Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints

We analyze the nonlinear pricing problem faced by an incomplete information monopolist operating in a market populated by agents with budget constraints. We show that if other goods are available and if the monopolist's goods are nonessential relative to other goods, then there exists an optimal, individually rational, and incentive compatible selling mechanism for the monopolist (Theorem 1). Moreover, we show that a solution to all such nonlinear pricing problems exists if and only if the monopolist's goods are nonessential (Theorem 2). In the absence of nonessentiality, we show that if the monopolist's profit function is independent of quantity (e.g., if all costs are fixed), then an optimal selling mechanism exists (Theorem 3). Finally, we show that if there is reporting (of types by agents) and partial recognition of types (by the monopolist), then an optimal selling mechanism exists, even in the absence of nonessentiality, provided agents' utility functions are affine and continuous in goods (Theorem 4).     

Utility maximization under a shortfall risk constraint

The article analyzes optimal portfolio choice of utility maximizing agents in a general continuous-time financial market model under a joint budget and downside risk constraint. The risk constraint is given in terms of a class of convex risk measures. We do not impose any specific assumptions on the price processes of the underlying assets. We analyze under which circumstances the risk constraint is binding. We provide a closed-form solution to the optimization problem in a general semimartingale framework. For a complete market, the wealth maximization problem is equivalent to a dynamic portfolio optimization problem.     

The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project

We examine the asymptotic behavior of two strategyproof mechanisms discussed by Moulin for public goods – the conservative equal costs rule (CER) and the serial cost sharing rule (SCSR) – and compare their performance to that of the pivotal mechanism (PM) from the Clarke–Groves family. Allowing the individuals’ valuations for an excludable public project to be random variables, we show under very general assumptions that expected welfare loss generated by the CER, as the size of the population increases, becomes arbitrarily large. However, all moments of the SCSR’s random welfare loss asymptotically converge to zero. The PM does better than the SCSR, with its welfare loss converging even more rapidly to zero.     

Performance management practices within emerging market multinational enterprises: the case of Brazilian multinationals

This study advances our understanding of HRM within emerging market multinational enterprises (EM-MNEs) by examining the extent to, and mechanisms by, which Brazilian MNEs standardise or localise their performance management (PM) policies and practices, and the factors that influence their design and implementation. We explored these issues through qualitative case studies of three Brazilian MNEs. The analysis of interview data reveals a strong tendency for Brazilian MNEs to centralise and standardise their PM policies and practices. The key finding of this paper is that PM practices within Brazilian MNEs are not based on indigenous Brazilian practices, but, rather, are heavily influenced by global best practices. The findings are at odds with previous research, which suggests that EM-MNEs apply different HR practices in developed country subsidiaries and developing country subsidiaries. Also, contrary to expectations, our results indicate that institutional distance does not have a significant influence on the adaptation of PM practices at subsidiary level.     

Two-sided matching with spatially differentiated agents

We consider the problem of assigning sellers and buyers into stable matches. The agents are located along a line and the match surplus function is decreasing in the distance between partners. We investigate the structure of stable assignments under both non-transferable utility (NTU) and transferable utility (TU). If the surplus function is sufficiently convex, the TU-stable assignments are a subset of the NTU-stable assignments. Furthermore, if trade is restricted to uni-directional flows the unique TU-stable assignment coincides with the unique NTU-stable assignment for every convex surplus function. We also examine the graph-theoretic representation of stable assignments and show that the graph structure can be exploited to compute surplus shares in TU-stable assignments.     

Position limit for the CSI 300 stock index futures market

The aim of this study was to find the optimal position limit for the Chinese stock index (CSI) 300 futures market. A low position limit helps to prevent price manipulations in the spot market, and thus keeps the magnitude of instantaneous price changes within the tolerance range of policymakers. However, setting a position limit that is too low may also have negative effects on market quality. We propose an artificial limit order market with heterogeneous interacting agents to examine the impact of different levels of position limits on market quality, measured as liquidity, return volatility, efficiency of information dissemination, and trading welfare. The simulation model is based on realistic trading mechanisms, investor structure, and order submission behavior observed in the CSI 300 futures market.Our results show that on the basis of the liquidity status in September 2010, raising the position limit from 100 to 300 could significantly improve market quality and at the same time keep the maximum absolute price change per 5 s below the 2% tolerance level. However, the improvement becomes only marginal if the position limit is further increased beyond 300. Therefore, we believe that raising the position limit to a moderate level can enhance the functionality of the CSI 300 futures market, which should benefit the development of the Chinese financial system.     

