Where Does the Good Shepherd Go? Civic Virtue and Sorting into Public Sector Employment

Several studies have analyzed motives to work in the public versus private sector. However, research on prosocial motivation in the context of public sector employment has largely neglected civic virtue, the motive to contribute to society. This study considers civic virtue in addition to other possible motives, using a representative, longitudinal dataset of employees in Germany including 63,180 observations of 13,683 different individuals. We find that civic virtue relates positively to public sector employment beyond altruism, risk aversion, laziness and (low) financial motivation. The result holds within different branches and is explained by sorting into the sector.     

Intergenerational transfers,demographic transition,and altruism: Problems in developing Asia

This paper develops a three‐period overlapping‐generations model where middle‐aged agents care about not only their own lifetime utility but also their old parents' and children's well‐being. The doubly altruistic agents choose amounts of intergenerational transfers to their old parents and children as well as private savings. The government specifies amounts of public transfers from working adults to the dependents. The model also takes the effects of demographic transition on the burdens of supporting the elderly and children into account. Using 23 countries' data from the National Transfer Accounts (NTA ), we estimate the degrees of filial and parental altruism and adjust them for their respective life expectancy and fertility rates. The findings suggest that people in developing countries are more parentally altruistic than those in developed ones while the adjusted degree of filial altruism tends to be low in developing Asia. Our welfare analyses reveal that the developing Asian countries must introduce more comprehensive public welfare programs for the elderly to maximize social welfare. Moreover, their low adjusted degree of filial altruism may trap the developing Asian countries at the low levels of public old‐age support and social welfare as the further demographic transition ensues.     

Free‐Riding and the Provision of Public Goods in the Family: A Laboratory Experiment*

We examine the provision of family public goods using experimental economics methods. With sufficient altruism and shared resource arrangements, families can provide the efficient level of family public goods. Becker's Rotten Kid Theorem asserts that transfers from altruistic parents will induce children to maximize family income even if children are not altruistic toward other family members. Consistent with altruism, parents and children contributed more to a public good when in groups with family members than when in groups with strangers. In contrast to the predictions of the Rotten Kid Theorem, however, children's behavior fell short of maximizing family income.     

Donor Altruism and the Transfer Paradox in an Overlapping Generations Model

This paper examines the transfer problem between two countries when a donor exhibits altruistic utility toward a recipient in a one‐sector overlapping generations model. We demonstrate that if the donor has a larger marginal propensity to save than the recipient, the donor's altruism never contributes to donor enrichment irrespective of the degree of the donor's altruism. Donor enrichment occurs only if the donor has a smaller marginal propensity to save and a sufficiently high level of altruism. These findings imply that the altruism of a donor toward a recipient does not necessarily explain the motivation to voluntarily provide a transfer.     

Opting out and topping up reconsidered: Informal care under uncertain altruism

We study the design of public long‐term care (LTC) insurance when the altruism of informal caregivers is uncertain. We consider non‐linear policies where the LTC transfer depends on the level of informal care, which is assumed to be observable, while children's altruism is not. Our policy encompasses two policies traditionally considered in the literature: topping up policies consisting of a transfer independent of informal care, and opting out policies entailing a positive transfer only if children fail to provide care. We show that both total and informal care should increase with the children's level of altruism. This is obtained under full and asymmetric information. Public LTC transfers, on the other hand, may be non‐monotonic. Under asymmetric information, public LTC transfers are lower than their full information level for the parents whose children are the least altruistic, while it is distorted upward for the highest level of altruism. This is explained by the need to provide incentives to highly altruistic children. In contrast to both topping up and opting out policies, the implementing contract is always such that social care increases with informal care.     

Public Preferences and Private Choices: Effect of Altruism and Free Riding on Demand for Environmentally Certified Pork

Sales of private goods with affiliated public good attributes have markedly risen in recent years. This fact is difficult to explain within the paradigm of purely self-interested behavior. This paper investigates factors influencing consumer demand for pork products with certifications related to the environment, animal welfare, and antibiotics. Using psychometric scaling techniques, we measure individuals’ degree of altruism and propensity toward free riding. Results of a random parameter logit model applied to choice data obtained from a nationwide survey in the United States indicates that more altruistic individuals are willing to pay more for pork products with public good attributes than less altruistic individuals and free riders. These results indicate that private purchases of goods with public-good attributes are not simply a result of individuals’ perceptions of the ability to mitigate private risks such as food safety, but that individuals are making private choices to affect public outcomes. Results have implications for policy makers weighing the relative costs and benefits of food labeling policies versus bans related to certain livestock production practices.     

Altruism in cost-benefit analysis

It has recently been argued that altruistic motives for paying for a public sector project should be ignored in a cost-benefit analysis. The reason is that including altruism would mean a kind of double counting of the project's benefits. This paper takes a look at these arguments, and derives cost-benefit rules which cover different kinds of altruism. The paper also provides some recommendations for the treatment of altruism in studies using the contingent valuation method.     

