Environmental Liability Law and Induced Technical Change – The Role of Discounting

We analyse the incentives of environmental liability law for inducing progress to emission abatement technology. We consider three liability rules: strict liability, a negligence rule with an emission norm as the due care standard, and a double negligence rule which combines the emission standard with an abatement technology norm. In the case of distortive discounting, i.e. where the private discount rate deviates from the social one, we show, how the level of distortion influences the ranking of liability rules, according to the criterion of generated social cost.     

Environmental Regulations Under Simple Negligence or Strict Liability

We use negligence and strict liability as the basis for environmentalregulations and show that, when jurisdictions compete for firms that engagein environmentally risky behaviour, strict liability implements the sociallyoptimal outcome while simple negligence does not, even if the jurisdictionsfully cooperate in setting standards of care. Consequently, we argue that,even if jurisdictions delegate standard setting to a central authority, likein the European Union, this would not implement the socially optimaloutcome. We also demonstrate that harmonization of environmental regulationsmakes more sense if strict liability is used rather than simple negligence.     

EFFICIENCY OF LIABILITY RULES WITH MULTIPLE VICTIMS

Abstract. This paper investigates the structure of liability rules from the efficiency perspective when there are multiple victims. It is shown that, when there is one injurer and multiple victims, there is no liability rule with the property of invariably yielding efficient outcomes. The fact that there is no rule which is efficient for all applications of course does not in any way preclude the possibility of a rule being efficient with respect to some subclass of applications which may be of interest. We consider in this paper the important subclass of applications (     ') which are such that the expected loss of a victim depends only on the care level taken by that victim and the care level taken by the injurer. It is shown that a sufficient condition for a one-injurer multiple-victim liability rule to be efficient with respect to the above subclass of applications      ' is that its structure be such that: (i) whenever the injurer is negligent and a particular victim is non-negligent, the entire loss incurred by that victim must be borne by the injurer; and (ii) whenever a particular victim is negligent and the injurer is non-negligent, the entire loss incurred by that victim must be borne by the victim himself. In fact, for an important subclass of one-injurer multiple-victim liability rules, characterized by the condition that the proportions in which the loss incurred by a particular victim is to be borne by the injurer and that victim must depend only on the non-negligence proportions of the injurer and that victim, the above condition is both necessary and sufficient for efficiency with respect to the restricted subclass of applications      '.     

Generalized Progress of Abatement Technology: Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law

This paper considers the incentives environmental liability creates to improve pollution abatement technology. Our analysis considers technical progress in end-of-pipe abatement and in the production technology used, thereby generalizing the approach taken by Endres et?al. (Environ Resour Econ 36:341?C366, 2007). We establish that this generalization has drastic repercussions on incentives under negligence liability, while the performance of strict liability is not compromised. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the social desirability of investment in abatement or production technology (or both) decisively determines how ex-ante and ex-post regulation fare with respect to welfare maximization in the case of negligence liability.     

On and Off the Liability Bandwagon: Explaining State Adoptions of Strict Liability in Hazardous Waste Programs

We test a model of states' adoption of the hazardous waste liability regime (negligence, strict liability) providing greater net benefits. The likelihood of adopting strict liability increases in a state's number of chemical-intensive manufacturing plants, decreases in the number of large mining establishments. Also predictive: severity of state's hazardous waste problem, effectiveness of other state environmental programs, and political climate. States may view strict liability as better for industrial than mining pollution, and may be partly motivated by "precaution targeting" and "deep pockets" mentality. Non-adopters may wish not to discourage business or have other programs that substitute for strict liability.     

Environmental liability and the capital structure of firms

This paper analyses the impact of environmental liability regimes on the capital structure of firms. We show that imposing environmental liability only on polluting firms, with limited liability, increases use of bank debt. Extending environmental liability to banks lowers bank borrowing relative to liability only on firms, with an ambiguous effect relative to no liability. Using US industry-level data we estimate a reduced-form model of bank borrowing by firms and show that the introduction of environmental liability only on firms increased bank borrowing by 15–20%, but when liability was extended to banks, borrowing returned to a level slightly higher than with no liability.     

