Voting in Hiring Committees: Which “Almost” Rule is Optimal?

We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almost-plurality, the almost-inverse-plurality, and the almost-Borda rule can be optimal. Which of the “almost” rules is optimal depends on the likelihood that a candidate has high ability and how likely committee members are to correctly identify the abilities of the different candidates.     

Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections

We compare the Condorcet Efficiencies of the plurality rule, the negative plurality rule, and the Borda rule to examine what might be gained by using a voting rule that requires candidate rankings. Previous analyses have considered (1) voting situations for which the three rules determine different candidates as winners (and the Condorcet Efficiencies might actually differ across the three rules) as well as (2) refined measures of Group Mutual Coherence that assess the presence of underlying models of rational behavior that governs voter preferences. In this paper, we present the final step of this particular line of analysis by analyzing (1) and (2) simultaneously. We conclude that there is a considerable benefit on the basis of Condorcet Efficiency from asking voters to submit candidate rankings in three-candidate elections.     

Menu Dependence and Group Decision Making

This paper is concerned with the problem of group decision making. We introduce the notion of a collective system rule. A collective system rule maps each preference profile to a group-preference system, which is a collection of social preferences on the subsets of the alternatives. By formulating the Arrovian conditions, we show the Arrow-type impossibility theorems. We also discuss how our approach is related to the standard group decision-making process.     

Nash Equilibrium and Decentralized Negotiation in Auctioning Divisible Resources

We consider the problem of software agents being used as proxies for the procurement of computational and network resources. Mechanisms such as single-good auctions and combinatorial auctions are not applicable for the management of these services, as assigning an entire resource to a single agent is often undesirable and appropriate bund sizes are difficult to determine. We investigate a divisible auction that is proportionally fair. By introducing the notion of price and demand functions that characterize optimal response functions of the bidders, we are able to prove that this mechanism has a unique Nash equilibrium for an arbitrary number of agents with heterogeneous quasilinear utilities. We also describe decentralized negotiation strategies which, with approrpate relaxation, converge locally to the equilibrium point. Given an agent with a sequence of jobs, we show how our analysis holds for a wide variety of objectives.     

Rules for the disposition of tariff revenues and the determination of common external tariffs in customs unions

This paper is about the determination of common external tariffs (CETs) in customs unions (CUs). We first examine how the relationship between preferences over CET levels, technology and the distribution of factor ownership in a CU is conditioned by the rule that determines the disposition of tariff revenues. We then explore how majority voting at the country level translates these preferences into an equilibrium CET. Among other things, we find that, when revenues are partitioned in proportion to members’ imports, tariff preferences may be polarized, the trade patterns of some CU members may be endogenous, and, as a result, their payoff functions may not be single-peaked. This leads to voting outcomes that dramatically differ from those arising under other sharing rules (e.g., the ‘population’ and ‘consumption’ rules) and raises the possibility of a Condorcet paradox.     

Diversity as Polyphony: Reconceptualizing Diversity Management from a Communication-Centered Perspective

In this paper, we propose reconceptualizing diversity management from a communication-centered perspective. We base our proposal on the observation that the literature on diversity management, both in the instrumental and critical traditions, is primarily concerned with fostering the diversity of organizational members in terms of individual-bound criteria (e.g., gender, age, or ethnicity). By drawing on Bakhtin’s notion of polyphony as well as the ‘communicative constitution of organizations’ (CCO) perspective, we suggest reconsidering diversity as the plurality of ‘voices’ which can be understood as the range of individual opinions and societal discourses that get expressed and can find resonance in organizational settings. We contribute to the literature on diversity management by moving away from a focus on individual-bound and inalterable criteria of diversity and toward a reconceptualization of diversity management as dynamic processes of voice articulation and mediation.     

Bayesian estimation of discrete games of complete information

Estimation of discrete games of complete information, which have been applied to a variety of contexts such as market entry, technology adoption and peer effects, is challenging due to the presence of multiple equilibria. In this paper, we take a Bayesian MCMC approach to this problem, specifying a prior over multiple equilibrium selection mechanisms reflecting the analysts uncertainty over them. We develop a sampler, using the reversible jump algorithm to generate draws from the posterior distribution of parameters across these equilibrium selection rules. The algorithm is flexible in that it can be used both in situations where the equilibrium selection rule is identified and when it is not, and accommodates heterogeneity in equilibrium selection. We explore the methodology using both simulated data and two empirical applications, one in the context of joint consumption, using a dataset of casino visit decisions by married couples, and the second in the context of market entry by competing chains in the retail stationery market. We demonstrate the importance of accounting for multiple equilibrium selection rules in these applications and show that taking an empirical approach to the issue, such as the one we have demonstrated, can be useful.     

