What Stops Dutch Households from Taking Up Much Needed Benefits?

It is common for individuals not to take up welfare benefits. The most common explanation is that people make a rational choice between the utility they expect from the benefit and the effort required to take‐up. Most studies utilize surveys, which are subject to misreporting and measurement errors, to determine eligibility and non‐take‐up rates. This study uses a novel dataset based on administrative data sources, which provides a more accurate identification of eligible households and take‐up. Furthermore, this study documents non‐take‐up of a compensation to which nearly 5 million Dutch households are entitled. The richness of the data allowed us to conduct a detailed analysis of key drivers of non‐take‐up. The analysis largely confirms the transaction‐costs hypotheses. However, we found an unexpected effect. Although, in general, the probability of take‐up increases when income decreases, those with the lowest income or wealth do not have the highest probability of take‐up.     

Testing, hold up and the dynamics of preferences

This paper presents an overlapping generations model with cultural transmission of preferences in an economy in which players face a hold up problem. One of the players, the firm, can use a testing technology which allows him to imperfectly monitor his partner's behaviour. This technology is completely useless with homogeneous preferences. We obtain that in the stable steady state of the economy there is a mixed distribution of preferences where both selfish and other-regarding preferences are present in the population. Moreover, with a good testing technology, the steady state is characterized by the first-best result in the investment decisions. JEL Classification: C78, D23, D63 The authors acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology project SEC2001-2763. This paper has also benefited from comments of participants in the XXVIII Spanish Symposium of Economic Analysis in Seville (Spain), in the International Workshop on Social and Behavioral Economics in Valencia (Spain), in the 2nd World Congress of the Game Theory Society in Marseille and in the VI Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Practice in Elche (Spain).     

企业在同质产品市场的差异化战略行为——一个对我国反垄断立法的产业组织理论解释

我国在加入WTO后,一些重要的服务领域面临着全面对外开放。由于转换成本的存在,使得该领域中本来在购买前功能相近的同质商品或服务,在购买后成为异质的商品。企业因而拥有相对于消费者的事后垄断的权力。为此,企业有动机在初期采取战略行为吸引消费者。这既缓和了后续阶段的企业间竞争,也在整体上将该行业的产品价格维持较高水平。它可能会降低社会效率和消费者福利。文章通过分析企业间在同质商品市场竞争的市场效果和福利后果,为在我国该领域反垄断立法提供了理论解释。     

转移成本、价格歧视与银行竞争——基于霍特林模型的实证分析

在银行业竞争中,转移成本能够锁定消费者,使银行能够对锁定的消费者定一个较高的价格,但是,转移成本也使银行对没有被锁定的消费者的竞争更加激烈。研究发现,转移成本的存在增加了银行的利润,并且转移成本越高,银行从信贷中获得的利润越高。但是,当存在存款市场和贷款市场竞争时,由于价格歧视的存在,银行的利润随着转移成本的增加而降低,转移成本没有给银行带来优势。     

转移成本、价格歧视和非对称寡头竞争

通过在Hotelling空间差异模型的基础上结合转移成本构建非对称企业竞争博弈模型.主要研究在非对称情况下,两企业在一致定价与价格歧视下竞争的均衡结果.还对两种不同定价体制下的均衡结果进行了比较,分析价格歧视是否强化竞争.研究发现价格歧视对竞争的效应是不确定的,很大程度受到两企业不对称程度的影响.     

产品差异、转移成本和市场竞争

文章通过在豪泰林空间差异模型的基础上结合转移成本构建的博弈模型,主要研究转移成本和产品差异的存在对于企业价格竞争和策略性行为的影响。文章发现纯策略价格均衡是否存在以及在位企业容纳还是遏制竞争对手的潜在进入,都依赖于转移成本相对于产品差异程度的大小。     

国际货币的惯性及对人民币国际化的启示

随着人们对人民币国际化问题的普遍关注,货币的国际化成为国际金融领域的热点问题。利用货币竞争模型分析由于货币的网络外部性和转换成本的存在所造成的国际货币的惯性,从而解释世界上到底需要多少种国际货币、为什么在每个时期只能有一种货币可以成为真正意义上的国际货币、为什么一种货币想要取代已有的国际货币的过程都十分漫长等问题。对上述问题的解释启示我们在人民币国际化的过程中,要关注货币网络外部性和转换成本的影响,可以通过贸易逆差输出人民币和中国金融市场的发展来培育人民币的网络外部性。     

Subprime Mortgage Tremors: An International Issue

The subprime mortgage crisis has negatively affected individuals, investors, lenders, and economies worldwide. This paper first examines contributing factors of the crisis: predatory lending, predatory borrowing and mortgage fraud, unethical practices, unregulated mortgage brokers, off-balance-sheet activity, and the infusion of capital from Asia that provided the fuel for subprime mortgage activity to continue. International markets have both suffered from and contributed to the crisis. Legislation that has been enacted or recommended in the U.S. and the European Union is reviewed. We then make recommendations which could begin to restore confidence of consumers and investors worldwide; however, it is clear that laws and regulations must be enacted quickly to correct the situation and bring stability to investment markets.      

农户民间借贷需求影响因素的实证研究——以湘北234户农户的调查为例

通过对我国农业大省--湖南省华容县和安乡县农户的问卷调查,运用Tobit模型对农户借贷需求的影响因素进行实证研究.研究结果表明:农户的收入水平和农业生产支出对农户民间借贷需求具有显著的负向影响,而农户的非农业生产支出和文化教育支出对农户民间借贷需求则具有显著的正向影响.     

顾客资产管理视角下的顾客忠诚及其驱动因素研究

在当今的顾客中心时代,顾客忠诚及其有效管理已经成为学术界和企业界共同瞩目的战略问题之一。关系营销与管理的深入发展和顾客资产管理学派的兴起．为企业更有效地管理顾客忠诚提供了新的思路。本文旨在以中国电信产业的发展与竞争现况为背景。从顾客资产管理的整合视角,探索顾客忠诚的关键维度及其驱动因素。同时．也对关系收益与转移成本在驱动顾客忠诚过程中的作用进行了理论剖析与实证研究。     

政治型交易成本测算的两个维度及其关系——基于中国分省份截面数据的实证研究

学术界对政治型交易成本的定量研究是从宏观、微观两个维度平行发展的,目前尚未发现关于两者间数量关系的研究成果。为了弥补这一学术空白,文章以我国各省份的截面数据为样本,对政治型交易成本的两个测算维度及其数量关系进行了实证研究。结论是两个维度的政治型交易成本呈现密切的正相关关系,宏观政治型交易成本的差异必然导致微观政治型交易成本的差异。所以,必须控制政府规模,减少政府本身的运行成本,以减少政府机构对企业的经济压力,即通过节约宏观政治型交易成本达到节约微观政治型交易成本的目的。     

Tobin tax and trading volume tightening: a reassessment

This article extends the previous literature on the Tobin tax. We find that very roughly, a doubling in transaction costs would reduce trading volume by 25% to 40% in the Forex. Most importantly, this article is the first contribution to specify the trading volume of the Forex through different (low and high volatility) regimes. Our results show evidence of nonlinear patterns for trading volumes and transaction costs on the Forex. Thus, the Tobin tax would not have a monotonic impact on trading activity across market conditions. The change in elasticity between low and high volatility regimes would be slight but significantly different. We may suggest that the high-variance regime might be the fundamentalist regime and the low-variance regime might be the chartist regime. It is a first step towards understanding which categories of agents would react to the introduction of a tax. Our results seem consistent with Tobin’s underlying thinking; since a tax would penalize chartists more than fundamentalists, it could reduce exchange rate volatility.