A UNIFIED ANALYSIS OF TRADE GAINS IN THE PRESENCE OF PUBLIC GOODS*

It has long been known that free trade is potentially (after lumpsum compensatory transfers) beneficial for each trading country if the autarkic and post‐compensation free‐trade equilibria are perfectly competitive, with market distortions limited to non‐negative taxes on imports and exports. However these conditions are merely sufficient. It can now be shown that, under alternative sufficient conditions, free trade is potentially beneficial to each trading country even in the context of public goods.     

Extending the Sectoral Coverage of an International Emission Trading Scheme

In a model inspired by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, non-cooperative countries allocate their emissions to internationally trading and non-trading sectors. Each country is better off with trading than without, and aggregate welfare is maximized with all sectors in the trading scheme. We analyze the effects of extending the sectoral coverage of the trading scheme in a two-country model with quadratic abatement costs. If only the original trading sector is asymmetric between countries, the welfare change is always positive and the same in both countries. If the original and additional trading sectors are asymmetric, one country might lose, but there is an aggregate welfare gain. If the original trading sector and the non-trading sector are asymmetric, both countries always gain.     

The Torrens–Ricardo Principle of Comparative Advantage: an Extension*

The Torrens–Ricardo Principle of Comparative Advantage rests on the special assumptions that, both in autarky and under free trade, all countries can produce all commodities and that, in autarkic equilibrium, each country consumes all producible commodities, at least incipiently. We reformulate the Principle to accommodate alternative assumptions. In our reformulation the emphasis is on marginal rates of substitution, not on the traditional marginal rates of transformation in production. It is shown in effect that, in existing formulations, the supply side is assigned a role that it can rarely sustain.     

Cross-border mergers in vertically related industries

We construct a tractable model of an oligopolistic industry that allows us to capture the role of the vertical structure in the incentives for and implications of cross-border horizontal mergers. We show that vertical integration can increase the gains from cross-border mergers. We also demonstrate how market concentration interacts with costs in the decision of a relatively efficient foreign firm located in one country (source) to merge with a disintegrated or an integrated firm in another country (target) when the industry is vertically related. Absent any merger incentives in an autarkic equilibrium, we demonstrate that vertical integration can raise the incentives for diversification in production and add to the gains from cross-border horizontal mergers. Any additional gain from cross-border horizontal mergers, due to the existence of a vertically integrated production structure, is shown to be sensitive to the relative market concentration across countries. Cross-border mergers will be triggered by a relatively cost-efficient source taking over a disintegrated target when pre-merger competition among the disintegrated firms is relatively intense but, otherwise, the initial target will be a vertically integrated firm.     

考虑港口收费管制的进出口贸易竞争研究

考虑港口的收费管制因素,建立了进出口贸易竞争模型。该模型由一个出口国和两个进口国组成,且各国都拥有一个港口,位于出口国的两家公司均向两个进口国销售商品,并在各个进口国展开市场竞争（古诺竞争或伯川德竞争）,各贸易国的港口根据其是否存在价格管制确定港口收费。针对进出口公司的每种竞争模式,得到了不同的港口收费管制组合下各贸易国的港口收费、港口利润和社会福利,并将竞争均衡结果进行了比较。研究发现： （1）在进出口公司古诺竞争模式下,若三个贸易国的港口都无收费管制（有收费管制）且进出口产品的差异较大 （小）时,各贸易国的社会福利和港口利润均更高; （2）在进出口公司伯川德竞争模式下,若进出口产品的差异较大 （小）,则出口国的港口利润主要取决于港口收费 （贸易量）,而进口国恰好相反; （3）当进出口产品的差异较大 （小）时,进出口公司在古诺 （伯川德）竞争模式下各贸易国的社会福利、港口利润以及港口使用费都更高。     

Monetary equilibrium in an overlapping generations model with productive capital

Summary We study perfect foresight competitive equilibrium in an overlapping generations model with productive capital and a fixed nominal stock of money. We obtain almost-complete characterizations of (a) the existence of a monetary equilibrium from an arbitrary initial capital stock, and (b) the existence of anefficient monetary equilibrium from an arbitrary initial capital stock. When the initial capital stock is no larger than the golden rule stock, the necessary and sufficient condition for both (a) and (b) is the dynamic inefficiency (in the sense of Malinvaud) of the autarkic (or nonmonetary) equilibrium from the same initial stock. However, this condition, though necessary, isnot sufficient for the existence of a monetary equilibrium when the initial stock exceeds the golden rule stock (and still more conditions are needed for anefficient monetary equilibrium to exist). We provide characterizations for these cases, and as corollaries obtain examples in which (a) the nonmonetary equilibrium is inefficient but no monetary equilibrium exists, and (b) monetary equilibria exist but no efficient monetary equilibrium does.We are grateful to a co-editor and an anonymous referee for comments that greatly improved the exposition in the paper.     

