INCENTIVE CONTRACTS AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY*

We propose a transactions cost theory of total factor productivity (TFP). In a world with asymmetric information and transactions costs, productivity must be induced by incentive schemes. Labor contracts trade off marginal benefits and costs of effort. The latter include, in addition to the workers' marginal disutility of effort, organizational costs and rents. As the economy grows, contracts change endogenously, inducing higher effort and productivity. Transactions costs are also affected by societal characteristics that determine the power of incentives. Differences in these characteristics may explain cross‐economy productivity differences. Numerical experiments demonstrate the model's consistency with time‐series and cross‐country observations.     

SECRET SEARCH

For high-profile positions, should applicant identities be made public within the organization (“open search”) or kept confidential (“secret search”)? We construct a model where an organization seeks to hire, but where candidates' abilities are private information unless it uses open search. Rejected applicants, under open search, suffer disutility. We find the following: Salaries are lower under secret search, the expected ability of applicants decreases as the posted (open search) salary increases, secret search is preferred by organizations where quality of candidate is relatively unimportant, and organizations will, for some parameter values, choose secret search even when open search is more efficient.     

Trade-induced productivity gains reduce incentives to impose strategic tariffs

Strategic tariffs, which raise an economy's welfare by restricting trade and improving the terms of trade, can create an obstacle to free trade. We evaluate how far trade-induced productivity gains (technology spillovers) reduce or remove this obstacle, because more intensive trade enhances these potential gains. Based on theory and the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) we estimate stronger import-induced than export-induced productivity gains. We feed the theory and the estimates into a global Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model calibrated to WIOD. We find that the USA's, China's and the EU's optimal tariffs are reduced by less than 20%, Russia's and India's by around 25% and Brazil's by 40% when taking endogenous trade-induced productivity gains into account. Nonetheless, incentives for single economies to impose strategic tariffs persist. Particularly large, trade-intensive downstream sectors producing distinct goods incentivize high sectoral optimal tariffs. A global free trade agreement could overcome such incentives and maximize the trade-induced productivity gains.     

STATE DEPENDENCE IN LABOR MARKET FLUCTUATIONS

This article documents state dependence in labor market fluctuations. Using a Threshold Vector Autoregression (TVAR) model, we establish that the unemployment rate, the job separation rate, and the job-finding rate (JFR) exhibit a larger response to productivity shocks during periods with low aggregate productivity. A Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides model with endogenous job separation and on-the-job search replicates these empirical regularities well. We calibrate the model to match the standard deviation of the job-transition rates explained by productivity shocks in the TVAR, and show that the model explains 88% of the state dependence in the unemployment rate, 76% for the separation rate and 36% for the JFR. The key channel underpinning state dependence in both job separation and JFRs is the interaction of the firm's reservation productivity level and the distribution of match-specific idiosyncratic productivity. Results are robust across several variations to the baseline model.     

Tax distortions, household production, and black-market work

This paper studies an economy with high- and low-productivity households. Household services are produced either by households themselves or are purchased in a white or black market. Black market work is inefficient (efficient) when it otherwise would have been done in the white market (within the household). With low (high) tax wedges, the black market reduces (increases) welfare by competing with white-market production (own-household production). With intermediate tax wedges, the welfare effect of a black market is ambiguous: welfare is improved (reduced) when black services are demanded by low- (high-) productivity households. An increase in the tax wedge may then reduce the benefits from a black service market.     

Marriage and employment participation with wage bargaining in search equilibrium

We build an equilibrium search model where married couples make joint decisions on home production and labour market participation and analyse the implications of our results for a frictional marriage market. A worker's bargaining position reflects their productivity, and the productivity and employment status of their spouse. People sometimes accept transitory jobs only to raise the spouse's long-term wages. Firms sometimes reduce turnover by unilaterally increasing a worker's wage, ensuring that the spouse stays at home.     

Risk and regret aversions on optimal bank interest margin under capital regulation

This paper examines the bank's optimal loan rate (and thus the bank's interest margin) under more stringent capital regulation when the bank is not only risk-averse but also regret-averse. Risk-averse preferences are characterized by an option-based utility function that includes disutility from the dislike of bank equity risk. Regret-averse preferences feature an option-based utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. We show that an increase in bank capital requirement results in an increased margin under risk aversion dominating regret aversion, whereas it results in a reduced margin under regret aversion dominating risk aversion. The former holds when risk aversion domination stems from increasing risk-averse preference, but not from decreasing regret-averse preference, while the latter holds when regret aversion domination results from either decreasing risk-averse or increasing regret-averse preference. Risk aversion, as such, makes the bank more prudent and less prone to risk-taking, while regret aversion, as such, makes the bank less prudent and more prone to risk-taking.     

