Getting real about virtual commerce

In its first generation, electronic commerce has been a landgrab. Space on the Internet was claimed by whoever got there first with enough resources to create a credible business. It took speed, a willingness to experiment, and a lot of cybersavvy. Companies that had performed brilliantly in traditional settings seemed hopelessly flat-footed on the Web. And despite their astronomical valuations, the new e-commerce stars have appeared to be just as confused. Many have yet to make a profit, and no one has any idea when they will. Now, the authors contend, we are entering the second generation of e-commerce, and it will be shaped more by strategy than by experimentation. The key players--branded-goods suppliers, physical retailers, electronic retailers, and pure navigators--will shift their attention from claiming territory to defending or capturing it. They will be forced to focus on strategies to achieve competitive advantage. Success will go to the businesses that get closest to consumers, the ones that help customers navigate their way through the Web. Indeed, the authors argue, navigation is the battlefield on which competitive advantage will be won or lost. There are three dimensions of navigation: Reach is about access and connection. Affiliation is about whose interests the business represents. And richness is the depth of the information that a business gives to or collects about its customers. Navigators and e-retailers have the natural advantage in reach and affiliation, while traditional product suppliers and retailers have the edge in richness. The authors offer practical advice to each player on competing in the second generation of e-commerce.     

Get the right mix of bricks & clicks

The bright line that once distinguished the dot-com from the incumbent is rapidly fading. Success in the new economy will go to those who can execute clicks-and-mortar strategies that bridge the physical and virtual worlds. But how executives forge such strategies is under considerable debate. Despite the obvious benefits that integration offers--cross-promotion, shared information, purchasing leverage, distribution economies, and the like--many executives now assume that Internet businesses have to be separate to thrive. They believe that the very nature of traditional business--its protectiveness of current customers, its fear of cannibalization, its general myopia--will smother any Internet initiative. Authors Ranjay Gulati and Jason Garino contend that executives don't have to make an either- or choice when it comes to their clicks-and-mortar strategies. The question isn't, "Should we develop our Internet channel in-house or launch a spin-off?" but rather, "What degree of integration makes sense for our company?" To determine the best level of integration for their companies, executives should examine four business dimensions: brand, management, operations, and equity. Drawing on the experiences of three established retailers--Office Depot, KB Toys, and Rite Aid--the authors show the spectrum of strategies available and discuss the trade-offs involved in each choice. By thinking carefully about which aspects of a business to integrate and which to keep distinct, companies can tailor their clicks-and-mortar strategy to their own particular market and competitive situation, dramatically increasing their odds of e-business success.     

Future space. A new blueprint for business architecture

Although the Internet is an essential conduit for many business activities, it isn't rendering the physical world any less important, as the failures of many Web merchants demonstrate. People need social and sensual contact. The companies that succeed will be those best able to integrate the physical and the virtual. But that requires a new kind of business architecture--a new approach to designing stores, offices, factories, and other spaces where business is conducted. The author, a faculty member at Harvard Graduate School of Design, provides practical guidelines to help managers and entrepreneurs think creatively about the structures in which their businesses operate. He outlines four challenges facing designers of such "convergent" structures, so-called because they function in both physical and virtual space: matching form to function, allowing visitors to visualize the presence of others, personalizing spaces, and choreographing connectivity. Using numerous examples, from a fashion retailer that wants to sell in stores as well as through a Web site to a radically new kind of consulate, the author shows how businesses can meet each challenge. For instance, allowing customers to visualize the presence of others means that visitors to a Web site should be given a sense of other site visitors. Personalizing physical and virtual spaces involves using databases to enable those spaces to adapt quickly to user preferences. The success of companies attempting to merge on-line and traditional operations will depend on many factors. But without a well-designed convergent architecture, no company will fully reap the synergies of physical space and Internet technology.     

Making business sense of the Internet

For managers in large, well-established businesses, the Internet is a tough nut to crack. It is very simple to set up a Web presence and very difficult to create a Web-based business model. Established businesses that over decades have carefully built brands and physical distribution relationships risk damaging all they have created when they pursue commerce through the Net. Still, managers can't avoid the impact of electronic commerce on their businesses. They need to understand the opportunities available to them and recognize how their companies may be vulnerable if rivals seize those opportunities first. Broadly speaking, the Internet presents four distinct types of opportunities. First, it links companies directly to customers, suppliers, and other interested parties. Second, it lets companies bypass other players in an industry's value chain. Third, it is a tool for developing and delivering new products and services to new customers. Fourth, it will enable certain companies to dominate the electronic channel of an entire industry or segment, control access to customers, and set business rules. As he elaborates on these four points, the author gives established companies a systematic way to sort through the risks and rewards of doing business in cyberspace.     

