证券分析师VS统计模型:证券分析师盈余预测的相对准确性及其决定因素

本文使用2005年35家券商对我国上市公司做出的每股盈余预测数据,考察了证券分析师盈余预测相对于统计模型的相对准确性及其决定因素。我们发现,我国证券分析师做出的盈余预测,同以年度历史数据为基础的统计模型得出的盈余预测相比,预测误差较小,证券分析师盈余预测具有一定的优势;但同某些以季度历史数据为基础的统计模型得出的盈余预测相比,预测误差较大,证券分析师盈余预测不具有优势。我们同时考察了决定证券分析师盈余预测相对准确性的决定因素。我们发现,公司每股盈余的波动性越大,公司上市越晚,跟踪公司的分析师越多,证券分析师的优势就越大。我们的研究对证券分析师以及投资者都有一定的启示作用。     

High-Technology Intangibles and Analysts' Forecasts

This study examines the association between firms' intangible assets and properties of the information contained in analysts' earnings forecasts. We hypothesize that analysts will supplement firms' financial information by placing greater relative emphasis on their own private (or idiosyncratic) information when deriving their earnings forecasts for firms with significant intangible assets. Our evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. We find that the consensus in analysts' forecasts, measured as the correlation in analysts' forecast errors, is negatively associated with a firm's level of intangible assets. This result is robust to controlling for analyst uncertainty about a firm's future earnings, which we also find to be higher for firms with high levels of internally generated (and expensed) intangibles. Given that analyst uncertainty increases and analyst consensus decreases with the level of a firm's intangible assets, we also expect and find that the degree to which the mean forecast aggregates private information and is more accurate than an individual analyst's forecast increases with a firm's intangible assets. Finally, additional analysis reveals that lower levels of analyst consensus are associated with high-technology manufacturing companies, and that this association is explained by the relatively high R&D expenditures made by these firms. Overall, our results are consistent with financial analysts augmenting the financial reporting systems of firms with higher levels of intangible assets (in terms of contributing to more accurate earnings expectations), particularly R&D-driven high-tech manufacturers.     

Stock option compensation and the likelihood of meeting analysts' quarterly earnings targets

One role of stock options in executive compensation packages is to counterbalance the inherently short-term orientation of base salary and annual bonuses. Managerial compensation plans frequently include stock options in order to better align the interests of managers and outside shareholders and reduce agency problems. However, since option values are sensitive to fluctuations in stock prices, and investors reward firms that meet or exceed earnings expectations, executives of firms with sizable option components in their compensation plans have increased incentives to report earnings that meet or exceed analysts' forecasts. We show that the propensity to meet or exceed analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts is positively related to the use of options in top executives' compensation plans. Further, firms that employ relatively more options in their compensation plans more frequently report earnings surprises that exceed analysts' forecast by small amounts (between 0 and 1 cent per share). These results suggest that the use of stock-based compensation intensifies top executives' focus on financial analysts' short-term earnings forecasts.     

Real earnings management and the properties of analysts' forecasts

Prior literature generally finds analysts are able to identify and process complex financial information. However, research suggests that in certain settings, analysts struggle to fully incorporate into their forecasts all available information. We examine analysts' forecast properties in the face of a specific type of complex financial information: real earnings management (REM). First, we investigate the relation between measures of REM and analysts' forecast properties. We find REM measures are associated with greater forecast error and dispersion in the following year. However, REM measures, by definition, capture abnormal operating results, and thus include both firms engaging in manipulative REM as well as firms experiencing firm-specific economic shocks. Thus, we conduct cross-sectional tests of analysts' forecasts for firms with and without incentives to manipulate earnings. We find that firms with low incentives to engage in earnings management (i.e., firms most likely experiencing firm-specific economic shocks) generate the strongest positive relation between REM measures and the following year's analysts' forecast properties, suggesting analysts more fully incorporate the earnings implications of firms with high incentives (i.e., firms most likely engaging in manipulative REM). Our results are consistent across numerous REM proxies and indicators of earnings management incentives.     

