International credit and welfare: A paradoxical theorem and its policy implications

This paper considers a developing nation that faces a foreign exchange shortage and hence its demand for foreign goods is limited both by its income and its foreign exchange balance. Availability of international credit relaxes the second constraint. We develop a simple model of strategic interaction between lending institutions and firms, and show that the availability of international credit at concessionary rates can leave the borrowing nation worse off than if it had to borrow money at higher market rates. This ‘paradox of benevolence’ is then used to motivate a discussion of policies pertaining to international lending and the Southern government's method of rationing out foreign exchange to the importers.     

Unemployment and the welfare effects of trade policy

Abstract.  In this paper the welfare effects of tariffs and import quotas in the presence of involuntary unemployment are derived and compared. The framework used is the standard model of a competitive small open economy with many goods and factors. Optimum levels of the respective trade policy instruments are derived, as well as welfare increasing reform strategies. In all cases, the labour intensity of the import‐competing sectors turns out to be a crucial variable for deriving the welfare effects. JEL classification: F13, F16     

An endogenous policy model of hierarchical government

Endogenous policy models usually neglect that government policies are frequently the result of decisions taken at different tiers by different agents, each enjoying some degree of autonomy. In this paper, policies are the outcome of the choices made by two agents within a hierarchy. A legislator decides on the budget to be successively spent by a bureaucrat. Both agents are lobbied by one or two interest groups. The combination of sequential decisionmaking and lobbying implies that the interaction between the agent at one tier and the interest group(s) depends on the exchange between the same interest group(s) and the agent at the other tier. Our results concerning multi-tier lobbying and legislatorial oversight substantially qualify the conventional wisdom related to one-tier lobbying. In particular, the reaction of the legislator to lobbying at the bureaucratic tier may make lobbying wasteful even when there is no competition from other lobbies. Moreover, the legislator benefits from lobbying only when there is competition between interest groups at the upper tier. It is also shown that competition for influence at the bureaucratic tier may work as a perfect substitute for legislatorial oversight. Extensions of the model indicate its usefulness for the analysis of decisionmaking in other multilevel governance structures, like federations or firms.     

Public enterprises,planning and policy adoption: three welfare propositions

Despite widespread privatizations over the last three decades, public enterprises, as production units under government control, are still present in several countries and sectors. While the academic and political debate on the costs and benefits of privatization is vast, a focus on the rationale for public enterprises, from the standpoint of Social Cost Benefit Analysis, is missing. This paper aims at filling this gap and provides a normative discussion on public enterprises in a general equilibrium setting. The conditions under which public provision may be beneficial and the metrics for evaluating polices and projects under (a)symmetric information and (non)benevolent governments are presented in three welfare propositions. The main policy message points to the overall quality of institutions as a necessary pre-condition for socially desirable public enterprises. A sound institutional environment provides policy-makers with the correct incentives to design and implement meaningful policies even if public administrators adopt sub-optimal plans. Institutions should constrain self-interested policy-makers from disrupting the key welfare signals for policy adoption as well as for project appraisal, while bias in management is a relatively less important concern.     

Exploring welfare implications of resource equivalency analysis in natural resource damage assessments

Resource equivalency analysis (REA) has become the dominant method for calculating natural resource damages for biological injuries from pollution incidents. This methodology compares resources lost as a result of an incident to benefits that can be gained from a habitat or wildlife restoration project. Compensation is evaluated in terms of resource services instead of market currency. Recently, this approach has been questioned regarding its ability to provide adequate compensation based on economic welfare principles. The following paper examines these critiques and develops a model to quantify the welfare implications of using REA when some of its implicit assumptions are violated.We focus on the situation where compensatory restoration projects provide services that are comparable to those lost as a result of an incident. We examine simulation scenarios where the public has heterogeneous preferences for resources and where resource values change over time. Using the Hicks-Kaldor criterion, we find that the traditional REA provides an acceptable approximation of aggregate compensation for a reasonably wide range of economic and biological parameter combinations.     

The effects and policy implications of state aids to industry: an economic analysis

The use of state aids to industry is a poorly understood part of competition policy. Currently, the EU Commission presumes that state aids distort competition, yet it approves 98% of applications, often for social or distributional reasons. We argue that proper regulation of state aids should focus on two issues, the externalities generated and the inefficiencies arising from failures in competition between governments. We thus develop a new framework for EU policy and compare its implications with the existing practice of the EU Commission.     

Bank regulation and supervision and its welfare implications

This study provides a general equilibrium model to explore the welfare implications of bank regulation and supervision (RS). The model supports the basic expectations regarding the positive effects of RS on the growth rate, output, credit, investment, wages and profits; and its negative effects on the interest rate. In addition, RS is observed to lead to a convergence effect. Furthermore, it is observed that the decision of banks to monitor and charge differentiated interest rates to firms depends on the distribution of firm-specific moral hazard rates; bank monitoring increases profits as the distribution of producer type improves.     

Retailer power: recent developments and policy implications

It is common, but incorrect, to view retailing as a highly competitive activity. Unlike manufacturing, retailing has displayed a trend towards much higher concentration, reinforced by actions of retailers themselves, such as emphasis on own-label brands. This may introduce distortions arising from exercise of market power or may create countervailing power to that already enjoyed by manufacturers. Acknowledging increased market power within retailing raises new issues for competition authorities. We develop a consistent framework of analysis and use it to examine two issues: attitudes to retail mergers and exclusivity arrangements between retailers and their suppliers.     

