Examination and Approval of New Patents in an Endogenous Growth Model

This study introduces the examination duration for newly developed goods into a standard R&D-based growth model. Producing such goods requires approval from an authority, and their examination incurs both cost and time. Thus, there is a lag between invention and production. This study investigates the effects of reducing the examination duration on examination backlogs (the number of newly invented goods under examination), economic growth, and welfare. We obtain an inverted-U shaped relationship between backlogs and duration, because reducing the duration decreases backlogs by accelerating the examination process, but simultaneously increases backlogs by promoting R&D and increasing the number of applications. In addition, we demonstrate that reducing the examination duration promotes economic growth. However, a rather short examination duration needs considerable resources as the examination has a higher cost. Thus, an extremely short duration hurts welfare. Our numerical analysis reveals the existence of an optimal examination duration.     

Franchise fee,contract bargaining,and economic growth

This paper combines the industrial organization (IO) theory and the R&D-based endogenous growth theory in a model of a successive imperfect competitive economy. The current study assumes that firms between upstream and downstream industries bargain over both the price of intermediate goods and the franchise fee. Findings show that the intermediate goods firm with a R&D sector charges the price equal to the marginal cost. Economic rent may also be partly transferred into the franchise fee determined by the relative bargaining power. In particular, the traditional double marginalization result, such as in Spengler (1950), does not take place here due to the above-mentioned bargaining scheme. Finally, this work shows that final goods firms in vertically linked industries play an important role in an economic growth model. The more bargaining power the final goods firms have (or the more returns to specialization upstream firms have, or the less substitution elasticity the final goods have), the more the economy grows. However, the consumer preference for diversity seemingly does not affect economic growth rate.     

Competition,taxation and economic growth

The paper mainly examines the relationship between economic growth, tax policy and sectoral labor distribution in an endogenous growth model with expanding varieties. For analyzing these relationships, we consider an economy where three sectors of production are vertically integrated: final goods sector, intermediate goods sector and research sector. We show that the extent of imperfect competition in the intermediate products market affects both economic growth and the allocation of the available labor to all the sectors employing this input. The resources from capital taxation, which are used for financing research sector, have a U-shaped effect on growth and lead to a movement of the labor from research sector to final goods sector. Additionally, we show that if there exists a higher competitive structure in an economy, the probability of the positive effect of an increase in tax on growth gets higher.     

Horizontal innovation-based growth and product market competition

The influence of the intensity of competition in the product market on economic growth is analyzed by developing an endogenous growth model with horizontal innovation. Product market competition is measured by (1 − Lerner index) and depends on both the share of factor inputs in total income and the degree of substitutability across goods. We find that the shape of the relationship between competition and growth can change dramatically according to which proxy of competition is used. We explain our results in terms of the interplay between the resource allocation and the profit incentive effects.     

Costly investment, complementarities and the skill premium

We propose a new framework to analyse the relationship between the relative high-skilled labour endowment, the skill premium and economic growth. Building on Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), we introduce physical capital; internal costly investment in both capital and R&D; and complementarities between intermediate goods. We only find a positive relationship between the relative labour endowment and both the skill premium and economic growth within determined intervals of relative labour endowment values, which vary with the absolute productive advantage of high over low-skilled labour. The model thus accommodates theoretically mixed empirical results on the relative labour endowment-skill premium relationship. We further find that the impact on both the relative labour endowment and the skill premium of a rise in investment costs or in the complementarities degree depends on: (i) the absolute productivity advantage of high over low-skilled labour; and (ii) the relative labour endowment.     

Imperfect Competition and Growth with Entrepreneurial Risk

Abstract. This paper analyzes an overlapping generations endogenous growth model of occupational choice under risk in a two-sector economy with intermediate and final goods. Agents choose between business ownership in the monopolistically competitive intermediate goods industry or employment as a worker in this sector. Firm-specific profits are stochastic. Occupational choice under risk endogenizes the number of firms and products in the intermediate goods industry. The analysis shows that economic performance and growth both depend on the entrepreneurship rate and are inefficiently low compared with an economy with perfect markets for pooling risks. Monopolistic competition partly offsets the negative income effects from a too low level of entrepreneurial risk-taking.     

