Monetary union in Latin America: an assessment in the context of optimum currency area

The article applies the optimum currency area (OCA) theory to Latin America to assess the potential of a monetary union in Latin America and in its major existing regional trade agreements (RTAs). According to OCA criteria we find that Latin America is far from being an optimum currency area, as its countries’ exposure to asymmetric shocks is high and their capacities to adjust in response to macroeconomic disturbances are limited. Using a panel of 20 Latin American countries from 1990 to 2014, we apply the dynamic OLS estimation techniques to estimate the costs and benefits of a potential monetary union in Latin America and in its various RTAs. to estimate the costs and benefits of a potential monetary union in Latin America and in its various RTAs. We find that the costs are high, because Latin America’s economies are vulnerable to severe macroeconomic disturbances and its RTAs differ significantly in their response to negative demand shocks. Most of the monetary efficiency gains are shown to be the result of a common restrictive monetary policy which would result in higher FDI inflows and, to a more limited extent, increased GDP, both overall and per capita. Although Central American countries are shown to be most suitable for further monetary integration, we conclude that Latin American countries should head first towards greater economic and political integration.     

Costs and benefits of unilateral euroization in central eastern Europe

Countries unable or unwilling to join a monetary union can replicate most membership effects unilaterally through either a currency board or the formal replacement of domestic currency by that of the Union. Potential benefits include lower transaction costs, lower interest rates, and lower exposure to speculative attacks. Costs include initial reserves, inadequate response to asymmetric shocks, loss of seigniorage, no lender of last resort. Expected costs and benefits have probably been exaggerated. Net effects depend primarily on the degree of monetary, real, and institutional convergence. Positive net advantages will accrue to countries that are either already converging, or wish to use a single currency to speed up convergence — especially if small. There is no legal or economic justification for EU aversion to unilateral euroization in accession candidate countries. JEL classification: F33, F36, E58, P33.     

New EU member states and the Euro: economic readiness,benefits and costs

All of the new EU member states (NMSs) have made a commitment to adopt the Euro. This essay considers the countries’ economic readiness to adopt the Euro as well as the economic benefits and costs of adoption. Paper applies a method suggested by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) and finds that the changes of real effective exchange rates between the Euro area and the new EU member states follow the pattern predicted by the optimum currency area theory. This finding allows the construction of the readiness for adoption index for every NMS. The tangible benefits (for NMSs) of adoption are also examined in this essay. Analyses suggest that the costs of currency exchange and hedging against the uncertainty in foreign exchange markets account for about 0.08–0.012% of the countries’ GDP. In addition, countries that adopt the Euro might expect lower inflation and interest rates. This essay also examines the possible costs of adoption. These are in the forms of the lost ability to use monetary policy tools and set the level of seigniorage. Analysis suggests that many countries had given up their independence over monetary policy even before the accession to the EU. In addition, bigger NMSs have not used seigniorage as the source of fiscal income. However, they used exchange rate flexibility to depreciate their currencies during the recent crisis.     

Commitment and the adoption of a common currency*

In contrast to Mundell's inquiry on the optimality of currency areas, this article aims to understand under what circumstances a Pareto‐dominant monetary union will be established. Using a multicountry overlapping generations model, we highlight gains from monetary union arising from reduced transactions costs and lower inflation. Despite these gains, countries acting independently will impose barriers to exchange through local currency restrictions, thereby creating transactions costs and providing an incentive for inflation. Therefore, the gains from monetary union are most likely to be lost without collective effort.     

Fixed Exchange Rates and Banking Crises: When Does the Former Prevent the Latter?

Because monetary policy is constrained in fixed exchange rate regimes, banks should expect fewer money‐financed bailouts and therefore manage their risks more carefully when exchange rates are fixed than when they are flexible. It follows that we should observe fewer banking crises in countries with formal currency pegs. The 1990s however are littered with occurrences of banking crises in countries with fixed exchange rates. This paper asks whether banks in those countries could have adopted excess risk expecting money‐financed bailouts or whether their pegs discouraged such moral hazard‐type risks.     

