The Strategic Management of Trade Secrets in Technology-based Firms

The importance of trade secrets to the effective strategic management of technology-based firms can make the difference between economic success and failure for significant new product lines, or even the firm itself. This article proposes the conceptual outlines of a framework addressing the strategic management of trade secrets. The author identifies three environments that strongly influence strategy formulation (legal and market) and strategy implementation (organizational). A conceptual framework for trade secret strategy formulation is developed, offering a logical approach to reaching a managerial choice of trade secrecy over other forms of intellectual property protection. Discussion of trade secret strategy implementation invokes an emphasis on managerial control structures and mechanisms, focusing on the use of the trade secret audit, the identification of components of an implementation strategy (e.g., employee education, controlling physical and electronic access, and monitoring competitors), and an ever vigilant defense of trade secret protection pursued in the courts.     

The Strategic Management of Trade Secrets in Technology-based Firms

The importance of trade secrets to the effective strategic management of technology-based firms can make the difference between economic success and failure for significant new product lines, or even the firm itself. This article proposes the conceptual outlines of a framework addressing the strategic management of trade secrets. The author identifies three environments that strongly influence strategy formulation (legal and market) and strategy implementation (organizational). A conceptual framework for trade secret strategy formulation is developed, offering a logical approach to reaching a managerial choice of trade secrecy over other forms of intellectual property protection. Discussion of trade secret strategy implementation invokes an emphasis on managerial control structures and mechanisms, focusing on the use of the trade secret audit, the identification of components of an implementation strategy (e.g., employee education, controlling physical and electronic access, and monitoring competitors), and an ever vigilant defense of trade secret protection pursued in the courts.     

Structural Estimation of Variety Gains from Trade Integration in Asia

This article studies the variety gains of trade integration in Asia. Adopting a heterogeneous firm model of trade of monopolistic competition allowed us to estimate not only the welfare gains because of country specialisation, but also the variety gains arising from trade integration. The underlying structural parameters were estimated econometrically, based on a large panel of firm‐level data for the Asian economies (ORIANA). Our empirical findings suggest that, when relaxing the assumption of firm homogeneity and accounting for export market entry costs, the gains from trade integration are higher than in conventional models with representative firms.     

Learning How To Export

In this paper, we present a standard quality ladders endogenous growth model with one significant new assumption: it takes time for firms to learn how to export. It is known that the welfare gains from trade liberalization implied by a large class of models like the Armington gravity model, the Krugman model, and the Melitz model are small. Our quality ladders model is consistent with a number of firm‐level stylized facts from the heterogeneous firms trade literature and is, in addition, capable of generating very large welfare gains from trade liberalization.     

Employee opportunism and redundancy in firms

Firms who share specialized information or client connections with their employees expose themselves to the risk of opportunism, in which their workers leave the firm and go into business for themselves. Legal and contractual solutions to the problem of employee opportunism are not always viable. Instead, firms may organize themselves so as to discourage opportunism. We study an organizational scheme called internal redundancy: the practice of assigning employees to overlapping tasks so that they are less likely to possess sole access to trade secrets or customers, and therefore, less likely to profit if they leave the firm.     

International Trade,Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms

Recent trade models determine the equilibrium distribution of firm‐level efficiency endogenously and show that freer trade shifts the distribution towards higher average productivity because of entry and exit of firms. These models ignore the possibility that freer trade also alters the firm‐size distribution via international firm migration (offshoring); firms must, by assumption, produce in their “birth nation.” We show that when firms are allowed to switch locations, new productivity effects arise. Freer trade induces the most efficient small‐nation firms to move to the large nation. The large country gets an “extra helping” of the most efficient firms while the small nation's firm‐size distribution is truncated on both ends. This reinforces the large‐nation productivity gain while reducing or even reversing the small‐nation productivity gain. The small nation is nevertheless better off allowing firm migration.     

Political connections and trade expansion

This article, using a 2004 survey of Chinese private firms, empirically studies the impact of political connections (indicated by being a deputy to the Chinese People's Congress) on trade expansion. It is found that political connections lead to an increase of trade expansion. Meanwhile, the expansion into other administrative areas requires a high hierarchical level of political connections, at the corresponding administrative level or above. Furthermore, it is found that political connections affect trade expansion by overcoming insecure property rights institutions and inefficient contracting institutions.     