Incorporating positions into asset pricing models with order-based strategies

The paper addresses the problem of agent-based asset pricing models with order-based strategies that the implied positions of the agents remain indeterminate. To overcome this inconsistency, two easily applicable risk aversion mechanisms are proposed which modify the original actions of a market maker and the speculative agents, respectively. Here the concepts are incorporated into the classical Beja–Goldman model. For the deterministic version of the thus enhanced model a four-dimensional mathematical stability analysis is provided. In a stochastic version it is demonstrated that jointly the mechanisms are indeed able to keep the agents’ positions within bounds, provided the corresponding risk aversion coefficients are neither too low nor too high. A similar result holds for the misalignment of the market price. We wish to thank two anonymous referees for their observations and detailed comments. Financial support from EU STREP ComplexMarkets, contract number 516446, is gratefully acknowledged.     

Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers

Procurement auction literature typically assumes that the suppliers are uncapacitated [see, e.g. Dasgupta and Spulber in Inf Econ Policy 4:5–29, 1990 and Che in Rand J Econ 24(4):668–680, 1993]. Consequently, the auction mechanisms award the contract to a single supplier. We study mechanism design in a model where suppliers have limited production capacity, and both the marginal costs and the production capacities are private information. We provide a closed-form solution for the revenue maximizing direct mechanism when the distribution of the cost and production capacities satisfies a modified regularity condition [Myerson in Math Oper Res 6(1):58–73, 1981]. We also present a sealed low bid implementation of the optimal direct mechanism for the special case of identical suppliers. The results in this paper extend to other principle-agent mechanism design problems where the agents have a privately known upper bound on allocation. The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for valuable suggestions and comments.     

Cost sharing: efficiency and implementation

We study environments where a production process is jointly shared by a finite group of agents. The social decision involves the determination of input contribution and output distribution. We define a competitive solution when there is decreasing-returns-to-scale which leads to a Pareto optimal outcome. Since there is a finite number of agents, the competitive solution is prone to manipulation. We construct a mechanism for which the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of competitive solution outcomes. We define a marginal-cost-pricing equilibrium (MCPE) solution for environments with increasing returns to scale. These solutions are Pareto optimal under certain conditions. We construct another mechanism that realizes the MCPE.     

Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies

We present a feasible strategic market mechanism with finitely many agents whose Nash, semi-strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibria fully implement the Walrasian equilibria. We define a strategic equilibrium concept, called correlated semi-strong equilibrium, and show that the Walrasian equilibria can be implemented by these equilibria, and also by the coalition-proof correlated equilibria of our mechanism. We show that these two concepts, suitably modified with transfers, fully implement the Pareto optimal allocations.     

Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism

We consider a class of economies with public goods that have the following properties: (i) The preferences of the agents are convex, interior, and strictly increasing. (ii) The technology for production of public goods is a closed convex cone that satisfies free disposal and an additional mild assumption. No assumptions are made on continuity, completeness or transitivity of preferences. We provide a continuous and feasible mechanism that implements the Lindahl equilibrium by Nash equilibria, and has the following property: For every economy in our class every Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism is a strong Nash equilibrium.     

Regulating a Manager‐controlled Natural Monopoly with Unknown Costs

We study the regulation of a manager‐controlled natural monopoly with unknown costs, borrowing from Baron and Myerson (BM) (1982), where the monopoly is controlled by the owner. We consider the case where the regulator can tax the owner as well as the case where she cannot. We find that the optimal price schedule generally lies below the one in the BM model and that it can be as low as the marginal cost if the compensation parameter is sufficiently small and the regulator cannot tax the monopoly owner. We also identify the cases where the monopoly owner prefers to delegate the control to a manager. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Location theory and transportation costs

In this paper, we consider the problem of locating one firm within a transportation network. For this problem, the main known result, called the Hakimi theorem, states that an optimal location of the firm is either a market or a node of the network. Our purpose is to extend this result in two directions. First, when several transportation modes exist, we show that the junction points between different modes can also be optimal locations. Second, we study the role of the fixed transportation costs. We prove that markets are local optimal locations when such costs exist, and that a market is the only optimal solution under specific assumptions about the size of the fixed costs. Simulation is used to illustrate the relevance of the approach.     