Intangible Assets, Information Complexity, and Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

Abstract:   We examine the relation between analysts' earnings forecasts and firms' intangible assets, including technology‐based intangibles, brand names, and recognized intangibles. We predict that high information complexity of intangible assets increases the difficulty for analysts to assimilate information and increases analysts' forecast error of intangibles‐intensive firms. We find a positive association between analysts' forecast error and the firm's intangible intensity that deviates from the industry norm. We also find that analysts' forecast errors are greater for firms with diverse and innovative technologies. In contrast, analysts' forecast errors are smaller for biotech/pharmaceutical and medical equipment firms that are subject to intangibles‐related regulation.     

Analysts' Rationality and Forecast Bias: Evidence from Sales Forecasts

When optimistic forecasts can improve access to management, rational analysts have incentives to issue optimistically-biased forecasts (Lim, 2001). This paper proposes that the extent of this optimistic forecast bias will depend on the forecast's importance to management. If management attaches less importance to a forecasted measure, analysts should decrease their forecast bias because the expected benefits of issuing optimistic forecasts are less. We examine analysts' earnings and sales forecasts, and predict that analysts' optimistic bias will be greater for earnings than for sales. Results are consistent with our predictions and contribute to the evidence that analysts' forecast bias is rational and intentional.     

Accrual usage to manage earnings toward financial analysts' forecasts

This study examines whether management uses discretionary accounting accruals to move earnings upward toward analysts' earnings forecasts when it appears that earnings before discretionary accruals will fall short of the forecast. An earnings shortfall relative to analysts' forecasts could lead management to fear lower compensation and an increase in the likelihood of job termination. The article finds that firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are below analysts' forecasts use income-increasing discretionary accruals and do so to a greater extent than do firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are above analysts' forecasts.     

Analysts' Incentives and Street Earnings

We examine whether analysts' incentives are associated with street earnings. Because prior research argues that analysts' incentives to promote stocks increase in the extent to which the stock exhibits glamour characteristics, we predict that analysts are more likely to make income-increasing adjustments in determining street earnings for glamour stocks than for value stocks. We find that analysts are more likely to exclude expense items from street earnings for glamour stocks than for value stocks and that excluded expense items help predict future earnings for glamour stocks but not for value stocks. Overall, our results suggest that analysts' self-interest influences street earnings and this self-interest leads to street earnings that are less useful in predicting future earnings for glamour stocks.     

IPO Underpricing, Firm Quality, and Analyst Forecasts

We find that IPO underpricing is positively related to post-IPO growth in sales and EBITDA, but is not significantly related to growth in earnings. Our evidence suggests that accrual reversals or earnings management may cause this inconsistency. We interpret the growth rates of sales and EBITDA as measures of firm quality, and conclude that our evidence supports the notion that IPO firms with greater underpricing are of better quality. Our tests on analysts' earnings forecast errors show that analysts are less positively biased in their earnings forecasts for IPO firms that have greater underpricing.     

Does Regulation FD work? Evidence from analysts' reliance on public disclosure

We examine how Regulation FD changed analysts' reliance on firms' public disclosure. Regulation FD is associated with a stronger analyst response to earnings announcements, management forecasts and conference calls—that is, analysts respond to these events more quickly, more frequently and with larger forecast revisions after FD. Further, following public disclosure, the decline in analyst forecast dispersion and forecast error accelerates after FD. We find no such changes either for foreign ADR firms or around several confounding events. Overall, Regulation FD levels the playing field between the analysts and individual investors, thereby promoting “fair game” property of the market.     