Climate game analyses for CO2 emission trading among various world organizations

This paper simulates the saving in terms of the total abatement cost of CO₂ emission reductions for different trading games reflecting the potential cooperation among organizations including the European Union (EU), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries, the Union of South American Nations (USAN), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). A game approach is conducted to determine if the cooperation will come into existence among the organizations stated above. A similar idea is applied to the four largest emission countries, China, the United States, Russia, and India, as four individual players in the trading game.Joining the market is the strictly dominant strategy for any organization from the results. The Nash equilibrium shows that, regardless of the organizations that have already existed in the market, joining the market is always the best policy for the remaining organizations which are currently not in the market. Similarly, India likes the organization to which it belongs, i.e. IOR-ARC, to trade with the EU and APEC, and the U.S. wants the organization to which it belongs, i.e., APEC, to cooperate with the organizations USAN and IOR-ARC. However, China and Russia prefer trading with other countries within their own organizations.     

Vertical technology transfer and the welfare implications of patent protection

Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs between developed and developing-country firms, and many trading companies from developing countries create competition in the developed countries, yet the literature on intellectual property rights did not pay considerable attention to these aspects. In a Cournot oligopoly with vertical technology transfer, we show that patent protection in the developing country raises developed-country welfare if the following three conditions hold together: (i) patent protection in the developing country deters entry in the final goods market, (ii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant final goods sellers is sufficiently small, and (iii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant developing-country producers is sufficiently high. We also show that patent protection in the developing country always creates higher developing-country welfare if no developing-country firm enters the final goods market. We also discuss the implications of Bertrand competition on our results.     

CAN PRODUCTIVITY PROGRESS IN CHINA HURT THE USA? SAMUELSON'S EXAMPLE EXTENDED

Abstract.  This paper develops a general equilibrium three-goods Ricardian model that extends Samuelson's example on the impact of productivity progress. Our model highlights Samuelson's insight that productivity progress can change the pattern of trade and in turn can have dramatic welfare implications. It also shows that while Samuelson is correct that productivity growth in one country can hurt another, the loss is not as permanent as his example appears to suggest. Continuing productivity growth in one country is likely to benefit all trading countries in the long run.     

Tax Competition, Capital Mobility, and Public Good Provision Within a Trading Block

The authors examine a two–country general–equilibrium model of a two–country trading block where governments through tax policies attract mobile capital and provide an imported public consumption good. Within this framework the authors examine, among other things, how preferences over the public good and the size (population) of a country affect the Nash or cooperative equilibrium values of income tax rates in the two countries. The analysis identifies sufficient conditions under which (i) the Nash/cooperative equilibrium income tax rates are strategic substitutes or complements, and (ii) the Nash equilibrium income tax rates may be greater than the cooperative rates.     

A dynamic two country Heckscher–Ohlin model with non-homothetic preferences

We examine the properties of a two-country dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin model that allows for preferences to be non-homothetic. We show that the model has a continuum of steady state equilibria under free trade, with the initial conditions determining which equilibrium will be attained. We establish conditions under which a static Heckscher–Ohlin theorem will hold in the steady state, and also conditions for a dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin theorem to hold. If both goods are normal, each country will have a unique autarkic steady state, and all steady state equilibria are saddle points. We also consider the case in which one good is inferior, and show that this can lead to multiple autarkic steady states, violations of the static Heckscher–Ohlin theorem in the steady state. Furthermore, there may exist steady state equilibria that Pareto dominate other steady states. These steady states will be unstable if discount factors are the same in each country, although they may exhibit dynamic indeterminacy if discount factors differ.     

Partial International Coordination in the Great Fish War

This study extends the great fish war model of Levhari and Mirman [Levhari, D. and Mirman, L. (1980) Bell Journal of Economics 11: 322–344] by incorporating a multiple country context into the model and investigates the existence of a partial coordination Nash equilibrium. First, findings of this paper suggest that a partial coordination scheme is sustainable only in limited cases. Any coalition that has more than two member countries cannot be sustained. Second, the existence and the number of coordinating countries depend critically on the magnitude of the biological and preference parameters. Finally, if the coalition is assumed to be a dominant player, there always exist one or two welfare-improving sustainable coalitions and the size of the sustainable coalitions depends on the parameters of the problem.     

