股权结构、资本结构与公司价值的实证研究

文献回顾 自1932年以来,Berle和Means及许多研究者对经营者和股东的利益冲突进行了广泛研究,努力寻求理解公司的本质.股权结构与公司绩效的关系命题的提出与Berle和Means的假说有关.该假说认为,两权分离式的现代公司由于股权高度分散,公司受控于经营者而非众多小股东,公司资产是为经营者的利益使用而不是使股东财富最大化.由于经营者的个人价值取向与股东间的利益冲突,从而不能保证公司业绩达到最优.     

上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的实证研究

上市公司绩效表现取决于治理结构,而股权结构又是公司治理结构的基础,它对于公司的经营激励、收购兼并、代理权竞争、监督等诸方面均有较大影响。本文第一部分对前人在股权结构与绩效方面的研究进行综述,第二部分对上市公司股权结构与绩效的实证分析,最后得出结论。     

股权结构与公司绩效实证研究

本文采用我国A股上市公司2009年1639家公司数据作为样本,对公司股权和公司绩效之间的关系作了实证研究。结论如下:①在当前的情况下,我国公司第一大股东的持股比例对公司绩效有负作用。②股权适度集中对公司治理有正效应。③同时本文也验证了公司管理层持有公司股票对公司绩效的影响。     

我国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的实证研究

股权结构与公司绩效的相关性问题历来是金融理论界关心的热点问题,国内外学者也纷纷提出不同的理论研究和实证研究,并没有一致的定论。根据委托代理理论,公司的股权结构不同,股东行为也会不同,对公司治理机制发挥作用的影响也不一样,从而会导致不同的公司绩效。因此为了提高委托代理的效率,必须慎重安排好各类股东的持股比重,即公司股权结构。     

股权结构与公司治理

现代化的公司中股权是各种关系的基础,股权结构对于公司治理的内容和效率有很大的影响,本文首先介绍我国公司治理的发展阶段,指出股权结构与公司治理方式之间的关系,最后提出合理的公司治理构建和股权结构设计。     

关于资本结构、股权结构与公司绩效的实证研究

通过构造二次函数模型,对资本结构、股权结构与公司绩效的关系进行研究.研究发现:资本结构与公司绩效不是成严格的线性关系,而是呈倒“U”型的关系;股权结构和公司绩效之间的关系也不是简单的线性关系,呈“U”型的关系,它们都比一次关系具有更高的解释能力.     

股权结构、公司治理与上市公司投资水平的实证研究

实证研究表明,在上市公司投资水平的决定因素中,资产负债率、资产规模、现金流都与投资显著正相关,但托宾Q并不显著,并且在方向上与预期相反;行业之间的投资行为存在差异;第一大股东持股比例与投资负相关;流通股比例与投资正相关但不显著,国有股比例和社会法人股比例都与投资负相关但只有国有股比例显著;高管持股比例和独董比例都与投资负相关,但同样不显著。     

股权结构、公司治理与公司绩效——基于家电行业上市公司的实证研究

本文以权力制衡理论和委托代理理论为基础,探讨了股权结构与公司绩效的关系,以国内市场竞争程度最高的家电业上市公司为对象,比较"上证180指数"股样本进行了实证分析。结果表明,第一大股东的持股比例、股权集中度以及独立的次要股东的存在均与公司经营绩效正相关。该研究有助于我国形成合理的公司治理结构和完善的现代企业制度。     

监督,抑或共谋?——我国上市公司股权结构与公司价值的关系研究

本文通过扩展LLSV(2002)的模型,在监督与共谋的视角下分析了大股东之间分享控制权的治理模式对公司价值的影响,并利用2000—2004年间我国上市公司的样本数据进行实证检验。研究发现:(1)股权集中度、股权制衡度与公司价值之间均存在显著的正相关关系;(2)在不同股东性质的公司中,股权制衡的效果存在明显差异,尤其当第一、二大股东均属于非国有性质时,股权制衡难以发挥积极作用。这些研究结果表明其他大股东虽然能够起监督作用,但也可能与控股股东达成共谋以分享控制权收益。     

股权结构对公司价值的影响

在现代公司治理中,公司股权结构已成为重要的研究领域.虽然Berle和Means（1932）年提出股权分散化是现代公司的重要特征,但实际上,根据LLSV（1999）从法律的角度分析得出,除英美少数国家外,大部分发达国家的公司股权都集中在控股股东手中,一些法律制度不健全的国家中,大股东控制权现象尤为严重.我国上市公司中存在的“一股独大”现象,一方面有助于改善公司经营绩效使全体股东受益,另一方面在追求自身福利最大化过程中,有可能“掏空”上市公司,进而侵占中小股东利益（李增泉,2004;唐清泉等,2005）.究竟股权结构如何影响公司价值,本文将进行具体分析.     