The Case of European Monetary Integration and its Former Hegemon

There is no historical precedent for the institutional set‐up of the eurozone. However, it is an arrangement that could not and cannot escape the universal laws and principles of economics. This article tries to look generally at the consequences of this integration project from the perspective of the former monetary hegemon, Germany, whose hegemony largely ended as a result of the monetary integration method chosen. Those consequences are, of course, more apparent in bad times than they were in good times. We then specifically examine the problem of convergence and divergence within a currency area and discuss the issue of competitive devaluation. In the conclusion, we try to formulate the fundamental dilemma faced by the former monetary hegemon. Its solution will affect those inside and outside the integration project.     

West African Currency Unions: Rationale and Sustainability

Drawing on the recent literature and experience of monetaryintegration in Europe, the paper examines the rationale forestablishing regional currency unions in western Africa. Despitedramatic economic, political and historical differences betweenthe two regions, the analysis indicates that monetary unificationmight well be beneficial for a number of the member states ofthe Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Themain reason is that the costs stemming from the loss of monetaryautonomy are often more than offset by the gains originatingin the (partial) separation of monetary and fiscal powers. However,large countries with relatively ambitious public expenditureobjectives would not be attractive partners because they wouldbe expected to pressure the common central bank, creating excessiveinflation in the entire union. Hence, the desirability and sustainabilityof a currency union critically depends on fiscal disciplineamong its members. We also explore the vulnerability of regionalmonetary institutions to country-specific disturbances. Overall,the desirability of an ECOWAS monetary union requires a strongfiscal surveillance procedure both in the transition phase andafter the establishment of the union. (JEL E58, E61, F42)     

Assessing independent monetary policy in small, open and euroized countries: evidence from Western Balkan

This article approaches to the optimum currency area from the empirical side by investigating the costs of adoption of a single currency for small, open and euroized Western Balkan countries (WBC). Using several econometric techniques, this study attempts to answer three questions relevant for monetary integration of the WBC and similar transition countries: What are the constraints on an independent monetary policy? What is the need for operating an independent monetary policy? and What is the ability to conduct an independent monetary policy? The constraints on independent monetary policy in most of the WBC at this stage are relatively serious because of high levels of openness and euroization. They limit the ability of the central bank, which is oriented to price stability, to use the nominal exchange rate for achieving other goals (for example, output stabilization). Regarding the second question, the results from structural VAR framework suggest a low synchronization for supply and demand shocks between the WBC and the euro area, indicating potentially high costs of losing independent monetary policy. Furthermore, the results from Kalman filter technique inform that the shock convergence process is slow or absent in the WBC vis-à-vis the euro area. Regarding the last question, the results from cointegration and VAR analysis suggest that the ability to conduct an independent monetary policy, assessed by analyzing the interest rate channel as the most prominent transmission channel in the euro area, is relatively weak in the WBC.     

Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Systems

A new 'fiscal' theory of price determination has implications for exchange rate systems and common currency areas. We show that deeper monetary integration requires the discipline of a Ricardian regime ; that is, the government must guarantee fiscal solvency for any sequence of prices or exchange rates. Particularly striking results are that a currency peg is not credible without the discipline of a Ricardian regime, and a common currency area is not viable if fiscal policy in two (or more) of the countries in the union is Non-Ricardian. Interestingly, constraints written into the Maastricht Treaty are sufficient for a Ricardian regime.     

Common Trends and Common Cycles in Per Capita GDP: The Case of the G7 Countries, 1870–2001

In this paper we analyze per capita incomes of the G7 countries using the common cycles test developed by Vahid and Engle (Journal of Applied Econometrics, 8:341–360, 1993) and extended by Hecq et al. (Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 62:511–532, 2000; Econometric Reviews, 21:273–307, 2002) and the common trend test developed by Johansen (Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 12:231–254, 1988). Our main contribution is that we impose the common cycle and common trend restrictions in decomposing the innovations into permanent and transitory components. Our main finding is permanent shocks explain the bulk of the variations in incomes for the G7 countries over short time horizons, and is in sharp contrast to the bulk of the recent literature. We attribute this to the greater forecasting accuracy achieved, which we later confirm through performing a post sample forecasting exercise, from the variance decomposition analysis.