Spillovers from Foreign Exporters

We develop a general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous firms that accounts for productivity spillovers transmitted by foreign exporters. Everything else equal, stronger spillovers increase welfare. We embed the model framework into a trade policy scenario where countries strategically set inter‐country variable trade costs for the trading partner. In the strategic Nash‐equilibrium policy, governments trade‐off welfare gains from protectionism and those that are due to spillovers from foreign exporters. The equilibrium degree of protectionism is decreasing in the strength of the spillover. Policy coordination induces welfare gains but these gains can be hump‐shaped in the spillover strength.     

Strategic pollution control under free trade

This paper designs a reciprocal dumping model to address the control of industrial pollution between two trading partners. Firms generate transboundary pollution from production and environmental taxes represent the pollution control instrument. We ask whether environmental taxes implemented in a non-cooperative setting are more stringent than the globally efficient level. Relative to the globally efficient case, we find in the linear Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) context that the tax rate for both countries is smaller and individual emissions are larger. However, these results may not hold in the non-linear MPNE case depending on market structure and environmental conditions. Unlike the symmetric equilibrium case, the tax rates are always discontinuous under asymmetric MPNEs. The asymmetric equilibrium scenario can give rise to higher individual payoffs relative to the symmetric equilibrium case.     

Endogenous trading bloc formation in a North-South global economy

Abstract .  The majority of the trading blocs to date are between similar countries, rather than between developed and developing countries. This paper provides a rationale for why trading blocs among similar countries may arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. It develops a model of an asymmetric world economy in which there are at least four countries. The countries are differentiated with respect to their market size and they choose their trading partners. In the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, either there is global free trade or free trade areas are formed among similar countries.     

Gains From Trade in a Cournot–Nash General Equilibrium

It is shown that, in a context of Cournot–Nash general equilibrium, free trade is potentially gainful for each trading country. No restrictions are placed on the numbers of products, factors of production or countries, or on the nature of returns to scale. Moreover, preferences, techniques and factor endowments can differ from agent to agent.
JEL Classification Numbers: F10, F12, F13, F15.     

Moral Hazards,Bankruptcy Costs,and International Financial Capital Mobility*

Using a model with moral hazard and bankruptcy costs, we show that the direction of intertemporal trade between countries depends on differences in their autarkic distributions of wealth. We also examine the consequences of redistribution policies and bail‐out policies in this framework. We show that, in the presence of bankruptcy cost and capital market imperfections due to moral hazard, the very rich and the very poor do not undertake any risk and choose to be passive lenders. Only individuals whose wealth lies within an intermediate range choose to become entrepreneurs. Redistributive policies influence the supply of entrepreneurship and autarkic interest rates.     

International Economies of Scale and the Gains from Trade

In this paper, we present a two-country trade model with external economies of scale that emerge on an international level but are partially localized in each country. First, we show that the larger country exports the good produced in an industry with external economies of scale in the trading equilibrium. Second, we investigate the welfare effects of trade for the following two cases: (I) the case where external economies are completely localized in autarky; (II) the case where external economies are internationally effective in autarky. In case (II), it is shown that trade can be welfare-decreasing for both countries.     

IMPOVERISHING TECHNICAL AND PREFERENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS

Abstract.  Edgeworth showed that a free-trading country might be impoverished by its own technical improvements if they are confined to the export industry and if no good is inferior in consumption. More recently it has been shown that improvements confined to the country's import competing industry can never be impoverishing if, in that country, no commodity is inferior in consumption. However, in all available proofs of these propositions, it has been assumed that for each country there exists an autarkic equilibrium. It will be shown that, without that assumption, the second proposition must be severely qualified.     

Renegotiation-Proof Climate Agreements with Full Participation: Conditions for Pareto-Efficiency

Recent contributions show that climate agreements with broad participation can be implemented as weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria in simple models of greenhouse gas abatement where each country has a binary choice between cooperating (i.e., abate emissions) or defecting (no abatement). Here we show that this result carries over to a model where countries have a continuum of emission choices. Indeed, a Pareto-efficient climate agreement can always be implemented as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, for a sufficiently high discount factor. This means that one need not trade-off a “narrow but deep” treaty with a “broad but shallow” treaty.