic forms of power. To become an active epistemic community, the WFSF has to realise its potential and develop these much needed linkages.     

Management control in the transfer pricing tax compliant multinational enterprise

This paper studies the impact of transfer pricing tax compliance on management control system (MCS) design and use within one multinational enterprise (MNE) which employed the same transfer prices for tax compliance and internal management purposes. Our analysis shows immediate effects of tax compliance on the design of organising controls with subsequent effects on planning, evaluating and rewarding controls which reveal a more coercive use of the MCS overall. We argue that modifications to the MCS cannot be understood without an appreciation of the MNEs’ fiscal transfer pricing compliance process.     

Regulate one service,tame the entire market: Credit cards in Turkey

In credit card markets banks provide both payment and credit services. Two regulations were recently enacted in the Turkish credit card market: one on payment services in 2005 and the other on credit services in 2006. By employing the well-known  and  method and a unique quarterly data set for 21 Turkish banks between 2002 and 2008, we investigate the extent of banks’ market power in the Turkish credit card market before and after the regulations. Unlike most of the existing literature, which considers competition and regulation for either credit or payment services and ignores the externalities between them, we consider the entire market by taking both services into account. Fixed effects estimations reveal that banks enjoyed collusive oligopoly power before the regulations. Although the first regulation did not have much impact, the second led to rises in both banks’ total revenues and competition in the entire market.     

An improved estimation method and empirical properties of the probability of informed trading

We report evidence that boundary solutions can cause a bias in the estimate of the probability of informed trading (PIN). We develop an algorithm to overcome this bias and use it to estimate PIN for nearly 80,000 stock-quarters between 1993 and 2004. We obtain two sets of PIN estimates by using the factorized likelihood functions in both [Easley et al., 2010] and [Lin and Ke, 2011], respectively. We find that the estimate based on the EHO factorization is systematically smaller than the estimate based on the LK factorization, meaning that there is a downward bias associated with the EHO factorization. In addition, we find that boundary solutions appear with a very high frequency when the LK factorization is used. Thus it is necessary to use the LK factorization together with the algorithm in this paper. At last, we document several interesting empirical properties of PIN.     

Equity market integration in the Asia Pacific region: Evidence from discount factors

The paper investigates stock market integration among 10 economies in the Asia Pacific region over the period April to May 2006 based on a recently developed technique that relies on estimating expected discount rates; see [Flood and Rose, 2005a] and [Flood and Rose, 2005b]. The results show a limited but varying degree of stock market integration among the 10 economies. Membership in a formal economic organization does not seem to affect the degree of integration.     

美日跨国公司在华投资企业治理机制的特征及借鉴

跨国公司治理机制的形成是建立在母公司治理机制不断完善的基础之上的,其有效性包括了各子公司在内的整个企业集团治理机制的效率。跨国公司治理机制的实质就是母子公司治理机制及二者之间的内在联系。中国跨国公司的竞争力与发达国家的跨国公司相比存在很大差距,其根本原因就是公司治理水平的差异。通过对美国、日本跨国公司在华投资企业治理机制的比较,可以看出文化要素对跨国公司治理机制的独特作用,这对中国跨国公司完善治理机制具有重要借鉴意义。     

Apple's financial success: The precariousness of power exercised in global value chains

The topic of this paper is the Apple Inc business model and how, in a financialized world, the success of this business model is represented by what we term financial ‘point values’. Our argument is that there is a tendency to promote specific point valuation multiples as measures of success, but these values, by their nature, do not reveal the contingent and variable nature of the power relations exercised in and along global supply chains. Firms such as Apple exploit their resources and capabilities to ‘create value’ but also exercise power to recalibrate relationships with suppliers in the value chain to secure ‘value capture’ for financial transformation. Value capture is an active ingredient that can help inform our understanding of the fragility of the Apple business model value proposition and frame a critical argument regarding the precarious nature and sustainability of Apple's substantial profit margins.     

Tax strategy control: The case of transfer pricing tax risk management

This paper examines how a functional tax strategy impacts the management control system (MCS) in a multinational enterprise (MNE) facing transfer pricing tax risks. Based on case study findings it is argued that the MCS in a multinational setting is contingent upon the MNE's response to its tax environment. Moreover, the paper extends existing contingency-based theory on MCS by illustrating the role of inter-organisational network collaboration across MNE transfer pricing tax experts. This collaboration, caused by a widely dispersed tax knowledge base, fuels the formal interactive control system and reduces tax uncertainty. The paper adopts an interdisciplinary approach for explaining findings, using contingency-based theory and network theory at the inter-organisational level.     

When are path-dependent payoffs suboptimal?

Generalizing a result by  and , this note shows that risk-averse investors with fixed planning horizon prefer path-independent payoffs in any financial market if the pricing kernel is a function of the underlying’s price at the end of the planning horizon. Generally, for every payoff which is not a function of the pricing kernel, there is a more attractive alternative that depends solely on the pricing kernel at the end of the planning horizon.     