经济增长与环境质量:来自中国省际面板数据的证据

环境库兹涅茨曲线是经济增长与环境污染之间呈倒U型关系的曲线,即随着经济增长,环境质量先恶化,当经济发展到一定程度,环境质量又会逐渐改善。文章基于中国1991—2003年29个省级区域环境质量与人均GDP的数据,利用工业废水、废气、固体排放物等变量与人均GDP拟合方程验证环境库兹涅茨曲线假说。研究结果验证了环境库兹涅茨假说,人口密度和外商直接投资对不同的污染物有不同的影响,而工业发展对这三种污染物排放的影响比较大,因此加强产业结构的调整将有助于改善环境质量。     

Variety of products,public capital,and endogenous growth

This paper develops an extension of the endogenous growth model with variety expansion presented in Romer [Romer, P.M., 1990. Endogenous technical change, Journal of Political Economy 98, part 2, S71–S102] by considering public capital accumulation. Characterizing the transitional dynamics, the growth rate of consumption traces (and available number of intermediate goods also might trace) an S-shaped converging path to the equilibrium growth rate, similar to a logistic growth curve, if the intensity of public capital is sufficiently high. We also show that public investment enhances economic growth because it stimulates demand for intermediate goods and raises the market interest rate.     

Developmental aspects of China��s trade pattern: The role of imported intermediate goods

This paper studies the relationship between China’s trade and its economic development. More than two centuries ago Adam Smith argued that it is the use of imported intermediate goods that constitutes the vector through which openness improves productivity. Imported intermediate goods can relieve what would otherwise be key constraints allowing faster growth, together with better human development. While China’s trade reform is often related to its productivity growth, there has been remarkably little attention to the relationship between imports and productivity growth at the industry-sectoral level. Our paper examines the sector-specific impact of intermediate goods utilizing a time series for the share of imported intermediate goods in each sector derived from our model calculations. Our study indicates that imported intermediate goods are playing an important role in the growth of Chinese productivity.     

Technological-knowledge bias and the industrial structure under costly investment and complementarities

We develop an extended directed technological change model with vertical and horizontal R&D to analyze the economic growth rate, the technological-knowledge bias and the industrial structure, assuming: (i) complementarities between intermediate goods, and (ii) internal costly investment. We find that complementarities directly affect long-run technological-knowledge bias and relative production, both elements influence the economic growth rate and neither affects the skill premium and the relative number of firms. We also verify that the relationship between the relative supply of skills and both economic growth and the industrial structure suggested by our model is qualitatively consistent with recent empirical data for a number of developed countries.     

Redistributive taxation,wealth distribution,and economic growth

This paper examines the relationship between wealth distribution and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with heterogeneous households and redistributive taxation. In this paper, we incorporate an endogenous determination of redistributive policy into the model, focusing on the relation between pre- and post-tax inequality. Endogenous redistributive policy affects wealth distribution and economic growth. Therefore, the relation between post-tax inequality and economic growth is different from that between pre-tax inequality and economic growth. Results show that there exists a negative correlation between pre-tax inequality and economic growth, whereas there exists an inverted-U relationship between post-tax inequality and economic growth in a voting equilibrium.     

Firm Heterogeneity,Contract Enforcement,and the Industry Dynamics of Offshoring*

We develop an endogenous growth model with R&D spillovers to study the long‐run consequences of offshoring with firm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. In so doing, we model offshoring as the geographical fragmentation of a firm's production chain between a home upstream division and a foreign downstream division. While there is always a positive correlation between upstream bargaining weight and offshoring activities, there is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between these and growth. Whether offshoring with incomplete contracts also increases consumption depends on firm heterogeneity. As for welfare, whereas with complete contracts an R&D subsidy is enough to solve the inefficiency due to R&D spillovers, with incomplete contracts a production subsidy is also needed.     

Globalization and the decline in labor shares: Exploring the relationship beyond trade and financial flows

We employ data from up to 125 countries during the 1970–2009 period to explore the relationship between globalization and labor share. Existing studies report a negative relationship between trade and investment flows and labor shares. While we also find that economic flows are often negatively related to labor shares, measures of social globalization tend to be positively related to labor shares. While greater mobility of goods and capital may be associated with increases in capital's bargaining power, all else equal, greater flows of information, ideas, and people may increase the bargaining power of workers.     

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LABOUR MARKET IMPERFECTION

This paper will set up a general equilibrium model with a distorted labour market to explore the effects of an environmental tax and union bargaining power on formal employment and the informal competitive wage. We find that when the government raises the environmental tax, both formal employment and informal competitive wage would fall. In addition, we confirm that a policy of labour market reform would increase both formal employment and the informal competitive wage.     

