Characterization of additive cost sharing methods

The set of additive cost sharing methods when individual demands are integer valued and cost shares are non negative is characterized by its extreme points and by a network flow representation. The extreme methods allocate costs incrementally along a chain of demand vectors independent of the cost function. The result generalizes Wang’s characterization in that we do not assume the Dummy axiom.     

Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games

We study network games in which each player wishes to connect his source and sink, and the cost of each edge is shared among its users either equally (in Fair Connection Games—FCG's) or arbitrarily (in General Connection Games—GCG's). We study the existence and quality of strong equilibria (SE)—strategy profiles from which no coalition can improve the cost of each of its members—in these settings. We show that SE always exist in the following games: (1) Single source and sink FCG's and GCG's. (2) Single source multiple sinks FCG's and GCG's on series parallel graphs. (3) Multi source and sink FCG's on extension parallel graphs. As for the quality of the SE, in any FCG with n players, the cost of any SE is bounded by H(n) (i.e., the harmonic sum), contrasted with the Θ(n) price of anarchy. For any GCG, any SE is optimal.     

Cost sharing with multiple technologies

We study cost sharing problems where gains from cooperation can come from the presence of other agents, such as when agents share their technologies. A simple model is built, where economies of scale are eliminated in order to study this effect. We use as the key axiom the property that, if an agent does not improve the technology of any coalition he joins, he should not get any part of the gain from cooperation. With properties of linearity and symmetry, this axiom characterizes a well-defined set of rules. From this set, we propose a rule derived from the familiar Shapley value. We show that it is the only rule in that set satisfying an upper-limit property on individual cost allocations or a monotonicity property when technology improves. We also derive a distinct rule using a property that ensures that no coalition has an incentive to manipulate the individual demands of its members.     

Strong monotonicity in surplus sharing

Summary. We consider three new axioms for surplus sharing problems. The first is strong monotonicity which says that workers should be rewarded for increases in productivity and the second says that productive workers should receive some compensation. The third requires that the surplus sharing rule should be well defined (and continuous on) the set of threshold functions. We show that none of the standard "equitable" mechanisms satisfy any of these axioms and then present a constructive characterization of mechanisms which do. Using this we construct several new mechanisms. These are the Almost Flat mechanism, the Spread Aumann-Shapley mechanism, and the Spread Serial mechanism, which have many desirable properties.Received: 15 September 2002, Revised: 11 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C71, H4.I would like to thank Hervé Moulin, Rich Mclean, Yves Sprumont and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

The stand-alone test and decreasing serial cost sharing

Summary. The rule of decreasing serial cost sharing defined in de Frutos [1] over the class of concave cost functions may violate the important stand-alone test. Sufficient conditions for the test to be satisfied are given, in terms of individual rationality as well as coalitional stability. These conditions restrict the shape of the cost function and the distribution of demands. Received: July 29, 1999; revised version: October 4, 1999     

Information sharing about a demand shock

This paper examines two questions in asymmetric Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly with a demand shock. Under which conditions is information sharing a subgame-perfect equilibrium? What is the welfare effect when firms are better off? Given these questions, the normal assumptions in the earlier literature can be relaxed in three ways: demand functions can be asymmetric; a demand shock can affect firms differently; distributions of the demand shock and information signals can be arbitrary. Under these general assumptions, the answer to the first question is: every firm's response to the demand shock is stronger when all firms have perfect information than when one firm does so alone; the answer to the second question is: social welfare increases in Cournot competition, and consumer surplus decreases in Bertrand competition.     

