Debt Policy Rules in an Open Economy

In a small open economy model of endogenous growth with public capital accumulation, we examine the effects of a debt policy rule under which the government must reduce its debt–GDP ratio if it exceeds the criterion level. To sustain public debt at a finite level, the government should adjust public spending rather than the income tax rate. The long‐run debt–GDP ratio should be kept sufficiently low to avoid equilibrium indeterminacy. Under sustainability and determinacy, a tighter (looser) debt rule brings welfare gains when the world interest rate is relatively high (low).     

International capital flows,liquidity risk,and monetary policy

In recent years, there has been a large amount of lending coming from the public sector of many developing countries. At the same time, the financial sectors in many advanced countries have issued a large share of portfolio debt to other countries. What are the implications of these events for the global financial system and overall economic activity? Do they have an impact on the transmission channels of monetary policy across countries at different stages of economic development? We investigate these important issues using a micro-founded model of money and banking so that the effects of monetary policy across countries can be meaningfully studied. Notably, the increase in capital outflows to the advanced economy renders monetary policy in developing countries to be less effective, while the effects of monetary policy in advanced economies are more pronounced. Yet, our results indicate that it can indeed be optimal for lower income countries to lend to the advanced world. Importantly, we find that the optimal amount of lending to advanced countries critically depends on the degree of liquidity risk — if it is sufficiently high, then public sector lending to advanced economies is not warranted. Consequently, our results indicate that governments in developing countries should carefully consider how much capital they send abroad to foreign countries.     

Equity Control of Multinational Firms: Effects on Resource Allocation and National Welfare

In this paper, we re-examine the effects of equity control of multinational firms on resource allocation and national welfare in a model with rural–urban migration and urban unemployment. A large number of recipient (host) countries are developing countries with dual economies. We indicate, among other things, that a restriction on multinational investment may lower the unemployment rate and increase the total employment in the host country. Furthermore, we find that the restriction on multinational investment raises the national welfare in the host economy if the tariff imposed on imports is sufficiently large and the difference between domestic and foreign capital rental is sufficiently small.     

The brain drain and the world distribution of income

Skilled emigration (or brain drain) from developing to developed countries is becoming the dominant pattern of international migration today. Such migration is likely to affect the world distribution of income both directly, through the mobility of people, and indirectly, as the prospect of migration affects the rate of return to education in both the sending and receiving economies. This migration pattern will therefore affect human capital accumulation and fertility decisions in both the sending and receiving economies. This paper analyzes these effects in a dynamic two country model of the world economy where agents in both countries make optimal fertility and human capital decisions. The implications of the analysis for the world distribution of income are derived in the light of recent empirical findings of the brain drain literature. The analysis shows that the current trend towards predominantly skilled emigration from poor to rich countries may in the long run increase inequality in the world distribution of income as relatively poor countries grow large in terms of population. In the short run however, it is possible for world inequality to fall due to rises in GDP per capita in large developing economies with sufficiently low skilled emigration rates.     

Government expenditure,external and domestic public debt,and economic growth

This paper analyzes the relationship between government expenditure, tax on returns to assets, public debt, and growth in an endogenous growth model. Public debt is composed of two components, domestic debt and external debt. We show conditions for existence, uniqueness, and multiplicity of the steady states. More precisely, existence of steady state requires a sufficiently high productivity and a sufficiently low tax on returns to assets. We also provide the effects of an increase in the tax rate on returns to assets on the steady state. In particular, the relation between public spending and the tax rate has a bell shape. Domestic debt unambiguously increases with tax whereas external debt displays an inverted U‐shaped curve. A high tax rate leads to a reallocation of public debt in favor of domestic debt (to the detriment of external debt). The effect of taxation on consumption (and production) also displays a nonlinear pattern when the output elasticity of capital is lower than unity (the effect is monotonously increasing if this elasticity is unity). We also derive the conditions under which a tax increase can boost or reduce the balanced growth rate.     

