Labour market signalling and job turnover revisited

Turnover by both low and high productivity workers occurs in all jobs. However, the reasons for turnover by workers of different abilities differ. When the probability that better workers transmit accurate signals to the labour market increases, we show that incumbent employers are more likely to adopt a separating wage offer strategy. This reduces the likelihood of turnover by more productive workers. We also show that turnover depends on a firm's willingness to match outside wage offers. Hence, the personnel and wage policies adopted by employers are important for understanding the turnover of workers of all productivity types.     

Monopsonistic competition for the “best” workers

In this paper we analyse an economy where firms use labour as the only production factor, with constant return to scale. We suppose that jobs differ in their non-wage characteristics so each firm has monopsonistic power. In particular, we suppose that workers are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity. Then, each firm has incentives to offer higher wages in order to recruit the most productive workers. Competition among firms leads to a symmetric equilibrium wage, which is higher than the reservation wage, and to involuntary unemployment for the less productive workers, who are willing to work at the current wage but are not hired because their productivity is lower than the wage level. If firms have no institutional constraint on paying lower wages for the same job, an endogenous labour market segmentation emerges.     

Tighter labour markets to finally lift global wages

• Wage growth has been relatively slow since 2007 in advanced economies, but an upturn may be in sight. Slow productivity growth remains an issue but tighter labour markets make a positive response by wages to rising inflation more likely and there are signs that compositional and crisis‐related effects that dragged wage growth down are fading – though Japan may be an exception.
• Overall, our forecasts are for a moderate improvement in wage growth in the major economies in 2017–18, with the pace of growth rising by 0.5–1% per year relative to its 2016 level by 2018 – enough to keep consumer spending reasonably solid.
• Few countries have maintained their pre‐crisis pace of wage growth since 2007. In part this reflects a mixture of low inflation and weak productivity growth, but other factors have also been in play: in the US and Japan wage growth has run as much as 0.5–1% per year lower than conventional models would suggest.
• The link with productivity seems to have weakened since 2007 and Phillips curves – which relate wages to unemployment – have become flatter. A notable exception is Germany, where the labour market has behaved in a much more ‘normal’ fashion over recent years with wage growth responding to diminishing slack.
• ‘Compositional’ factors related to shifts in the structure of the workforce may have had an important influence in holding down wage growth, cutting it by as much as 2% per year in the US and 1% per year in the UK. There are some signs that the impact of these effects in the UK and US are fading, but not in Japan.
• The forecast rise in inflation over the next year as energy price base effects turn positive is a potential risk to real wages. But the decline in measures of labour market slack in the US, UK and Germany suggests wages are more likely to move up with inflation than was the case in 2010–11 when oil prices spiked and real wages fell.

     

How Governments Should Support the Adjustment of Competitiveness in the Euro Area – and How They Should Not

In addition to unsustainable fiscal policies, the weak competitiveness of southern European countries is contributing to the ongoing crisis in the euro area. However, wages and productivity are only one element of competitiveness and the value of competitive wages is hard to measure. Hard‐to‐identify non‐price competitiveness such as quality, innovation and technology of goods affects overall competitiveness too. Given the lack of information, the necessary level of wage adjustment needs to be negotiated on the market. Governments can support a market based adjustment of competitiveness by liberalising labour markets and by strengthening the business environment.     

COMPETITIVENESS WITHIN THE EURO AREA: THE PROBLEM THAT STILL NEEDS TO BE SOLVED

Unsustainable public debt, low competitiveness and high current account deficits are major problems for the so‐called PIIGS countries. These countries experienced consumer price and wage inflation above the euro area average in the first decade of the euro, basically fuelled by buoyant capital inflows. The resulting real appreciation against low‐inflation countries led to a deterioration in their competitiveness, but rigid labour markets now prevent a quick market‐based readjustment of real wages to the changed situation. Thus, both public expenditure cuts and structural labour market reforms are urgent to reduce the likelihood of a euro area break‐up.     

Productivity – your countries need you!