MARKET ACCESS,INVESTMENT, AND HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS*

This article presents a model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms can expand through capital acquisitions. I show that demand elasticities are a crucial element in predicting which firms invest, in what location, and for what reason. High‐productivity firms, who tend to sell goods at a low elasticity, invest for market access (tariff jumping). Middle productivity firms, who tend to sell at a higher elasticity, invest for productivity improvement. The relative value of trade costs dictates which incentive is larger. In equilibrium, trade liberalization can reduce aggregate productivity by reducing an important source of investment demand: foreign firms.     

Exporters in cross‐section: Direct versus intermediated trade

How do producers that export their goods directly differ from those that export through trade intermediaries? We take a standard model of trade with heterogeneous firms and add heterogeneity in quality to the usual heterogeneity in productivity. Modeling trade intermediaries as increasing marginal costs but decreasing fixed costs of exporting, we find that only firms with the highest quality‐adjusted productivity levels choose to export directly. Under certain parameter restrictions, the model shows that direct exporters tend to be larger and charge higher prices for their goods. In contrast to the literature, using Chinese customs data, we confirm that direct exporters do charge higher prices for their goods.     

Trade Intermediation and the Organization of Exporters

Empirical papers show that successful exporting firms either use unaffiliated foreign trade intermediaries or own foreign wholesale subsidiaries. However, conventional trade theory models assume that producers can directly access foreign consumers. We introduce intermediaries in an international trade model where producers differ with respect to productivity as well as regarding their varieties' perceived quality and tradability. Trade intermediation is prone to frictions owing to the absence of enforceable cross‐country contracts while own wholesale subsidiaries require additional capital investment. The sorting pattern of firms depends on their degree of competitive advantage; the equilibrium prevalence of intermediation in the industry depends negatively on the heterogeneity among producers, and the market‐specificity of goods, and positively on expropriation risk. Using sectoral US export data by destination country, we confirm the empirical validity of these predictions.     

Efficient spatial competition

Game-theoretic models of spatial competition usually assume that firms set prices after their choices of locations. Rather than make this assumption, this paper uses the core to model the competition between the firms. Two conditions are shown to be sufficient for efficient spatial competition. The first is that the firms' location choices satisfy a no-externalities condition. The second is that the second-stage game satisfy a separable-value condition, namely that the value (gains from trade) can be created on a buyer-by-buyer basis. This approach yields two further benefits. First, efficient location can be stable in situations with arbitrary distributions of buyers, arbitrary willingness-to-pay functions, and completely general location spaces. Second, efficiency in location games can be shown to be related to the Second Welfare Theorem.     

标准掌控与全球价值链治理研究

对标准与全球价值链的研究有助于更好地理解全球经济的变迁,以及发展中国家在其中的作用与地位.在国际金融危机后危机时代及贸易保护主义兴起的背景下,标准作为新型贸易壁垒被各国频繁使用.标准对全球价值链的影响主要体现在它能将复杂的信息形式进行编码,从而减少价值链行动者的交易成本.特别是当全球价值链越来越趋向于“购买者驱动”时,主导企业可以通过被广泛接受的标准及相关认证程序,向其直接供应商传递复杂的产品质量要求.通过执行标准,可以提高信息的编码性,并使企业间的治理从相对的层级型转向更为模块型或市场型的关系,从而减少主导企业的协调.发展中国家只有积极参与全球标准的制定,培育主导企业,才能在未来的竞争中处于有利地位.     

发展中国家跨国公司的一体化战略研究

本文尝试以建立一个发展中国家跨国公司一体化战略选择的内生模型来研究差异化厂商基于国家间要素禀赋优势、贸易成本、市场容量以及自身技术水平等因素做出的一体化战略选择。并且通过比较静态分析方法,将此研究扩及到贸易自由化对差异化厂商均衡时的一体化战略、平均价格和生产规模,以及整体产业平均技术水平的影响。     

Market Integration,Choice of Technology,and Welfare

This paper develops an international trade model where firms in a duopoly may diversify their technologies for strategic reasons. The firms face the same set of technologies given by a tradeoff between marginal costs and fixed costs, but depending on trade costs firms may choose different technologies. Market integration may induce a technological restructuring where firms either diversify their technologies or switch to a homogeneous technology. In general, market integration improves welfare. However, a small decrease of trade costs which induces a switch from heterogeneous technologies to a homogeneous technology may locally reduce global welfare. The model also shows that productivity differences lead to intra‐industry firm heterogeneity in size and exports similar to the “new–new” trade models with monopolistic competition.     

PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS AND FALLING TRADE COSTS: BOON OR BANE?*

This article looks at two features of globalization, namely, productivity improvements and falling trade costs, and explores their effect on welfare in a monopolistic competition model with heterogenous firms and technological asymmetries. Contrary to received wisdom, and for reasons different from adverse terms of trade effects, it is shown that improvements in a partner's productivity must hurt us. Moreover, falling trade costs can raise welfare in the technologically advanced country while reducing it in the backward one, if technological asymmetries are large enough.     

Preferential trade areas, multinational enterprises, and welfare

Abstract.  The effects of preferential trade areas (PTAs) on the investments by multinational enterprises and their implications for the welfare of members and non‐members are studied in a model with two types of firms: national firms and multinational firms. In the presence of multinational activity PTAs can create new investment as well as divert investment from non‐members to members. Both affect the welfare of members positively. More interestingly, if the investment creation effect of a PTA is sufficiently strong, then the PTA could be welfare enhancing for non‐members as well. JEL classification: F2, L1     

Skill‐biased heterogeneous firms,trade liberalization and the skill premium

We propose a theory that rising globalization and rising wage inequality are related because trade liberalization raises the demand facing highly competitive skill‐intensive firms. In our model, only the lowest‐cost firms participate in the global economy exactly along the lines of Melitz ( 2003 ). In addition to differing in their productivity, firms differ in their skill intensity. We model skill‐biased technology as a correlation between skill intensity and technological acumen, and we estimate this correlation to be large using firm‐level data from Chile in 1995. A fall in trade costs leads to both greater trade volumes and an increase in the relative demand for skill, as the lowest‐cost/most‐skilled firms expand to serve the export market while less skill‐intensive non‐exporters retrench in the face of increased import competition. This mechanism works regardless of factor endowment differences, so we provide an explanation for why globalization and wage inequality move together in both skill‐abundant and skill‐scarce countries. In our model countries are net exporters of the services of their abundant factor, but there are no Stolper‐Samuelson effects because import competition affects all domestic firms equally.     

Sizing Up the Impact of Embassies on Exports

The purpose of this study is to test for the effects of trade promotion via the foreign service. The theory of trade with heterogeneous firms predicts that unilateral trade promotion allows medium‐sized firms to export. We investigate the effects of trade promotion using firm‐level data and information on the opening and closing of embassies abroad from the very similar neighboring countries Sweden and Norway. We use a difference‐in‐difference specification where firms from Norway are used as a control group for Swedish firms. Our results show that large firms as well as medium‐sized firms respond to the opening of embassies.     

Trade and the Euro: effects on bystanders

This article investigates trade effects of the euro focusing on the impact on bystanders. We use data for Swedish firms and examine the impact on exporting firms’ intensive and extensive margins of trade. Our result shows an overall increase in Swedish firms’ exports to the euro area after the introduction of the single currency, indicating that the euro has decreased trade costs also for outsiders. In addition, we find important heterogeneity in the sample, suggesting that it is the large majority of small firms that has increased trade flows with the Eurozone the most.     

Multi-product firms,heterogeneous quality and exporting behaviour: product-level evidence from the movie industry

This article examines how quality affects heterogeneous multiple-product firms’ exporting behaviours. We develop a structural model of the global movie market, including both consumers’ movie demand choices and firms’ exporting decisions. A movie studio is a multi-product firm that releases many movies within a year. We model movie quality as a combination of firm-level appeal and product-level attractiveness. We find that both studio-level and movie-level heterogeneity affect demand for movie, and movie-level heterogeneity is relatively more important. We also explore the counterfactual effects of quality improvement and trade liberalization on trade. Our results show that improvement of quality increases both intensive margin and extensive margin of trade. By elimination of quota, we find that trade liberalization increases movie exports to a foreign market by 19%. The results of our study can also help improve understanding of trade in the service industry. For instance, we do not find a positive correlation between the foreign entry costs and the geographic distance, as in the case of manufacture goods.