Segmented risk sharing in a continuous-time setting

Summary. The economy we study is comprised of a continuum of individuals. Each has a stochastic endowment that evolves continuously and independently of all other individuals' endowment processes. Individuals are risk averse and would therefore like to insure their endowment processes. The mutual independence of their endowment processes makes it feasible for them to obtain this insurance by pooling their endowments. We investigate whether such a scheme would survive as an equilibrium in a noncooperative setting. Received: October 16, 2000; revised version: August 8, 2001     

Knowledge dynamics in a network industry

In this paper, we model the impact of networks on knowledge growth in an innovating industry. Specifically, we compare two mediums of knowledge exchange: random interaction, and the case in which interaction occurs on a fixed architecture. In a simulation study, we investigate how the medium of knowledge exchange contributes to knowledge growth under different scenarios related to the industry's innovative potential. We measure innovative potential by considering the extent to which knowledge can be codified, and the available technological opportunities. Our results tend to support the conjecture that spatial clustering generates higher long-run knowledge growth rates in industries characterized by highly tacit knowledge, while the opposite is true when the degree of codification is important.     

Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment

We study a continuous-time version of the optimal risk-sharing problem with one-sided commitment. In the optimal contract, the agent?s consumption is a time-invariant, strictly increasing function of a single state variable: the maximal level of the agent?s income realized to date. We characterize this function in terms of the agent?s outside option value function and the discounted amount of time in which the agent?s income process is expected to reach a new to-date maximum. Under constant relative risk aversion we solve the model in closed-form: optimal consumption of the agent equals a constant fraction of his maximal income realized to date. In the complete-markets implementation of the optimal contract, the Alvarez–Jermann solvency constraints take the form of a simple borrowing constraint familiar from the Bewley–Aiyagari incomplete-markets models.     

企业剩余分享及其产权机理

企业剩余由资本所有者独享向其他要素所有者共同分享的演进是现代企业治理结构发展的一个重要趋势。本文对剩余和剩余分享进行了界定,分析了剩余分享的几种情形,阐释了剩余分享的内在产权机理及其主要途径。     

Farsighted strategies in the formation of a communication network

I examine the formation of a specific communication network, a variant of the two-way flow model, in which agents have farsighted strategies. I show that the likelihood to form efficient networks tends to zero for sufficiently large network sizes.     

The supply of education quality in a spatial model with asymmetric moving costs

The paper analyses the characteristics of the supply of higher education in different geographical macroareas using a strategic interaction framework. It focuses on universities operating in centralised funding system that autonomously set the quality of education showing that in equilibrium it is inversely related to students’ moving costs across areas. We show that in the presence of asymmetric information about workers’ ability and asymmetric costs of moving, the only PBE consistent with forward induction involves that only high ability workers acquire education and the quality of education is lower in macroareas where the moving costs are higher. Our model predicts that in economies with centralised university funding, educational policies must be regulated according to the specific socioeconomic characteristics of the area. Direct subsidies to universities may be ineffective in improving the quality of education in the less developed areas. When regional disparities are not too big, efficiency gains may be obtained by reducing moving costs.     

Estimating the economic benefits of acidic rock drainage clean up using cost shares

This paper reports the results of a stated preference study that estimates the economic value for cleaning up acid rock drainage in Colorado's Snake River watershed. In contrast to much of the existing literature, the present study emphasizes benefit estimation for three implementing projects rather than benefit estimation for general changes in water quality or large scale water quality policy. The focus on implementing projects delivers information that is specifically relevant to current decisions being faced in the watershed. While valuation questions in most stated preference studies present costs that have no relation to actual project costs, this study presents a new cost share approach. Project costs are estimated and then valuation questions present different local cost shares to subjects. This approach facilitates stated cost variation necessary for estimating the mean of the distribution of project values without resorting to experimentally designed, fictitious stated costs. In addition to estimating the mean value, which facilitates benefit cost analysis, the study also provides median value estimates, which provide insights into the political feasibility of these projects. Study results suggest that local cost shares on the order of 20%-40%, depending on the project, are politically feasible.     

