Is intrajurisdictional resource allocation equitable?: An analysis of campus-level spending data for Texas elementary schools

Considerable research has focused on the allocation of resources across jurisdictions. However, much less work has been directed toward understanding the pattern of intrajurisdictional resource allocation. This study adds to the local public economics literature by carrying out an empirical study of variation in spending per pupil across elementary schools within Texas school districts. Results from estimating a district fixed-effects model reveal that the discretionary resources of school districts are skewed toward schools in low-income, minority neighborhoods, beyond the amounts that would be allocated based on the state aid formula. The findings suggest that attempts by Texas state lawmakers to raise the level of resources allocated to poor schools have been reinforced by district-level decisions regarding intrajurisdictional discretionary spending. However, the dollar magnitude of this incremental funding is relatively small, and hence impacts on educational outcomes are also likely to be small.     

Voluntary contributions and local public goods in a federation

This paper considers nonneutral effects of government spending in a federation of multiple jurisdictions. Both government spending and private donations finance local public goods, redistributive programs, that provide transfers for the poor. In the standard model, government spending has no effect on the public goods, as donors reduce their donations one for one in response to an increase in government spending. In a federation, donors of a jurisdiction donate, through federal charities, to help the poor in the jurisdiction and the poor in other jurisdictions as well. Jurisdictions are thus linked through donations. Such linkage influences donors' behavior beyond the traditional crowding-out effect. As a result, government spending has nonneutral effects on the level of public goods.     

Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions

Corruption is thought to prevent poor countries from catching up with richer ones. We analyze one channel through which corruption hampers growth: public investment can be distorted in favor of specific types of spending for which rent-seeking is easier and better concealed. To study this distortion, we propose a dynamic model where households vote for the composition of public spending, subject to an incentive constraint reflecting individuals’ choice between productive activity and rent-seeking. In equilibrium, the structure of public investment is determined by the predatory technology and the distribution of political power. Among different regimes, the model shows a possible scenario of distortion without corruption in which there is no effective corruption but the possibility of corruption still distorts the allocation of public investment. We test the implications of the model on a set of countries using a two-stage least squares estimation. We find that developing countries with high predatory technology invest more in housing and physical capital in comparison with health and education. The reverse is true for developed countries.      

Demographic shift, relative costs and the allocation of local public consumption in Norway

Local government responses to shifting demand and supply conditions are investigated. The desired allocation of local public consumption is determined in a voter group decision model where different age groups compete for services within an exogenous budget constraint. The model is implemented in an AIDS demand system built into a partial adjustment framework. The estimates indicate that the dramatic shift in the age composition of the population from the young to the elderly during the period studied has led to higher educational spending per pupil and less health care services per elderly. Age groups in decline are able to resist reallocations and gain in terms of spending per head.     

Capital indivisibility and tax competition: Are there too many business areas when some of them are empty?

In this paper, we propose a model where local jurisdictions must engage a development cost before competing for hosting a firm with uncertain preferences among possible sites. We first show that even an optimizing central planner managing all the jurisdictions develops more sites than there are plants to host. Doing so, he diversifies his supply and has a higher probability of hosting the firm. Then, we show that, if every jurisdiction is managed by a local government, there are more developed sites than with the central planner, which implies excess supply.     

Capital indivisibility and tax competition: Are there too many business areas when some of them are empty?

In this paper, we propose a model where local jurisdictions must engage a development cost before competing for hosting a firm with uncertain preferences among possible sites. We first show that even an optimizing central planner managing all the jurisdictions develops more sites than there are plants to host. Doing so, he diversifies his supply and has a higher probability of hosting the firm. Then, we show that, if every jurisdiction is managed by a local government, there are more developed sites than with the central planner, which implies excess supply.     

An Income Tax Increase to Fund Higher Education: A CGE Analysis for Chile

An increase in income taxes to fund education was one of the demands made by the social movements that emerged in Chile in 2011. Currently, the Chilean Congress is enacting a tax reform to raise money for higher education. This study aims to show the dynamic effects on the general equilibrium of the Chilean economy under two alternative approaches: a subsidy to lower the price of higher education (public and private), and greater spending on public higher education to reduce household payments for education. The social accounting matrix (SAM) used to calibrate the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model has 38 economic sectors, including the production structure of private education and public education. The study mainly concludes that a subsidy policy has significant advantages over increasing higher public education spending, regarding its effects on variables such as GDP, investment, and household incomes, while both policies have a similar effect on poverty and income distribution.     