CRYPTOCURRENCIES,NETWORK EFFECTS,AND SWITCHING COSTS

Cryptocurrencies are digital alternatives to traditional government‐issued paper monies. Given the current state of technology and skepticism regarding the future purchasing power of existing monies, why have cryptocurrencies failed to gain widespread acceptance? I offer an explanation based on network effects and switching costs. In order to articulate the problem that agents considering cryptocurrencies face, I employ a simple model developed by Dowd and Greenaway (1993) (Dowd, K., and D. Greenaway. “Currency Competition, Network Externalities, and Switching Costs: Towards an Alternative View of Optimum Currency Areas.” The Economic Journal, 103(420), 1993, 1180–89). The model demonstrates that agents may fail to adopt an alternative currency when network effects and switching costs are present, even if all agents agree that the prevailing currency is inferior. The limited success of bitcoin—almost certainly the most popular cryptocurrency to date—serves to illustrate. After briefly surveying episodes of successful monetary transition, I conclude that cryptocurrencies like bitcoin are unlikely to generate widespread acceptance in the absence of either significant monetary instability or government support. (JEL E40, E41, E42, E49)     

EMU in Reality: The Effect of a Common Monetary Policy on Economies with Different Transmission Mechanisms

The theory of optimal currency areas states that a single currency zone should have symmetry of shocks and structures across regions. Research on monetary union in Europe has either assumed these conditions to hold close enough not to cause problems, or has focussed on asymmetries in shocks. But what if economic structures and/or market responses differ between countries or regions? This paper examines the consequences of a single monetary policy when there are asymmetries in i) the monetary transmissions; ii) the wage/price transmissions; and iii) private sector asset holdings. We find the first and last destabilise the business cycle, and put countries out of phase with one another in a way that cannot be corrected by deficit constrained fiscal policies. The effect is to delay convergence.     

Money demand in the czech republic since transition

We analyse the demand for money since the “break up” of the Czech-Slovak Republics at the beginning of 1993 and for the aggregates M0, Ml, and M2 using monthly data. Due to the widespread use of foreign currency in formally centrally planned economies, we also investigate the issue of currency substitution. Because of our relatively small sample period the Johansen cointegration approach is not used and instead we use the general to specific methodology in a single equation framework. Previous empirical evidence on money demand in Eastern Europe, and specifically Czech Republic, has been mixed. Both graphical and empirical results suggest that any currency substitution was a one-off event due to increased uncertainty at the end of 1992 at the time of the monetary dissolution. Certainly, currency substitution in the Czech Republic is not as strong as has been found in other former centrally planned economies. However, our results do indicate that Czech National Bank may have to take account of foreign interest rates when interpreting movements in the monetary aggregates.     

Social identity and preferences over redistribution

We design an experiment to study the effects of social identity on preferences over redistribution. The experiment highlights the trade-off between social identity concerns and maximization of monetary payoffs. Subjects belonging to two distinct natural groups are randomly assigned gross incomes and vote over alternative redistributive tax regimes, where the regime is chosen by majority rule. We find that a significant subset of the subjects systematically deviate from monetary payoff maximization towards the tax rate that benefits their group when the monetary cost of doing so is not too high. These deviations cannot be explained by efficiency concerns, inequality aversion, reciprocity, social learning or conformity. Finally, we show that behavior in the lab helps explain the relationship between reported income and stated preferences over redistribution observed in survey data.     

Monetary policy synchronization in the ASEAN-5 region: an exchange rate perspective

In light of the long-standing vision of economic and monetary integration in the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) region and the importance of coordinating monetary policies to achieve it, the objective of this article is to assess the monetary policy synchronization among the founding members of the ASEAN, that is, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Due to the importance of exchange rate movements to monetary policies, we approach this issue from a currency exchange rate perspective. Specifically, multivariate trend–cycle decomposition is employed to investigate common trends and common cycles among the exchange rates of these countries during the period 1976–2012. Our analysis reveals that the real exchange rates of Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand share common cycles in the short term and have common trends in the long term, but the Indonesian currency does not share these relationships. Thus, our results augur well for the synchronization of monetary policies among Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. In contrast, the relatively turbulent dynamics of the Indonesian rupiah evident in frequent bouts of stark depreciation separated by periods of steady depreciation over the past three decades raise questions regarding the readiness of Indonesia for participating in a monetary alliance with the ASEAN-4 nations.     