Led on the Wrong Track? A Note on the Direction of Technical Change under Environmental Liability Law

This note shows that polluters might opt for technical change which is inferior to other innovations from a social standpoint under environmental liability law. Polluters choose what is socially optimal under strict liability. However, we show that it is possible to have not only too little or too much technical change of a given kind but, importantly, also the wrong kind of technical change under negligence.     

Why is there Corporate Taxation? The Role of Limited Liability Revisited

Most economists reject the idea that corporate taxation should be interpreted as a price for the privilege of limited liability. In this paper, we reconsider this idea and show that limited liability can lead to overinvestment if information is incomplete. In this setting, introducing an additional tax on limited liability contracts is welfare-enhancing. Our model thus offers an explanation for the nexus between double taxation and limited liability observed in many existing tax systems.      

Environmental Liability and Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe: Toward an Optimal Policy

It has been estimated that the costs of remediating contaminated sites in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) will be very high. These contingent environmental liabilities have emerged precisely at the time CEE countries are attempting to privatize their capital stocks, creating major challenges for privatization agencies. It is also generally agreed that an inadequate handling of these liabilities in the past has reduced sales of state-owned enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe.This paper uses an analytical model to identify optimal policies for minimizing the damage to privatization processes from environmental liabilities. Policy simulations are conducted which evaluate the effects of the use of liability indemnifications and environmental audits on privatization sales, prices and government revenues net of environmental costs. The major finding of the paper is that goals to mitigate the effects of environmental liability on privatizations and maximize government net revenues from privatization sales require equivalent environmental liability policies. Both goals require optimal provision of information and indemnifications to investors, and moreover it is found that the two policies are complementary rather than substitutes.     

Vasicek模型下寿险责任准备金评估

在假定寿险产品定价利率固定,准备金评估利率基于长期国债收益率且符合Vasicek模型等前提下,该模型适合我国目前的长期国债收益率。然后推导出随机利率下全离散型寿险责任准备金评估公式,并以Vasicek模型为例,使用蒙特卡罗模拟方法计算出准备金分布,同时对准备金在利率波动条件下的充足性做出分析。     

Least-Cost Avoidance: The Tragedy of Common Safety

This article shows that the least-cost avoider approach in tortis not necessarily the optimal way to attain least-cost avoidancewhen accidents can be avoided by either of two parties. Whenparties do not observe each other's costs of care at the timeof the accident and are unable to determine which party is theleast-cost avoider, they fail to anticipate the outcome of theadjudication. Under these circumstances, accident avoidancebecomes a commons problem because care by each individual partyreduces the prospect of liability for both parties. As a result,parties suboptimally invest in care. We show that regulationremoves this problem and is superior to tort liability bothwhen parties act simultaneously and when they act sequentially.We further examine how different liability rules perform inthis respect. (JEL K13, K32)     

Ambiguity and Accident Law

Environmental accidents often involve ambiguous risks, i.e., the relevant probabilities are unknown. This paper studies how liability rules are affected by ambiguity. The injurer and the victim choose a level of care, which is observable, and an unobservable action. Both actions may affect the size and/or likelihood of loss. We analyze the welfare implications of tort rules. First, we show that with ambiguity, negligence is likely to perform better than strict liability. Second, we propose a tort rule of negligence and punitive damages, which gives the efficient levels of both care and unobserved actions.     

