交易冲突博弈分析

市场交易的直接参与者是买卖双方,为实现自己利益的最大化,双方在交易活动中不可避免地会发生矛盾和冲突,在此意义上,任何一场交易的全过程实际上都是解决买卖双方矛盾冲突的博弈过程。这个博弈有时候可以一次性完成,有时候则需要多次反复才能完成。无论何种博弈,信息和战略是最重要的因素,博弈的输赢取决于参与方能否充分地获取有用信息和成功地传递信号,能否适时地利用和营造对自己有利的战略环境,从而争取到博弈中的主动地位。无论何种博弈,最后总是以达到某种均衡而告终。博弈的结果可能是双赢,买方获得满意的商品,卖方也能实现最大的利益,这当然是一种较为理想的状态。博弈的结果也常常是残酷的,双方的矛盾冲突不可协调,最后以一方置另一方于死地而告终。     

卖方优势市场和买方优势市场之比较——市场格局的信息经济学新解

信息不足是市场失灵的一个重要根源。买卖双方信息不对称会造成价值规律不能正常发挥作用,使买方或卖方遭遇意外损失。面对这种情况,买主和第三方如行业协会、行政主管部门、法律等会有相应的措施,那么,作为卖方的企业该如何主动应对呢?下面就此做些分析。一、概念界定卖方优势市场是指卖方比买方拥有对交易至关重要的、更多的信息的市场,买方优势市场是指买方比卖方拥有对交易至关重要的、更多的信息的市场。可见,这二个概念与“买方市场和卖方市场”两个概念是不同的。买方市场是指供过于求的市场,卖方市场是指供不应求的市场。卖方优势市…     

不完全信息下博弈的卖方获益模型分析

文章构造了只存在两个寡头厂商的不完全竞争的市场环境下,诸多买家中的一个买家进入寡头企业内部进行交易的讨价还价的博弈过程,并分析为了构造该博弈模型应满足的条件,最终得出卖方获益的模型,并分析得出影响卖方获益的因素有哪些,解释了卖方的获益以及获益的多少与买方的购买数量,卖方的还价能力以及卖方对产品的管理成本的关系。     

成交市值表示的市场流动性模型

本文从市场流动性的定义出发，从证券市场宏观交易角度，依据考察的交易时间长短不同致使新公布的证券市场信息对均衡价格产生影响，最终推导出以成交市值变化率表示的买方流动性和卖方流动性。     

浅析网购买卖双方的博弈

电子商务领域中存在着各种博弈,网络零售商与普通零售商的博弈、买方和卖方的博弈、销售商之间的博弈等等。本文以完全信息下的静态博弈、完全且完美信息动态博弈以及重复博弈三个方向对网购买卖双方进行博弈论角度的建模研究。     

具缺货期不同决策支配权的两级供应链合作机制研究

从考虑市场需求固定且卖方和买方对缺货期的不同决策支配权情况,研究了两级供应链的合作机制,建立了其不完全信息的动态博弈模型,并得出其精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,从理论上证明了卖方和买方分别占支配地位和从属地位时买方卖方应相互合作。     

签定商品房预售合同时应怎样订立违约责任条款

在签订商品房预售合同时,有些商品房开发商或代理商往往列出许多有关买方违约责任的苛刻条款,而千方百计避开卖方违约责任的约定;或虽约定了买卖双方的违约责任,但有关买卖双方的违约责任之约定显失公平和对等,对买方极为不利。因此,在与卖方签订商品房预售合同时,买方应要求在合同中明确卖方的违约责任,并争取双方违约责任的公平和对等。比如,有的开发商或代理商的合同方本对买卖双方违约责任是这样约定的：“买方逾期付款,应按中国人民银行固定资产贷款利率向卖方偿付违约金,买方付款逾期２０日,卖方有权终止合同,并有权没收…     

基于动态博弈的C2C网上交易信用研究

第三方支付平台的出现解决了网上交易中支付安全的问题,使得网上交易飞速发展。但是在网上交易中买方卖方纠纷不断出现,其根本原因是信用问题。文章首先梳理了网上交易信用问题的相关研究和理论基础,然后以实际交易流程为基础,建立买卖双方的不对称信息动态博弈模型,并利用逆向递推法求解模型得出结论,最后给出提高网上交易信用的策略。     

建筑市场价格心理分析

建筑市场价格心理分析弓经远（深圳市建设定额价格管理站深圳５１８０３１）市场，系指商品交换的场所。建筑市场系指发包商（买方）和承包商（卖方）买卖双方为满足消费者利益基础上研究如何建应市场需求而给市场提供建筑商品和服务的经营活动──即建设工程的交易和生产...     