Viability and Equilibrium in Securities Markets with Frictions

In this paper we study some foundational issues in the theory of asset pricing with market frictions. We model market frictions by letting the set of marketed contingent claims (the opportunity set) be a convex set, and the pricing rule at which these claims are available be convex. This is the reduced form of multiperiod securities price models incorporating a large class of market frictions. It is said to be viable as a model of economic equilibrium if there exist price-taking maximizing agents who are happy with their initial endowment, given the opportunity set, and hence for whom supply equals demand. This is equivalent to the existence of a positive lineaar pricing rule on the entirespace of contingent claims—an underlying frictionless linear pricing rule—that lies below the convex pricing rule on the set of marketed claims. This is also equivalent to the absence of asymptotic free lunches—a generalization of opportunities of arbitrage. When a market for a nonmarketed contingent claim opens, a bid-ask price pair for this claim is said to be consistent if it is a bid-ask price pair in at least a viable economy with this extended opportunity set. If the set of marketed contingent claims is a convex cone and the pricing rule is convex and sublinear, we show that the set of consistent prices of a claim is a closed interval and is equal (up to its boundary) to the set of its prices for all the underlying frictionless pricing rules. We also show that there exists a unique extended consistent sublinear pricing rule—the supremum of the underlying frictionless linear pricing rules—for which the original equilibrium does not collapse when a new market opens, regardless of preferences and endowments. If the opportunity set is the reduced form of a multiperiod securities market model, we study the closedness of the interval of prices of a contingent claim for the underlying frictionless pricing rules.     

An evolutionary Cournot oligopoly model with imitators and perfect foresight best responders

We consider the competition among quantity setting players in a linear evolutionary environment. To set their outputs, players adopt, alternatively, the best response rule having perfect foresight or an imitative rule. Players are allowed to change their behavior through an evolutionary mechanism according to which the rule with better performance will attract more followers. The relevant stationary state of the model describes a scenario where players produce at the Cournot‐Nash level. Due to the presence of imitative behavior, we find that the number of players and implementation costs, needed to the best response exploitation, have an ambiguous role in determining the stability properties of the equilibrium and double stability thresholds can be observed. Differently, the role of the intensity of choice, representing the evolutionary propensity to switch to the most profitable rule, has a destabilizing role, in line with the common occurrence in evolutionary models. The global analysis of the model reveals that increasing values of the intensity of choice parameter determine increasing dynamic complexities for the internal attractor representing a population where both decision mechanisms coexist.     

Markov chain Monte Carlo for incomplete information discrete games

This paper outlines a Bayesian approach to estimating discrete games of incomplete information. The MCMC routine proposed features two changes to the traditional Metropolis–Hastings algorithm to facilitate the estimation of games. First, we propose a new approach to sample equilibrium probabilities using a probabilistic equilibrium selection rule that allows for the evaluation of the parameter posterior. Second, we propose a differential evolution based MCMC sampler which is capable of handling the unwieldy posterior that only has support on the equilibrium manifold. We also present two applications to demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed methodology.     

IS LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY DESIRABLE OR HARMFUL? A FURTHER DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE

A common belief of mainstream economics as well as underpinning government policy is that the more flexible real wage is, the lower is unemployment. In this paper we study the dynamics of a standard neoclassical labour market under the simplest Walrasian adjustment rule. We show that when consumption and leisure are sufficiently low substitutes, an increase in real wage flexibility may destabilize the unique Walrasian equilibrium of the economy, triggering fluctuations in wages and employment. Minimal departures from strict (Walrasian) neoclassical equilibrium modelling are required to obtain instability results for wage flexibility.     

论超强有效市场

考虑到信息不对称、信息尤其是前瞻性信息的获得需要花费较高成本等因素,本文认为即使市场实现了强式有效,也不意味着经济效率就必然会实现.鉴于此,文中放松了有效市场理论的假设,考虑了前瞻性信息生产的不确定性,提出了超强有效市场的概念,并构造了一个超强有效均衡的模型.本文指出只有存在充分有效的激励和约束机制,使得投资者和经理都能努力生产关于公司潜在投资项目的前瞻性信息,并且经理会对股价传递的信息做出积极的反应时,股票市场才会真正在实现信息效率的同时充分发挥优化资源配置的功能.     

‘Consuming Responsibility: The Search for Value at Laskarina Holidays’

This paper provides an alternative theoretical conceptualisation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in order to further our understanding of prosocial organisational behaviour. We argue that consumption provides a perspective that enables theorists to escape the confines of existing CSR literature. In our view the organisation is re-imagined as an arena of consumption where employees are engaged in a quest for value, constructing and confirming their identities as consumers. Using the award-winning tour operator Laskarina Holidays as an illustrative case, it is suggested that CSR can provide combinations of functional, social, emotional, epistemic and conditional value. This new perspective on CSR facilitates the coexistence of a plurality of values that are relativistically constructed and narrativised by organisational stakeholders. Our consumption paradigm provides a thought provoking means of reconciling divergent perspectives and encourages further interdisciplinary research. We argue that future research should begin, not by asking the question of why organisations assume responsibility, but by contemplating the notion of why organisations consume responsibility.     