• Increased global productivity could boost real wages, consumption, fiscal positions and alleviate fears of secular stagnation. But will it? Puzzles relate to the longer term global slowdown and to some countries' recent productivity‐less recoveries in jobs. We assess various explanations including mismeasurement, secular stagnation, financial sector malfunction and increased labour market flexibility. Our baseline forecast is for a moderate pro‐cyclical recovery in productivity but we show how downside risks imply it could be anaemic.
• Sustained weak productivity is a secular issue. Eight years after 2007, median productivity growth in OECD economies is less than Japan's was eight years into its lost decade. Aspects of secular stagnation and balance sheet adjustment have contributed. Measurement error may have played a role over the longer term.
• Recent experience divides recoveries into “haves” and “have nots” in terms of productivity and employment. The UK may finally be emerging from a “productivity‐less” recovery in employment after 2011; Spain and the Netherlands have experienced jobless recoveries in productivity; others, such as Canada and Sweden, have experienced pro‐cyclical (typically weak) recoveries in productivity; Italy hardly got going in either direction.
• Most theories provide, at best, a limited explanation for recent weak productivity performance. These include data mis‐measurement, increased labour market flexibility, financial sector malfunction and supply side secular stagnation.
• On balance, we think that a modest productivity bounce‐back could be imminent, caused by some demand recovery, tighter labour markets in major economies, higher real wages and firms deciding to invest more in capital, which enhances productivity and points the global economy towards normality.
• We also illustrate how global risk scenarios could dampen recovery. Negative skews imply mean G7 productivity growth across the scenarios would be an anaemic 1.1% in 2016, 0.5 percentage points (pp) lower than the baseline.

     

Are Short‐lived Jobs Stepping Stones to Long‐Lasting Jobs?*

This article assesses whether short‐lived jobs (lasting one quarter or less and involuntarily ending in unemployment) are stepping stones to long‐lasting jobs (enduring 1 year or more) for Belgian long‐term unemployed school‐leavers. We proceed in two steps. First, we estimate labour market trajectories in a multi‐spell duration model that incorporates lagged duration and lagged occurrence dependence. Second, in a simulation we find that (fe)male school‐leavers accepting a short‐lived job are, within 2 years, 13.4 (9.5) percentage points more likely to find a long‐lasting job than in the counterfactual in which they reject short‐lived jobs.     

Overlapping labour markets

Overlapping labour markets arise when some types of workers do not meet employers with some types of jobs. For example, skilled workers could seek high-skill or low-skill jobs, but low skill workers could be limited to low-skill jobs. The paper derives conditions for equilibrium and efficiency, distinguishes reducible from irreducible overlapping labour markets, and describes distributional impacts of proportional demand shifts and technological change. Many labour models incorporate the structure of overlapping labour markets, so that the results have widespread applicability.     

Local Economic Structure and Growth

Abstract

This paper tests how the local economic structure—measured by local sector specialization, competition and diversity—affects growth of manufacturing sectors. Most of the empirical literature assumes that in the long run more productive regions will attract more workers and use employment growth as a measure of local productivity growth. However, this approach is based on strong assumptions, such as those of national labour markets and homogeneous labour. This paper shows that if we relax these assumptions, regional adjusted wage growth is a better measure of productivity growth than employment growth. This measure is used in order to study regional growth in Portuguese regions between 1985 and 1994. Evidence is found of MAR externalities in some sectors and no evidence of Jacobs or Porter externalities in most of the sectors. These results are at odds with the findings for employment-based regressions, which show that regional concentration and the region's size have a negative effect in most of the sectors. It is also shown that simply using regional wage growth would overstate the effect of regional concentration and competition on long-run growth.     

Is training more frequent when the wage premium is smaller? Evidence from the European Community Household Panel

According to Becker [Becker, G., 1964, Human Capital, NBER, New York], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general training is paid by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from the investment. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the greater the training wage premium, the greater the investment in general training. Using data from the European Community Household Panel, we compute a proxy of the training wage premium in clusters of homogeneous workers and find that smaller premia induce greater incidence of off-site training, which is likely to impart general skills. Our findings suggest that the Becker model provides insufficient guidance to understand empirical training patterns. Conversely, they are not inconsistent with theories of training in imperfectly competitive labour markets, in which firms may be willing to finance general training if the wage structure is compressed, that is, if the increase in productivity after training is greater than the increase in pay.     