"讨价还价"的艺术

凡做过销售的人,都会有这样一个感受:客户的讨价还价就像一支美丽却让人心碎的恋曲,永远伴随自己左右.从集贸市场几毛钱的小菜生意,到工商企业间上百万的巨额交易,买卖双方总难免为成交价格纠缠不休:买方在货比三家后总是要求物美价亦廉,卖方则唇干舌燥地宣称物超所值,自己亏本;买方动辄以价高为借口,"移情别恋"向卖方说"再见",卖方为了挽留客户"芳心",最终还是忍痛割"利"……讨价还价,市场上似乎无处不在、无时不有.     

Neutrality of buyer and seller commissions to auction house profit

This paper presents an examination of optimal revenue management of a monopoly auction house through which a seller sells goods via a second‐price auction. The house charges commissions to both the buyer and seller. Results demonstrate that a continuum of combinations of optimal buyer and seller commission rates exists, all of which yield the same expected profit of the house. Additionally, we discuss several possible factors that lead to the prevailing custom of zero buyer commission, such as commission aversion of buyers, the house's incentive to maximize the hammer price, and seller and buyer preferences for apparently lowered commission rates.     

佣金约束条件下排污权双边叫价拍卖机制设计

通过排污权交易提高环境资源的使用效率和配置效率,实现环境资源最优配置。排污权和排污权市场理论研究是环境资源可持续利用的重要研究课题,而排污权交易模型是排污权市场理论与实践中排污权交易的核心。本文采用双边叫价拍卖交易模式,建立了排污权交易双边叫价拍卖的不完全信息博弈模型,给出了双边叫价拍卖的机制设计。该机制具有有效性和激励相容性。     

Price experimentation with strategic buyers

A two-period model in which a monopolist endeavors to learn about the permanent demand parameter of a specific repeat buyer is investigated. The buyer may strategically reject the seller’s first-period offer for one of two reasons. First, in order to conceal information (i.e., to pool), a high-valuation buyer may reject high prices that would never be accepted by a low-valuation buyer. Second, in order to reveal information (i.e., to signal), a low-valuation buyer may reject low prices that would always be accepted by a high-valuation buyer. Given this, the seller often finds it optimal to post prices that reveal no useful information. Indeed, in the equilibrium where there is no signaling, the seller never charges an informative first-period price. Learning may occur in the equilibrium where there is maximal signaling, but the scope for learning is quite limited even in this case. Indeed, in order to preempt information transmission through signaling, the seller may be induced to set a first-period price strictly below the buyer’s lowest possible valuation.      

Adverse selection and costly information acquisition in asset markets

We develop an asset exchange model with adverse selection and costly information acquisition incentives. A seller of an asset knows the true value of the asset, while a buyer can obtain information about the asset’s quality at a cost. An equilibrium offer is pooling, but a buyer can purchase only good assets after producing the costly information about the asset’s quality. When the probability that the seller holds good assets is above the threshold value, a trade can occur with and without information acquisition, depending on the information acquisition cost, and the trade volume and social welfare are higher in equilibrium without information production than in equilibrium with information production. When the probability of facing good assets is below the threshold value, a trade occurs only after screening the quality of assets, and, hence, the market collapses if the information acquisition cost is sufficiently high. As the information acquisition cost increases, social welfare can increase or decrease depending on the probability of facing good and bad assets.     

Descending price multi-item auctions

We propose a simultaneous descending price auction mechanism to sell multiple heterogeneous items, each owned by a distinct seller, to a number of buyers. Each buyer has known private valuations on items, and wants at most one item. We show that if the sellers follow a descending price offer procedure and the buyers follow a greedy strategy for accepting the offers, the auction results in a nearly efficient allocation, and terminates close to a competitive equilibrium price vector. The descending price offer strategy of the sellers is close to a Nash equilibrium. However, we show that the buyers are better off waiting in our auction. There is a maximum limit (corresponding to the minimum competitive equilibrium price vector) till which they can wait without running into the risk of not winning any item. If the buyers wait within this limit, the prices can be brought arbitrarily close to a uniquely defined competitive equilibrium price vector.     