Information,individual errors,and collective performance: Empirical evidence on the Condorcet Jury Theorem

The Condorcet Jury Theorem implies that the collective performance of a group, in arriving at a “correct” judgment on the basis of majority or plurality rule, will be superior to the average performance of individual members of the group, if certain apparently plausible conditions hold. Variants of the Jury Theorem are reviewed, particularly including the politically relevant variant that allows for conflicting interests within the group. We then examine two kinds of empirical data. First, we compare individual and collective performance in a large number of multiple-choice tests, and we find that collective performance invariably and substantially exceeds average individual performance. Second, we analyze American National Election Study data to create dichotomous-choice tests concerning positions of candidates on a variety of political issues; Condorcet-like effects are again evident. Finally, continuing to use NES data, we construct, on each political issue, a simulated referendum (direct voting on the issue) and election (indirect voting on the issue by voting for candidates on the basis of their perceived positions on the issue), and we compare the two results. Despite high rates of individual error, electoral error is quite small, and collective performance is fairly high, providing evidence of Condorcet-like effects in situations of conflicting preferences.     

Managing Channel Profits: The Role of Managerial Incentives

The existing literature has examined how manufacturers can enhance profits by employing specific channel structures and channel coordination mechanisms. In this paper, we examine the implications of strategically designed managerial incentives for channel performance in a duopoly. We first analyze how equilibrium outcomes (especially manufacturer profits) are altered when the manufacturers provide their channel managers with strategically designed incentives. Following that, we examine how optimal channel structure decisions are altered when manufacturers provide their managers with strategic incentives, i.e., we examine how strategic incentives moderate optimal channel structure decisions. In contrast with the existing literature, we find that an asymmetric channel structure with one manufacturer employing a profit-maximizing retailer and the other integrated manufacturer providing strategic incentives for the channel manager in charge of pricing, is an equilibrium outcome under certain conditions. We then compare how the implications of strategic incentives differ from those of channel structure decisions and channel coordination initiatives, and discuss when and why strategic incentives yield superior outcomes from the manufacturer’s perspective. Our results shed light on the sparsely researched role of managerial incentives in the channel context.     

Negotiating free trade

We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining, and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome, leading to worldwide free trade. A model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection. Global free trade is not achieved when the political-economy motive for protection is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the model generates both “building bloc” and “stumbling bloc” effects of preferential trade agreements. In particular, we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form (a building bloc effect), and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden (a stumbling bloc effect). The analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges.     

The accountability lens: A new way to view management issues

In this article, we contend that viewing organizations through an accountability lens (in terms of source, focus, salience, and intensity) helps illuminate issues of governance and ethical dilemmas common to most individuals at work. We also propose that disconnects between aspects of accountability may pressure individuals to behave unethically and seek to rationalize their behaviors. We suggest that accountability is not only an organizational requirement, but also a perceptual lens that can be used to observe and understand behavior in, and of, organizations. As such, we demonstrate herein how to make better sense of functional and dysfunctional behavior in organizations by applying the accountability lens. A key component of this accountability lens is the notion of an accountability environment: those aspects of an individual’s immediate work environment that directly affect the subjective interpretation and experience of felt accountability. The notion that individuals perceive and interpret their accountabilities subjectively is critical to understanding why multiple employees can behave differently (and sometimes unethically) under the same accountability conditions.     

Internationalizing the Assessment Criteria to Build Cross-Cultural Competency

ABSTRACT

International business programs, universities with international students, and educators who seek to internationalize their teaching need to make informed decisions about teaching, testing, and assessment criteria. The infusion of American business curricula throughout the world as well as the need to train American business students for leadership roles in global contexts calls for teaching and assessment practices which explore a plurality of cognitive, affective and behavioral pedagogical strategies. This article considers traditional education and assessment in China in light of American educational practices currently used for assessment in business training. It explores how an understanding of modern Confucianist values can shape assessment choices in both American and overseas programs as an example of developing cross-cultural awareness. The authors call for an assessment process in business education which draws from a plurality of methods adapted to teaching, learning and testing for global awareness.     

Equilibrium Pricing in the Presence of Cumulative Dividends Following a Diffusion

The paper presents some security market pricing results in the setting of a security market equilibrium in continuous time. The theme of the paper is financial valuation theory when the primitive assets pay out real dividends represented by processes of unbounded variation. In continuous time, when the models are also continuous, this is the most general representation of real dividends, and it can be of practical interest to analyze such models.
Taking as the starting point an extension to continuous time of the Lucas consumption-based model, we derive the equilibrium short-term interest rate, present a new derivation of the consumption-based capital asset pricing model, demonstrate how equilibrium forward and futures prices can be derived, including several examples, and finally we derive the equilibrium price of a European call option in a situation where the underlying asset pays dividends according to an Itô process of unbounded variation. In the latter case we demonstrate how this pricing formula simplifies to known results in special cases, among them the famous Black–Scholes formula and the Merton formula for a special dividend rate process.     

Do countries free ride on MFN?

The Most-Favored Nation (MFN) clause has long been suspected of creating a free rider problem in multilateral trade negotiations. To address this issue, we model multilateral negotiations as a mechanism design problem with voluntary participation. We show that an optimal mechanism induces only the largest exporters to participate in negotiations over any product, thus providing a rationalization for the Principal supplier rule. We also show that, through this channel, equilibrium tariffs vary according to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of export shares: higher concentration in a sector reduces free riding and thus causes a lower tariff. Estimation of our model using sector-level tariff data for the U.S. provides strong support for this relationship.