Analysts' Reactions to Earnings Preannouncement Strategies

Preannouncements of earnings tend to overstate negative or understate positive news, which decreases the chance of a negative surprise when actual earnings is announced. We conduct an experiment to investigate how experienced sell-side analysts' earnings forecasts are affected by preannouncements that either understate, accurately state, or overstate the magnitude of positive or negative total earnings news, holding total earnings news constant. We find that firms with negative (positive) total news receive the highest post-earnings announcement forecasts of future earnings when the earlier preannouncement overstates (understates) the magnitude of the news. These forecasts are consistent with the analysts' perceptions about the firms' future prospects, but not their perceptions of management. While analysts expect preannouncements to be lower than actual earnings, they do not adjust their forecasts for these beliefs. These insights into analysts' responses have implications both for managers and analysts.     

Investor and (Value Line) Analyst Underreaction to Information about Future Earnings: The Corrective Role of Non-Earnings-Surprise Information

Prior research suggests that financial analysts' earnings forecasts and stock prices underreact to earnings news. This paper provides evidence that analysts and investors correct this underreaction in response to the next earnings announcement and to other (non-earnings-surprise) information available between earnings announcements. Our evidence also suggests that analysts and investors underreact to information reflected in analysts' earnings forecast revisions and that non-earnings-surprise information helps correct this underreaction as well. Controlling for corrective non-earnings-surprise information significantly increases estimates of the degree to which analysts' forecasting behavior can explain drifts in returns following both earnings announcements and analysts' earnings forecast revisions.     

The Relevance of Analysts' Earnings Forecasts in Japan

Abstract:   This study examines the role of financial analysts in equity valuation in Japan by comparing the relevance of financial analysts' earnings forecasts, over financial statement information, to investors' decisions. We find that the value‐relevance of a set of accounting variables is very modest, but the incremental contribution of analysts' forecasts is very significant. This is in line with the expectation that the skill and expertise of analysts are more valuable in markets with poor financial disclosure, such as Japan. We also find that the importance of the financial statements increases over time while the importance of the analysts' forecasts does not change. We also provide evidence of the effect of Japanese corporate groupings, keiretsu, on the informativeness of accounting signals and earnings forecasts. The results show that the contribution of accounting variables to valuation is lower for keiretsu firms, which supports the exclusionary hypothesis that companies which are a part of keiretsu, disclose less information than do non‐keiretsu companies. The analysts' forecasts are equally important for investors in both types of firms.     

Alternative adjustments to analysts' earnings forecasts: relative and complementary performance

This study examines the relative and complementary performance of alternative earnings forecast adjustments using a common set of consensus analysts’ earnings forecasts. We document that a simple adjustment to analysts’ earnings forecasts, based solely on cross-sectional relationships between actual and forecasted earnings in the prior year, performs as well as more complicated adjustment methods, i.e., composite forecasts and persistence adjusted forecasts. A forecast adjustment that is based on prior year earnings and returns, however, provides significant incremental reductions in forecast error and dominates all of the other adjustment methods.     

Institutional effects on information content of US and French management earnings forecasts: Evidence from market reactions and analyst revisions

The United States and France are both most developed economies in the world. Their socio-economic institutions, however, are very different. These differences are indications of their dichotomous legal regimes: common law in the US versus code law in France. The political influence of these legal regimes, in turn, leads to a dichotomized classification of accounting systems: the British-American Model and the French Continental Model. This study extends these institutional effects into the field of management earnings forecast. We find that earnings forecasts by French firms are less informative than those made by US firms matched-up by industry and firm size. We also compare US and French financial analysts' revisions of their forecasts following the management forecasts. We find that revisions by French analysts are more influenced by management forecasts. Our findings are consistent with prior studies that argue that information asymmetry in code-law countries is largely resolved through private information channels, rendering less information content in management announcements and less demand and incentives for original research by financial analysts.     

International Variation in Accounting Measurement Rules and Analysts' Earnings Forecast Errors

We theorize that accounting systems affect analysts' forecast accuracy through changes in earnings variability. We argue that the matching and historical cost principles reduce earnings variability, and hence, reduce analysts' earnings forecast errors. We also argue that restricting the choice of accounting methods can result in larger forecast errors. We argue that more informative disclosure environments should reduce forecast errors. We test whether variation in these factors across countries explain variation in analysts' earnings forecast bias and accuracy. Our results indicate that these characteristics of financial accounting systems are complements, and that they affect financial analysts' earnings forecast errors.     

