Information Complementarities and the Dynamics of Transparency Shock Spillovers

We show that information complementarities play an important role in the spillover of transparency shocks. We exploit the revelation of financial misconduct by S&P 500 firms, and in a “Stacked Difference-in-Differences” design, find that the implied cost of capital increases for “close” industry peers of the fraudulent firms relative to “distant” industry peers. The spillover effect is particularly strong when the close peers and the fraudulent firm share common analyst coverage and common institutional ownership, which have been shown to be powerful proxies for fundamental linkages and information complementarities. We provide evidence that increase in the cost of capital of peer firms is due, at least in part, to “beta shocks.” Disclosure by close peers—especially those with co-coverage and co-ownership links—also increases following fraud revelation. Although disclosure remains high in the following years, the cost of equity starts to decrease.     

The impact of corporate fraud on director‐interlocked firms: Evidence from bank loans

We examine the impact of corporate fraud committed by one firm (the “fraudulent firm”) on other firms with interlocking directors (the “interlocked firms”), focusing on the debtholder side. We argue that the revelation of a fraudulent firm's fraud can damage the reputation of the interlocked firms because corporate governance can propagate via director interlocks. Empirically, we find that the interlocked firms' cost of debt is higher and the loan covenants become stricter after the fraud cases of the fraudulent firms are revealed. Consistent with the corporate governance propagation explanation, our results are weaker (stronger) for interlocked firms that have better (worse) pre‐event corporate governance standards. Our findings suggest that corporate fraud of fraudulent firms can affect other firms through director‐interlocks beyond shareholder value.     

Corporate Fraud and Corporate Bond Costs: Evidence from China

This study investigates the relationship between corporate fraud and four typical components of costs associated with corporate bonds. Based on data from a booming corporate bond market in China, we confirm that fraudulent issuers have higher corporate bond costs. Specifically, they are more likely to push upward price revisions, pay higher issue fees and coupon spreads, and encounter larger underpricing after issuance. Moreover, we demonstrate that severe corporate fraud is also significantly related to the costs of corporate bonds. Furthermore, we find that investors pay more attention to fraud in accounting information and disclosure. These results remain robust to a strand of endogeneity and through the robustness tests. In additional research, we find that bonds issued by fraudulent firms tend to receive lower ratings and show inferior performance after issuance. We also demonstrate that the effects of corporate fraud on bond costs erode as time passes, although the mitigation speed is slow. Finally, we find that hiring reputable financial intermediaries can partially mitigate the negative effects of corporate fraud.     

上市公司舞弊性财务报告及其防范与监管——基于中国证券监督委员会处罚公告的分析

舞弊性财务报告是全世界经济社会和会计职业界关注的重大问题。我国目前也面临其挑战。本文以中国证券监督委员会2002—2006年处罚公告中涉及的上市公司舞弊性财务报告为依据,对我国上市公司舞弊性财务报告的主要类型、手段等进行了统计分析。分析发现,舞弊公司表外舞弊严重,所占比重大;同时存在多种舞弊类型,典型的是虚假利润表和虚假披露;虚构销售业务、虚增资产、隐瞒对外担保分别成为虚假利润表、虚假资产负债表和虚假披露的最主要舞弊手段;舞弊公司同时采用多种舞弊方法,且舞弊行为持续年限在两年以上,最长的达9年。本文最后提出了相应的防范与监管建议。     

An Analysis of Accounting Frauds and the Timing of Analyst Coverage Decisions and Recommendation Revisions: Evidence from the US

This paper provides a comprehensive exploration of the types of accounting fraud committed by firms over the period 1995–2009. Using detailed data from US SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER), we examine the likelihood and timing of analyst coverage decisions and recommendation revisions related to fraud firms versus firms without accounting fraud. We find that analysts have a higher probability of taking the more severe action of dropping coverage rather than only revising down recommendations for firms with any type of accounting fraud and also for specific egregious types of accounting fraud. Through the use of competing hazards models, we also find that accounting frauds and their egregiousness are positively (negatively) associated with the timeliness of the analysts’ action to drop coverage (revise only). Overall, we find that analysts’ actions may be useful in determining the occurrence of accounting fraud prior to the public announcement of the fraud.     

Is there a dark side to incentive compensation?

We report a significant positive association between the likelihood of securities fraud allegations and a measure of executive stock option incentives. This relation is robust to the inclusion of other components of the compensation structure and to other possible determinants of fraud allegations. In addition, we find that the positive relation between the likelihood of fraud allegations and option intensity is stronger in firms with higher outside blockholder and higher institutional ownership. These findings support the view that stock options increase the incentive to engage in fraudulent activity and that this incentive is exacerbated by institutional and block ownership.     

