从"通钢事件"看心理契约违背在企业并购中的影响

组织变革中并购是重要的方式之一,在企业并购过程中发生的心理契约违背是导致并购失败的重要原因.本文通过"通钢事件"分析并购中的心理契约违背现象,并以Tumlye&Feldman的心理契约违背差异模型为基础,构建了一个企业并购中的心理契约违背模型,并运用此模型对通钢企业并购过程中心理契约违背发生的机理进行研究.最后提出企业并购要重视心理契约,建立良性的沟通机制,推进员工参与及促进企业文化的融合等管理建议.     

并购企业员工心理契约构建研究

<正>企业并购是当今世界性的一个热门话题,全球每年的并购案例数以万计,国际经济与产业结构的格局因为企业并购而被大大影响和改变了。但是与企业并购的战略和期望值相比, 很多企业并购后没有或完全没有达到其目标的要求,据权威统计在中国成功率尚不足10％,究其原因固然是多方面的,但并购后整合不力却是关键因素之一,尤其是心理契约的整合与重构成功与否至关重要。一、并购企业员工心理契约的特点 1．契约内容的不确定性心理契约本质上是组织成员对于个人与组织之间相互责任的感知和期     

心理契约:构建员工与企业的生命共同体

在经济全球化的背景下,企业的裁员、并购及流程再造等各种变革使得企业与员工所面临的不确定性日益增加,由此带来的员工忠诚度、工作行为、工作态度等方面的问题引起了各方关注.心理契约管理逐步成为组织变革时代企业获取竞争优势的战略手段. 心理契约是指构成员工和组织之间交换关系和相互责任的一种心理期望.20世纪80年代后,美国管理心理学专家施恩(E.H.Schein)进一步明确了心理契约的内涵,即“个人将有所奉献与组织欲望有所获取之间,以及最早将针对个人期望收获而有所提供的一种配合”.     

安徽建工集团组织变革中的心理契约违背和重塑研究

国有企业改制重组面临着许多新问题,员工对待企业这种变革的心态和心理契约违背一直没有引起足够的重视。文章结合安徽建工集团变革的实际过程,运用案例研究、深度访谈、发放调查表等方式对集团员工的心理契约违背进行研究,分析了组织变革与员工心态之间的影响关系以及企业与员工心理契约问题,最后根据心理契约理论,提出了把握员工心态推进组织变革进程的建议和对策。     

跨国并购知识型员工整合策略--基于一种新的心理契约分类

文章在传统心理契约的研究基础上，在跨国并购这一特殊情景下，按照知识型员工不同的特征和对组织的知觉和认知，划分不同的心理契约类型：交易型、观望型、动摇型、关系型，企业可根据不同的心理契约类型对其实施整合策略。随着企业实施是否合理的管理策略，各个类型之间也发生动态转化，文章拓展了运用心理契约在组织变革过程中实施管理策略的研究。     

中小企业员工心理契约调查研究——基于烟台市中小企业调查数据分析

心理契约包括个体水平上的心理契约和组织水平上的心理契约两个方面。在现代组织内部,企业和员工之间也存在这两个方面的心理契约,即员工对企业的心理契约和企业对员工的心理契约。本文对山东省烟台地区30多家中小企业员工的心理契约现状进行了问卷调查,总结出中小企业员工在成长中个体心理契约的特点,并在结论中提出中小企业员工心理契约可以通过实施有效的沟通、建立公平的竞争激励机制及科学的职业生涯发展规划等途径构建。     

论心理契约与企业人力资源管理

<正>心理契约理论认为:员工与企业之间除了存在正式劳务合约之外,还存在一种心理契约。心理契约是联系员工和企业的心理纽带,也是影响企业人力资源管理的重要因素。员工对企业的满意度、对企业的情感投入度,进而员工的工作绩效和员工的流动率都和心理契约息息相关。一、心理契约的内涵与意义心理契约这一概念是20世纪60 年代由Argyris(1960)提出并应用于管理领域的。心理契约是个人对他(她)将为企业作出的贡献和企业相应地给予个人的诱因的总的预期。个人对企业的贡献包括努力、技能、能力、时间以及忠诚等。企业给予个人的诱因包括有形的回报和无形的回报。有形的回报如薪资、职业成长机会等,无形的回报包括     