How low can U go?

• ? Although there is growing evidence that wage growth is building in response to low and falling unemployment in the advanced economies, there is scope for unemployment rates to fall further without triggering a pay surge.
• ? For a start, current unemployment rates in comparison to past cyclical troughs overstate the tightness of labour markets. Demographic trends associated with the ageing ‘baby boomer’ bulge have pushed down the headline unemployment rate – unemployment rates among older workers are lower than those of younger cohorts. And in a historical context, Europe still has a large pool of involuntary part‐timers.
• ? In addition, rising participation rates mean that demographics are less of a constraint on employment growth than widely assumed. In both 2017 and 2018, had it not been for increased activity rates (mainly for older cohorts), unemployment would have had to fall more sharply to accommodate the same employment increase. We expect rising participation rates to continue to act as a pressure valve for the labour market.
• ? Finally, unemployment rates were generally far lower during the 1950s and 1960s than now. If wages stay low relative to productivity, as was the case during that prior era, employment growth may remain strong, with unemployment falling further. In the post‐war era, low wages were partly a function of a grand bargain in which policy‐makers provided full employment in return for low wage growth.
• ? There is evidence to suggest that many post‐crisis workers have opted for the security of their existing full‐time job and its associated benefits despite lower wage growth, rather than change job and potentially earn more; the rise of the ‘gig economy’ has led some workers to value what they already have more. Put another way, the non‐accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) has fallen. So, the role of labour market tightness in pushing wage growth higher may continue to surprise to the downside.

     

Within Occupation Wage Dispersion and the Task Content of Jobs

Most analyses linking task content of jobs to income inequality focus on the effects between occupations, e.g. the growing dispersion between lousy and lovely jobs. The theory, meanwhile, provides insights on links between task content of jobs and inequality also within occupations: models predict compression of wages in more routine jobs, that is those where capital is a direct substitute for labour, and an increase in dispersion in jobs where capital and labour are complements. I document that within occupations dispersion of wages is empirically relevant, as it represents around half of total wage inequality across Europe. I then link wage inequality to the task content of jobs. Using matched employee–employer data from Europe for the period 2002–14, I show that occupations where tasks complement newer technologies exhibit higher wage dispersion. This relationship is robust to adjusting for a variety of confounding and mitigating channels.     

Wage mobility: do institutions make a difference?

This paper checks empirically the assertion that strict labour market regulation leads to low wage mobility, addressing an apparent puzzle. Indeed, most economic reasoning links a combination of regulations in the labour market to low wage flexibility and mobility, but the scarce empirical evidence available challenges that view. I focus on Portugal, one of the most regulated labour markets in Europe. The evidence gathered indicates that an aggregate view—of minimum wage enforcement, unionisation rates and extension of collective bargaining contracts—provides a misleading idea of the actual constraints imposed by the institutional framework on wage setting. Instead, micro conditions at the firm level play a major role shaping wage mobility in Portugal. Some comparisons with the UK, traditionally pointed out as a flexible labour market, are provided. Remarkable similarities in mobility level and trend are detected between the two countries, further suggesting that a regulated institutional framework does not necessarily reduce individual mobility in the wage distribution.     

THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR IMMIGRATION1

Immigration into the UK has increased in response to high labour demand in the recent past. This additional supply of labour has helped keep interest rates lower, and growth higher, than they might have been otherwise. The longer‐term impact of higher immigration may be an increase in trend productivity growth. Although the evidence on such long‐term economic effects is incomplete, there is no reason to believe market principles ‐ or fundamental freedoms ‐ are any less relevant when it comes to flows of people rather than goods or capital.     