Creating corporate advantage

What differentiates truly great corporate strategies from the merely adequate? How can executives at the corporate level create tangible advantage for their businesses that makes the whole more than the sum of the parts? This article presents a comprehensive framework for value creation in the multibusiness company. It addresses the most fundamental questions of corporate strategy: What businesses should a company be in? How should it coordinate activities across businesses? What role should the corporate office play? How should the corporation measure and control performance? Through detailed case studies of Tyco International, Sharp, the Newell Company, and Saatchi and Saatchi, the authors demonstrate that the answers to all those questions are driven largely by the nature of a company's special resources--its assets, skills, and capabilities. These range along a continuum from the highly specialized at one end to the very general at the other. A corporation's location on the continuum constrains the set of businesses it should compete in and limits its choices about the design of its organization. Applying the framework, the authors point out the common mistakes that result from misaligned corporate strategies. Companies mistakenly enter businesses based on similarities in products rather than the resources that contribute to competitive advantage in each business. Instead of tailoring organizational structures and systems to the needs of a particular strategy, they create plain-vanilla corporate offices and infrastructures. The company examples demonstrate that one size does not fit all. One can find great corporate strategies all along the continuum.     

The new deal at the top

What makes a company strategically agile--able to alter its strategies and business models rapidly in response to major changes in its market space, and to do so repeatedly without major trauma? Three years of in-depth case research on a dozen large companies worldwide showed the authors that one key factor is a new leadership model at the top. Senior executives at agile companies assume collective rather than individual responsibility for results. They build interdependencies among units and divisions, motivating themselves to engage with one another, and carefully manage their dealings to promote collaboration that is frequent, intense, informal, open, and focused on shared issues and the long term. Challenges to conventional thinking are encouraged. This is the new deal, and it's not easy to strike, because it requires executives to act in ways that are far from comfortable. After all, the corporate ladder at most firms favors independent types with a deep need for power and autonomy. At executive meetings, disagreement is suppressed or expressed passive-aggressively, eroding any real sense of belonging to a team. Switching to the new deal almost always requires a huge shift in the company's culture, values, and norms of interaction. The authors describe three approaches to making the shift: Executives can be given formal responsibility not for a business unit but for different stages in the company's value chain. This worked well for SAP, which has a relatively focused business portfolio. When a company's portfolio is less uniform, like Nokia's, business and functional units can be organized to crisscross on a matrix. And when a company is widely diverse, like easyGroup, it can emphasize the learning opportunities that units with common business models may share.     

The surprising economics of a "people business"

When people are your most important asset, some standard performance measures and management practices become misleading or irrelevant. This is a danger for any business whose people costs are greater than its capital costs-that is, businesses in most industries. But it is particularly true for what the authors call "people businesses": operations with high employee costs, low capital investment, and limited spending on activities, such as R&D, that are aimed at generating future revenue. If you run a people business-or a company that includes one or more of them how do you measure its true performance? Avoid the trap of relying on capital-oriented metrics, such as return on assets and return on equity. They won't help much, as they'll tend to mask weak performance or indicate volatility where it doesn't exist. Replace them with financially rigorous people-oriented metrics-for example, a reformulation of a conventional calculation of economic profit, such as EVA, so that you gauge people, rather than capital, productivity. Once you have assessed the business's true performance, you need to enhance it operationally (be aware that relatively small changes in productivity can have a major impact on shareholder returns); reward it appropriately (push performance-related variable compensation schemes down into the organization); and price it advantageously (because economies of scale and experience tend to be less significant in people businesses, price products or services in ways that capture a share of the additional value created for customers).     

金融EDI的运用与商业银行竞争力的提升

电子化技术带给金融业的不仅仅是速度和工具,而且是方式、过程、体制、观念等的变革.当电子商务活动中的一些关键步骤如采购订单和发票等均采用电子技术处理后,资金的支付和流转如果采用纸张传递的传统方式来处理,那么这种经营方式的滞后必然会影响到企业和公司整个商务活动链的有效运作和发展.随着EDI(Electronic Data Interchange)在一系列商业活动中的广泛应用,许多公司和企业对于将EDI的应用范围扩大到支付领域有着强大的需求.我国加入WTO后,金融等服务行业应积极采用EDI技术,以面对来自外部世界的竞争.     

