The Vertical Multinational Enterprise and International Trade

This paper analyzes an endogenous vertical multinational enterprise by explicitly modeling a distortion in the intermediate goods sector. Firms invest abroad to lower the cost of multistage production. The implications for international trade and investment differ markedly from the conventional wisdom of multinationals. Particularly, intrafirm trade in intermediates implies vertical investment complements rather than substitutes for trade. The decision to become a multinational depends on the level on foreign factor prices, the nature of the competition with foreign suppliers, transport, tariffs, and subsidiary plant costs. Marginal change in tariff may result in unintended welfare jumps as firm configuration shifts.     

Efficiency in International Trade with Firm Heterogeneity and Networks

This paper examines integrated effects of firm heterogeneity and communication network services on international trade. Patterns and effects of trade are analyzed in a general equilibrium model where firms with different productivity levels share among them the cost of network services and compete in a monopolistically competitive market for a differentiated good. The paper reveals that the more efficient country in the production of the differentiated good is not always the net exporter of the good. The less efficient country also has the chance to expand the industry and then to become the net exporter in this intra‐industry trade due to the combination of the efficiency effect induced by firm heterogeneity and the cost‐sharing effect by the existence of the network service industry.     

Does trade liberalization increase global pollution?

In this paper we consider a simple duopoly market in which a home firm and a foreign firm use labor to produce an identical product and supply it to the home market. Firms emit pollution as a by-product of production. We show conditions under which international trade liberalization decreases (increases) the global pollution.     

International Organization of Production with Heterogeneous Firms

This paper presents a North–South model with differentiated goods being produced in the North. Each differentiated final good requires both management and manufacturing services as inputs, and firms are heterogeneous with regard to their productivity levels in providing these inputs. Two scenarios of relocating manufacturing to the South, which are interpreted to correspond to vertical foreign direct investment (FDI) and offshoring, are investigated. In both cases there is a minimum level of management productivity required for firms to benefit from relocation of manufacturing to the South. In the case of offshoring, productivity and profit gains are relatively larger for firms with low initial manufacturing productivity. Firms with high initial productivity in both aspects choose not to offshore owing to the presence of fixed costs. The model is subsequently used to examine the implications of global economic integration on the type of firm that exits an industry, changes production location or keeps manufacturing domestically.     

Competition Policy as Strategic Trade with Differentiated Products

The paper analyzes how countries use competition policy as a tool for strategic trade. In the model, two countries export to a third country. Each exporting country is endowed with a set of differentiated products. Each government chooses the number of exporters for its country and the products that each exporter sells in the first period, and a tax policy in the second period. Firms choose prices or quantities independently in the third period. In the unique subgame‐perfect equilibrium, both countries group all their products within a single firm—the “national champion policy.” We study the implication of different assumptions about the timing of the game.     

International Provision of Trade Services, Trade, and Fragmentation

This paper examines the special role that trade liberalization in service industries can play in stimulating not only trade in services but also in goods. International trade in goods requires inputs from several services industries (trade services, such as transportation, insurance, and finance) in order to complete and facilitate international transactions. Restriction on the ability of national service providers to provide these services across borders and within foreign countries creates additional costs and barriers to international trade above those that would arise in otherwise comparable intranational exchange. As a result, trade liberalization in services can yield benefits, by facilitating trade in goods, that are larger than one might expect from analysis of the services trade alone. This paper explores this idea using simple theoretical models to specify the relationships between services trade and goods trade. The paper also notes the role of services trade in a model of international industrial fragmentation, where production processes can be separated across locations but at some cost in terms of additional service inputs. The incentives for such fragmentation can be larger across countries than within countries, owing to the greater differences in factor prices and technologies available. However, the service costs of international fragmentation can also be larger, especially if regulations and restrictions impede the international provision of services. As a result, trade liberalization in services can also stimulate fragmentation of production of both goods and services, thus increasing international trade and the gains from trade even further.     

The value of online banking to small and medium-sized enterprises: evidence from firms operating in the uae free trade zones

This study estimates the willingness to pay of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) for a business online banking services. The estimation utilizes a contingent valuation method employing data from 400 SMEs in the United Arab Emirates free zones. An interval regression model is used to identify company characteristics affecting WTP. The results indicate an average WTP for online banking of $518.50 per month. Firms engaging in international trade value these services at least 10% more than those with only domestic operations. Other variables that significantly affect WTP include number of employees and the transportation cost of using traditional branch banking.     

