Overinvestment and fraud

We analyze the interactions between two managerial tasks: investing and revealing information. We assume that a manager can invest influencing the firm’s quality, then he reports this quality to investors. Whenever truthful reporting is not an equilibrium, the manager has incentives to overinvest relative to shareholders. Therefore, the potential for market manipulation is the key in understanding investment policy; it is the desire to manipulate prices that leads to inefficient investment. Also, more manipulation occurs when the manager is in control, so prices are less informative. Finally, we show that the manager is better off with an exogenous reporting policy.     

Location of industry, market size, and imperfect international capital mobility

This paper examines the impact of imperfect international capital mobility on an industrial location when increasing returns are present. When the international capital mobility is perfect, agglomeration of manufacturing firms progresses with a decline in transportation costs of manufactured goods, and full-agglomeration in a large-market country is observed at low transportation costs. In contrast, when international capital mobility is imperfect, agglomeration in a large-market country progresses with capital trade integration. When the transportation costs of manufactured goods are low, all capital holders in two countries invest their capital into a home market.     

Seller Financing of Consumer Durables

Sellers of consumer durables often provide financing to customers. This paper shows that when customers desire consumption smoothing and when financial markets are imperfect, a seller can find it optimal to offer a menu of deferred-payment plans. A monopolist seller price discriminates among customers with different intertemporal income profiles by making such menu offers, and the interest rate on the seller credit can be significantly lower than the market borrowing rate. Seller financing can be an equilibrium outcome in a game where sellers and banks with market power choose payment plans and interest rates strategically.     

Verifiable wage offers and recontracting: effect on wage and consumption profiles

This paper analyzes the effect of recontracting and matching verifiable wage offers on the intertemporal structure of contract wage and consumption profile for a two-period economy. A contract firm provides specific training for a worker during the first period, which increases his productivity if he stays in the second period, but the worker may quit to accept an alternative wage offer after a successful search. Wage offers are private to the worker but can be presented to the contract firm for matching. This paper shows that when capital markets are imperfect and wage offers are verifiable, the contract firm recontracts and matches any wage offers the worker receives up to the second-period productivity. The ex ante contract wage profile will be flat. Inefficient quits will be eliminated and there will be complete ex ante consumption smoothing. It is significant to note that the result of rising wage profile derived in numerous contract models is fragile with respect to assumptions on mechanism of interfirm labor mobility.     

Venture capital and entrepreneurship: a conceptual model and research suggestions

This paper discusses the relationship between entrepreneurship, as an important factor to enhance the competitiveness of enterprises, and venture capital (VC) in the context of China which has an emerging and immature market with high proportion of state-owned capital, imperfect legal system, inexperienced investors, and wrong market orientation. According to the exsisting literature and the development of Chinese VC industry, the conceptual framework we propose has five main elements: characteristics of VC, contextual issues in China, the meaning of the entrepreneurship, influence mechanism, and outcomes, including the change of entrepreneurship at individual and firm level as well as region and industry level. In addition to taking into account the selection preference of VC, two-sided moral hazard problem, and the special situation of Chinese market, the authers provide three suggestions for further empirical research to identify the effect of VC more precisely.     

Who is more aggressive under vertical product differentiation?

In this paper, we introduce quality differences in vertical market and compare the managerial delegation contracts of downstream firms. We find that the owner of a downstream firm that produces low-quality products induces the manager to behave more aggressively when the marginal cost coefficient is low. While when marginal cost coefficient is high, the owner of a downstream firm that produces high-quality products induces the manager to behave more aggressively. It is further found that managerial delegation can improve the profits of downstream firms but reduce the consumer surplus and social welfare.     

Imitation and price competition in a differentiated market

We study the stable market outcome that evolves in a spatially differentiated market when price-competing firms choose actions by imitation of the most profitable firm. We compare and contrast the stable outcomes under two imitation procedures: one, where each firm immediately imitates the most profitable firm, and the other when a firm imitates another firm only if it is more profitable while being “sufficiently similar” (in context of the market segment it operates in) or “sufficiently close”. In either case, the symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium is always a stable outcome. However, when imitation of the most profitable firm is immediate and market differentiation is ‘moderate’, states with prices lower than the Nash equilibrium are also stable. In contrast, when imitation of the most profitable firm is more gradual and market differentiation is below a threshold, states with prices above the Nash equilibrium are also stable. Thus, while competitive evolutionary pressure in this imitation based model does result in the Nash equilibrium always being stable, other outcomes may be stable as well. Interestingly, the states that are stable under gradual imitation give the firms a higher profit than the stable states under immediate imitation.     