Why business models matter

"Business model" was one of the great buzz-words of the Internet boom. A company didn't need a strategy, a special competence, or even any customers--all it needed was a Web-based business model that promised wild profits in some distant, ill-defined future. Many people--investors, entrepreneurs, and executives alike--fell for the fantasy and got burned. And as the inevitable counterreaction played out, the concept of the business model fell out of fashion nearly as quickly as the .com appendage itself. That's a shame. As Joan Magretta explains, a good business model remains essential to every successful organization, whether it's a new venture or an established player. To help managers apply the concept successfully, she defines what a business model is and how it complements a smart competitive strategy. Business models are, at heart, stories that explain how enterprises work. Like a good story, a robust business model contains precisely delineated characters, plausible motivations, and a plot that turns on an insight about value. It answers certain questions: Who is the customer? How do we make money? What underlying economic logic explains how we can deliver value to customers at an appropriate cost? Every viable organization is built on a sound business model, but a business model isn't a strategy, even though many people use the terms interchangeably. Business models describe, as a system, how the pieces of a business fit together. But they don't factor in one critical dimension of performance: competition. That's the job of strategy. Illustrated with examples from companies like American Express, EuroDisney, WalMart, and Dell Computer, this article clarifies the concepts of business models and strategy, which are fundamental to every company's performance.     

The real new economy

During the soar-and-swoon days of the late 1990s, many people believed that information technology, and the Internet in particular, were "changing everything" in business. A fundamental change did happen in the 1990s, but it was less about technology than about competition. Under director Diana Farrell, the McKinsey Global Institute has conducted an extensive study of productivity and its connection to corporate IT spending and use during that period. The study revealed that information technology is important--but not central--to the fate of industries and individual companies. So if information technology was not the primary factor in the productivity surge, what was? The study points to competition and innovation. In those industries that saw increases in competitive intensity, managers were forced to innovate aggressively to protect their revenues and profits. Those innovations--in products, business practices, and technology--led to the gains in productivity. In fact, a critical dynamic of the new economy--the real new economy--is the virtuous cycle of competition, innovation, and productivity growth. Managers can innovate in many ways, but during the 1990s, information technology was a particularly powerful tool, for three reasons: First, IT enabled the development of attractive new products and efficient new business processes. Second, it facilitated the rapid industrywide diffusion of innovations. And third, it exhibited strong scale economies--its benefits multiplied rapidly as its use expanded. This article reveals surprising data on how various industries in the United States and Europe were affected by competition, innovation, and information technology in the 1990s and offers insights about how managers can get more from their IT investments.     

What's wrong with strategy?

Why is it that successful strategies are rarely developed as a result of formal planning processes? What is wrong with the way most companies go about developing strategy? Andrew Campbell and Marcus Alexander take a common sense look at why the planning frameworks managers use so often yield disappointing results. Companies often fail to distinguish between purpose (what an organization exists to do) and constraints (what an organization must do in order to survive), the authors say. Many executives mistakenly believe, for example, that satisfying stakeholders is an objective that drives thinking about strategy. In fact, it's a constraint, not an objective. Companies that don't win the loyalty of stakeholders will go out of business. Strategy is not about plans but about insights, the authors add. Strategy development is the process of discovering and understanding insights and should not be confused with planning, which is about turning insights into action. Furthermore, because executives develop most of their insights while actually doing the real work of running a business, it is important for companies not to separate strategy development from implementation. Is there a better way? The answer is not new planning processes or more effort. Instead, managers must understand two fundamental points: the benefit of having a well-articulated, stable purpose and the importance of discovering, understanding, documenting, and exploiting insights about how to create value.     