Behavioral Mechanism Design

This paper studies the mechanism design problem for the class of Bayesian environments where agents do care for the well‐being of others. For these environments, we fully characterize interim efficient (IE) mechanisms and examine their properties. This set of mechanisms is compelling, since IE mechanisms are the best in the sense that there is no other mechanism which generates unanimous improvement. For public good environments, we show that these mechanisms produce public goods closer to the efficient level of production as the degree of altruism in the preferences increases. For private good environments, we show that altruistic agents trade more often than selfish agents.     

Long‐term care policy with lazy rotten kids

This paper studies the determination of informal long‐term care (LTC) provided by children in a scenario which is somewhere in between perfect altruism and selfish exchanges. Parents are altruistic but children are purely selfish, and neither side can make credible commitments. The model is based on Becker's “rotten kid” specification except that it explicitly accounts for the sequence of decisions. In Becker's world, with a single good efficiency is achieved. We show that when family aid is introduced the outcome is likely to be inefficient. Still, the rotten kid mechanism is at work and ensures that a positive level of LTC is provided as long as the bequest motive is operative. We identify the inefficiencies by comparing the laissez‐faire (subgame perfect) equilibrium to the first‐best allocation. We first assume that families are identical ex ante and then consider the case where dynasties differ in wealth. We study how the provision of LTC can be improved by public policies. Interestingly, crowding out of private aid by public LTC is not a problem in this setting. With an operative bequest motive, public LTC will have no impact on private aid. More amazingly still, when the bequest motive is (initially) not operative, public insurance may even enhance the provision of informal aid.     

Substitution Between Private and Public Consumption in Australia*

Large increases in the private sector's savings ratio during a period of rapid growth in the relative size of the public sector has led to the suggestion that substitution between private and public consumption may be an important fcature of the Australian economy (Clements 1979). In this paper, empirical estimates are presented which indicate that no such substitution exists The estimates are derived from a theoretical model of consumption which is based on inter-temporal optimization in a stochastic environment. The estimates also suggest that private sector consumption behaviour is consistent with the joint hypothesis of rational expectations and Ricardian equivalence     

Free Riding on Altruism and Group Size

It is shown that altruism does not affect the equilibrium provision of public goods although altruism takes the form of unconditional commitment to contribute. The reason is that altruistic contributions completely crowd out selfish voluntary contributions. That is, egoists free ride on altruism. It is also shown that public goods are less likely to be provided in larger groups. The only qualification to our results is when the probability of altruism is so high that it is a dominant strategy for all egoistic players to free ride. In this case, actually, both altruism and the larger group facilitate public good provision.     

The welfare impact of a managerial oligopoly with an altruistic firm

I analyse the welfare impact of a mixed market with a private or public firm that is characterised by wider objectives or altruism, in the presence of an agency problem. Contrary to some earlier findings, the total surplus turns out to be increasing in the degree of altruism. This impact is stronger than without an agency problem, despite more stringent conditions for the market to remain mixed. The altruistic firm is more cost efficient, and viable if the market can remain mixed. A competition policy that encourages entry may increase welfare, but its scope is reduced by higher altruism.     

Economic inequality and paretian welfare economics: Some insinuating questions

This paper examines the academic soundness of the Pareto welfare criterion as a normative rule for evaluating alternative economic inequality scenarios and suggests that the criterion has several weaknesses, which weaken its usefulness. First, the Pareto principle is of limited use in the inequality debate because labor markets hardly satisfy the conditions of perfect competition, the pivotal assumption of the theory. Second, the proposition that competitive equilibrium leads to the “common good” of society is difficult to defend. Third, the Paretian welfare economics barely answers the questions society demands, because perfect competition does not guarantee fairness in the determination of relative prices in the initial situation of income distribution. Fourth, in the distribution theory, the marginal productivity principle determines the rewards to the factors of production. If we assume that rent, wage and interest incomes are determined by this theory, then questions arise about how profits, the potentially huge surpluses generated by the businesses, are distributed. Fifth, income distribution, being a public policy topic, is a political issue. However, Pareto's primary motivation in formulating the principle was to alienate the income distribution debate from political and policy discourses. Finally, by invoking the Pareto principle, economists are in fact avoiding the real issues of the public debate on personal distribution of income. Personal income distribution truly refers to division of income generated by a group of people working together and therefore, ought to be analysed with reference to the sector of employment. Thus, Tommy Franks' earning should be compared with that of a private, while an ordinary worker's salary should be compared with that of the CEO. History testifies that the public earning structure is much more equitable than that of the private sector. This poses a very serious question: Which earning structure reflects improvement in social welfare: public or private?     

Evolution of the Public–Private Sector Wage Differential during Transition in Estonia

This article estimates the public–private sector wage differential in Estonia over the transition period. Quantile regression is used with a dataset from Estonian Labour Force Surveys from 1989 to 2004 for this purpose. The results of the analysis indicate that the public–private sector wage differential was negative during early transition but has decreased subsequently. It also shows that employees with low potential wages tend to gain more or lose less from working in the public sector than workers with high potential wages. The public–private sector wage differential is negatively related to the number of public employees and tends to be counter-cyclical. Political cycles have no effect on the public–private sector wage differential in Estonia.     