Public spending and economies of scale in partial fiscal decentralized governments: The case of Chile

This article evaluates economies of scale in local public spending in Chile, emphasizing the country's geographical features and high fiscal heterogeneity. We leverage balanced panel data for ten years and 307 municipalities in order to estimate the population level at which a reduction in the average cost of local public goods provision occurs and to differentiate between levels of market potential. We follow a theoretical model of cost efficiency that considers spatial interactions and spillover effects among neighboring jurisdictions. Our findings suggest that Chilean municipalities reach an optimum population level at around 700,000 inhabitants, which is high considering that only two cities qualify. When differentiating for levels of economies of scale according to levels of market potential, municipalities with a low potential reach their optimum at around 28,000 inhabitants, those with a medium potential reach it at approximately 124,000, and those with a high potential reach it at approximately 680,000.     

Estimating a public school expenditure model under binding spending limitations

A model explaining desired expenditure on education is estimated for a sample of New Jersey school districts. Because the limit on annual increases in school spending is binding for a subsample of jurisdictions, the Tobit estimation procedure is used. We test for equality of the pre- and postlimitation structures and find substantial similarity. The cap on expenditure increases was part of a court-ordered reform of New Jersey school finance law. The results can be used to explain the failure of the existing school finance laws in lessening expenditure disparities at the lower end of the distribution.     

Local business taxation and competition for capital: the choice of the tax rate

A theoretical model describes the local choice of the tax rate on capital income. It establishes preferences and various fiscal conditions — including the tax rates of competing jurisdictions — as determinants of the tax rate. The empirical implications are tested using a large panel of jurisdictions in Germany, which have discretion in setting the local rate of the business tax. Tax competition is identified by means of instrumental variables techniques. Despite significant competition effects between local neighbors, where tax rates are strategic complements, jurisdictions are found to have some leeway in using the tax rate as an instrument of their policy. In particular, large jurisdictions set higher tax rates in interjurisdictional competition.     

ON THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF FISCAL POLICY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY

Spending depends on the quantity of money. If an increase in the budget deficit is financed by sales of government debt to non-banks, the quantity of money is unchanged and public borrowing 'crowds out' private spending. But – if the government finances its deficit (or buybacks of existing debt) from the banks – the quantity of money, and hence spending and national income increase.     

Note on ‘Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game’

Jensen (1994a) finds that loss of monetary discretion leads to lower welfare. However, by extending his model we show that if real base money holdings are relatively low, as is likely to be the case for modern economics, a zero-inflation rule may well be preferable to monetary discretion. If the emphasis on achieving the output and public spending targets falls, a zero-inflation rule is more likely to be preferred. The increased support for binding policy rules thus conforms with a less tolerant attitude towards inflation.     

Shocks derived from mining windfalls and horizontal transfers: Exploring the permanent income hypothesis in Chilean municipalities from a spatial competition approach

We explore how spatial interaction affects the strategic use of municipal income when deciding between 1) an optimal long-run expenditure strategy versus 2) using the current income to finance current activities, a phenomenon known as the permanent income hypothesis. Even when this hypothesis is grounded in temporal logic, insufficient attention has been given to the impact of spatial dependence on this type of budget decision. Therefore, we present two reasons why spatial interaction adds new insight to this discussion. First, subnational governments located inside larger functional areas have lower average costs due to the population concentration, allowing for coordination between jurisdictions to achieve more power of negotiation and to potentially exploit economies of scale. Second, local government decision-making is not independent of other jurisdictions as municipalities would constantly evaluate the others’ actions regarding local tax effort, spending, and debt. While this spatial consideration remains a challenge for theoretical modeling, we offer empirical evidence to evaluate how robust the permanent income hypothesis is when geography is incorporated. Our empirical approach uses dynamic panel data with spatial dependence on debt, expenditure, and the error term. To evaluate our hypothesis, we exploit panel data from 320 Chilean municipalities between 2008 and 2020 and use two sources of income: non-matched grants via mining windfalls and horizontal fiscal transfers among cities. The evidence indicates that jurisdictions make backward-looking decisions regarding spending; that is, there are no significant differences between the short and long run. The results for debt, however, are not robust. Policy pertaining to the use of public resources should consider the spatial dependence between municipalities which should be a crucial factor in budgetary decision-making.     

Time horizons matter: the hazard rate of coalition governments and the size of government

This study examines how coalition governments affect the size of government, measured by total central government expenditure as a share of GDP. Existing studies suggest that the presence of multiple political parties within ruling coalitions generate common pool resource problems or bargaining inefficiencies which, in turn, leads to more government spending when coalition governments are in office. We demonstrate that coalition governments have shorter time horizons than single party governments and use that finding to motivate a simple formal model. The model shows that coalition governments have greater incentives to increase government spending because of a lower discount factor in office. Results from empirical models estimated on a global sample of 111 democracies between 1975 and 2007 provide strong statistical support for the aforementioned theoretical prediction. The empirical results remain robust when we control for alternative explanations, employ different estimation techniques, and use different measures of government spending.     