Tax progression and training in a matching framework

This paper investigates the effect of tax progression on labour market outcomes in an equilibrium search model with wage bargain and endogenous training decisions. We find that the effect of tax progression on training depends crucially on which party invests and the tax function that is considered. When the firm invests, a higher tax progression may increase training levels. Moreover, when a complete contract is possible or when the firm invests, the optimal tax rate in a model with endogenous human capital is at least as high as in a model with exogenous human capital.     

Shadow costs of incomplete information and short sales in the valuation of the firm and its assets

This paper presents a simple framework for the valuation of compound options within shadow costs of incomplete information and short sales. The shadow cost includes two components. The first component is the product of pure information cost due to imperfect knowledge and heterogeneous expectations. The second component represents the additional cost caused by the short-selling constraint. Information costs are linked to Merton's (1987. Journal of Finance 42, 510) model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information, CAPMI. This model is extended by Wu et al. (1996. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 7, 136) who propose an incomplete-information capital market equilibrium with heterogeneous expectations and short sale restrictions, GCAPM. This model is used in our paper to provide for the first time in the literature analytic solutions for derivatives in the presence of both shadow costs of incomplete information and short sales.When deriving the compound call option formula, we consider a call option on a stock, which is itself an option on the assets of the firm. Our methodology incorporates shadow costs of incomplete information and short sales on the firm's assets as well as the effects of leverage in the capital structure. The formula can be useful in the valuation of several corporate liabilities in the presence of information uncertainty and short sales constraints about the firm and its cash flows. Our analysis can be used for the valuation of several real options.     

Dividend policy and investment: Theory and evidence from US panel data

This paper examines the importance of dividend policy and liquidity constraints in the context of the firm's investment behaviour. While early financial literature has argued that dividend policy should be independent of firm investment decisions, recent studies indicate that linkages are probable in a world of imperfect capital markets. This study develops an alternative Q specification which incorporates the actual dividend payment of the firm in order to test the hypothesis of independence. Empirical results suggest that after controlling for the firm's dividend payment, liquidity constraints remain an important determinant of firm investment behavior.     

Will We Ever Meet Again? The Relationship between Inter-Firm Managerial Migration and the Circulation of Client Ties

A large body of research shows that the migration of managers from one professional service firm to another weakens the old employer’s relationship with its clients, because migrating managers remove their relationship-specific knowledge and expertise – i.e., human and social capital – from their old employers, redeploying it to their new employers. This study extends this research by introducing a bi-directional perspective of social capital in which both firms and managers may exploit these relationship-specific resources. We use theory on social capital to build arguments about how one form of manager mobility, manager migration between two service providers in a single market, can both lead and lag the movement of client ties between those providers, and signaling theory to hypothesize the conditions under which this is likely to occur. Analyses using longitudinal data on New York City advertising agencies generally support our arguments. Our findings contribute to theory and research on manager migration, social capital, and signaling, and raise new questions for how the portability of relationship-specific social capital shapes markets.     

Organization of innovation and capital markets

This paper develops a theory of the firm scope where not only research but also ordinary production employees can generate inventions. Separating research from production (“specialization”) solves the two-tier agency problem of inducing simultaneously research effort and managerial truthful-reporting but is costly when capital markets are imperfect. Improvements in capital markets, therefore, promote specialization, allowing a greater number of specialized firms to be established and also enabling them to undertake innovative projects with larger potential outcomes. Moreover, this capital market improvement effect is stronger for innovative activities that are less capital-intensive and that have weaker synergies with existing production activities. The model can help us understand the explosion of small company innovation in the U.S. since late 1970s and the contribution of venture capital to this change.     

Why More Forward-Looking Accounting Standards Can Reduce Financial Reporting Quality

A premise of standard setters and of much empirical research is that improving the quality of accounting standards and their implementation increases information in capital markets. This paper challenges this premise and shows that there are situations in which ‘better’, that is, more forward-looking, accounting standards reduce the information content of financial reports. The reason is that a forward-looking accounting standard affects the smoothness of reported earnings, which can conflict with the manager's smoothing incentive and her willingness to incorporate private information in the financial report. Although the manager could eliminate the effect by earnings management, it is too costly to do so. As a consequence, the capital market's ability to infer the financial and nonfinancial information in reported earnings declines. This finding should increase the awareness that an ‘improvement’ in accounting standards, without considering incentives and other information residing in firms, can adversely affect the quality of financial reporting.     

