Rivalry Restraint as Equilibrium Behavior

Rivalry restraint has received a lot of attention as a theory of profits in recent research on business strategy. Its economic rationale is explained as the consequences of either exogenous or endogenous anticompetitive forces present in different industries. In this paper, we use a dynamic oligopolistic industry model and show that rivalry restraint emerges as equilibrium behavior among firm owners who delegate decisions to managers. In the corresponding two‐stage game, managers choose optimal production rates in a dynamic Cournot market and owners set incentives for managers, acting sequentially rational. Equilibrium incentives correspond to rivalry restraint, that is, managers are less aggressive in the product market with lower outputs and increasing profits for all firms in the industry.     

会计信息交易与监管

本文提出了用经济学理论解释会计信息问题。会计信息是一种有价值的稀缺性经济资源,其获取可以降低利益相关者决策所面临的不确定性,改善决策者的决策效用,是一种特殊的商品,会计信息可在利益相关者之间进行交易。得出可以用厂商理论来解释会计信息交易行为以及国家作为监管机构所扮演的角色的结论。     

A Real Options Approach to Economic Exposure Management

Exchange rate volatility is not only a source of concern for firms but also of profit opportunities. If adjustment costs and lags are low, managers can adjust their input or output decisions to raise the firm's expected profits. Notwithstanding the resulting higher profit variability, the actual risk perceived by the managers may fall as they are probably more averse to downside risk—such as financial distress—than to risk in general. Hence, this paper argues that optimal economic exposure management consists of exploiting the upward profit potential of real exchange rate volatility, while keeping downside risk under control. It is shown that option theory provides useful new principles for economic exposure management by bringing out the crucial role of adjustment costs.     

经理人组合报酬激励契约模型研究

经理人报酬激励制度是现代企业激励机制的重要组成部分,现代经理人的报酬激励具有多种实现形式。为了激励经理人的有效行为,利用最优报酬契约经济理论构建了一个包含短期激励以及长期激励的财务性组合报酬契约模型,以及分析非财务性报酬对经理人行为选择的影响,是十分必要的,尤其是对我国国有企业经理人报酬激励制度优化问题,应该是很好的借鉴。     

Women managers in Poland and the United States: a comparative analysis

This paper compares women managers in Poland and the United States in the context of their contrasting political and economic systems—the socialism of Central and Eastern Europe and the liberal democratic tradition of the West. We discuss the two political philosophies and their impact on gender roles and labour markets, and then compare this theory to the reality of Poland's transition. Finally, this background is used to analyse differences between Polish women managers and their American counterparts.     

The historical roots of the democratic challenge to authoritarian management

Democracy is among the most misused words in our vocabulary and one of the most evanescent and slippery operational concepts. Sadly, although it should not come as a surprise, theory and reality often fail to mesh. This article provides an historical perspective on the participative management movement, based on the works of such theorists as Trist, Chandler, Taylor, and Fayol among others. It takes a critical look at the real problem facing managers today: How do we accommodate efficiency with democracy in a world where economic giants are subverting historical political sovereignties?     

分析现阶段工程建设项目中工程造价管理存在的问题

阐述了现阶段工程建设项目中工程造价管理存在的主要问题,为造价管理理论的研究起到抛砖引玉的作用,为项目管理者提供借鉴,使我国的建设项目能够健康发展,更好的为经济建设服务。     

Agency-Theory and Internal-Labor-Market Explanations of Bonus Payments: Empirical Evidence from Spanish Firms

This paper combines agency theory and internal-labor-market theories to explain the determinants of bonus payments among a large sample of top and middle managers from Spanish firms. A distinction is made between the decision whether to pay bonus or not and the size of the bonus. The empirical evidence confirms that the two decisions are determined by different factors. The results of the analysis show a trade-off between short-term and long-term incentives (bonuses and promotion opportunities) as well as differences in the pattern of compensation policies across economic sectors and functional areas inside the firm.     

