A Solution to Two Paradoxes of International Capital Flows

International capital flows from rich to poor countries can be regarded as either too small(the Lucas paradox in a one-sector model)or too large(when compared with the logic of factor price equalization in a two-sector model).To resolve the paradoxes,we introduce a non-neoclassical model which features financial contracts and firm heterogeneity.In our model,free trade in goods does not imply equal returns to capital across countries.In addition,rich patterns of gross capital flows emerge as a function of financial and property rights institutions.A poor country with an inefficient financial system may simultaneously experience an outflow of financial capital but an inflow of FDI,resulting in a small net flow.In comparison,a country with a low capital-to-labor ratio but a high risk of expropriation may experience an outflow of financial capital without a compensating inflow of FDI.     

Corporate transparency, cream-skimming and FDI

We develop a simple information-based model of Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. On the one hand, the relative abundance of “intangible” capital in specialized industries in the source countries, which presumably generates expertise in screening investment projects in the host countries, enhances FDI flows. On the other hand, host-country relative corporate-transparency diminishes the value of this expertise, thereby reducing the flow of FDI. The model also demonstrates that the gains for the host country from FDI [over foreign portfolio investment (FPI)] are reflected in a more efficient size of the stock of domestic capital and its allocation across firms. These gains are shown to depend crucially (and positively) on the degree of competition among FDI investors. We provide also some evidence on the effects of corporate transparency indicators, such as accounting standards, on bilateral FDI flows from a panel of 24 OECD countries over the period of 1981-1998.     

THE POLITICS OF FDI EXPROPRIATION

I examine the role of political instability and fractionalization as potential explanations for the lack of capital flows from rich countries to poor countries (i.e., the Lucas Paradox). Using panel data from 1984 to 2014, I document that (i) developed countries exhibit larger inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), (ii) countries subject to high investment risk (IR) receive low FDI inflows, and (iii) IR is higher in fractionalized and politically unstable economies. These findings suggest a negative relationship between political instability and FDI through the IR channel. I inspect the theoretical mechanism using a dynamic political economy model of redistribution, wherein policymakers can expropriate resources from foreign investors. The proceeds are used to finance group‐specific transfers to domestic workers but hinder economic growth by discouraging FDI. I show that the political equilibrium exhibits overexpropriation and underinvestment.     

Technology sourcing versus technology exploitation: an analysis of US foreign direct investment flows

The traditional paradigm of foreign direct investment (FDI) suggests that FDI is undertaken principally to exploit some firm-specific advantage in a foreign country which provides a locational advantage to the investor. However, recent theoretical work suggests a model of FDI in which the motivation is not to exploit existing technological advantages in a foreign country, but to access such technology and transfer it from the host economy to the investing multinational corporation via spillover effects. This paper tests the technology sourcing versus technology exploiting hypotheses for a panel of sectoral FDI flows between the United States and major OECD nations over a 15 year period. The research makes use of Patel and Vega’s (Research Policy, 28, 145–55, 1999) taxonomy of sectors which are likely a priori to exhibit technology sourcing and exploiting behaviour respectively. While there is evidence that FDI flows into the United States are attracted to R&D intensive sectors, very little support is found for the technology sourcing hypothesis either for inward or outward FDI flows. The results suggest that, in aggregate, firm-specific ‘ownership’ effects remain powerful determinants of FDI flows.     

Cross-Country Externalities of Trade and FDI Liberalization

We develop a three-country heterogeneous-firm model and show that FDI liberalization in one foreign country (F1) results in the following: (i) some firms from the home country switch from export to FDI in F1; (ii) skilled labor’s wage rate drops in the home country; (iii) wage inequality between the skilled and unskilled labor decreases; and (iv) some firms from the home country switch from FDI to export to another foreign country (F2). The effects from trade liberalization are just the opposite, but the effects from education improvement are qualitatively the same as FDI liberalization. The cross-country externalities work through the domestic labor market.     

Taxes,institutions and foreign diversification opportunities

Investors can access foreign diversification opportunities through either foreign portfolio investment (FPI) or foreign direct investment (FDI). The worldwide tax regime employed by the US potentially distorts this choice by penalizing FDI, relative to FPI, in low-tax countries. On the other hand, weak investor protections in foreign countries may increase the value of control, creating an incentive to use FDI rather than FPI. By combining data on US outbound FPI and FDI, this paper analyzes whether the composition of US outbound capital flows reflects these incentives to bypass home and host country institutional regimes. The results suggest that the residual tax on US multinational firms' foreign earnings skews the composition of outbound capital flows — a 10% decrease in a foreign country's corporate tax rate increases US investors' equity FPI holdings by approximately 10%, controlling for effects on FDI. Investor protections also seem to shape portfolio choices, though these results are not robust when only within-country variation is employed.     

International asset market, nonconvergence, and endogenous fluctuations

We develop an overlapping generations model with re-tradeable paper assets and capital accumulation to analyze the interaction between the real economy and an international asset market. The world consists of two homogeneous countries, which differ only in their initial levels of capital. Consumers who live for two periods transfer wealth over time and across countries by holding international mutual funds which pay stochastic dividends. The optimal portfolio decisions of consumers do not necessarily induce convergence of incomes between the two countries. Moreover, interaction through the asset market induces endogenous fluctuation of capital flows between the rich and the poor country.     