Do Sentiments Matter in Fraud Detection? Estimating Semantic Orientation of Annual Reports

We present a novel approach for analysing the qualitative content of annual reports. Using natural language processing techniques we determine if sentiment expressed in the text matters in fraud detection. We focus on the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of annual reports because of the nonfactual content present in this section, unlike other components of the annual reports. We measure the sentiment expressed in the text on the dimensions of polarity, subjectivity, and intensity and investigate in depth whether truthful and fraudulent MD&As differ in terms of sentiment polarity, sentiment subjectivity and sentiment intensity. Our results show that fraudulent MD&As on average contain three times more positive sentiment and four times more negative sentiment compared with truthful MD&As. This suggests that use of both positive and negative sentiment is more pronounced in fraudulent MD&As. We further find that, compared with truthful MD&As, fraudulent MD&As contain a greater proportion of subjective content than objective content. This suggests that the use of subjectivity clues such as presence of too many adjectives and adverbs could be an indicator of fraud. Clear cases of fraud show a higher intensity of sentiment exhibited by more use of adverbs in the “adverb modifying adjective” pattern. Based on the results of this study, frequent use of intensifiers, particularly in this pattern, could be another indicator of fraud. Moreover, the dimensions of subjectivity and intensity help in accurately classifying borderline examples of MD&As (that are equal in sentiment polarity) into fraudulent and truthful categories. When taken together, these findings suggest that fraudulent MD&As in contrast to truthful MD&As contain higher sentiment content. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

美国安然事件的经济背景分析

本文分析美国证券公开发行公司如安然披露欺诈财务信息的经济背景。财务作假既不是孤立的也不是偶然的现象。财务作假的关键问题产生于经济环境。首先 ,今天美国经济中生产、流通、分配和消费四个主要环节失去了相互制衡的作用 ;其次 ,不论美国的上市公司制度和公司治理都存在若干缺陷。     

The Market's Valuation of Fraudulently Reported Earnings

This study examines the market valuation of accounting earnings during the period before it is publicly revealed that the earnings are fraudulent. Using both cross‐sectional and time‐series valuation models, we first find that the market accords less weight to earnings when the accounting numbers are fraudulent. We also show that the market better anticipates the presence of fraud when there is information in the public domain indicating a high ex‐ante risk of fraud. Our findings suggest that investors are able to accurately assess the probability of fraud and that such assessments affect the market's valuation of earnings even before it is publicly announced that fraud has occurred.     

Improving Experienced Auditors’ Detection of Deception in CEO Narratives

We experimentally study the deception detection capabilities of experienced auditors, using CEO narratives from earnings conference calls as case materials. We randomly assign narratives of fraud and nonfraud companies to auditors as well as the presence versus absence of an instruction explaining that cognitive dissonance in speech is helpful for detecting deception. We predict this instruction will weaken auditors’ learned tendency to overlook fraud cues. We find that auditors’ deception judgments are less accurate for fraud companies than for nonfraud companies, unless they receive this instruction. We also find that instructed auditors more extensively describe red flags for fraud companies and more accurately identify specific sentences in narratives that pertain to underlying frauds. These findings indicate that instructing experienced auditors to be alert for cognitive dissonance in CEO narratives can activate deception detection capabilities.     

Fraud and its PREY: Conceptualising social engineering tactics and its impact on financial literacy outcomes

Financial literacy may not be as effective as previously thought in protecting against fraud victimisation. It does not inoculate investors from persuasion or social engineering tactics used by offenders to secure investment in fraudulent schemes. In fact, recent research indicates that overconfidence in investment knowledge may make individuals more susceptible to fraud. Using boiler room fraud as a case study, this article introduces the PREY (Profiled, Relational, Exploitable and Yielding) model to capture the psychological tactics used by fraud perpetrators to influence the thoughts and decision-making processes of individuals. The PREY model operationalizes the tenets of social engineering and demonstrates how such tactics could be re-engineered to increase the effectiveness of fraud prevention within the financial literacy context.     

Fraudulent financial reporting in China: Evidence from corporate renaming

Using a sample of listed Chinese companies during 2010–2019, we examine whether corporate renaming is associated with fraudulent financial reporting. We find that companies that change their corporate names without making underlying changes to business fundamentals are more likely to commit financial reporting fraud. The positive association between corporate renaming and financial reporting fraud is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises and companies with a lower ownership concentration. There is further evidence that corporate renaming is more likely to be associated with disclosure-related fraud (e.g., failure to disclose or delayed disclosure) and that the likelihood of fraudulent behavior increases with the frequency of corporate renaming. Overall, the findings of this study provide evidence of a new red flag for regulators and investors investigating financial fraud. This study is timely and has policy implications for market regulators hoping to establish and improve emerging capital markets in which the information environment is generally considered weak and opaque.     