Public Debt,Terms of Trade and Welfare: The Role of Capital Production Shares,External Balances,and Dynamic (In)efficiency

In view of still large external imbalances across the world economy and dramatically risen public debts in major advanced economies, this paper reconsiders the relationship between public debt, the terms of trade and welfare in a two-good, two-country overlapping generations model with technological differences across countries. We find that the terms of trade effect of a public debt shock depends only on international differences in capital production shares and the dynamic (in)efficiency of the world economy. As in a model with similar capital production shares, domestic welfare rises and foreign welfare decreases when Home has a positive external balance and the Golden Rule holds. Under dynamic efficiency, welfare decreases in the debt-expanding, net foreign creditor country if she has a relatively smaller capital production share, and if the welfare effect through the accumulation channel is negative. In contrast, under dynamic inefficiency she can increase her welfare by debt expansion.     

Sustainable government debt in a two-good,two-country overlapping generations model

The recent dramatic rise of government deficits in most advanced countries to counter the effects of the global financial crisis arouses renewed interest for one of the perennial topics of fiscal policy: the sustainability of government debt. This paper explores maximum sustainabile debt in a two-good, two-country overlapping generations (OLG) model and analyzes existence and dynamic stability of steady states as well as the transitional dynamics of private capital when government debt remains below the maximum sustainable level. We find that maximum government debt levels for both countries exist and are negatively related. Moreover, if sustainable government debt is unilaterally expanded, private capital is crowded out in both countries while the terms of trade of the debt-expanding country are unaffected if capital income shares are internationally equal.     

Saving,fertility and public policy in an overlapping generations small open economy

Motivated by the recent increase of public debt experienced by many developed countries, we develop an OLG model to provide the fiscal policies needed for any public debt level to be sustainable in steady state and the consequences that such policies produce on saving and fertility in a small open economy. Our main finding is that a reduction of public debt (an event currently publicly debated) needs tax adjustments that eventually will be detrimental for both fertility and saving under a low-interest-rate regime (possibly similar to the current world regime), with opposite transitional effects on fertility and saving. On the contrary, the needed fiscal adjustments will eventually increase saving and fertility under a high-interest-rate regime, with opposite transitional effects on fertility and saving. Besides providing clear-cut policy implications, our analysis offers possible testable implications concerning the pattern of fertility, taxes and public debt observed in many developed economies.     

The Optimal Level of Debt in an OLG Model with Endogenous Fertility

Abstract. In the present work we extend Diamond's OLG model by allowing for endogenous fertility and look at the consequences of such an extension on the rules for optimal public debt issuing. In particular, we show that the condition according to which the rate of growth of population should be higher than the interest rate is no longer sufficient for obtaining welfare improvements via debt increases and that the level of optimal debt is, ceteris paribus, lower than the one arising with exogenous fertility. Finally, a sensitivity analysis shows that the optimal level of debt is higher the lower the capital share, the higher individuals' degree of patience, the bigger the child‐rearing cost and the lower the preference for children. On policy grounds we argue that debt‐tightening policies may be optimal in the long run provided that the cost of rearing children does not increase (or, if anything, does decrease).     

国有企业的债务问题研究*

本文基于1995—2014年间A股制造业上市公司的样本数据进行实证研究,回归结果表明所有制因素对公司资本结构的选择没有显著影响,即便把资本结构区分为长期结构和短期结构亦是如此。公司的总资产收益率、有形资产比率、成长性、公司规模以及实际税率对上市公司资本结构具有显著影响,其中最主要的两个因素是公司的总资产收益率和公司规模。这说明虽然从总量数据上看国企负债的确构成了宏观债务的主体,但就制造业来说国企的债务水平和其经济特征是相匹配的,规模和总资产收益率足以解释这种高债务水平,国企过度负债说至少对制造业国有企业来说并不成立。国企债务风险可能来自平台类国企,相关的政策应该针对这类企业来设计。     