Job Creation, Job Destruction, and the International Division of Labor

The authors incorporate equilibrium unemployment due to imperfect matching into a model of trade in intermediate inputs. Firms are assumed to be price‐takers and their size is given by technology. Firms enter the market as long as expected profits cover the search cost they incur initially; jobs are endogenously destroyed by random shocks that affect firms’ price–cost margins. Trade increases productivity in the final good and then demand for each intermediate input. Steady‐state unemployment is reduced after trade integration because the rate of job destruction is reduced, which in turn induces an indirect positive effect on job creation. A more volatile environment faced by firms does not necessarily increase unemployment. However, the rate of job destruction unambiguously rises, and rises more under free trade.     

GLOBALIZATION AND MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS

We present an international trade model with multiproduct firms. Firms are heterogeneously endowed with two types of capabilities that jointly determine the trade‐off within firms between managing a large portfolio of products and producing at low marginal cost. The model can explain many of the documented cross‐sectional correlations in firm performance measures, including why larger firms are more productive and more diversified, and yet more diversified firms trade at a discount. Globalization is shown to induce heterogeneous responses across firms in terms of scope and productivity, some of which are consistent with existing empirical work, whereas others are potentially testable.     

Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R&D Spillovers

Abstract. We analyze a situation where a principal wants to induce two firms to produce an output, for example electricity from renewable energy sources. Firms can undertake non-contractible investments to reduce production cost of the output. Part of these investments spills over and also reduces production cost of the other firm. Comparing a general price subsidy and an innovation tournament, we find that the principal's expected cost of implementing a given expected output is always higher under the tournament, even though this scheme may lead to more innovation.     

International Service Transactions: Is Time a Trade Barrier in a Connected World?

Firms’ international fragmentation of production has recently widened its focus from outsourcing of intermediates to off-shoring of business services such as software program development and international call center networks. Although many services are intangible and non-storable, gravity model estimates show that geographical distance between business partners matters less for commercial service transactions. Rather, time zones can be a driving force of international service trade by allowing for continuous operation over a 24 hours business day (continuity effect) when a proper division of labor is feasible and countries are connected to electronic communications infrastructure (ICT). But even when ICT provides alternatives for face-to-face interaction, time zones can act as a barrier when coordination problems with sleeping business partners occur (synchronization effect). In this paper, we find empirical evidence for the continuity effect in trade of business services, which is robust to measurement and sample size. Even more important is that the effect of time zones on service trade depends on access to ICT. An improvement of ICT infrastructure will affect business service trade at long time zone distances significantly more than trade at short time zone distances.     

Intermediate good sourcing,wages and inequality: From theory to evidence

This paper examines the consequences of offshoring and outsourcing on domestic wages and wage inequality. I highlight the role of labor market frictions in impacting firms’ outsourcing and offshoring decisions; specifically, how differential costs of matching with workers affect the location of production (onshore or offshore) and how differential costs of assessing worker quality affect the ownership of intermediate production (intra‐firm or inter‐firm). I demonstrate how firm sourcing decisions can depend crucially on the industry skill intensity, which reflects the importance of worker–firm match quality, and as a result, the effect of offshoring on domestic labor depends on occupation and industry characteristics, as well as the ownership regime of trade. Bringing the theory to the data I rely on plausibly exogenous variation in the cost of inter‐ and intra‐firm offshoring to identify the effects of a change in each type of offshoring on domestic wages. I find strong evidence that the effect of offshoring on domestic wages—both on the average and on the wage distribution—is governed by the type of offshoring (inter‐ vs. intra‐firm), the skill intensity of the industry, and the offshorability of the occupation.     

Breeding and raiding: A theory of strategic production of skills

Some of the skills that firms require are obtained only through on-the-job-training. This paper concentrates on the strategic production of skills within the firm. Firms obtain high-quality workers either by training their own (breeding) or by using the open market to bid away workers trained by other firms (raiding). Even when all firms have access to the same technology of production, training, and breeding, it will typically be the case that both breeding and raiding will be pursued, with equal profitability, in equilibrium. Thus, we explain raiding behavior as part of an equilibrium theory. This paper also studies the effect of the decision to train workers on the optimal firm size and the distribution of income.     