Trade Liberalization and Firm Productivity: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Industries

This paper examines the impact of tariff reduction following China's World Trade Organization (WTO) entry on the productivity of Chinese manufacturing firms using a firm‐level panel database that comprises all of China's manufacturing firms with an annual turnover above 5 million yuan and that spans the period of 2000–2006. An instrumental variable estimator is used to account for the endogeneity of the tariff reduction. The results indicate that China's trade liberalization in the five years following its WTO entry has led to a 0.94% annual increase in total factor productivity for Chinese manufacturing firms. However, the overall productivity gain from the tariff reduction is a net result of a productivity depressing effect of output tariff reduction and a productivity enhancing effect of input tariff reduction. Both effects have diminished in magnitude over the years after China joined the WTO. Firm heterogeneity and turnover plays an important role in generating gains from trade liberalization. The surviving firms have managed to cope with and take advantage of lower tariffs. The extent to which the tariff reduction affects Chinese firms' productivity is also dependent on the ownership structure of the firms with foreign‐invested firms being the clear winner.     

The Costs of Financial Crises: Resource Misallocation,Productivity, and Welfare in the 2001 Argentine Crisis

Financial crises in emerging market countries appear to be very costly: both output and a host of partial welfare indicators decline dramatically. The magnitude of these costs is puzzling both from an accounting perspective – factor usage does not decline as much as output, resulting in large falls in measured productivity – and from a theoretical perspective. With the aim of resolving this puzzle, we present a framework that allows us to do the following. First, we account for changes in a country's measured productivity during a financial crisis as the result of changes in the underlying technology of the economy, the efficiency with which resources are allocated across sectors, and the efficiency of the resource allocation within sectors, driven both by reallocation amongst existing plants and by entry and exit. Second, we measure the change in the country's welfare resulting from changes in productivity, government spending, the terms of trade, and a country's international investment position. We apply this framework to the Argentine crisis of 2001 using a unique establishment level dataset and we find that more than half of the, roughly, 10 percent decline in measured total factor productivity can be accounted for by deteriorations in the allocation of resources both across and within sectors. We measure the decline in welfare to be of the order of one‐quarter of one year's gross domestic product.     

Wealth effects and agency costs

We analyze how the agent's initial wealth affects the principal's expected profits in the standard principal–agent model with moral hazard.We show that if the principal prefers a poorer agent for all specifications of action sets, probability distributions, and disutility of effort, then the agent's utility of income must exhibit a coefficient of absolute prudence less than three times the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for all levels of income, thus strengthening the sufficiency result of Thiele and Wambach (1999). Also, we prove that there is no condition on the agent's utility of income alone that will make the principal prefer richer agents. Moreover, we show that, for an interesting class of problems, the principal prefers a relatively poorer agent if agent's wealth is sufficiently large. Finally, we discuss how alternative ways of modeling the agent's outside option affects the principal's preferences for agent's wealth.     

Fields of Study and the Earnings Gap by Race in Brazil

Workers with tertiary education in Brazil earn three times more than those with a lower level of schooling. Thus, the attainment of a bachelor's or graduate degree by a black worker usually provides important benefits at the individual level. However, an educational improvement of this type does not assure equal labor market outcomes relative to white workers with the same level of education. The labor earnings differential by race in Brazil is high even among individuals who completed at least a bachelor's degree. This paper investigates this labor earnings gap, emphasizing the unequal distribution of whites and blacks across fields of study. Evidence indicates that disparities in the distribution of racial groups across fields of study help explain 18% of the total median earnings differential in 2000 and 33% in 2010, accounting for most of the gap between white and black workers due to characteristic effects in this latter period.     

Productivity growth and environmental regulations - accounting for undesirable outputs: Analysis of China's thirty provincial regions using the Malmquist-Luenberger index

This paper employs the Malmquist-Luenberger (ML) productivity index to evaluate China's growth in total factor productivity (TFP), incorporating undesirable outputs, during the period from 1989 to 2008. The ML productivity index and its components (technical and efficiency changes) are derived from the directional distance function which gives credit for an increase in good outputs and for reductions in undesirable outputs. The average annual ML productivity growth, accounting for undesirable outputs, is 2.46%, whereas the value of the traditional Malmquist productivity index is 4.84%, showing that the true TFP growth in China is overestimated if undesirable outputs are ignored. We explore the strictness in enforcing environmental regulations and its impact on improvements in ML productivity. The results show that, the enforcement of environmental regulations in China is, in general, far below the levels achieved in the best performing regions, and that the more stringent enforcement of environmental regulations would help to improve ML productivity growth in China.     

The Nature of China's Economic Growth in the Past Two Decades

The Chinese economy has grown at record rates since the start of the market-oriented reforms in 1978. Motivated by the Asian productivity debate, this article provides an assessment of the role of total factor productivity in China's economic growth in the past two decades. We identify four main factors in the productivity growth: efficiency gain at the micro level; improvement in resource allocation; diffusion of technology through foreign direct investment; and improvement in infrastructure. We also argue that further state-owned enterprise and banking reforms, an emerging entrepreneurial class and greater research and development efforts are additional driving forces for the medium to long-term total factor productivity growth in China.     