Causes and consequences of the lack of strategic foresight in the decisions of multinational enterprises to enter China

Strategic foresight, in the sense of ‘understanding the future’ [R.A. Slaughter. Futures studies as an intellectual and applied discipline. American Behavioral Scientist 42(3) (1998) 372-385; A.N. Whitehead. Modes of Thought. Free Press, New York, 1966], can play a significant role in the long term success, or failure, of business corporations. However, in understanding the development and management of strategic foresight within business enterprises, instances where lack of foresight was exhibited, can be equally instructive, especially when these business organizations are some of the world’s largest multinational corporations and they are faced with a situation they had met before: new market entry.By drawing on 42 in depth interviews, conducted by one of the authors with executives from Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) currently operating in China, this paper identifies the causes and consequences in the lack of foresight exhibited by many MNEs in their China-market entry strategies. In this way the foresight failure is distilled into two factors: Failure of understanding, and Failure of anticipation.     

Foreign exchange market efficiency under recent crises: Asia-Pacific focus

The Asia-Pacific region’s currency markets are generally efficient within-country when tested using the 30 and 31 cointegration technique whereas market efficiency fails to hold when tested using Fama’s (1984) conventional regression. Using the Pilbeam and Olmo (2011) model, we reconcile these conflicting findings. The Pilbeam and Olmo (2011) model confirms within-country market efficiency. It further confirms that free-float currency markets are more resilient than managed-float currency markets among 12 Asia-Pacific economies. From the across-country perspective, the foreign exchange markets are mostly efficient and the results show that the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis was a more disturbing event than the 2008–2009 global financial crisis in the region.     

The informativeness of analyst forecast revisions and the valuation of R&D-intensive firms

Prior studies (e.g., [McNichols and O’Brien, 1997] and [Diether et al., 2002]) find that analysts are less willing to disclose unfavorable earnings forecasts than to disclose favorable forecasts, and this tendency induces an optimistic bias in disclosed forecasts that increases with the degree of earnings uncertainty. Building on these findings, we predict that, in the context of R&D-intensive industries, there should be differential informativeness and asymmetric valuation roles for upward versus downward analyst forecast revisions. Consistent with our predictions, we find the following evidence: (i) analyst forecast revisions contain a downward bias, causing upward revisions to under-represent, whereas downward revisions to over-represent, changes in true earnings expectations, with the extent of over/under-representation greater for firms with higher R&D expenditures; (ii) upward revisions are associated with more rapid reductions in earnings uncertainties (proxied by forecast dispersions) than downward revisions, mainly for high R&D firms; and (iii) upward revisions are more effective in mitigating the return differentials between high and low R&D firms (as documented in Chan et al., 2001).     

Sufficient conditions for expected utility to imply drawdown-based performance rankings

The least restrictive sufficient condition for expected utility to imply Sharpe ratio rankings is the location and scale (LS) property (see [Sinn, 1983] and [Meyer, 1987]). The normal, the extreme value, and many other distributions commonly used in finance satisfy this property. We argue that the LS property is also sufficient for expected utility to imply drawdown-based performance measure rankings, because for investment funds satisfying the LS condition, the Sharpe ratio and drawdown-based performance measures result in identical rankings. Hence, the same conditions that provide an expected utility foundation for the Sharpe ratio also provide a foundation for drawdown-based performance measures. We conclude that from a decision-theoretic perspective, drawdown-based performance measures are as good as the Sharpe ratio.     

Triangulation of audit evidence in fraud risk assessments

Drawing on the triangulation framework of audit evidence ( and ), we experimentally test for the conditions, if any, under which financial-statement auditors alter their fraud-risk assessments based on whether external evidence provides positive or negative news about underlying business performance. We focus on the condition in which two kinds of management-controlled audit evidence – evidence from the financial statements and evidence from internal data depicting performance of a key business process – is contradicted by external evidence suggesting that a key business objective has not been attained. According to the triangulation framework, such contradictory external evidence should heighten auditors’ skepticism about the veracity of management-controlled evidence and increase their assessment of fraud risk.     

Are current syndicated loan alliances related to past alliances?

The odds of a current syndicate relationship between two lenders depend upon their previous alliances. The odds are significantly higher [lower] and strongest for a current lead–participant relationship with a continuation [reversal] of their previous roles. To illustrate, the odds are nearly four times higher when two lenders have allied in the previous 5 years. The strength of lead–participant syndicate relationships between two lenders with same-ordered roles is most sensitive to the lead bank’s reputation and informationally opaque participants tend to have stronger relationships with lead banks. Lenders exhibit home bias in their syndicate alliances since ongoing relationships are stronger with domestic counterparts.     

The effect of outcome and process accountability on customer–supplier negotiations

Prior studies on customer–supplier negotiations ( and ) find that negotiators who have access to relevant activity-based cost information are not always able to use this information to improve joint outcomes. Our study extends this literature by examining how the type of accountability (process and outcome accountability) influences the extent to which negotiators can obtain lower joint costs. We hypothesize and test a model that predicts that the type of accountability affects negotiated outcomes through its effect on negotiators’ fixed-pie bias revisions and the negotiation tactics they employ during customer-supplier negotiations. Results from an experiment show that negotiators held accountable for their negotiation processes are better able to reduce their fixed-pie biases and achieve lower joint costs compared to those who are held accountable for their negotiation outcomes. Using rich data based on taped negotiations, we demonstrate that the effect of accountability on joint costs is indirect through its effect on negotiators’ choice of negotiation tactics and the extent to which negotiators can reduce their fixed-pie biases.