Welfare effects of unbundling under different regulatory regimes in natural gas markets

In this paper, we develop a theoretical model that enriches the literature on the pros and cons of ownership unbundling vis-à-vis lighter unbundling frameworks in the natural gas markets. For each regulatory framework, we compute equilibrium outcomes when an incumbent firm and a new entrant compete à la Cournot in the final gas market. We find that the entrant’s contracting conditions in the upstream market and the transmission tariff are key determinants of the market structure in the downstream gas market (both with ownership and with legal unbundling). We also study how the regulator must optimally set transmission tariffs in each of the two unbundling regimes. We conclude that welfare maximizing tariffs often require free access to the transmission network (in both regulatoy regimes). However, when the regulator aims at promoting the break-even of the regulated transmission system operator, the first-best tariff is unfeasible in both regimes. Hence, we study a more realistic set-up, in which the regulator’s action is constrained by the break-even of the regulated firm (the transmission system operator). In this set-up, we find that, for a given transmission tariff, final prices in the downstream market are always higher with ownership unbundling than with legal unbundling.     

Revisiting electricity liberalization and quality of service: empirical evidence from New Zealand

What effect does the firm structure have on the quality of service delivered by networks and infrastructure industries? We answer this question by empirically assessing the impacts of complete vertical separation, such as ownership unbundling, on the quality of service delivered by a liberalized network industry. Electricity distribution utilities in New Zealand are considered for this purpose and are analysed using panel-data econometrics. The results show robust evidence that ownership unbundling contributed to a fall in the duration and frequency of supply interruptions in electricity distribution. However, the results also show that unbundling has no effect on reducing distribution network losses. These results, overall, highlight the nonsimple impacts of ownership unbundling on the quality of electricity distribution. We suggest that the quality of service may largely improve when considered in the economic regulation of electricity networks than completely relying on specific reform measures such as ownership unbundling.     

Pricing flexibility under rate-of-return regulation: Effects on network infrastructure investment

When a commodity market relies upon a regulated network service industry—e.g., telecommunications, electricity, or natural gas transmission—economic efficiency in that commodity market is a crucial consideration for regulatory design. This is because insufficient infrastructure investment relative to network demand results in congestion. The extraction of associated rents has distortionary effects on commodity spot market prices. Greater regulatory flexibility in network pricing can alleviate such issues by cultivating the incentives needed for stakeholders to invest in transmission capacity. To illustrate this effect I derive and numerically solve stylized optimality conditions for access and usage prices for a gas pipeline operator under alternative regulatory models. My results have general implications for regulation in network infrastructure industries, as energy and telecommunications markets are expected to expand considerably over the coming decades.     

Imperfect legal unbundling of monopolistic bottlenecks

We study an industry with a monopolistic bottleneck supplying an essential input to several downstream firms. Under legal unbundling the bottleneck must be operated by a legally independent upstream firm, which may be partly or fully owned by an incumbent active in downstream markets. Access prices are regulated but the upstream firm can perform non-tariff discrimination. Under perfect legal unbundling the upstream firm maximizes only own profits; with imperfections it is biased and to some extent accounts also for the incumbent’s downstream profits. We show that increasing the incumbent’s ownership share increases total output if the upstream firm’s bias is sufficiently small, while otherwise effects are ambiguous. Stronger regulation that reduces the bias without changing ownership shares generally increases total output. We also endogenize the bias and show that it can depend non-monotonically on the ownership share.     

Imports and the structure of retail markets

Abstract We construct a model of trade with heterogeneous retailers to examine the effects of trade liberalization on retail market structure, imports and social welfare. We are especially interested in investigating the transmission of lower import prices into consumer prices and the effects of retail market regulation. The paper shows that changes in import prices may have large effects on consumer prices and import volumes when changes in retail market structure are taken into account, and that restrictions on retailing, as they occur in several countries, may significantly alter this transmission mechanism by reducing imports and raising consumer prices.     

Did the introduction of a nodal market structure impact wholesale electricity prices in the Texas (ERCOT) market?

Regression analysis suggests that zonal averages of locational marginal prices under the nodal market are about 2 % lower than the balancing energy prices that would occur under the previous zonal market structure in ERCOT. The estimates for the nodal market price effects are found after controlling for such factors as natural gas prices, total system load levels, non-dispatchable generation levels, the treatment of local congestion costs, and the treatment of the revenues received by the market from the auctioning of transmission rights. Our finding is limited to periods which are not characterized by price spikes in the wholesale market.     