Industrial organization implications of QR trade regimes: Evidence and welfare costs

Evidence of the relationship between trade regimes, concentration and profitability in semi-industrial countries' manufacturing sectors is reviewed. This evidence is used to justify the formulation and simulation of a three sector general equilibrium model in which the manufacturing sectors's behavior is linked to the degree of restrictiveness of the QR regime. Simulations are conducted with several variants of the model to ascertain separately the effects of introducing economies of scale, firm entry/exit, departures from competitive pricing, and interactions between entry and pricing rules. Numerical results suggest that a 20 percent rationing rate of intermediates and consumption goods can have welfare costs of about 2.0 percent of national income in the absence of economies of scale and industrial organization interactions with the trade regime. When industrial organization features are included, the costs of the same 20 percent rationing quadruples.     

Environmental policy and long-term welfare in a tourism economy

A dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy specialized in producing tourism services is presented. The tourism package is a bundle of attributes provided by firms, the government and the natural environment. Investment in accommodation increases the number of visitors but also congests public goods and reduces environmental quality. The model is used to determine the conditions for the existence of a long-term double dividend. These conditions depend on both the initial level of environmental quality and the responsiveness of the tourism price to marginal changes in environmental and accommodation quality and congestion of public goods. Support from the Balearic Islands Government (PRIB-2004-10142) and helpful comments from anonymous referees are gratefully thanked.     

Expansion and welfare in microfinance: A screening model

The expansion of microfinance has triggered concerns of rising indebtedness, and higher default and interest rates. Using a screening model, we show that even if interest and default rates increase due to expansion, borrower welfare may improve. This is because: (i) all borrowers previously denied credit can obtain loans, and (ii) screening costs for pre-existing borrowers go down. Hence, policies that seek to regulate interest and screening levels can be counterproductive.     

The welfare implications of advertising and extension under uncertainty

This paper specifies an adoption model based upon Bayesian learning and exogenous information generation. Formulae for welfare effects are derived and calibrated using Green Revolution agricultural data. The effects of intervention through the dissemination of new information are then estimated numerically. The simulations indicate that gains to intervention can be substantial. Intervening with slowly adopted marginal technologies is as beneficial as intervening with superior technologies. Taken from Shampine [Am. J. Agric. Econ. 2 (1998).], which examined intervention in the presence of learning externalities, the results suggest that if adoption is slow, and information is the primary constraint, the gains to intervention are generally substantial relative to the costs.     

E时代的货币自由化:发展前景与货币政策含义

现有文献由于缺乏货币制度及其变迁的分析框架,从而高估了私人电子货币所承载的货币自由化前景。货币制度原理解析表明,迄今为止,尚未出现真正意义上的私人电子货币。货币制度变迁中的激励不足,使得私人电子货币的出现并流通,面临着巨大的制度约束。抛开制度变迁框架后,进一步的货币替代效率分析,也同样得出了私人电子货币令人难以乐观的前景。虽然不存在私人电子货币带给传统货币政策的根本性冲击,但是,在“货币——银行”电子化的背景下,随着货币需求的利率弹性增强,利率在货币政策操作框架中的地位将会明显提高。     

On the welfare costs of misspecified monetary policy objectives

This paper quantifies the effects on welfare of misspecified monetary policy objectives in a stylized DSGE model. We show that using inappropriate objectives generates relatively large welfare costs. When expressed in terms of ‘consumption equivalent’ units, these costs correspond to permanent decreases in steady-state consumption of up to two percent. The latter are generated by both the inappropriate choice of weights and the omission of variables. In particular, it is costly to assume an interest-rate smoothing incentive for central bankers when it is not socially optimal to do so. Finally, a parameter uncertainty decomposition indicates that uncertainty about the properties of markup shocks gives rise to the largest welfare costs.     

On the welfare implications of restricting bankruptcy information

The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) dictates that adverse events such as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing must be removed from an individual’s credit record after 10 years. The intent of the law is to provide partial consumption insurance by giving an individual a fresh start. However, the law obviously weakens incentives not to default, which can result in higher interest rates that in turn reduce intertemporal insurance. Because of this tradeoff, it is unclear how long is the optimal length of time that an adverse event remains on an individual’s credit record. In this paper we assess the welfare consequences of varying the length of time that adverse events can be on one’s credit record. We calibrate the model to US data where the exclusion parameter is set to be 10 years on average. Then we run a counterfactual to find the length that maximizes ex-post economywide welfare using a consumption equivalent measure. The model predicts agents prefer to remove the bankruptcy flag after one year, though the gains are small.     

Macroeconomic implications of financial policy

This paper studies the effects of financial policy in a model with heterogeneous agents, incomplete markets and portfolio restrictions. For an economy calibrated to replicate key aspects of the U.S. wealth distribution, we find that the quantitative effects of financial policy are relatively small. The reason is that the households determining aggregate behavior are relatively well insured and can therefore offset the actions of the firm by modifying their portfolio allocations. However, financial policy has important effects on asset prices. Whereas a higher level of debt in the capital structure of the firm introduces more risk into the economy by increasing the volatility of the equity return, it enhances the liquidity of households by increasing the supply of bonds. In an economy with a substantial amount of heterogeneity, this last effect dominates and leverage leads to a decrease in the equity premium. This is in contrast to the findings in representative agent models, in which leverage unambiguously increases the premium through a higher equity return volatility.     

Public policies: will policy be ineffective if welfare is a random-walk

This study contradicts the view that policy cannot be effective if the welfare variable is a random-walk. Also, the study disagrees with the methodology employed by some proponents of this view, and goes on to show that the conclusion of policy ineffectiveness was only due to a wrong inference procedure. Furthermore, it points out that the notion of policy effectiveness suggests the examination of the relationship between policy and welfare; hence, what to look for is not a trend in the individual time series, but a common trend which relates the policy instrument and the welfare-variable in the policy environment under consideration.