企业文化对员工心理契约的影响机制研究——以某高科技上市公司为例

本文的基本观点是,企业文化是通过影响员工心理契约的形成而发挥作用的。本研究发现,企业文化是员工心理契约形成的更一般性的基础,企业文化的特征将决定员工心理契约的性质。我们认为,员工心理契约是一个平衡结构,员工责任和组织责任在内容和强度上都需要平衡。     

基于心理契约的某流通企业员工忠诚度研究

员工对企业忠诚是企业稳定健康发展的一个重要条件,心理契约作为对经济契约的一个补充,是员工与企业之间的精神纽带.现实中员工与企业心理契约破裂和违背是造成企业中员工忠诚度下降的主要原因.员工忠诚度下降会严重影响企业核心竞争力.本文从心理契约的角度来发现某流通企业中员工忠诚度下降的因素,并针对这些因素给出基于心理契约的员工忠诚度的培养与提升方法,以期提高员工的忠诚度,促进企业的健康发展.     

基于心理契约的核心员工忠诚管理

核心员工作为企业最重要的人力资源,其对组织的忠诚度深刻地影响着企业的发展。心理契约作为企业与核心员工的心理纽带,是核心员工忠诚管理的前提和保证。因此,本文针对核心员工的特征,结合心理契约机制,提出了基于心理契约的核心员工忠诚管理策略。     

The selection of contracts in supply chains: An empirical analysis

This paper seeks to empirically identify the key drivers for firms in selecting a contract in a supply chain by investigating their performance, supply chain orientation, and supply chain integration. A conceptual model is drawn up based on the existing literature in supply chain coordination contracts, performance, supply chain orientation, and supply chain integration and tested on a large sample of European firms. Multiple and multinomial logistic regression models allow for estimating the relationships between these variables. Our results demonstrate that the selection of contracts and the probability of their adoption depend on several combinations of firms' performance, supply chain orientation, and integration. Overall, the research provides an empirical contribution to the literature on coordination with contracts, which turns out to be mainly game theory based.     

Contract ineffectiveness in emerging markets: An institutional theory perspective

The effectiveness of contracts is bounded by the institutional environment in which they are designed and enforced. When firms form supply chain partnerships in emerging markets, they may experience contract ineffectiveness, which is defined as a firm's perceived limits of contracts with respect to safeguarding interests and coordinating activities. Specifically, we identify two institutional factors that may give rise to contract ineffectiveness, information transparency and legal enforceability, as they determine how effectively a firm designs and enforces a contract. In addition, we reveal that contract ineffectiveness prompts a firm to seek social ties, including business ties and political ties, to overcome the institutionally induced limits of contracts. These efforts, however, are moderated by the type of predominant pressure a firm bears. While equity pressure strengthens the relationship between contract ineffectiveness and a firm's pursuit of social ties, efficiency pressure weakens this relationship, because seeking social ties imposes an extra burden of efficiency. Tested by data collected from 187 distributors in China, our study reveals the institutional causes and the consequences of contract ineffectiveness, which is a common problem encountered by firms when forming supply chain partnerships in emerging markets.     

Bank capital regulation,loan contracts,and corporate investment

This paper studies the link between bank capital regulation, bank loan contracts and the allocation of corporate resources across firms’ different business lines. Credit risk is lower when firms write contracts that oblige them to invest mainly into projects with highly tangible assets. We argue that firms have an incentive to choose a contract with overly safe and thus inefficient investments when intermediation costs are increasing in banks’ capital-to-asset ratio. Imposing minimum capital adequacy for banks can eliminate this incentive by putting a lower bound on financing costs.     

Contract employment policy and research productivity of knowledge workers: an analysis of Spanish universities

Abstract

This article investigates how contract employment practices adopted by universities—fixed-term contracts and permanent contracts—impact research productivity measured in terms of publications in scholarly journals. The empirical application considers the Spanish public higher education system for the period 2002–2008. We report an inverse U-shaped relationship between the rate fixed-term contracts and the research productivity of Spanish universities. That is, contract policies based on fixed-term contracts are conducive to research productivity; however, beyond a critical threshold value increases in the proportion of fixed-term contracts are associated with declining research productivity. These findings reveal that contract employment policies shape research productivity, and that flexible and balanced contract practices are critical for enhancing universities’ research productivity. The results suggest that the excessive use of fixed-term contracts might create an unstable working environment that limits the universities’ capacity to capitalize on their knowledge workers. Policy implications and future research avenues are discussed.     