The paradox of rising wage growth and falling inflation

• ? Strong labour markets and rising wages in advanced economies stand in sharp contrast to recent declines in economists’ inflation forecasts and market expectations. In our view, though, these developments are not necessarily contradictory. Even if wage growth edges higher, we think demand factors will limit any pick‐up in prices. Instead, we expect firms’ margins will be squeezed.
• ? Although the labour share has risen more sharply than we had expected over the past couple of years, we are sceptical that this will translate into substantially stronger underlying inflation. Not only has the rise been small, it has been employment rather than wages that has surprised to the upside. The strength of employment is probably more about firms’ production preferences than workers’ capitalising on a stronger negotiating position.
• ? True, wages adjusted for productivity now look high by historical standards. But neither theory or empirical evidence suggests that this must inevitably lead to stronger CPI inflation in the short‐term. Our forecast for flat wage growth in 2019 and the absence of strong cost pressures elsewhere are also a comfort.
• ? Inflation tends to be more responsive to demand indicators – and the recent GDP growth soft patch suggests any further pick‐up in underlying inflation pressures will be limited (see Chart below).
• ? More generally, we think that the consensus view on inflation for the key advanced economies is high. Market‐based inflation expectations are typically lower than our own, which may reflect the perception that inflation risks are skewed to the downside. Positive economic surprises could lead downside risks to narrow, but ageing expansions and secular stagnation worries suggest this is unlikely, limiting any future pick‐up in bond yields.

     

Do Low‐Wage Workers React Less to Longer Unemployment Benefits? Quasi‐Experimental Evidence*

The fact that unemployed workers have different abilities to smooth consumption entails heterogeneous responses to extended unemployment benefits. Our empirical exercise explores a quasi‐experimental setting generated by an increase in the benefits entitlement period. The results suggest a hump‐shape response of unemployment duration over the one‐year pre‐unemployment wage distribution; individuals at the bottom and top of the wage distribution reacted less than those in the interquartile range. This behaviour of job searchers is consistent with labour supply models with unemployment insurance and savings. It questions the optimality of very long entitlement periods to target the unemployment experiences of low‐wage workers.     

Some deadweight losses from the minimum wage: the cases of full and partial compliance

This paper highlights the social costs from non-price rationing of the labour force due to the minimum wage. By short-circuiting the ability of low reservation-wage workers to underbid high-reservation wage workers, the minimum wage interferes with the market's basic function of grouping the lowest cost workers with the highest productivity firms. The present paper models the deadweight loss that society bears when high reservation-cost workers displace low reservation-cost workers. When firms can evade part or all of the minimum wage, an extra deadweight loss arises. Firms with high evasive ability but low productivity may displace firms with low evasive ability but high productivity.     

The de-collectivisation of pay setting in Britain 1990–98: incidence,determinants and impact

What were the causes and consequences of declining collective bargaining coverage in Britain? The demise of collective bargaining did not lead to a greater use of individualised payment mechanisms, ‘high-involvement’ practices or productivity gains. Wage inequality rose as a result of the decline. However, workplaces that abandoned bargaining created more jobs. Overall, these results raise questions about Britain’s labour market performance during the 1990s because they suggest that falling unemployment as a result of weaker trade unions came at the price of slower productivity growth and widening male wage inequality.     

The distributive and welfare effects of product and labour market deregulation

This paper studies the effects of product and labour market deregulation on wage inequality and welfare. By constructing an analytically tractable model in which the level of product market competition and the wages are endogenously distributed among sectors, I show that deregulation in goods market has mixed effects on inequality: the wage variance and the Gini index are lower, but the ratio of the highest over the lowest wage paid in the economy increases. Moreover, deregulation in labour markets raises the aggregate level of employment and the average real wage but reduces the welfare of trade unions in sectors with a low level of competition.     

Dynamics of Trade Integration and Technological Convergence

The issue of the impact of trade on economic performance and labour markets has been intensively discussed in recent literature on trade liberalization and globalization, where the debate was mainly about identifying the relative impact of trade and technology. The bulk of the existing literature in this area employs, almost without exception, a static Heckscher-Ohlin framework that seems not to be a suitable tool for analysing the ongoing dynamics. This paper presents a dynamic multi-sectoral framework with heterogenous labour to explore the issue of trade liberalization and sectoral catching-up in productivity levels. The model is basically an input-output framework with Schumpeterian features; the latter are modelled as the impact of transitory rents that result from uneven productivity growth and technological catching-up upon the price and quantity systems of the trading economies. Relative productivity and wage rate dynamics across sectors determine the comparative costs and the dynamics of trade specialization. In the Appendix, the equilibrium solutions of the model are derived.