Analysts' forecasts of Japanese firms' earnings: additional evidence

This article examines analysts' forecasts of Japanese firms' earnings during Japan's economic burst period in the 1990s. Using the evidence of analyst earnings forecasts in the United States as a benchmark, the article documents the following three findings. First, whereas the forecast accuracy of U.S. analysts following U.S. firms improves over time, the forecast accuracy of U.S. and Japanese analysts following Japanese firms does not. Second, whereas decreases in forecast errors of U.S. analysts following U.S. firms are best explained by decreases in forecast bias of the analysts, increases in forecast errors of U.S. and Japanese analysts following Japanese firms are best explained by increases in the frequency of losses experienced by Japanese firms. Third, Japanese analysts forecast earnings less accurately than do U.S. analysts. These findings reflect the difficulty of producing accurate earnings forecasts during economic downturns. They also suggest that Japanese analysts are more bound than their U.S. counterparts by cultural ties that impede forecast accuracy.     

Do Japanese Analysts Overreact or Underreact to Earnings Announcements?

Several recent studies have used U.S. analysts' forecasts to test for underreaction or overreaction to information in earnings announcements. These tests have provided mixed results. Evidence in Mendenhall (1991) is that analysts underreact. By contrast. results in De Bondt and Thaler (1990) show overreaction by U.S. financial analysts to earnings announcements. The current study contributes to this topic by examining over/underreaction by Japanese financial analysts. Test results show that Japanese analysts do not overreact to earnings announcements, market to book ratios and sales growth. Instead. there is strong evidence that Japanese analysts underreact to earnings announcements and that their underreaction is more pronounced for firms with mostly permanent earnings. Our results also show that Japanese analysts display larger forecast biases for earnings reported under U.S. GAAP as opposed to Japanese GAAP. Finally, we find that US. analysts discount information in earnings announcements to a larger degree (relying to a greater extent on information in past prices instead) when compared to their Japanese counterparts. Further, in contrast to their Japanese counterparts, these analysts display no optimistic bias. The results above suggest that the impact of each country's unique culture and capital norms will have to be taken into account by policy makers in evaluating the feasibility of harmonization of accounting standards.     

Can Stock Recommendations Predict Earnings Management and Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors?

In this article we present evidence that a firm's stock price sensitivity to earnings news, as measured by outstanding stock recommendation, affects its incentives to manage earnings and, in turn, affects analysts' ex post forecast errors. In particular, we find a tendency for firms rated a Sell (Buy) to engage more (less) frequently in extreme, income–decreasing earnings management, indicating that they have relatively stronger (weaker) incentives to create accounting reserves especially in the form of earnings baths than other firms. In contrast, firms rated a Buy (Sell) are more (less) likely to engage in earnings management that leaves reported earnings equal to or slightly higher than analysts' forecasts. Our empirical results provide direct evidence of purported, but heretofore, weakly documented equity market incentives for firms to manage earnings. They are also consistent with a growing body of literature that finds analysts either cannot anticipate or are not motivated to anticipate completely in their forecasts firms' efforts to manage earnings.     

Analyst Pessimism and Forecast Timing

In this study, we show that on average relatively pessimistic analysts tend to reveal their earnings forecasts later than other analysts. Further, we find this forecast timing effect explains a substantial proportion of the well‐known decrease in consensus analyst forecast optimism over the forecast period prior to earnings announcements, which helps explain why analysts’ longer term earnings forecasts are more optimistically biased than their shorter term forecasts. We extend the theory of analyst self‐selection regarding their coverage decisions to argue that analysts with a relatively pessimistic view–compared to other analysts–are more reluctant to issue their earnings forecasts, with the result that they tend to defer revealing their earnings forecasts until later in the forecasting period than other analysts.