Temporary stabilization with capital controls

This paper studies both positive and normative aspects of quantity-based capital controls in a small open economy undergoing a temporary inflation stabilization plan. In the model, capital controls are implemented by choosing two policy variables: a ceiling on the private sector debt and a terminal date for removing controls; the date on which controls trigger and hence its duration are endogenously determined. Equilibrium dynamics are characterized for all feasible range of debt ceilings and durations. Temporary controls that end with the collapse of the stabilization plan are shown to mitigate consumption boom-bust cycles and dominate allocations under perfect capital mobility, thus providing a “second-best” rationale for employing them. For controls that are prolonged beyond the collapse of the stabilization plan, equilibria exist even when the debt ceiling is above the debt that accumulates under perfect capital mobility. Here, if the ceiling is sufficiently low, controls mitigate consumption cycles. Conversely, a sufficiently high ceiling amplifies consumption cycles. For prolonged controls, there is a critical value of debt ceiling below (above) which the welfare is higher (lower) relative to the perfect capital mobility case. Finally, for a given debt ceiling, prolonged controls rank lower in welfare than those that end with the stabilization plan. We would like to thank two anonymous referees and the editor whose suggestions have helped us improve the paper substantially. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Economic integration and growth under intergenerational financing of human-capital formation

This paper examines the patterns of economic integration and endogenous growth in a two-country overlapping-generations world, in which the formation of children's human capital is financed by parents. It explores the influence of cross-border external effects in human capital on growth. Interestingly, world integration can enhance (reduce) long-run growth in both countries if cross-border external effects in human capital are sufficiently strong (weak).     

Demographic structure and the security of property rights: The role of development and democracy

It is often argued that countries with a high population share of children and young workers should attract large capital inflows from aging industrialized economies. However, many of these countries deter foreign investors by a high risk of creeping or outright expropriation. In this paper we explore whether the correlation between countries' demographic structure and the perceived security of property rights reflects a causal relationship. We show that, in low-income countries, the ratio of young to old workers has a positive effect on the perceived security of property rights if the political system is sufficiently democratic. By contrast, this relationship cannot be observed in middle income countries.     

CAPITAL CONTROL AND DOMESTIC INTEREST RATES: A GENERALIZED MODEL

This article addresses the question of capital control (inflow) and its varied effect on interest rates and real-side economy. The moral hazard problem causes interest rates to increase as a function of external debt. Decreased capital inflow (external debt) can reduce moral hazard and outweigh the effect of costly capital transactions, with capital control decreasing interest rates and increasing output. This result runs counter to other theoretical works on capital control. The policy implication is that a government can generate national gains from capital inflow control by prohibiting new external debt (borrowing from abroad). With old debt retired and no new borrowing from abroad, external debt is reduced. This will reduce the moral hazard problem and lead to a drop in interest rates and an increase in output. (JEL F32 , F41 , E43 )     

Environmental capital flight and pollution tax

This paper analyzes the impacts of a production pollution tax on environmental capital flight and national product in a two-country static general equilibrium model with two-way foreign investment. It is assumed that the capital input in both countries is a composite good of domestic and imported capital. And pollution is assumed to originate in the production process. The productivity of capital in each country is negatively (or positively) related to the worldwide aggregate emissions.The analysis shows that when a domestic pollution tax is levied, domestic capital outflows increase and foreign capital inflows decrease for sufficiently high elasticities of substitution between labor (immobile input) and capital (mobile input) in both countries. Moreover, with negative transnational externalities, increases of a domestic pollution tax reduce domestic production and increase foreign production. The difficulty of substitution between immobile and mobile inputs hinders the optimal allocation of worldwide capital and national product. In this paper, the optimal pollution tax is based on global welfare maximization, not on global income maximization, taking into consideration the impact of income change on individual welfare. Therefore, an optimal pollution tax in the developing country should be lower for a given rate of pollution.     

