Are Brokers' Commission Rates on Home Sales Too High? A Conceptual Analysis

Many people in North America believe that prevailing commission rates for residential real estate brokers are too high, even though such beliefs are not based on a formal model. This paper presents a general equilibrium model of the housing market in which real estate brokers serve as matching intermediaries. We use this model to construct an illustrative example which is calibrated using data consistent with a typical housing market. The example suggests that the commission rate which maximizes aggregate efficiency is considerably below the prevailing rate. Moreover, this finding appears to be robust to changes in the matching process.     

The Housing Market and Real Estate Brokers

The major development in this paper concerns the failure, in earlier studies, to consider interaction between alternative methods of arranging sales in the housing market. A seller may market a house by direct negotiations with buyers, without the intermediation of real estate brokers, or by listing the house with a broker. A rational seller would choose the option which offers the higher expected return on the house. In a sequence of models we argue that the seller's option of a method of sale induces competitive pressure in the choice of the commission rate by the broker. We also consider the split rate in a multiple listing system, ease of entry of brokers and the cartel hypothesis as applied to brokers. We conclude that the competitive pressure of direct negotiations between sellers and buyers, relative free entry of brokers and the inappropri-ateness of the cartel hypothesis cast serious doubt about a general consensus of opinion that the brokerage system is characterized by price fixing, excessive commissions and excessive marketing costs.     

Benefit cost analysis of an import access request

Invasive species outbreaks are often unintended side effects of trade. In this paper partial equilibrium trade models and stochastic bioeconomic impact simulation models are combined to present a benefit cost analysis template to assess market access requests. The template is used to assess the likely regional economic welfare implications of a decision by Australian biosecurity regulators to allow the Chilean table grape industry access to the national table grape market. We show that consumption benefits expected to accrue to Western Australia are exceeded by increases in likely invasive species damage resulting from grape imports, implying that insufficient consumer gains are grounds to deny market access.     

Measuring Welfare from Ambulatory Surgery Centers: A Spatial Analysis of Demand for Healthcare Facilities

This paper studies competition between healthcare facilities, particularly between hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers (ASC's), in the market for outpatient surgery. The goal is to answer questions about the existence and magnitude of welfare gains earned from the use of ASC's. These questions are relevant to current policy debates about the usefulness of ASC's. I calculate welfare by specifying a multinomial logit model of consumer demand for healthcare facilities, and estimating structural elements of demand functions. Total elimination of ASC's results in between 10.2 and 28.1 minutes of welfare loss per patient surgery.     

Horizontal mergers and delegation

This paper shows that the profitability of merger in oligopoly is significantly enhanced if firms delegate the output decision to an agent and then motivate the latter using strategic rent shifting contracts. Two consequences of increased profitability are that the minimum market share that the merging parties require in order to merge profitably without efficiency gains, as well as the maximum market share that the merging parties can possess in order to guarantee that a profitable merger is welfare enhancing, are reduced. A third result is that delegation cannot reduce the set of endogenous mergers.     

Entry in the ADHD drugs market: Welfare impact of generics and me‐too's

Recent decades have seen a growth in treatments for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) including many branded and generic drugs. In the early 2000's, new drug entry dramatically altered market shares. We estimate a demand system for ADHD drugs and assess the welfare impact of new drugs. We find that entry induced large welfare gains by reducing prices of substitute drugs, and by providing alternative delivery mechanisms for existing molecules. Our results suggest that the success of follow‐on patented drugs may come from unanticipated innovations like delivery mechanisms, a factor ignored by proposals to retard new follow‐on drug approvals.     

Reconsidering the political economy of farm animal welfare: An anatomy of market failure

Animal welfare is often cited as a classic public good, which implies market failure and, thus, that government intervention is required. However, the current literature does not provide an accessible account of how governed markets are supposed to cope with the issues of animal welfare. This paper seeks to fill this gap by re-considering the political economy of animal welfare. Conceptual analysis shows that the major cause of market failure in the case of farm animal welfare is a problem of consumption externalities. It is the specific regulation of animal welfare conditions which is a public good (or bad). Two important conclusions follow from this analysis, which are largely unexplored in the literature on animal welfare. First, measurement of potential market failure, through identifying actual willingness to pay (WTP) for animal welfare friendly products, is potentially misleading. The difference between citizen votes and consumer WTP for animal welfare is not prima facie evidence for either market failure or a gap in the market. Second, conventional arguments in favour of subsidies and assistance to producers for better animal welfare are misconceived and potentially counterproductive. A more rational policy is to subsidise the consumption of animal welfare friendly products.     