股权估值模型及其比较研究

股权估值方法是建立在预期基础上的。由于关键估值变量的不同选择,产生了三种基本的股权估值模型:红利贴现模型、贴现现金流量模型和剩余收入模型。本文对三个基本模型进行了理论和实证的分析、综述,研究了基本模型之间的关系,比较了基本模型及其引申模型之间的优劣。     

Agency Problems,Equity Ownership,and Corporate Diversification

We provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for corporate diversification. We find that the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the equity ownership of outside blockholders. In addition, we report that decreases in diversification are associated with external corporate control threats, financial distress, and management turnover. These findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining value-reducing diversification strategies and that the recent trend toward increased corporate focus is attributable to market disciplinary forces.     

Corporate Equity Ownership and the Governance of Product Market Relationships

We assemble a sample of over 10,000 customer–supplier relationships and determine whether the customer owns equity in the supplier. We find that factors related to both contractual incompleteness and financial market frictions are important in the decision of a customer firm to take an equity stake in their supplier. Evidence on the variation in the size of observed equity positions suggests that there are limits to the size of optimal ownership stakes in many relationships. Finally, we find that relationships accompanied by equity ownership last significantly longer than other relationships, suggesting that ownership aids in bonding trading parties together.     

Corporate Equity Ownership, Strategic Alliances, and Product Market Relationships

This paper examines long-term block ownership by corporations and performance changes in firms with corporate block owners. We also examine potential reasons for corporate ownership including benefits in product market relationships, alleviation of financing constraints, and board monitoring by corporate owners. We find the largest significant increases in targets' stock prices, investment, and operating profitability when ownership is combined with alliances, joint ventures, and other product market relationships between purchasing and target firms, especially in industries with high research and development. Our findings are consistent with the conclusion that block ownership by corporations has significant benefits in product market relationships.     

Corporate Governance,Product Market Competition,and Equity Prices

This paper examines whether firms in noncompetitive industries benefit more from good governance than do firms in competitive industries. We find that weak governance firms have lower equity returns, worse operating performance, and lower firm value, but only in noncompetitive industries. When exploring the causes of the inefficiency, we find that weak governance firms have lower labor productivity and higher input costs, and make more value‐destroying acquisitions, but, again, only in noncompetitive industries. We also find that weak governance firms in noncompetitive industries are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds, suggesting that investors take actions to mitigate the inefficiency.     

Market Valuation and Equity Ownership Structure: The Case of Agency Conflict Regimes

This paper provides further evidence on the link between the firm's performance and the distribution of the common shares between insiders, blockholders and institutions. We endogenize the functional form of the market valuecommon equity structure relationship by using a switching regression methodology. This allows us to observe four distinct ownership structure types that constitute different agency conflict regimes. We provide evidence that supports the notion that investors recognize the existence of such regimes and assess market values differently depending on the type of agency regime the firm operates in. We find that firms with low insider stakes and low blockholder stakes and firms with high insider stakes and high blockholder stakes have the highest agency costs of free cash flow. We also find that the effect of the ownership variables on market values differs across regimes and that there are differences in the monitoring effectiveness of institutional holders and blockholders.     

中外合资企业股权变更评估的有关问题

中外合资企业股权结构变动时,往往涉及国有股权利益.该文就中外合资企业是否国有资产占有单位及三种常见的中外合资企业股权结构变更形式是否涉及国有资产评估问题进行了探讨.     

高管股权激励动机差异对公司绩效的影响研究

以股权激励动机为视角,研究了两类动机下高管股权激励与公司绩效之间的关系。研究结果表明,两类动机下的高管股权激励与公司绩效之间的关系显著不同:相比于非激励型股权激励与公司业绩呈不显著的负相关关系,激励型高管股权激励却能显著提高公司业绩。     

同济堂股权收购案例中的资产评估问题研究

资产评估是企业并购过程中的核心环节,但近年来评估中的问题仍层出不穷。本文依据资产评估行业准则和企业价值评估的要求,对同济堂股权收购案例进行了研究,对其在评估程序和收益法的使用上存在的不足进行分析与改进,并以此为基础,从资产评估行业长远发展的角度提出若干建议。     

Equity Ownership and Firm Value: Evidence from Targeted Stock Repurchases

In contrast to the negative average abnormal return associated with the announcement of a control‐related targeted repurchase (greenmail transaction), we find that the announcement of a noncontrol‐related targeted repurchase is associated with a positive and significant average abnormal return. Cross‐sectional analysis indicates that the change in firm value at the announcement of a noncontrol‐related targeted repurchase is negatively related to the resulting changes in both insider ownership and outside blockholdings. We also find significant differences in announcement‐period stock price effects depending on the identity of the selling shareholder.