网络零售业中交易成本与顾客价值创造模式

交易成本和顾客价值创造之间存在着较复杂的关联,网络零售业交易成本的降低并不总意味着顾客价值的提高,网络零售业的交易成本与顾客价值相互关系模式中存在四种具体情况,交易成本不是越低越能创造顾客价值,网络零售业企业应注重对顾客交易成本的具体分析。     

Effect of market access on sharing practices within two Huaorani communities

One explanation for meat sharing within hunter-gatherer communities is that sharing reduces variance in consumption that results from unpredictable harvests. If this food-risk reduction is the primary reason for sharing, then a good alternative to sharing would be selling meat in a market and using the cash to buy storable foods. We analyze the effect of market access on sharing behavior in two Huaorani communities in the Ecuadorian Amazon in order to test the hypothesis that hunters share mainly to reduce food risk. If this hypothesis is correct we expect to find that hunters are selling meat that would have otherwise gone into sharing networks. The alternative hypothesis is that sharing has multiple benefits, in addition to risk reduction, making sharing and selling imperfect substitutes. We find evidence that households use the market to reduce food risk, but that the amount of meat a hunter sells has no relationship with sharing intensity. Rather, the likelihood of selling meat simply increases with hunting returns. The results suggest that selling meat has lower expected benefits than sharing and so hunters first satisfy their sharing requirements and then sell any excess meat.     

Demand disruption and coordination of supply chain via effort and revenue sharing

This article explores the equilibrium behaviour of a basic supplier–retailer distribution channel under demand disruption via effort and revenue sharing contract. This differs from the traditional supply chain coordination model. Firstly, demand is simultaneously affected by retail price and nonprice marketing effort from manufacturers and retailers. Secondly, when the demand is disrupted, this article considers disruptions in the market scale and price sensitivity coefficient. Thirdly, the supply chain coordination model is proposed via effort and revenue sharing contract. In this way, the manufacturer reduces the wholesale price as an incentive for the retailer to share revenue. Finally, the total supply chain profit is greater with contract than no contract. This also constitutes another incentive for the players to follow the effort and revenue sharing contract.     

Optimal product strategies in the presence of network externalities

A network externality exists when a user’s benefit from a product increases with the number of other users in the same network. We examine the possibility that a software firm may exploit network externalities by introducing a limited feature version of its commercially available software into the market. The two versions need not be perfectly compatible and network externalities are allowed to decline as the difference between the versions increases. We obtain conditions under which introducing a limited feature version is optimal.     

Aggregate risk sharing and equivalent financial mechanisms in an endowment economy of incomplete participation

Summary. A pure endowment overlapping generations economy can be inefficient because of insufficient risk sharing. The introduction of an outside asset by a government or the existence of a clearing house can remedy the inefficiency by allowing some intergenerational risk sharing. While the typical outside asset is fiat money, many alternative financial mechanisms, such as social security, risk-free government bonds, mispriced deposit insurance, and income insurance can serve the same function as fiat money. Hence there are many equivalent financial mechanisms that provide intergenerational insurance. In the presence of uncertainty, there are several concepts of Pareto optimality that can be appropriately applied in an overlapping generations setting. I examine the risk-sharing arrangements associated with two different concepts of optimality, including how these arrangements are financed. The results are related to, and in some instances an extension of, the equivalence results obtained by Chamley and Polemarcharkis (1984), Weiss (1977), and Wallace (1981).Received: 4 March 2003, Revised: 30 January 2004JEL Classification Numbers: E40, E44, D51.P. Labadie: I would like to thank the participants of the Economic Theory Symposium Recent Developments in Money and Finance at Purdue University, May 2-4, 2003 and an anonymous referee for comments on this version. I am grateful to Bruce Smith for comments on an earlier version.     

Dynamics of technology sharing cartels and industrial structure under a rule of thumb

We analyse the market effects of different degrees of knowledge transfer in a duopoly in which firms act following a rule of thumb. Three regimes are compared: the technology sharing cartels, the duopoly with spillovers, and the proprietary regime. We show the industrial structure evolution of these three regimes under different cost configurations when firms behave myopically, revising their production plan in each period according to the marginal profit previously gained. The analysis is conducted in a discrete setting using numerical simulations of finite difference systems. We show under which conditions knowledge transfer is beneficial to the system and can prevent market monopolisation.