Taxi,Takeoff and Landing: Behavioural Patterns of Capital Flows to Emerging Markets

This paper analyses volatility, persistence, predictability, correlation, comovement (or contagion risk) and sudden stop (reversibility) of capital flows (foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign portfolio equity investment, long-term and short-term debt flows) using time series econometric techniques for 24 emerging economies over 1970–2014. This is informative on the pattern and relationship between capital inflows, with implications for accommodating macroeconomic policies in countries receiving inflows. The paper also addresses the predictions of conventional theory, that differences are associated with the maturity of the capital (long-term vs. short-term), with the information-based trade-off model of Goldstein and Razin [(2006). An information-based trade off between foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment. Journal of International Economics, 70(1), 271–295], that differences are associated with the structure of the capital (equity vs. debt). In line with the latter, equity flows (FDI and portfolio) are less volatile and persistent, more predictable and less susceptible to sudden stops than debt flows. Contrary to conventional theory, short-term flows are not more volatile, but there is evidence that correlations and risks of contagion are strong within all capital flow components.     

Growth,fertility and human capital: A survey

This paper surveys recent work on endogenous fertility and endogenous growth. These models provide the building blocks for a theory of development. They are capable of explaining income and fertility differentials between rich and poor countries. They can produce switching behavior, countries that transform themselves from no growth economies into high growth economies. The fertility and growth effects of social security programs are also examined. Finally models with increasing returns to population are presented. They are capable of reproducing very long term relationships between human capital, fertility and economic growth.     

Taxes,risk taking,and financial stability

After the global financial crisis, the use of taxes to enhance financial stability received new attention. This paper analyzes the corrective role of taxes in banking and compares two instruments, namely, an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), which mitigates the debt bias in corporate taxation, and a Pigovian tax on bank debt (bank levy). We emphasize financial stability gains driven by lower bank asset risk and develop a principal-agent model, in which risk taking depends on the bank's capital structure and, by extension, on the tax treatment of debt and equity. We find that (i) the ACE unambiguously reduces risk taking, (ii) bank levies reduce risk taking if they are independent of bank performance but may be counterproductive otherwise, and (iii) taxes are especially effective if regulatory capital requirements are constrained to low levels.     

Public investment,national debt,and economic growth: The role of debt finance under dynamic inefficiency

Public investment is a central issue in the dynamic analyses of fiscal policy and economic growth. Debt financing for public investment and its effects have recently received great attention because interest rates have been low, almost invariably remaining below economic growth rates. This paper presents examination of the effects of debt-financed public investment subject to a simple fiscal rule in an overlapping generations model with public capital. This topic includes capital budgeting and the debt–deficit criterion of the Maastricht treaty. We show herein that debt financing for public investment enhances economic growth if an economy is dynamically inefficient and if public capital has a sufficiently large productivity effect. Moreover, it reduces economic growth rates in a dynamically efficient economy. Debt and growth can have a monotonic or non-monotonic relation, depending on the steady-state interest rate, growth rate, and productivity effect of public investment. The findings indicate that debt–growth relations match with controversial empirical evidence. Furthermore, existing generations choose perfect debt finance if dynamic inefficiency exists. In contrast, a balanced budget is preferred in a dynamically efficient economy with low productivity effects of public capital. However, an economy with high productivity effects of public capital might cho ose debt financing. This paper contributes to the elucidation of currently emphasized issues of public investment.     

Corporate debt and output pricing in developing countries: Industry-level evidence from Turkey

The present study is an application of capital structure theory to developing economies where markets are commonly imperfect. The industry-level data of Turkey is used as a benchmark case to investigate the effects of corporate debt on output pricing, which in return, might have critical implications for stabilization theory. The panel estimations on the major two-digit industries reveal two basic findings. First, short-term debt leads to an increase in output prices while long-term debt has the opposite effect, and short-term but not long-term debt has a cyclical influence on prices. Second, the inflationary effect short-term debt implies a lower capital gain and induces higher prices, while the effect long-term debt implies a higher capital gain and induces lower prices. Given the predominant share of short-term debt in most developing countries, these findings suggest an explanation for inflation inertia on the side of corporate sector.