Product–market flexibility and capital structure

Many companies have the ability to adjust their product's price and/or quantity in response to changes in the marketplace. We show that this product–market flexibility or market power, hitherto ignored in the contingent-claim modeling literature, can potentially have a significant effect on the corporate capital structure decision. When the firm is operating at full capacity, product–market flexibility is not important, hence market power has a negligible effect on optimal capital structure. However, when operating below capacity, product–market flexibility becomes important and market power has, in general, a positive effect on optimal debt level and optimal leverage ratio. This is consistent with available empirical evidence. Numerical results indicate that the effect of product–market flexibility on optimal debt level and optimal leverage ratio can potentially be large enough to be economically significant, hence it should not be ignored as a determinant of capital structure.     

Investments in flexible production capacity

We examine the technology and capacity choice problem of a multi-output firm facing stochastic demands in a continuous-time framework. The firm can install output-specific capital, or, at greater cost, flexible capital that can be used to produce different outputs. Investment is irreversible. The firm must choose a technology and decide how much capital to install, knowing it can add more later as demand evolves. We formulate the capacity choice problem as a singular stochastic control problem, show that the value of the firm equals the value of its installed capital plus the value of its options to add capacity in the future, and derive an optimal investment rule that maximizes the firm's market value. We also address the analogous problem for a multi-input firm that faces stochastically evolving factor costs, and can install input-specific or flexible capital.     

Capital procurement of a consumer cooperative: Role of the membership market

Cooperative firms are commonly thought to be financially weak and unable to flourish in the market economy. This paper addresses the idea that a consumer cooperative issues a membership, which represents an ownership share in the cooperative, as a method of procuring equity capital. It then shows that, in theory, consumer cooperatives are not necessarily financially weaker than investor-owned firms in the presence of a membership market. This implies that the consumer cooperative is potentially a promising alternative to the investor-owned firm when the latter type of firm induces serious market failure in the product market.     

Cournot duopoly and insider trading with two insiders

We study the effect of competition among insiders in an extension of the static Kyle [Kyle, A. (1985). Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica, 53, 1315–1335] model of insider trading introduced by Jain and Mirman (JMC) [Jain, N., & Mirman, L.J. (2002). Effects of insider trading under different market structures. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 42, 19–39]. In the JMC model competition in the real sector is introduced. In this paper we introduce competition in the stock sector in the JMC model by assuming that there is a manager who is responsible for making the real decisions of the firm as well as an ‘owner’ who has the same information as the manager but has no managerial responsibilities. In this way we can study the interaction between competition in the real sector and competition in the financial sector. We show that the stock price set by the market makers reveals more information than in the JMC model and that the expected equilibrium values of the manager’s profits sometimes decline and sometimes increase depending on the exogenous parameters of the model. Moreover, we prove that due to the competition in the financial sector, the level of output produced by the firm is less than in JMC. Finally, we also study the effect of financial competition in the case in which the market makers receive only one signal and analyze the comparative statics in this case.     

Integrated reporting of environmental,social, and governance and financial data: Does the market value integrated reports?

The concept of reporting nonfinancial information within the annual report, so‐called Integrated Reporting (IR) is a rising topic in reporting practice. Supporters claim that IR provides a better view regarding the value creation of a firm. This study investigates the value relevance of IR and the influence of certain characteristics such as assurance. Thus, this paper contributes to the existing literature by examining the actual advantages for firms when adopting an IR approach. The Ohlson model is applied for the market valuation of 50 companies of the STOXX Europe 50 between the years 2010 and 2016. The results of this study support the cost‐concerned school by showing a negative influence on the market value. Nonetheless, the study suggests that the quality of the reports is relevant for market valuation, as the negative effect is mitigated by the quality of the reports.     

Common holdings and strategic manager compensation: The case of an asymmetric triopoly

We study an asymmetric triopoly in a heterogeneous product market where quantity decisions are delegated to managers. The two biggest firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds, whereas the smallest firm is owned by independent shareholders. Under such a common holding owner structure, the owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing their manager compensation schemes. This coordination leads to a reallocation of production and induces a redistribution of profits. The trade volume in the market is reduced so that shareholder coordination is detrimental to consumer surplus as well as welfare.     

上市公司的股权结构、控制权溢价及其影响因素分析

本文从我国上市公司的股权结构入手分析控制权溢价的形成机制和影响因素。认为我国上市公司独特的股权结构所造成的大股东控制和内部人控制,使我国的控制权市场更多的表现为大股东和内部人获取控制权溢价的场所,而我国控制权转移中经常采用的协议转让方式又为控制权溢价的实现提供了便利条件。此外,股权转让比例、目标公司规模等因素影响了控股股东和内部控制人控制权收益的预期,从而影响了控制权溢价。