Incentive Regulation and Competition in Public Utility Markets: A 20-Year Perspective

Over the last 20 years, incentives in general and price caps in particular have breathed new life into public utility regulation. Price caps successfully combine incentives for cost reduction with incentives for more efficient pricing. These properties also facilitate opening public utility sectors to competition. Relatively tight price caps likely imply the right amount of competition, when the underlying natural market structure is unknown. While price caps make a regulated incumbent competitively more aggressive, this aggression is likely to improve on the unregulated outcome. Potentially anticompetitive behavior by the incumbent has led to regulation of essential inputs on the basis of benchmarked costs. Benchmarked costs should evolve into price caps for essential inputs and eventually lead to partial deregulation of end-user prices.     

中国模式:利益结构调整与宏观经济调控

我国当前的社会利益结构体现着中国市场经济模式的特点,既表现了一般市场经济利益结构多元性、差异性、倾斜性的特征,又表现了公有制模糊、利益行政化和过渡性这些中国式特征。利益结构失衡是导致中国宏观经济运行出现波动和宏观调控出现不同效应的重要因素。要调整利益结构,就要清晰界定公有制各层次的产权、合理调整中央政府与地方政府的利益关系、改革收入分配制度、构建合理透明的利益结构调整长效机制,而这些又有赖于社会主义市场经济体制的完善。     

Price Dynamics in a Network of Decentralized Power Markets

In this paper, we model the dynamic behavior of prices in a network of interconnected, but decentralized, electric power markets—an architecture very different from the centralized exchanges and power pools currently being implemented by many state regulators. We estimate dynamic equations of unregulated, wholesale power prices at spot markets scattered over an eleven-state trading region. The results indicate that this decentralized system of power and transmission trading produces prices that are efficient and dynamically stable over this vast network. Price convergence in the power market is similar to what has been observed in the recently deregulated natural gas market.     

Folk theorems on transmission access: Proofs and counterexamples

Nodal prices, congestion revenues, transmission capacity rights, and compensation for wire ownership are key concepts used to formulate claims about proposals to organize competitive and open transmission access. Underlying those claims are implicit assertions (folk theorems) concerning the regulation of transmission access, the determination of power flows, properties of economic dispatch, and the operations of competitive nodal markets for power. The paper has two objectives. We first formulate these folk theorems as explicit mathematical assertions. We then prove that some of these assertions are true, and we present counterexamples to other assertions.The counterexamples are interesting because they negate plausible propositions, including: (1) uncongested lines do not receive congestion rents (defined through node price differences); (2) nodal prices clear markets for power only if the allocation is efficient; (3) in an efficient allocation power can only flow from nodes with lower prices to nodes with higher prices; (4) strengthening transmission lines or building additional lines increases transmission capacity; (5) transmission capacity rights are compatible with any economically efficient dispatch.     

Evaluating the risk premium in the U.S.A. natural gas market: evidence from low-price regime

In recent years, the U.S.A. natural gas market has seen enormous changes. The expectations of abundant supply of shale gas and the slow U.S.A. economic recovery have pushed gas prices below US$ 4 MMBtu. Although shale gas is a new promising source of unconventional energy, investors face uncertain investment plans. In this study, we investigate the risk premium by comparing behaviour before and after the change point in agents risk perception. Unlike traditional empirical research on risk premium, we use the parametric, two-factor model of Schwartz and Smith (2000) to evaluate the implied risk premium term structure from futures prices traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). We compare our findings with other empirical results and find that the change point lies at the beginning of the low-price regime. When we compare periods before and after the change point, we observe that the risk premium changed, not only in sign, but also in magnitude.     

Using Market Structure to Regulate a Vertically Integrated Monopolist

A natural monopolist whose cost is private information produces a good which is combined with another good that can be produced by the monopolist or by other firms. The agency that regulates the monopolist can impose any of several different market structures in the industry: integrated monopoly, vertical separation with free entry downstream, or liberalization downstream (both integrated and independent production). When several firms produce downstream, a Cournot quantity-setting game with free entry determines the market price. We derive the optimal contracts to offer the monopolist under all three market structures and examine the influence of downstream cost differences on access prices.We then study the optimal regulatory policy where the regulator can condition the downstream market structure on the monopolist's cost report to the regulator. The optimal regulatory policy awards a monopoly to a low-cost upstream firm, but requires free entry downstream if the monopolist reports high upstream costs. Thus, the choice of market structure is an additional tool to limit rent extraction by the monopolist. Simulation analysis reveals the possibility of significant welfare gains from this additional regulatory tool.     