Reciprocity and matching frictions

The ability of search and matching models to replicate stylized facts—such as volatilities and correlations—has been a center of attraction over the last couple of years. This paper introduces the Akerlof (Q J Econ 97:543–569, 1982) fair wage approach into an endogenous separation search and matching model. Within a RBC general equilibrium context, we show that the efficiency wage model outperforms its benchmark Nash bargaining pendant. In particular, the model generates the empirically observed volatilities in response to a productivity shock and replicates a strong Beveridge curve. Furthermore, we derive the Solow condition in a search environment and discuss the interactions of search and efficiency wage frictions. We show that search frictions create a wedge between the optimal wage/effort solution in the search and the competitive equilibrium. The efficiency wage consideration adds an additional margin to the firm's decision problem. As effort varies over the cycle, it changes the firm's optimal response to exogenous disturbances and amplifies the response to shocks.     

Flows of Air Pollution,Ill Health and Welfare

We provide a theoretical framework for measuring welfare when pollution influences economic growth by impairing health and driving up defensive medical expenditures. We demonstrate the usefulness of our framework in practice by applying it to data from Swedish valuation studies designed according to the accounting principles suggested here. We estimate that the negative health effects of nitrogen dioxide emissions amount to 0.6% of GDP in Sweden. We also show that a corrective Pigouvian tax should internalize the direct disutility, reduced labor productivity, and increased healthcare expenditures caused by pollution. According to our calculations, harmful health impacts alone (excluding ecosystem effects) justify 65% of the current Swedish tax on nitrogen dioxide.      

A STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC MODEL OF THE MENTAL HEALTH OF CHILDREN*

We estimate the parameters of a dynamic multiperiod model where parents with one child periodically decide whether their child uses mental health services. In this model, parents receive utility from household consumption and from their child's mental health. Mental health services may improve the child's mental health, but may be costly in terms of reduced household consumption and direct disutility. We find that mental health services can slightly improve a child's mental health, but the use of services accounts for a small fraction of the improvement of the mental health of the children in our sample.     

Firm-level productivity in Latin America and the Caribbean

While the accumulation of factors of production, both physical and human capital, has helped Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to narrow the income gap with developed economies, aggregate productivity is still relatively low. Although there are numerous determinants of aggregate productivity, it is largely based on the underlying productivity of all firms in the economy. Using firm-level data from several waves of the World Bank Enterprise Survey and Chile's National Manufacturing Survey, we explore the ‘what’ question on productivity dispersion in LAC. We document three stylized facts: (i) there are significant differences in firm productivity within industries – the firm at the 90th percentile of the productivity distribution produces almost seven times as much output (using the same measured inputs) as the 10^th percentile firm; (ii) productivity differences persist over time – regressing a firm's current productivity on its one-year lagged productivity yields an autoregressive coefficient of around 0.9; and (iii) most of the growth in aggregate productivity comes from improvements in the productivity of existing firms.     

The Welfare Effects of Incentive Schemes

This paper computes the change in welfare associated with the introduction of incentives. We calculate by how much the welfare gains of increased output due to incentives outweigh workers' disutility from increased effort. We accomplish this by studying the use of incentives by a firm in the check-clearing industry. Using this firm's production records, we model and estimate the worker's dynamic effort decision problem. We find that the firm's incentive scheme has a large effect on productivity, raising it by 12% over the sample period for the average worker. Using our parameter estimates, we show that the cost of increased effort due to incentives is equal to the dollar value of a 5% rise in productivity. Welfare is measured as the output produced minus the cost of effort; hence, the net increase in the average worker's welfare due to the introduction of the firm's bonus plan is 7%. Under a first-best scheme, we find that the net increase in welfare is 9%.     

Outsourcing, Foreign Ownership, and Productivity: Evidence from UK Establishment-level Data

The paper presents an empirical analysis of “outsourcing” using establishment‐level data for UK manufacturing industries. The authors analyze an establishment's decision to outsource and the subsequent effects of outsourcing on the establishment's productivity. Outsourcing is compared in domestic with foreign‐owned establishments. The empirical results suggest that high wages are positively related to outsourcing, suggesting that the cost‐saving motive is important. Foreign‐owned firms have higher levels of outsourcing than domestic establishments. In the productivity analysis, an establishment's outsourcing intensity is positively related to its labor productivity and total factor productivity growth, and this effect is more pronounced for foreign establishments.     

The evolution of conventions in minimum effort games

The literature on minimum effort game has been concerned with a symmetric game with linear payoff functions. The main aim of the present paper is to study the coordination problem arising in a not necessarily symmetric minimum effort game with two players. The sources of asymmetry can be twofold: the productivity of effort and the distribution of the join output. To select among the Pareto ranked equilibria we use the stochastic stability criterion. We show that, for any configuration parameters, the set of stochastically stable equilibria coincides with the set of potential maximizers. We also show that when the disutility of effort is linear, the Pareto dominant equilibrium is stochastically stable provided that the distributive parameter belongs to a well defined range. When the disutility of effort is nonlinear no distributive arguments can be used to successfully affect the selection process. Lastly we prove that the connection between stochastic stability and maximum potential can fail when more than two agents are considered.