Scanning the periphery

Companies often face new rivals, technologies, regulations, and other environmental changes that seem to come out of left field. How can they see these changes sooner and capitalize on them? Such changes often begin as weak signals on what the authors call the periphery, or the blurry zone at the edge of an organization's vision. As with human peripheral vision, these signals are difficult to see and interpret but can be vital to success or survival. Unfortunately, most companies lack a systematic method for determining where on the periphery they should be looking, how to interpret the weak signals they see, and how to allocate limited scanning resources. This article provides such a method-a question-based framework for helping companies scan the periphery more efficiently and effectively. The framework divides questions into three categories: learning from the past (What have been our past blind spots? What instructive analogies do other industries offer? Who in the industry is skilled at picking up weak signals and acting on them?); evaluating the present (What important signals are we rationalizing away? What are our mavericks, outliers, complainers, and defectors telling us? What are our peripheral customers and competitors really thinking?); and envisioning the future (What future surprises could really hurt or help us? What emerging technologies could change the game? Is there an unthinkable scenario that might disrupt our business?). Answering these questions is a good first step toward anticipating problems or opportunities that may appear on the business horizon. The article concludes with a self-test that companies can use to assess their need and capability for peripheral vision.     

The Internet in the personal finance course

A revolution is occurring as textbook authors struggle with how to effectively incorporate the Internet into the personal finance textbooks and course. This paper considers three questions associated with this revolution. What is the current degree of Internet integration? Where might we be headed with this new technology? Will this integration make for a better course? The current degree of Internet integration is reported in Table 1, Table 2. An argument is made that we may be headed to an eventual elimination of the textbook, as we know it. There is some preliminary evidence that this will make for a better educational experience.     

基于行业增加值出口的显性比较优势测算及国际比较研究

基于对出口价值构成中行业增加值出口的形式、流向以及途径的区分,从价值链的视角改进了传统的显性比较优势指数,测算12个主要贸易大国1995~2011年制造业和服务业各行业的显性比较优势。结果表明：贸易格局的总体趋势表现为发达国家在巩固制造业高端环节优势的同时又将服务业特别是金融服务业、信息服务业以及商务网络等方面的优势渗透进来,建立起服务于全球的新体系,新兴市场国家则逐渐在不同要素密集度以及不同层次的制造业方面加紧布局。加强贸易与产业的结合,有助于我国通过增加值间接出口的方式参与国际竞争。     

Using VoIP to compete

Internet telephony, or VoIP, is rapidly replacing the conventional kind. This year, for the first time, U.S. companies bought more new Internet-phone connections than standard lines. The major driver behind this change is cost. But VoIP isn't just a new technology for making old-fashioned calls cheaper, says consultant Kevin Werbach. It is fundamentally changing how companies use voice communications. What makes VoIP so powerful is that it turns voice into digital data packets that can be stored, copied, combined with other data, and distributed to virtually any device that connects to the Internet. And it makes it simple to provide all the functionality of a corporate phone-call features, directories, security-to anyone anywhere there's broadband access. That fosters new kinds of businesses such as virtual call centers, where widely dispersed agents work at all hours from their homes. The most successful early adopters, says Werbach, will focus more on achieving business objectives than on saving money. They will also consider how to push VoIP capabilities out to the extended organization, making use of everyone as a resource. Deployment may be incremental, but companies should be thinking about where VoIP could take them. Executives should ask what they could do if, on demand, they could bring all their employees, customers, suppliers, and partners together in a virtual room, with shared access to every modern communications and computing channel. They should take a fresh look at their business processes to find points at which richer and more customizable communications could eliminate bottlenecks and enhance quality. The important dividing line won't be between those who deploy Vol P and those who don't, or even between early adopters and laggards. It will be between those who see Vol P as just a new way to do the same old things and those who use itto rethink their entire businesses.     

STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS: TRANSLATING STRATEGY INTO RESULTS

A large and growing number of companies worldwide are adopting strategic performance measurement (SPM) systems to help them execute their business strategies. SPM systems use some combination of financial, strategic, and operating measures to evaluate management's success in improving operating efficiency and adding value for shareholders. In many cases, the SPMs also provide the primary basis for rewarding top management, divisional operating managers, and, increasingly, rank‐and‐file employees. Some SPM systems are based entirely on a financial measure like economic value added (or EVA), which encourages managers to consider the opportunity cost of investor capital in making all operating and investment decisions. Other systems are based heavily on nonfinancial considerations, such as the balanced scorecard's emphasis on customer and employee satisfaction, operational excellence, and new product introduction. In this article, the author uses the findings of his recent survey of 113 North American and European companies to shed light on a number of questions: What are the most popular measures in such systems—are they primarily financial, nonfinancial, or amix of the two? To what extent is incentive compensation tied to such measures—and how far down in the organization are such measures (and incentives) extended? What are the most formidable challenges to implementing SPM systems in large corporations, with often diverse collections of businesses and tens if not hundreds of thousands of employees? Among the article's most notable conclusions, a majority of companies expect in the next three years to publish SPM targets and results in their annual reports. The most commonly cited financial SPMs will be cash flow, return on capital employed, and other variations of EVA. The most frequently cited nonfinancial SPMs are customer satisfaction, market share, and new product development. The greatest challenge in implementing SPMs is translating the vision and strategic objectives at the corporate level into performance measures that are relevant to activities at the business unit level, and securing buy‐in from business unit managers and employees.     