The impact of the disposition effect on asset prices: insight from the NBA

In this paper we examine the price movements of contracts that represent bets on NBA games and find that the disposition effect causes significant deviations between contract prices and values. The contracts under examination are listed on Tradesports, a prediction market which provides an ideal venue for testing this and other behavioral theories because of its asset properties, market structure, and the absence of the joint hypothesis problem. In our analysis, we forecast the projected final combined scores of both teams in a contest based on observed within-game scores and game time remaining. At all points in time throughout each game, mean future returns (measured as Ticks to Expiry) should be no different than zero. However, we find that contracts which have fallen off pace to exceed the stated contract total become overpriced and experience negative future returns. Likewise, we provide evidence that contracts on games in which teams are on pace to exceed the stated total become underpriced and experience significantly positive future returns. These findings are consistent with the disposition effect in which traders tend to hold losing positions to avoid realizing losses yet prematurely unwind winning positions to realize gains.     

建设项目成本加酬金合同的激励效用研究

成本加酬金合同是一种常用的建设工程合同类型,应研究其不同激励形式对业主和承包商产生的不同效用.本文基于业主和承包商期望效用,应用委托-代理理论建立了有限责任合同、按固定份额分成合同、按约定公式分成合同等三类合同模式的激励模型.采用规划方法求出模型最优解、并讨论分析激励的实施效用.通过测算各种情况下各模式对业主和承包商的效用,经过求解不等式,可比较出各效用的大小,并可推广到固定总价合同模式.通过建立合同激励模型可进行效用测算,能帮助业主设计既能吸引承包商参与又能扩大业主自身效用的合同模式;也能帮助承包商识别并参与对自身效用较大的合同.     

Long-Term or Short-Term Managerial Incentive Contracts

This paper deals with the strategic role of the temporal dimension of contracts in a duopoly market. Is it better for a firm to sign long-term incentive contracts with managers or short-term contracts? For the linear case, with strategic substitutes (complements) in the product market, the incentive variables are also strategic substitutes (complements). It is shown that a long-term contract makes a firm a leader in incentives, while a short-term contract makes it a follower. We find that, under Bertrand competition, in equilibrium one firm signs a long-term contract and the other firm short-term incentive contracts; however, under Cournot competition, the dominant strategy is to sign long-term incentive contracts.     

企业融资交易的契约安排：一个交易费用经济学的分析框架

交易费用经济学理论将股权契约和债权契约视为对融资交易不同的契约治理结构。债权契约具有古典契约的特征,是一种按规则运作的契约治理结构;股权契约具有弹性治理的特征,是一种关系型契约治理结构。依据交易费用经济学理论关于交易与契约匹配的一般机理,可以得出融资交易的契约安排机理:低资产专用性融资交易选择债权契约,高资产专用性融资交易选择股权契约,中等资产专用性融资交易选择混合性融资契约,这既可达到交易费用的最小化,又可实现交易效率的最大化。究竟哪类契约在现实融资契约安排中占主导地位,这取决于融资交易包含的资产专用性大小。     

考虑政府补贴的绿色供应链契约分析及优化研究

以政府、供应商和制造商组成的绿色供应链为研究对象,探讨政府补贴和供应链契约对绿色供应链绩效的影响。构建了批发价格契约、收益共享契约和数量折扣契约模型,比较分析了不同契约下各主体效益及契约选择偏好,设计了收益共享且绿色投入成本共担契约来提高供应链绩效。研究发现:消费者绿色偏好越强烈,产品绿色度和供应链各主体效益越高;当产品绿色度相等时,制造商更倾向于选择批发价格契约,而供应商和政府更倾向于选择收益共享契约或数量折扣契约;相较于其他契约,设计的收益共享且绿色投入成本共担契约可以提高产品绿色度和企业效益。本文为考虑政府补贴的绿色供应链企业决策及选择合理的合作契约提供了理论支持。