ELECTRIC POWER DEREGULATION: BACKGROUND AND PROSPECTS

The incentive failures of rate-of-return regulation are well known and thus raise the question of whether to deregulate electric power. The development of long-distance transmission and of alternative power sources in networks has spawned several institutions that would or could allow markets to substitute for such regulation. These include long-term contract sales, spot power exchange, contract power pooling, shared facility ownership, and economic dispatch. Because of the current surplus of power, the existence of such institutions has caused increasing competition in the electric power market and has catalyzed the movement to deregulate generators from state authority and to restructure utility assets. By encouraging this movement, regulators can further the discipline that markets already exert on prices and costs. By making counterproposals to the utilities, regulators can influence asset restructuring so that some of the capital gains inherent in such restructuring can be shared with consumers in the form of rate relief. Finally, for the future, the cotenancy agreement—which is antitrust supervised and competitively ruled—has promising possibilities for deregulating transmission and distribution.     

Vertical separation with location–price competition

While the literature has generally found that vertical separation helps buffer competition and harm consumers in a duopolistic market, we find the exact opposite. To induce the retailers to locate closer to consumers and earn a larger market share, the manufacturers set wholesale prices below marginal cost. This market share effect dominates the previously focused coordination effect under which a higher wholesale price helps coordinate the retailers’ pricing decisions. For each manufacturer, vertical separation is a dominant strategy so the endogenous determination of vertical separation versus vertical integration is a prisoner’s dilemma game.     

Economic reform of the electricity industries of Central and Eastern Europe

The purpose of the paper is the following: firstly, to chart how much economic reform of CEE electricity industries has taken place to date; secondly, to discuss why progress has been so limited; and thirdly, to consider the prospects over the next few years. In charting economic progress to date, we will consider and discuss progress in electricity price unbundling and rebalancing; in utility commercialization, in industry and market restructuring and liberalization; and in privatization, as well as the development of economic regulation. For the reasons outlined above, we will explore the pricing issues in some detail as they are essential for understanding the difficulties in making progress in the other aspects of economic reform. The analysis concentrates on the ten countries with which the EU has and Association Agreement and who are stated candidates for EU membership (the EU 10).     

Economies of scope in electricity supply and the costs of vertical separation for different unbundling scenarios

Motivated by the movement towards vertical unbundling in Europe this study measures the economies of scope for the U.S. electricity industry based on a multi-stage cost function. The paper analyzes three unbundling options and finds evidence for synergies that may be explained by coordination and risk effects. Separating generation from networks and retail appears to be the most costly alternative with an average cost increase of 19 to 26%. If generation and transmission remain integrated but are separated from distribution and retail, average scope economies amount to 8 to 10%. A split between the transmission level and the remaining supply stages leads to a cost increase of approximately 4%.     

Downstream gas pricing in an era of upstream deregulation

State public service commission regulation of gas utility pricing is examined during the period of wellhead price deregulation. A model which incorporates asymmetry in price setting during a period of changing input costs is estimated. Statistical analyses suggest public service commission regulation slowed the increase in gas utility prices during periods of rising costs. Gas utility pricing was not monitored as closely when purchased gas prices fell, thereby altering the rate structure in favor of industrial customers. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission policies designed to promote competition by restructuring the transmission sector of the gas industry after 1985 appear to have suppressed retail prices in industrial markets.     

股权结构对买卖价差的影响研究

本文从市场微观结构层面研究了买卖价差和股权结构之间的关系,引入股权激励和B、H股因素,选取2006年至2010年上证180指数成分股作为研究标的。研究表明,公司内部人和机构投资者持股增加了买卖价差,并且机构投资者的影响更大,股权转让会导致买卖价差上升。股权激励在长期中能够降低买卖价差,但是在牛市行情中作用不明显。发行B、H股产生的市场分割和信息非对称会提高A股的买卖价差。     

Price Convergence and Information Efficiency in German Natural Gas Markets

In 2007, Germany changed network access regulation in the natural gas sector and introduced a so‐called entry–exit system. The spot market effects of the reregulation remain to be examined. We use cointegration analysis and a state space model with time‐varying coefficients to study the development of natural gas spot prices in the two major trading hubs in Germany and the interlinked spot market in the Netherlands. To analyse information efficiency in more detail, the state space model is extended to an error correction model. Overall, our results suggest a reasonable degree of price convergence between the corresponding hubs. Market efficiency in terms of information processing has increased considerably among Germany and the Netherlands.     

Pitfalls in Restructuring the Electricity Industry

Abstract. This paper models some reductions in output that may follow the opening of electricity markets to competition. Specifically, we show that vertical separation of electricity generation, transmission and distribution could reduce welfare compared to the previous system of vertically integrated monopoly, if grid owners can act as monopolistic retailers or, alternatively, set access prices that maximize merchandizing surplus. Moreover, we show that a rule of non‐discriminatory pricing would not remedy any of these problems. Hence, to secure the efficiency gains of deregulation, the re‐regulation of the remaining monopolistic core – the electric grid – cannot rely on simple rules like cost‐based non‐discriminatory pricing.