Adaptive algorithms for maximizing overall stock return

Deciding which stocks to purchase and how to optimally allocate the total investment among them is a nontrivial task for every investor. In this article, we propose two adaptive techniques that would provide an optimal allocation maximizing the return over the investment period. The first approach is the adaptive power method (PM) which is a modification of the proper orthogonal decomposition method. The adaptive PM uses only the currently available information to compute the optimal allocations, yet its long-term solution approaches the dominant eigen solution, even though that solution would require having a priori knowledge of all stocks’ performance. The second approach is derived from the well-known Least Mean Square (LMS) method, where the optimal allocation can be computed by adaptively steering the overall return toward a desired value. The experimental results have indicated promising gains even when the general market trend is downward.     

Heterogeneous expectations in the gold market: Specification and estimation

The increase in the price of gold between 2002 and 2011 appears to be a candidate for a potential asset price ‘bubble’, suggesting that chartists (feedback traders) were highly active in the gold market during this period. Hence, this paper develops and tests empirically several models incorporating heterogeneous expectations of agents, specifically fundamentalists and chartists, for the gold market. The empirical results show that both agent types are important in explaining historical gold prices but that the 10-year bull run of gold in the early 2000s is consistent with the presence of agents extrapolating long-term trends. Technically this paper is a further step toward providing an empirical foundation for certain assumptions used in the heterogeneous agents literature. For example, the empirical results presented in this paper compare the economical and statistical significance of numerous switching variable specifications that are generally only introduced ad hoc.     

Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem

We introduce two notions of ex-post fairness, namely ex-post favoring ranks (EFR) and robust ex-post favoring ranks, which consider whether objects are received by those agents who have the highest rank for them. We examine their compatibility with standard properties of random assignments and state some impossibility theorems. We also propose and formalize a revised version of the Boston mechanism and prove that it provides an EFR random assignment.

     

Crude oil price forecasting based on internet concern using an extreme learning machine

The growing internet concern (IC) over the crude oil market and related events influences market trading, thus creating further instability within the oil market itself. We propose a modeling framework for analyzing the effects of IC on the oil market and for predicting the price volatility of crude oil’s futures market. This novel approach decomposes the original time series into intrinsic modes at different time scales using bivariate empirical mode decomposition (BEMD). The relationship between the oil price volatility and IC at an individual frequency is investigated. By utilizing decomposed intrinsic modes as specified characteristics, we also construct extreme learning machine (ELM) models with variant forecasting schemes. The experimental results illustrate that ELM models that incorporate intrinsic modes and IC outperform the baseline ELM and other benchmarks at distinct horizons. Having the power to improve the accuracy of baseline models, internet searching is a practical way of quantifying investor attention, which can help to predict short-run price fluctuations in the oil market.     

Switching from complete to incomplete information

We construct an elementary mechanism [Dutta, B., Sen, A., Vohra, R., 1995. Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments. Review of Economic Design 1, 173–203] that Nash implements the constrained Walrasian correspondence. We extend it to incomplete and non-exclusive information economies by enlarging the message space of agents. In addition, measurability restrictions on allocations with respect to prices proper to constrained rational expectations equilibria are imposed in the outcome function. We show that by imposing such restrictions, the mechanism Bayesian implements the constrained rational expectations equilibrium correspondence. This result shows game-theoretic connections between these two market equilibrium concepts. However, these connections are obtained at the price of strong restrictions on the behavior of agents.     

Implementing efficient market structure

Abstract. This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke–Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry. Received: 7 May 2001 / Accepted: 24 June 2002 We would like to thank seminar participants at Bonn and Berlin, in particular Peter Bank, Wieland Müller, and Urs Schweizer, the two anonymous referees, and the associate editor for most useful and exceptionally detailed comments. Financial support was received by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 373 (“Quantifikation und Simulation ?konomischer Prozesse”), Humboldt–Universit?t zu Berlin.     

Workers’ enterprises are not perverse: differential oligopoly games with sticky price

We take a differential game approach to study the dynamic behaviour of labour managed (LM) firms, in the presence of price stickiness. We find that the oligopoly market populated by LM firms reaches the same steady state equilibrium allocation as the oligopoly populated by profit-maximising (PM) firms, provided that the LM membership and the PM labour force are set before the market game starts. The conclusion holds under both the open-loop solution and the closed-loop solution. The result confirms the point made by Sertel (Eur Econ Rev 31:1619–1625, 1987) in a static framework.