Consumer flexibility,data quality and location choice

We analyze firms’ location choices in a Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity, along addresses and transport cost parameters (flexibility). Firms can price discriminate based on perfect data on consumer addresses and (possibly) imperfect data on consumer flexibility. We show that firms’ location choices depend on how strongly consumers differ in flexibility. Precisely, when consumers are relatively homogeneous, equilibrium locations are socially optimal regardless of the quality of customer flexibility data. However, when consumers are relatively differentiated, firms make socially optimal location choices only when customer flexibility data becomes perfect. These results are driven by the optimal strategy of a firm on its turf, monopolization or market-sharing, which in turn depends on consumer heterogeneity in flexibility. Our analysis is motivated by the availability of customer data, which allows firms to practice third-degree price discrimination based on both consumer characteristics relevant in spatial competition, addresses and transport cost parameters.     

Manipulable behavior in international trade

In this paper, we present a Cournot duopoly model to analyze the manipulated behavior in international trade. The WTO is assumed as an arbitrator for the exchange in an oligopolistic industry and sets tariff rules according to the SDT principles; a firm's cost is private information both for the WTO and the foreign rivalries. Subsequent to our analysis of several cases we find that a firm may misreport to the WTO for more production revenue and the government may collude with a firm for higher welfare. It is shown that the misreporting and collusion incentives are related to the WTO tariff rule, the misreported cost and market size. Furthermore, a strategy proof tariff rule has been designed in which firms can never make his revenue better off by misreporting production cost.     

Is Corporate Social Responsibility Associated with Lower Wages?

Firms with a reputation as socially responsible may have an important cost advantage: If workers prefer their employer to be socially responsible, equilibrium wages may be lower in such firms. We explore this hypothesis, combining Norwegian register data with data on firm reputation collected by an employer branding firm. Adjusting for a large set of background variables, we find that the firm’s social responsibility reputation is significantly associated with lower wages.     

Explaining Export Performance through Inputs: Evidence from Aggregated Cross‐country Firm‐level Data

Which trade barrier related to intermediate inputs forms a greater burden on the export performance of firms in developing countries? Using aggregated cross‐country firm‐level data covering 43 mostly developing economies, this paper estimates the marginal importance of the impact of various intermediate input trade cost barriers, namely tariffs, non‐tariff barriers (NTBs) and services barriers, on firms' export behavior. In a cross‐sectoral setting, this paper takes the firm's export performance in goods as a central focus to study the effects of these different trade barriers through the exporting firm's choice of use of intermediate inputs. The results show that the most significant trade barriers on inputs that impede export performance in developing countries are mainly NTBs and restrictions of services.     

Welfare‐reducing Domestic Cost Reduction*

We show that cost reduction by a domestic firm may reduce domestic welfare if it changes a foreign firm’s production strategy from foreign direct investment to export. Domestic cost reduction can be welfare reducing when the domestic market is sufficiently small and domestic firm’s marginal cost of production is higher than the foreign firm’s marginal cost of production under foreign direct investment, which is a usual feature of trade between developed and developing countries. So, developing countries with small domestic markets need competent competition policies when encouraging domestic innovation and also trying to attract foreign direct investment.     

Firms as knowledge repositories

One reason firms exist is to serve as knowledge repositories. Firms compete against other firms and need profits to survive. Firms must be entrepreneurial to discover and act on profit opportunities. Knowledge required to spot profit opportunities is disbursed among economic actors and often is tacit knowledge that can only be obtained by those in close proximity. This gives rise to agglomeration economies, which can be leveraged within firms. In a competitive economy people have an incentive to keep knowledge from people in other firms, but to share it with those in their firm. One role of the firm is to act as a repository of knowledge for those within the firm’s boundaries, and to lower the cost of obtaining knowledge about profit opportunities. Entrepreneurs need firms to contain and capture the profits from their innovations.     

Location of public and private firms under endogenous timing of choices

This paper studies the choices of locations in a mixed duopoly when production costs are endogenously determined and the public firm maximizes a weighted sum of social surplus and its profits. We find that the locations of the two firms are decided simultaneously when the weight of the public firm’s profits in its objective function is high enough. When this is not the case we find that one firm (not always the public firm but sometimes also the private one) behaves as a leader in the choice of location and location decisions are made sequentially. Moreover, in equilibrium, the production cost of the public firm is never higher than that of the private firm.