The Boundaries of the Firm: The Choice Between Stand-Alone and Integrated Firms

This study presents a theory of corporate structure selection. It outlines when economic units should be structured as stand-alone firms versus an integrated firm (conglomerate). The theory suggests that an integrated firm better controls agency problems through yardstick competition between managers for project acceptance. However, this structure reduces the ability to receive division-specific project information from the market. Based on this trade-off, we show that divisions within a conglomerate have different characteristics and, thus, different valuations than "similar" stand-alone firms. Our theory also explains differences in the required rate of return between stand-alone firms and conglomerates and how they relate to relative valuations of conglomerates and "similar" stand-alone firm. It also predicts when stock price reaction to divestiture and merger announcements will be positive or negative.     

Aqui No Se Habla Agencia.* An Examination of the Impact of Adverse Selection and Framing in Decision‐Making: a US/Mexico Comparison

US companies seeking cheaper labor or extraordinary returns have often seen foreign direct investment as a panacea. However, many of these companies founder on the horns of a control dilemma. While raw economic data such as labor rates prove to be true, productivity and decision‐making styles are so different that companies fail to maximize their investment returns. This situation is worsened as companies attempt to impose culturally inappropriate home country controls on their foreign investment. This study examines one of the potential sources of failure, escalation of commitment, which occurs when decision‐makers over‐commit incremental resources to failing investments without reasonable probability of recovery. This behavior has been widely documented in US domestic literature (see Whyte and Hook, 1997 , for a summary). However, there is also some evidence that such behavior is culturally bounded ( Chow et al., 1997; Sharp and Salter, 1997; Greer and Stephens, 2001 ). This study extends previous findings on cross‐cultural differences in decision‐making among managers by comparing the responses of managers in the USA and Mexico to an escalation of commitment exercise. The cross‐cultural validity of two US based theories, agency (adverse selection) and framing (prospect theory), is tested. The results indicate that at base Mexican managers were more risk seeking. However managers from the more individualistic USA were significantly more likely than Mexican managers to escalate in the presence of agency (adverse selection) based incentives. Negative framing among managers was universal in escalating commitment.     

Strategizing Environmental Policy and Compliance for Firm Economic Sustainability: Evidence from Taiwanese Electronics Firms

This study aims to examine whether the compliance of environmental policies can sustain firm economic performance, and whether a timing issue is relevant to firm economic sustainability in pursuit of eco‐friendly efforts. Offering models predominantly based on the institutional theory, this study tests hypotheses using data from 284 companies in the electronics sector in Taiwan during the period from 1997 to 2010. The findings reveal that the execution of environment policies mostly improves firm economic sustainability and some joint green efforts can even strengthen such sustainability; however, firms aiming to sustain their economic performance should not hasten to undertake eco‐friendly efforts, implying that first movers may not be guaranteed firm economic performance. Thus, managers should carefully strategize their green efforts to comply with environmental policies, and execute them in due course to prevent disadvantages, such as market uncertainty and complexity of green practices, while conquering organizational inertia. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

电力企业考核模式研究

经公司化改组后的电力企业自主经营、自负盈亏，成为市场竞争主体。企业管理者既要搞好企业生产经营管理工作，又要做好市场竞争工作，急需—套符合市场经济特点的考核模式理论来指导工作，从而做出正确的生产经营和市场竞争决策。对此，文章提出了关于经济责任制指标测算原则的几点建议。     

会计政策选择的经济后果博弈分析

本文认为,会计政策选择对财务报表的各种使用者具有经济后果。由于信息不对称而形成的逆向选择和道德风险的存在,使得企业内部管理者可以通过会计政策选择来损害外部投资者利益。在经济后果范围内将信息披露问题,利用博弈理论在管理者与投资者之间进行分析非常重要。研究发现,在存在不利经济后果时,由于信息不对称产生的负面效果使得博弈双方走入了“囚徒的困境“。     

Managing Change,or Changing Managers? The role of middle managers in UK public service reform

Abstract

Drawing upon interview data from three case study organizations, we examine the role of middle managers in UK public service reform. Using theory fragments from organizational ecology and role theory, we develop three role archetypes that middle managers might be enacting. We find that rather than wholesale enactment of a ‘change agent’ role, middle managers are balancing three predominant, but often conflicting, change-related roles: as ‘government agent’, ‘diplomat administrator’ and, less convincingly, ‘entrepreneurial leader’. Central government targets are becoming the main preoccupation for middle managers across many public services and they represent a dominant constraint on allowing ‘managers to manage’.     