Real-Time Pricing and Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets*

We analyze the effects of the adoption of real-time pricing (RTP) of electricity when generating firms have market power. We find that an increase in consumers on RTP contracts decreases peak prices and increases off-peak prices, increases consumer surplus (both for switching and non-switching consumers) and welfare, while decreasing industry profits, with these effects being magnified by the extent of market power. We illustrate these results by calibrating our model to the New Zealand electricity market, and find that taking into account the market power of generating firms increases the efficiency gains from RTP adoption by 41%.     

The Neighborhood Effects of Filtering

This article attempts to examine the filtering issue within a broad market framework, emphasizing some of the potentially serious neighborhood implications of the turnover process. It concludes that the negative social welfare effects associated with the market adjustments that take place in older inner city neighborhoods as a result of the expansion of the suburban inventory could be sufficiently great to offset the positive gains resulting from the chains of moves initiated by the new building activities on the urban fringe. This is because the vacancy creation and withdrawal process associated with filtering is not under policy control.     

Location and competition in retail banking

We investigate the impact of banking deregulation during the 1990s on consumer welfare. We estimate a spatial model of consumer demand for retail bank deposits that explicitly accounts for consumer disutility from distance traveled. This is important given the substantial changes in banks' branch networks observed in the data. Our model indicates that cross-price elasticities between banks whose branches are close to consumers (‘close’ banks) are larger than those between ‘far’ banks and more than double the cross-price elasticity of ‘close’ banks with respect to ‘far’ banks. We distinguish between thrifts and other banks and find that within-thrift competitive effects are stronger than within-bank effects or those between thrifts and banks. We use our estimates to predict the effect of changes in market structure on consumer welfare following the branching deregulation of the Riegle–Neal Act of 1994. Our results indicate that the median household gained around $60 per year from the changes. Approximately two thirds of the gains come from within-market changes in market structure. The gains were greater in markets with high initial numbers of banks than elsewhere.     

Discount Brokerage in Residential Real Estate Markets

Transaction costs are thought to affect asset prices and market liquidity, but the direction and magnitude of these effects continue to be the subject of debate. In the single‐family residential market, discount brokers offer to list a house for a lower price and thus reduce the transaction costs associated with obtaining a match. In this article we obtain empirical estimates of the price and liquidity impact of a seller selecting a discount broker to market a single‐family residential property. The unique data set allows for the identification of residential properties that were listed by a discount brokerage firm. The empirical results confirm the predictions of our theoretical model. Using a sample of 318,221 listings and 243,625 sales, we find that houses listed by discount brokers sell at prices similar to non‐discount brokerage listings, but are less likely to sell, and when they do sell, take approximately three days longer to sell. The results indicate that lower transaction costs do not impact housing prices in this market, but that they are related to asset liquidity.     

Concentration and Market Structure in Local Real Estate Markets

The competitiveness of the residential real estate brokerage industry has attracted much attention. Anecdotal evidence suggests some local markets are concentrated, yet no systematic market structure study has been conducted. We collected cross‐sectional data on real estate brokers in 90 diverse markets across the United States and collected longitudinal data for Louisville, Kentucky. In medium and large markets, no evidence exists that market concentration might create problems for competition. Small markets, on average, have higher Herfindahl‐Hirschman Indexes than medium and large markets. The longitudinal data reveal that many small brokers sell a house or two one year and none the next year.     

Market structure and product quality: A study of the 2002 Japanese airline merger

This study examines the economic consequences of a horizontal merger between Japanese airlines that took place in 2002, with particular emphasis on quality responses to the airline merger. A structural model allows firms to determine not only prices but also flight frequencies. The obtained estimates would reject the hypothesis that the merger facilitated coordinated effects. Efficiency gains from the merger are estimated as not trivial, and are more strongly observed in marginal costs per flight, rather than in marginal costs per passenger. Welfare effects of the merger are positive, but vary by market structure. Neglecting endogenous flight frequency overstates the welfare gains, especially for smaller markets. Finally, remedial measures imposed by the authority did little for the merger outcomes.     