VEHICLE CURRENCY*

Historically, the world economy has been dominated by a single currency accepted in the exchange of goods and assets among countries. In recent decades, the U.S. dollar has played this role. The dollar acts as a “vehicle currency” in the sense that agents in nondollar economies will generally engage in currency trade indirectly using the U.S. dollar instead of using direct bilateral trade among their own currencies. A vehicle currency is desirable when there are transactions costs of exchange. This article constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model of a vehicle currency. We explore the nature of the efficiency gains arising from a vehicle currency and show how it depends on the total number of currencies in existence, the size of the vehicle currency economy, and the monetary policy followed by the vehicle currency’s government. We find that there can be significant welfare gains to a vehicle currency in a system of many independent currencies. But these gains are asymmetrically weighted toward the residents of the vehicle currency country. The survival of a vehicle currency places natural limits on the monetary policy of the vehicle currency country.     

The Monetary Dimensions of Colonialism: Why did Imperial Powers Create Currency Blocks?

In the last few years, northern policymakers are increasingly interested in creating regional currency blocs which link their respective monetary systems more closely to those of nearby poorer 'southern' countries. To what extent does this new interest signal a kind of monetary 'neo-colonialism'? As a starting point for answering this question, I examine the motives that drove imperial powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to launch monetary reforms in their colonies which created giant currency blocs centred around each of their respective home currencies. I argue that colonial monetary reforms were driven by diversity of goals that related to: (1) international transaction costs; (2) domestic transaction costs within the colonies; (3) macroeconomic influence; (4) seigniorage; and (5) political identities. I conclude that there are similarities - although they should not be overstated - between some of these motivations and those driving the new interest in giant currency blocs today.     

The 2014–15 Financial Crisis in Russia and the Foundations of Weak Monetary Power Autonomy in the International Political Economy

ABSTRACT

This article contributes to international political economy debates about the monetary power autonomy (MPA) of emerging market and developing countries (EMDs). The 2014–15 Russian financial crisis is used as a case study to explore why an accumulation of large international reserves does not provide protection against currency crises and macroeconomic adjustments in EMDs. The analysis centres on the interplay between two dimensions of MPA: the Power to Delay and the Power to Deflect adjustment costs. Two structural factors condition Russia’s low MPA. First, the country’s subordinated integration in global financial markets increases its financial vulnerability. The composition of external assets and liabilities, combined with cross-border capital flows, restrict the use of international reserves to delay currency crises. Second, the choice of a particular macroeconomic policy regime embraced the financialisation of the – mainly state-owned – Russian banking sector, thus making it difficult to transform liquidity inflows into credits for enterprises. Russia’s main comparative advantage, hydrocarbon export revenues, is not exploited. The type of economy created due to the post-Communist transition means that provided ‘excessive’ liquidity remains in the financial system and is channelled into currency arbitrage. This factor increases exchange rate vulnerability and undermines Russia’s MPA.     

SYNCHRONIZATION OF ECONOMIC SHOCKS BETWEEN GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL AND UNITED STATES,EUROPE, JAPAN,AND OIL MARKET: CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME†

Using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) with block exogeneity, this study examines the impacts of external shocks originating from the United States, the European Union, Japan, and the oil market as well as those of the regional shocks, on the oil‐rich countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), viewed as a prospective monetary union. It takes into account the implications of the shock impacts for selecting an appropriate common exchange rate arrangement. The SVAR variance decomposition and impulse response analyses strongly underscore the relative impacts of the global shocks over the regional ones. The findings imply that the world's two major currencies, the U.S. dollar and the euro, should figure highly in a GCC's common basket of currencies. Accordingly, a transitional movement to a more flexible exchange rate arrangement such as a basket peg may be desirable for these trade‐dependent economies in the long run, as is argued in the optimal currency literature for developing countries. (JEL E52, O52, C22)     

Fiscal Consequences of Monetary Integration within a Common Economic Area: The Case of Belarus,Kazakhstan and Russia

This article analyses the possible impact of planned monetary integration on public sector revenue from seigniorage in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. Using the concept of total gross seigniorage, we investigate the main sources and uses of the central bank revenue in these countries. Special attention is given to the role of seigniorage revenue in financing public sector expenditure. Amounts of yearly transfers from central banks to the state budget in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia are evaluated, and the size of potential gains and losses in seigniorage revenue under different scenarios of monetary integration are estimated.