Why Are Rich Countries More Politically Cohesive?*

We document empirically that rich countries are more politically cohesive than poorer countries. In order to explain this regularity, we provide a model where political cohesion is linked to the emergence of a fully functioning market economy. Without market exchange, the welfare of inherently selfish individuals will be mutually independent. Whoever has greater bargaining power will be willing to make decisions that enhance the productivity of their supporters at the expense of other groups in society. If the gains from specialization are sufficiently large, however, a market economy will emerge. From being essentially non‐cohesive under self‐sufficiency, the political decision‐making process becomes cohesive in the market economy, because the welfare of individuals will be mutually interdependent as a result of the exchange of goods.     

Product market deregulation and the US employment miracle

We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulation and equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combining a job matching model with monopolistic competition in the goods market and individual bargaining. We calibrate the model to US data and perform a policy experiment to assess whether the decrease in trend unemployment during the 1980s and 1990s could be directly attributed to product market deregulation. Under our baseline calibration, our results suggest that a decrease of less than two-tenths of a percentage point of unemployment rates can be attributed to product market deregulation, a surprisingly small amount.     

Informality,enforcement and growth

This paper develops a two-sector growth model with formal and informal sectors for an economy that cares about redistribution and illustrates its relationship with the enforcement level. The technology gap and labour rigidity explicate the duality. The state can tax the formal sector to subsidise informal income and finance public infrastructure. Alternatively, enforcement, which is costly and corresponds to a variety of discrete components from the security of property rights and integrity of contracts to control of corruptions, can be chosen to favour the formal sector and discourage the informal sector. It is observed that weaker enforcement required to accommodate some degree of informality, which releases tax burden from the formal sector needed for redistribution, can accelerate growth rate. However, sufficiently weaker enforcement dampens the formal sector expansion and growth rate. The growth rate registers an inverted-U shaped relationship against the enforcement level. The optimum enforcement can, however, be higher without formal labour union and subsidisation. This must be higher for welfare maximisation than that of growth rate, especially when the consumer cares about the quality of enforcement.     

跨国合资的技术偏向性与经济增长

文章将偏向性技术进步理论和基于谈判实力的合作博弈理论相结合,分析了股权结构、谈判实力差异对偏向性技术进步和宏观经济增长的影响。文章得出以下结论:首先,在跨国合资模式下,技术进步具有偏向性,而股权结构和谈判实力对偏向性技术进步具有正向影响。其次,谈判实力对经济增长具有正向促进作用;股权结构与经济增长之间的关系呈现U型曲线,股权结构的不平衡性越强,经济增长速度越快,而合资双方越倾向于平均分享股权,经济增长速度则越慢。最后,股权结构和谈判实力对于跨国合资双方在国际经济中的地位和作用也会产生不同的影响。     

Access to infrastructure and women’s time allocation: Implications for growth and gender equality

Improved access to infrastructure is commonly viewed as a critical step to increase women’s labor force participation and promote economic growth in developing countries. This positive relationship is first established in a basic gender-based, overlapping generations model with collective households and congestion costs. The model is then extended to account for endogenous gender bias in the market place and women’s bargaining power, as well as fertility choices and rearing time. Numerical experiments, based on a calibrated version of the extended model, show that increased access to infrastructure may induce women to devote more time to child rearing – in line with the model’s predictions and some of the empirical evidence – thereby mitigating the increase in time allocated to market work. As a result, it may weaken the benefits of increased female labor force participation in terms of reduced gender bias in the market place, improved women’s bargaining power in the family, and higher growth rates in the long run.     

Diaspora growth and aggregate remittances: an inverted-U relationship?

This paper presents a model in which remittances stem from a decision made jointly by a family coalition of multiple migrants and non-migrants, allowing two alternative interpretations: migrants’ altruism or bargaining power. The model predicts that aggregate remittances first increase, reach a maximum, and then decrease as the emigration ratio (migrants/non-migrants) increases. An alternative model of loan repayment arrangement between each migrant and her parents, predicts that aggregate remittances grow monotonously with the emigration ratio. Testing both predictions on a macroeconomic bilateral dataset we find evidence in favour of the first model and an inverted-U relationship between aggregate remittances and the emigration ratio, with a maximum reached at a value of 0.5. Since many small ‘MIRAB’ island nations are close to or even above this threshold value, this finding is highly relevant for them since they may experience declining aggregate remittances as the diaspora grows further.