民事责任竞合刍议

民事责任竞合来源于法律规范竞合理论。现代法律都作抽象规定,并且从各种不同角度对社会生活加以规范,所以,经常发生同一个事实符合几个法律规范的要件,致使这几个法律规范竞合。同一民事违法行为同时符合数种民事权利保护的规定,就构成民事责任竞合。民法上的民事责任竞合,就是民事请求权竞合。民事责任的竞合包括多种情况,主要讨论侵权责任与违约责任的竞合。     

Resource Management and the Mayor's Guarantee in French Water Allocation

This paper uses standard methods in stochastic calculus tomeasure the cost of the agency conflict that pits electedofficials of French municipalities against the communities theyrepresent in the management of the water supply. Under the Frenchlegal code, the municipalities are responsible for the watersupply and the elected officials are personally liable for anydamage due to negligence on their part. Uncertainty regardingexactly how negligence will be defined by the courts puts theelected officials in a precarious position. By delegatingauthority to an oligopoly of private firms, however, electedofficials can eliminate their personal liability, which istransferred to the delegated firm. Many studies argue thatdelegation locks communities into long-term contracts that areagainst their better interests. Thus, the agency conflict mayaffect the delegation decision to the detriment of the community.To determine whether or not this is true it is necessary to knowthe economic cost of the mayor's personal liability.     

论政府在环境责任保险制度构建中的地位和作用

我国现阶段的环境责任保险主要依靠市场自身力量推动,从试点情况来看形势不容乐观。文章从保险公司和排污企业两个方面入手,分析了政府在环境责任保险制度构建中的地位,并阐述了政府介入后具有消除外部不经济性、确保制度全方位发展以及缓解政府财政压力的作用。     

Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: Some results on compromise alternatives

We consider an impossibility result in Börgers (1991), which says in a restricted environment with two players or three alternatives it is impossible to implement a social choice correspondence that is efficient, enforces compromises at a profile and is implementable in undominated strategies by a bounded mechanism. We extend and refine this result in many ways- we generalize the impossibility result for any number of players and alternatives when the compromises are enforced at a near-unanimous preference profile. We further show that the impossibility result in Börgers (1991) holds good if we replace efficiency of SCCs by neutrality. Also the impossibility result holds good for two agents and any number of alternatives when the SCC is unanimous and minimal. Interestingly, we get a possibility result when we relax the assumption of minimality.     

大陆法系中两合公司之立法研究

2006年1月1日开始实施的新《公司法》仍然没有规定两合公司,难以解决现实中存在的相关问题。因为在我国现实中的确存在事实上的“责任两合”的公司,因此对两合公司进行研究并在未来的公司法修改时考虑两合公司的问题具有重要价值。作者主要从两合公司的法律特点、成立、内部关系与外部关系、变更、解散和清算方面进行了论述,以期对我国公司法研究与立法有所裨益。     

Comparison Utility in a Growth Model

We examine the dynamics of two endogenous-growth modelsin which agents have comparison utility. In the inward-lookingeconomy, individuals care about how their current consumptioncompares with their own past consumption. In the outward-lookingeconomy, they care about how their own consumption compares withother peoples consumption. In response to a negative shock tocapital, saving and growth will temporarily fall in both of themodels that we consider but will remain constant in a model withstandard preferences. The decline will be smaller in the outward-than in the inward-looking case, but utility will be lower inthe former case because of a negative externality.     

劳动先合同义务之责任形态的博弈分析

在合同生效之前,当事人因故意或过失违反先合同义务,导致合同不成立、合同无效或被变更、撤销的,均应承担缔约过失责任.劳动合同也是合同的一种,缔约过失责任也应在劳动立法中得以体现.因此,作者从劳动合同的社会法属性出发,明确劳动缔约过失责任不能完全照搬合同法的规定,并运用博弈论的方法对义务及责任进行可行性分析,使正在修订中的《劳动合同法》明确劳动缔约过失责任,完善劳动合同订立阶段的不足.     

Can people learn rational expectations?

In this note the stability of the rational expectations equilibrium for the Foster and Frierman (1990) version of the Blume and Easley (1982) model is investigated under the assumption that the learning mechanism used by economic agents is based on a selection mechanism on a class of competing models having a physical meaning for the agent and not on the interpolation of models having no clear physical meaning, as it is often the case in the literature on learning rational expectations. It is found that, under the standard assumption that the rational expectations model is in the information set of the uninformed trader no matter his degree of rationality, convergence to it is less likely the higher the uninformed agent's degree of rationality, in a sense to be specified in the paper. Some comments on the result are also provided.