Net foreign assets,productivity and real exchange rates in constrained economies

Empirical evidence suggests that real exchange rates (RER) behave differently in developed and developing countries. We develop an overlapping generations two-sector exogenous growth model in which RER determination may depend on the country's capacity to borrow from international capital markets. The country faces a constraint on capital inflows. With high domestic savings, the RER only depends on the productivity spread between sectors (Balassa–Samuelson effect). If the constraint is too tight and/or domestic savings too low, the RER depends on both net foreign assets (transfer effect) and productivity. We then analyze the empirical implications of the model and find that, in accordance with the theory, the RER is mainly driven by productivity and net foreign assets in constrained countries and by productivity in unconstrained countries.     

Do Multinational Enterprises Contribute to Convergence or Divergence? A Disaggregated Analysis of US FDI*

It is widely held that foreign direct investment (FDI) has a positive effect on economic growth. To test this hypothesis, we perform convergence regressions derived from a theoretical model on the impact of FDI on endogenous technological change in small economies. The model includes FDI externalities that enhance growth, but also shows that FDI can crowd out host country income and reduce local innovation. The empirical analysis employs disaggregated US data for various FDI‐related activities—in addition to the conventionally used aggregate FDI stocks and flows. We estimate the net FDI impact on the convergence rate of per‐capita income to US levels, controlling for human development, financial development, and trade. We find that FDI accelerates convergence for high‐income countries only, otherwise slowing it down.     

International migration,foreign direct investment,and development stage in developing economies

The existing empirical results on the relationship between FDI and migration are rather mixed. This study reevaluates, both theoretically and empirically, how inward FDI relates to emigration in developing countries. Our model illustrates that the relationship between inward FDI and emigration flows depends on the development stage of a developing country, that is, there is a positive association between inward FDI and emigration flows for relatively less‐developed countries but a negative association between these two variables for relatively developed countries. We confirm the empirical validity of our model prediction using the panel data of 21 OECD and 51 non‐OECD countries during the period from 2003 to 2012. Our results argue that as economic development proceeds in a developing country, the home effect of inward FDI associated with intensified labor demand would dominate the linkage effect that induces the brain drain problem through enhancing the socioeconomic ties with migrant networks.     

Foreign Direct Investment into Open and Closed Cities

This article argues that the more open a city is to immigration, the more likely it is to welcome – and hence also receive – foreign direct investment (FDI). If immigration is allowed to complement the inflow of foreign capital, urban rent rises by more. This extra rise in rent aids in appeasing owners of capital specific to local traditional industries who else become worse off as FDI flows in. The article's model may help give a simple alternative explanation of why urban centers such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Dublin or many cities on China's Eastern coast have received so much more FDI per capita. These cities could draw on a nearby pool of extra labor that – by driving rents up and keeping wages down – may have been decisive in the political struggle over whether to let foreign direct investors in.     

Political Institutions, Capital Flows, and Developing Country Growth: An Empirical Investigation

The paper examines the real per-capita growth effects of the quality of democracy, the rule of law, and capital flows in developing countries. The direct growth effects of democracy are positive and often statistically significant. Moreover, the estimates from a three-stage least-squares regression offer evidence that democracy has indirect growth effects that work by encouraging schooling and that the rule of law influences growth indirectly by encouraging foreign direct investment. A higher FDI to GDP ratio is associated with a faster growth rate. The estimated growth effect of the FDI to GDP ratio is several times higher than the estimated growth effect of the domestic investment to GDP ratio. By contrast, this study does not find a clear asso-ciation between other types of capital flows and growth.     

REINVESTED EARNINGS IN THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS

The paper raises three questions. Firstly, is it warranted that a significant part of primary (property) income is not shown in the national accounts as being distributed to the owners of the assets to which it accrues but ends up as capital gains in the revaluation account? Secondly, why has the SNA chosen not to record reinvested earnings of corporations as flows of property income with the exception of foreign direct investment, and thirdly why the asymmetrical recording of stock investments constituting more than 10 percent of equity capital depending on whether domestic or foreign transactions are concerned? Reinvested earnings on domestic equity investment above 10 percent of a corporation are not recorded as property income in the system. The paper looks at these three questions from the perspective of the analytical uses of national accounts. The consequences for the analysis of income distribution both between nations and within nations are examined.     

The composition of capital inflows when emerging market firms face financing constraints

The composition of capital inflows to emerging market economies tends to follow a predictable dynamic pattern across the business cycle. In most emerging market economies, total inflows are pro-cyclical, with debt and portfolio equity flowing in first, followed later in the expansion by foreign direct investment (FDI). To understand the dynamic composition of these flows, we use a small open economy (SOE) framework to model the composition of capital inflows as the equilibrium outcome of emerging market firms' financing decisions. We show how costly external financing and FDI search costs generate a state contingent cost of financing such that the cheapest source of financing depends on the phase of the business cycle. In this manner, the financial frictions are able to explain the interaction between the types of flows and deliver a time-varying composition of flows, as well as other standard features of emerging market business cycles. If, as this work suggests, flows are an equilibrium outcome of firms' financing decisions, then volatility of capital inflows is not necessarily bad for an economy. Furthermore, using capital controls to shut down one type of flow and encourage another is certain to have both short- and long-run welfare implications.     