Public sector pay and corruption: Measuring bribery from micro data

This study provides the first systematic measure of bribery using micro-level data on reported earnings, household spending and asset holdings. We use the compensating differential framework and the estimated sectoral gap in reported earnings and expenditures to identify the size of unobserved (unofficial) compensation (i.e., bribes) of public sector employees. In the case of Ukraine, we find that public sector employees receive 24–32% less wages than their private sector counterparts. The gap is particularly large at the top of the wage distribution. At the same time, workers in both sectors have essentially identical level of consumer expenditures and asset holdings that unambiguously indicate the presence of non-reported compensation in the public sector. Using the conditions of labor market equilibrium, we develop an aggregate measure of bribery and find that the lower bound estimate of the extent of bribery in Ukraine is between 460 million and 580 million U.S. dollars (0.9–1.2% of Ukraine's GDP in 2003).     

The influence of ownership on the cost of bus service provision in Switzerland - an empirical illustration

In deregulated transport markets, a firm's ownership status and management system represent an important issue. Property right theory suggests that productivity and performance are higher in the private than in the public sector. In Switzerland, providers of bus transportation are traditionally corporations, though a large part of their equity shares are still held by the public sector (federal government, cantons, municipalities). This paper examines the potential impact of ownership on the cost of bus service provision for a sample of private, public and mixed bus companies in Switzerland. The estimation of a translog cost model has been considered for 34 bus transit companies observed over 5 years (1991–1995). The results only partially confirm that if the private sector holds shares in the company's capital, efficiency is enhanced. In addition, measures of economies of scale and density are derived and discussed within the actual public transport policy.     

ALTRUISM,EGOISM, AND THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS*

The economic approach to understanding human behavior has encountered serious difficulties when attempting to explain the private provision of public goods, such as voting and charitable contributions to large organizations. To gain insights into these important issues, this study takes an interdisciplinary approach. The individual is modeled formally in terms of dual egoistic/altruistic utilities, and the recursive relation between altruism and the existence and production of social capital is developed. The model is analyzed as a non-cooperative game between the egoistic and altruistic selves. The socialized rational actor that results from the combination of social capital, dual utilities, and non-cooperative behavior resolves a number of public goods paradoxes. Comparative statics and the dynamics of social capital formation are explored.     

Optimal contracting with altruism and reciprocity

Motivated by the recent experimental evidence on altruistic behavior, we study a simple principal–agent model where each player cares about other players' utility, and may reciprocate their attitude towards him. We show that, relative to the selfish benchmark, efficiency improves when players are altruistic. Nevertheless, in contrast to what may be expected, an increase in the degree of the agent's altruism as well as a more reciprocal behavior by players has ambiguous effects on efficiency. We also consider the effects of the presence of spiteful players and discuss how monetary transfers between players depend on their degrees of altruism and spitefulness.     

Public Sector Employment,Wage Inequality and the Gender Pay Ratio in the UK

This paper assesses the relative contributions of the different systems of pay determination in the private sector and the public sector toward the changing level of wage inequality and the gender pay ratio in the UK. The greater centralisation of pay arrangements in the public sector compared with the private sector in the UK suggests that public sector employment may have acted to offset the widening wage inequality seen in recent years, as well as making an important contribution to the increase in women's relative average earnings compared to men. This issue is addressed by drawing on unpublished occupational hourly earnings data from the New Earnings Survey and applying decomposition of the Theil index of wage inequality to analyse both static and dynamic trends. The change in wage inequality for the period 1986 to 1995 primarily reflected the change in wage dispersion within the private sector, and the narrowing of the gender pay gap among the public sector workforce was an important factor in explaining the overall improvement in women's relative earnings. The paper argues that the relatively centralised pay arrangements in the public sector, compared with the private sector, played an important role in slowing the increase in wage inequality and narrowing the gender pay gap. As such, future policies to decentralise pay determination in the UK public sector may exacerbate the increasing level of wage inequality and reverse women's recent relative pay improvements.     

COMPARING FEDERAL AND PRIVATE‐SECTOR WAGES WITHOUT LOGS

I use Current Population Survey data from 2005 through 2010 to compare the wages of federal employees and workers in the private sector who have similar observable characteristics. The distribution of wages differed drastically between the federal and private sectors. In particular, I find that federal employees with no more than a high school diploma earned 21% more, on average, than their private‐sector counterparts, whereas those with a professional degree or doctorate earned 23% less. Overall, the average of federal wages was about 2% higher than the average wage of similar private‐sector workers. Other researchers have found larger differences because they used log‐linearized models, which result in comparisons of geometric means. I show that arithmetic means are more relevant in the context of the relationship between a government's compensation policy and its budget. The discrepancy between differences in arithmetic and geometric means occurs because the wages of federal employees were much less dispersed than those of employees with similar characteristics in the private sector. (JEL J31, J38, J45)