He who must not be named

Landsberger et al. have studied a sealed bid first price auction with two players in which the ranking of the valuations is known. They argue that such a situation can arise in a sequential auction where only the name of the winner is revealed. In this paper we consider sequential auctions where two identical goods are sold sequentially to N players who are interested in both objects. In sealed bid auctions, no information is a priori revealed by the mechanism, but the seller can in principle reveal whatever he wants. We restrict our attention to the case where only the name of the winner is revealed to be in the context of Landsberger et al. for the second auction. The aim of the paper is to compare such a sequential auction with a simultaneous auction where both goods are sold as a bundle or equivalently with a sequential auction where no information is revealed. We first show that there exists an equilibrium of the sequential game in pure and monotone strategies. Then, the comparison of the seller's expected revenue in the two cases allows us to conclude that contrary to Landsberger et al.'s predictions, the seller can not use the information to increase his revenue. This result is obtained using simulations for a large class of distribution functions. The seller must not reveal the name of the winner between the two auctions and instead sell both goods using a simultaneous auction.Received: 31 July 2001, Accepted: 5 February 2003, JEL Classification: B44I wish to thank Laurent Linnemer, Thomas Ricke, Michael Visser and Shmuel Zamir for helpful comments and suggestions. I am very grateful to the referees and the associated editors in charge of my paper.     

业务外包中的质量博弈分析

在业务外包中,购买商和供应商有短期交易和长期合作,本文利用博弈论中的重复博弈理论,建立了博弈模型,并且在不同条件下讨论了购买商和供应商基于产品质量的有限次与无限次重复博弈.讨论结果表明：长期关系会使应商提供的产品质量更高.     

Game contingent claims in complete and incomplete markets

A game contingent claim is a contract which enables both the buyer and the seller to terminate it before maturity. For complete markets Kifer [Finance and Stochastics 4 (2000) 443–463] shows a connection to a (zero-sum) Dynkin game whose value is the unique no-arbitrage price of the claim. But, for incomplete markets one needs a more general approach. We interpret the contract as a generalized non-zero-sum stopping game. For the complete case this leads to the same results as in Kifer [Finance and Stochastics 4 (2000) 443–463]. For the general case we show the existence of an equilibrium point under the condition that both the seller and the buyer have an exponential utility function. For other utility functions such a point need not exist in the context of incomplete markets.     

基于不完全信息动态博弈模型的报价策略研究

目前应用博弈论对价格谈判所进行的研究大多集中于讨价还价问题,而关于报价问题的研究往往依靠定性分析。因此本文建立了一个关于报价策略的三阶段不完全信息动态博弈模型,并通过求解证明：在谈判双方信息对称的条件下,无论对买方还是卖方来说,“抢先报价”都是占优策略。在买卖双方都采取“抢先报价”策略时,报价顺序博弈的结果具有不确定性。在现实中买卖双方往往会通过各种其他手段来达到抢先报价的目的。     

Learning quality through prices and word‐of‐mouth communication

This paper studies the effect of word‐of‐mouth communication on the optimal pricing strategy for new experience goods. I consider a dynamic monopoly model with asymmetric information about product quality, in which consumers learn in equilibrium from both prices and other consumers. The main result is that word‐of‐mouth communication is essential for the existence of separating equilibria, wherein the high‐quality monopolist signals high quality through a low introductory price (lower than the monopoly price), and the low‐quality one charges the monopoly price. The intuition is simple: low prices are costly, and will only be used by firms confident enough that increased experimentation (and therefore communication among consumers) will yield good news about quality and increased future profits. Additional results are the following: for the high‐quality seller, the expected price (quantity) is increasing (decreasing) over time; whereas for the low‐quality one, the opposite is true. Moreover, signaling becomes more difficult when consumers pay less attention to their peers' reports and more attention to past prices. Finally, word‐of‐mouth communication improves consumer welfare.