The end of corporate imperialism

As they search for growth, multinational corporations will have no choice but to compete in the big emerging markets of China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil. But while it is still common to question how such corporations will change life in those markets, Western executives would be smart to turn the question around and ask how multinationals themselves will be transformed by these markets. To be successful, MNCs will have to rethink every element of their business models, the authors assert in this seminal HBR article from 1998. During the first wave of market entry in the 1980s, multinationals operated with what might be termed an imperialist mind-set, assuming that the emerging markets would merely be new markets for their old products. But this mind-set limited their success: What is truly big and emerging in countries like China and India is a new consumer base comprising hundreds of millions of people. To tap into this huge opportunity, MNCs need to ask themselves five basic questions: Who is in the emerging middle class in these countries? How do the distribution networks operate? What mix of local and global leadership do you need to foster business opportunities? Should you adopt a consistent strategy for all of your business units within one country? Should you take on local partners? The transformation that multinational corporations must undergo is not cosmetic--simply developing greater sensitivity to local cultures will not do the trick, the authors say. To compete in the big emerging markets, multinationals must reconfigure their resources, rethink their cost structures, redesign their product development processes, and challenge their assumptions about who their top-level managers should be.     

Strategy and the Internet

Many of the pioneers of Internet business, both dot-coms and established companies, have competed in ways that violate nearly every precept of good strategy. Rather than focus on profits, they have chased customers indiscriminately through discounting, channel incentives, and advertising. Rather than concentrate on delivering value that earns an attractive price from customers, they have pursued indirect revenues such as advertising and click-through fees. Rather than make trade-offs, they have rushed to offer every conceivable product or service. It did not have to be this way--and it does not have to be in the future. When it comes to reinforcing a distinctive strategy, Michael Porter argues, the Internet provides a better technological platform than previous generations of IT. Gaining competitive advantage does not require a radically new approach to business; it requires building on the proven principles of effective strategy. Porter argues that, contrary to recent thought, the Internet is not disruptive to most existing industries and established companies. It rarely nullifies important sources of competitive advantage in an industry; it often makes them even more valuable. And as all companies embrace Internet technology, the Internet itself will be neutralized as a source of advantage. Robust competitive advantages will arise instead from traditional strengths such as unique products, proprietary content, and distinctive physical activities. Internet technology may be able to fortify those advantages, but it is unlikely to supplant them. Porter debunks such Internet myths as first-mover advantage, the power of virtual companies, and the multiplying rewards of network effects. He disentangles the distorted signals from the marketplace, explains why the Internet complements rather than cannibalizes existing ways of doing business, and outlines strategic imperatives for dot-coms and traditional companies.     

The emerging importance of brand energy in the financial services sector

The long-term shift in the developed world from economies based on the trading of tangible goods to the trading of intangible services has precipitated two major shifts in business thinking that have become particularly apparent over the past 20 years. These have been a shift from a focus on generating profit to a focus on creating value and a shift in the notion of the brand from something that exists in the minds of consumers to something that exists in the experiences of different stakeholders. This is no less true of financial services than any other service sector. In the UK, the Operating and Financial Review proposes that all quoted companies introduce a new section in their annual report and accounts from 2005 (now delayed to 2006) to place a greater emphasis on the importance of ‘intangible, largely human assets’. This should not be interpreted by businesses as another imposition by government but as an opportunity to develop a much better understanding of the nature of the intangible assets of the business and how these work to create value. Accountancy is rooted in a tangible way of thinking but is ill-equipped to understand the nature of intangible equity which is where the real drivers of value creation lie. The author posits a new notion of brand energy as a starting point for rethinking how businesses really work to create value in the unceasingly intangible business world. The illustrations given are all from the UK, but the trends in thinking are essentially global and the points made could apply to any country.