The effects of corporate antitakeover provisions on long-term investment: empirical evidence

This paper's empirical results indicate that the average effect of antitakeover provisions on subsequent long‒term investment is negative. The interpretation of these results depends on whether one thinks that there was too much, too little, or just the right amount of long‒term investment prior to the antitakeover provision adoption. We use agency theory to devise more refined empirical tests of the effects of antitakeover provision adoption by managers in firms with different incentive and monitoring structures. Governance variables (e.g. percentage of outsiders on corporate boards, and separate CEO/chairperson positions) have an insignificant impact on subsequent long‒term investment behavior. However, consistent with agency theory predictions, managers in firms with better economic incentives (higher insider ownership) tend to cut subsequent long‒term investment less than managers in firms with less incentive alignment. Furthermore, managers in firms with greater external monitoring (due to higher institutional ownership) also tend to cut subsequent long‒term investment less than managers in firms with less external monitoring. Thus, the decrease in subsequent long‒term investment is significantly less for firms where the managers have greater incentives to act in shareholders' interests. Finally, there are interesting effects of the control variables. First, high book equity/market equity firms cut total long‒term investment more. Second, firms that were takeover targets or rumored to be takeover targets cut long‒term investment more. These results suggest that inefficient firms cut long‒term investment more when an antitakeover provision is adopted. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Humankapital deutscher Fußballmanager

Based on the human-capital-theory we analyse the effects of managers’ characteristics on the sportive success of soccer-clubs. Relevant characteristics are a previous career as a player or trainer, an apprenticeship or academic study and the work experience as a manager. Over the last twenty years the proportion of managers with an economic education doubled. This general human capital affects success less complementarily than as a substitutive for sector- or club-specific human capital in terms of a previous career as a player. The work experience as a manager correlates positively with the teams’ league ranking. These results allow recommendations for recruiting new managers.     

管理哲学时代的现实基础及哲学依据

随着经济全球化程度的不断加深,管理活动面临着越来越复杂的挑战,从而要求管理者从更高层次的哲学思维上把握管理活动,指导管理实践,预示着管理哲学时代的到来。主旨通过分析管理哲学时代的特征,揭示其现实基础、哲学依据,以使人们更好地认识和把握这一时代,有效地促进管理理论和实践的创新。     

“双主”企业培训教学设计的模式研究

企业的经济环境、社会环境、政治环境、技术环境和生态环境在不断变化。如何使企业适应变化、参与竞争、开拓市场,是企业管理者迫切需要解决的问题。由于企业培训十分注重成本/效益比,这与教学设计的思想不谋而合。教学设计能为企业培训与开发提供科学理论与具体实践,其中“双主”企业培训教学设计模式的应用势必给企业培训过程带来巨大的影响。     

The Role of Institutional and Economic Factors in the Strategic Use of Non-GAAP Disclosures to Beat Earnings Benchmarks

Abstract

We use hand-collected data for a sample of large European firms to investigate the influence of countries’ institutional and economic factors on managers’ non-generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) disclosures. We find that managers are more likely to use non-GAAP measures to meet or beat earnings benchmarks that GAAP earnings would miss in countries with efficient law and enforcement, strong investor protection, developed financial markets, and good communication and dissemination of information. We also find that managers in countries with developed institutional and economic conditions are more likely to adjust non-GAAP earnings for recurring expenses such as R&D, depreciation, and stock-based compensation expenses. Our findings suggest that in environments in which there is more pressure to achieve earnings benchmarks and less opportunity to manipulate GAAP earnings, managers use more non-GAAP earnings disclosures to meet the benchmarks.     

论组织内中层管理者的角色困惑与定位

中层管理者作为组织管理的重要环节,担负着承上启下的重任,是组织高层、联系基层的工作纽带。不管是处于经济的繁荣期还是衰退期,他们都负责执行组织战略,推动组织变革,并且推动基层员工积极参与组织建设,因此,组织内中层管理者必须准确定位。本文就新形势下中层管理者面临的角色困惑与定位,提出中层管理者应该成为组织决策坚定的执行者、有效引领下属的管理者、组织文化建设积极的参与者、卓有成效的自我治理者。最后提出了中层管理者管理能力提高的三大要点。