Foreign direct investment,international trade,and firm heterogeneity

We present an asymmetric model with firm heterogeneity and foreign direct investment (FDI) from a developed country to a developing country. We found that the successful entry firms could be sorted from highest to lowest according to productivity as reimport firms, FDI firms, export firms, and domestic firms. We also found that FDI decreases (increases) the gross national income of the developed (developing) country, but it can either increase or decrease the world income according to the level of the relative propensity to spend. In addition, we demonstrated that FDI influences welfare through variations in average price, national income, and the number of types of goods.     

Taxi,Takeoff and Landing: Behavioural Patterns of Capital Flows to Emerging Markets

This paper analyses volatility, persistence, predictability, correlation, comovement (or contagion risk) and sudden stop (reversibility) of capital flows (foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign portfolio equity investment, long-term and short-term debt flows) using time series econometric techniques for 24 emerging economies over 1970–2014. This is informative on the pattern and relationship between capital inflows, with implications for accommodating macroeconomic policies in countries receiving inflows. The paper also addresses the predictions of conventional theory, that differences are associated with the maturity of the capital (long-term vs. short-term), with the information-based trade-off model of Goldstein and Razin [(2006). An information-based trade off between foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment. Journal of International Economics, 70(1), 271–295], that differences are associated with the structure of the capital (equity vs. debt). In line with the latter, equity flows (FDI and portfolio) are less volatile and persistent, more predictable and less susceptible to sudden stops than debt flows. Contrary to conventional theory, short-term flows are not more volatile, but there is evidence that correlations and risks of contagion are strong within all capital flow components.     

Foreign direct investment, political resentment and the privatization process in eastern Europe

Foreign direct investment has been disappointingly low in eastern Europe, which has been reluctant to make existing assets available to foreign investors. To mitigate any such resentment, we propose a participation model in which foreign investors compete for joint venture contracts. Host governments contribute existing assets and receive non-voting stocks. Foreign investors, contributing capital and know-how, receive voting shares and control of operational decisions.{}This has several advantages over the cash sale of assets to foreigners. First, stock flow problems are eased, raising both asset prices and FDI flows. Second, by retaining some stake in the firm, transition countries share in the risk premium. Third, governments can hand over their shares to households, creating private collateral to foster new small businesses. Fourth, and crucially, compared to cash sales the auction of participation contracts offers higher privatization revenues in cases where governments cannot assess investors' knowledge and abilities. This reduces the risk of selling the family silver too cheaply, and should alleviate the host countries' resentment.     

Physical capital,knowledge capital,and the choice between FDI and outsourcing

Abstract There exist two approaches in the literature concerning the multinational firm’s mode choice for foreign production between an owned subsidiary and a licensing contract. One approach considers environments where the firm transfers primarily knowledge‐based assets and assumes that knowledge is non‐excludable. A more recent approach takes the property‐right view of the firm and assumes that physical capital is fully excludable. This paper combines both forms of capital assets in a single model. There are subtleties, and added structure is needed to establish what ex ante seems a straightforward testable hypothesis: relatively physical‐capital‐intensive firms choose outsourcing while relatively knowledge‐capital‐intensive firms choose FDI.     

Where enterprises lead, people follow? Links between migration and FDI in Germany

Standard neoclassical models of economic integration are based on the assumptions that capital and labor are substitutes and that the geography of factor market integration does not matter. Yet, these two assumptions are violated if agglomeration forces among factors from specific source countries are at work. Agglomeration implies that factors behave as complements and that the country of origin matters. This paper analyzes agglomeration between capital and labor empirically. We use state-level German data to answer the question whether and how migration and foreign direct investment (FDI) are linked. Stocks of inward FDI and of immigrants have similar determinants, and the geography of factor market integration matters. There are higher stocks of inward FDI in German states hosting a large foreign population from the same country of origin. This agglomeration effect is confined to higher-income source countries.     

FDI and pollution havens: Evidence from the Norwegian manufacturing sector

This is an empirical study of the firm and country determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) and how it is affected by the stringency of environmental regulations in host countries. We employ disaggregated data on sales by Norwegian multinationals' affiliates from 1999 to 2005 that allow such affiliates to be categorized as either efficiency-seeking (vertical) or market-seeking (horizontal) FDI. While the environmental stringency of a host country and its enforcement are found to have no effect on the average investment, we find a significant negative effect on multinationals with vertical motives. Compared to those located in lenient countries, the efficiency-seeking affiliates in more environmentally regulated countries receive less investment from their parent companies in terms of (i) equity capital, (ii) capital stock, and (iii) assets. We further find that the total exports from affiliates to parent companies in Norway decrease with the level of enforced environmental stringency in the host countries.