金融发展中的货币需求稳定性研究--基于1994～2005年的协整分析

本文以经济改革和金融发展为背景，从经典货币需求理论分析出发，运用协整检验和误差校正模型对我国货币需求的稳定性问题展开研究。分析结果表明，货币需求、国民收入、利率和通货膨胀率之间存在协整关系；我国货币需求主要受收入因素影响而呈现出长期稳定性特征，长期稳定的货币需求对其即期增长的抑制作用不明显，货币需求函数表现出高收入弹性和低利率弹性，而利率的外生性削弱了货币需求对利率的调节作用；基于VEC模型的短期Granger因果检验，支持货币量、利率和货币政策最终目标之间短期均衡关系的存在。     

Monetary general equilibrium with transaction costs

Commodity money arises endogenously in a general equilibrium model with separate budget constraints for each transaction. Transaction costs imply differing bid and ask (selling and buying) prices. The most liquid good—with the smallest proportionate bid/ask spread—becomes commodity money. General equilibrium may not be Pareto efficient. If zero-transaction-cost money is available then the equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient. Fiat money is an intrinsically worthless instrument. Its positive price comes from acceptability in paying taxes, and its use as a medium of exchange is based on low transaction cost.     

Competition in law enforcement and capital allocation

This paper studies inter-jurisdictional competition in the fight against crime and its impact on occupational choice and the allocation of capital. In a world where capital is mobile, jurisdictions are inhabited by individuals who choose to become either workers or criminals. Because the return of the two occupations depends on capital, and because investment in capital in a jurisdiction depends on its crime rate, there is a bi-directional relationship between capital investment and crime which may lead to capital concentration. By investing in costly law enforcement, a jurisdiction makes the choice of becoming a criminal less attractive, which in turn reduces the number of criminals and makes its territory more secure. This increased security increases the attractiveness of the jurisdiction for investors and this can eventually translate into more capital being invested. We characterize the Nash equilibria—some entailing a symmetric outcome, others an asymmetric one—and study their efficiency.     

The relative importance of campaign expenditures: An application of production theory

In an election campaign a politician attempts to combine the resources at his disposal so as to maximize the percent of the votes he receives. This behavior is consistent with an economic model of production where the producer combines inputs in order to maximize output. In this paper the concept of an election campaign as a production process is applied to elections to the U.S. House of Representatives. The three inputs were campaign expenditures, years of tenure in office, and the percent of registered voters in candidate's party. Cobb-Douglas and CES versions of the production function are estimated. Each estimation indicated that the marginal productivity of campaign expenditures was very low. Further, the CES estimation indicated low elasticity of substitution between campaign expenditures and other inputs. This means that it is difficult for a candidate who faces a disadvantage—either because his opponent is an incumbent with several years experience, or because he belongs to a minority party—to overcome this disadvantage by simply spending more money.     

From General Equilibrium to Schumpeter

A simple model of cost innovation in a monetary economy is presented that illustrates the essentially dynamic model of Schumpeter involving breaking the circular flow of capital is logically consistent with the General Equilibrium (GE) model of an exchange and production economy. The GE model as presented by Arrow, Debreu and McKenzie is a non-process model; and the original theory deals with the non-constructive proofs of existence of competitive equilibria (CEs). To associate this theory with GE it is necessary to recast the basic model as a process model. The GE model is enlarged and specified as a playable game by adding rules to describe the mechanisms that carry process.Although we believe that GE was a great intellectual achievement, it strangled dynamics and the type of low dimensional equilibrium dynamics of the rational expectations school is profoundly misleading. It turns out that, by remodeling GE as a process model even with only one or two strategic moves, Pandora׳s Box of mechanisms appears and the functions of markets, money and default conditions all emerge as logical necessities.It is shown that the opportunity for process innovation can be described minimally and formally modeled by considering the availability of a new process as a function of a controlled stochastic variable where success depends on chance modified by the level of investment. The Schumpeterian concept of “breaking the circular flow of capital” appears naturally as a disequilibrium phenomenon where the extra resources are captured by a strategic disequilibrating allocation of money.     

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions with heterogeneous firms: Technology vs. market motives

The most common form of foreign direct investment (FDI) is cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). A common explanation for M&A activity identified in the industrial organization literature is that firms seek technological expertise. However, this has not been examined in the FDI literature. In this paper, I develop and estimate a model of cross-border M&A and focus on the technology seeking explanation. In particular, I develop a general equilibrium model of exporting, greenfield FDI, technology-seeking cross-border M&A, and market-seeking cross-border M&A with heterogeneous firms. The model predicts that firms from a larger country are more likely to acquire in a smaller country when M&A activity is driven by a technology-seeking motive, but the opposite is true when it is driven by a market-seeking motive. Using detailed data on worldwide M&A activity from 1985 to 2007, I find empirical evidence that cross-border M&A activity exhibits behavior consistent with this prediction.