Product innovation with vertical differentiation: Is a monopolist's incentive weaker?

This paper compares the incentives for product innovation across different market structures when the new product is vertically differentiated and of lower quality, a common case empirically. We show that innovation incentive rankings across market structures can differ substantially when the new product is of lower rather than higher quality. In particular, the incentive to add the new product can be greater for a monopolist over the old product than for a firm that would face any degree of competition from the old product. This incentive ranking cannot occur when, instead, the new product is of higher quality as has been analyzed in previous work. Moreover, in that case, the incentive ranking is the same whether the market is covered or not covered, whereas in our setting the ranking can differ. With the market covered, our setting provides another environment where the monopolist can have the greatest incentive to innovate, as previously shown when the new product is horizontally differentiated. Together, both settings show that Arrow's famous result—a secure monopolist gains less from a nondrastic process innovation than would a competitive firm—does not always extend to nondrastic product innovations. However, in all the cases analyzed here, consumer welfare (though not total welfare) is always lower under monopoly, even when only the monopolist would add the new product.     

Economic efficiency,antitrust and rate-of-return

This paper examines the economic consequences of using excessive rates-of-return to detect and prosecute cartels. We find that this policy leads to inefficient factor utilization, but always increases output and welfare. The rate-of-return policy may yield greater social gains than a welfare-based antitrust policy.     

Likely gains from market timing in Japan

This paper explores the potential gains and required predictive ability of market timing in Japan and then compares the results to previously reported findings from another developed financial market — the United States — and a developing Asia Pacific financial market — Singapore. Shifts between cash equivalents and common stocks are evaluated. The results demonstrate that the potential gains from market timing in Japan are quite attractive and that the minimum predictive accuracy required for successful market timing may be attainable by some portfolio managers. However, for the period examined, the results also indicate that larger incremental gains result from market timing Singapore stocks and cash equivalents.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Second Annual Pacific Basin Finance Conference in Seoul, Korea in 1991. The author appreciates the helpful comments of Lim Kian Guan and two anonymous referees.     

Oligopoly under incomplete information: On the welfare effects of price discrimination

We study competition by firms that simultaneously post (potentially nonlinear) tariffs to consumers who are privately informed about their tastes. Market power stems from informational frictions, in that consumers are heterogeneously informed about firms’ offers. In the absence of regulation, all firms offer quantity discounts. As a result, relative to Bertrand pricing, imperfect competition benefits disproportionately more consumers whose willingness to pay is high, rather than low. Regulation imposing linear pricing hurts the former but benefits the latter consumers. While consumer surplus increases, firms’ profits decrease, enough to drive down utilitarian welfare. By contrast, improvements in market transparency increase utilitarian welfare, and achieve similar gains on consumer surplus as imposing linear pricing, although with limited distributive impact. On normative grounds, our analysis suggests that banning price discrimination is warranted only if its distributive benefits have a weight on the societal objective.     

转型期捷克福利体系改革及对中国的启示

捷克福利体系由社会保险、家庭政策和社会救助三部分组成。通过对转型期捷克福利体系三个组成部分实施的改革进行分析得出结论：尽管捷克福利模式没有实施养老金私有化等自由主义倾向明显的改革措施，但总体上仍然向着盎格鲁撒克逊自由主义福利模式转变，国家责任逐渐减少，市场力量逐步增强。结合捷克改革过程中的经验提出对中国养老金改革的一点建议。     

Estimation of the Effects of New Brands on Incumbents’ Profits and Consumer Welfare: The U.S. Processed Cheese Market Case

I estimate the effects of new brands on market competition and consumer welfare in the U.S. processed cheese market. I find that an observed increase in consumer welfare was attributable mainly to an increase in the number of brands in the sample market, while the price effect, which measures welfare change caused by adding new brands to existing brands, decreased welfare as the prices of the existing brands increased in a large portion of sample markets. The price increase was most pronounced among the introducers existing brands. I also find that the data used in the paper identify a significant enhancement of consumer welfare as a result of the change in product characteristics provided by new brands even if a large portion of welfare gain is explained by the assumption on the error term in the utility function.JEL classification: D40, D60, L13, L66, H20