CEO Connectedness and Corporate Fraud

We find that connections CEOs develop with top executives and directors through their appointment decisions increase the risk of corporate fraud. Appointment‐based CEO connectedness in executive suites and boardrooms increases the likelihood of committing fraud and decreases the likelihood of detection. Additionally, it decreases the expected costs of fraud by helping conceal fraudulent activity, making CEO dismissal less likely upon discovery, and lowering the coordination costs of carrying out illegal activity. Connections based on network ties through past employment, education, or social organization memberships have insignificant effects on fraud. Appointment‐based CEO connectedness warrants attention from regulators, investors, and corporate governance specialists.     

Detecting financial statement fraud using dynamic ensemble machine learning

Our study uses Machine learning to develop an advanced fraud detection model that can detect fraudulent firms. We build our model using raw financial and non-financial variables following prior literature. In addition, we introduce the Dynamic Ensemble Selection algorithm to the fraud detection literature, which combines individual classifiers dynamically to make a final prediction. Using several performance evaluation metrics, we find that our model can outperform several machine learning models used in recent studies.     

Neural network detection of management fraud using published financial data

This paper uses a Artificial Neural Network (AutoNet) to develop a model for detecting management fraud. The study offers an in-depth examination of important publicly available predictors of fraudulent financial statements. We find a model with a high probability of detecting fraudulent financial statements on one sample. The study reinforces the validity and efficiency of AutoNet as a research tool and provides additional empirical evidence regarding the merits of suggested red flags for fraudulent financial statements. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate social responsibility and financial fraud: evidence from China

This paper investigates the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on corporate financial fraud in China. We find that CSR scores are negatively associated with fraudulent financial activities, suggesting that CSR firms are less likely to engage in financial fraud. The results also indicate that the negative relation is more significant for CSR performance than CSR disclosure. Additionally, we demonstrate that the negative effect of CSR is more pronounced for firms with voluntary CSR practices, continuous CSR engagements, financial pressure and internal control weaknesses. Overall, we find that CSR is an ethical behaviour that reduces financial misconduct.     

基于GONE理论的上市公司财务报告舞弊识别研究

本文基于GONE理论,剖析了财务报告舞弊诱因的影响机理和舞弊行为的决策权衡机理,并选取2006～2009年因财务舞弊受处罚的上市公司为样本,实证分析了贪婪、机会、需要和暴露四因素与财务报告舞弊的关系,结果发现:在控制了一系列因素以后,管理层的风险偏好和剩余索取权引发的个体贪婪程度越高,治理结构不完善制造的舞弊机会越多,增发配股引发的组织需要程度越高,舞弊的可能性越大;审计意见类型和会计师事务所变更代表的发现机制越完善,暴露的可能性越大,舞弊的可能性越小。     

Conservatism,SEC investigation,and fraud

We present evidence on the relationship between firms that have engaged in fraudulent financial reporting and accounting conservatism. We empirically investigate the extent to which US firms identified by the SEC in their Enforcement Releases demonstrate higher levels of conditional conservatism in order to mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems. Specifically, by assessing the timing of changes in the litigation risk environment for fraud firms, we document how differences in heightened legal liability guide changes in conservative accounting behavior. Compared to a matched non-fraud control sample, we document that fraud firms have significantly lower levels of accounting conservatism in the pre-fraud period. Consistent with changes in potential legal liability, we find an increase in accounting conservatism for fraud firms during the SEC investigation period. Subsequently, during the public discovery of fraud, any increases in accounting conservatism are marginal and appear to converge back to lower levels compared to the SEC investigation period. Overall, our findings suggest more temporary changes in conservative reporting in the short-term for fraud firms. We also document that increased levels of accounting conservatism for fraud firms are not due solely to the passage of the SOX Act. Our findings aid in explaining fraud firms’ incentives and opportunities for accounting conservatism and lend support for why standard setters, regulators and auditors should continue to monitor and re-evaluate conservatism’s short-term effects that are conditioned on changes in a firm’s risk environment.     

Back-to-Back Loans: A Fraud in Transition

Case law relating to an auditor's detection of fraud has identified three fraud categories: "ingenious", those that arouse or ought to arouse the auditor's suspicions, and "well-known frauds". This paper argues that the extensive publicity given to Bond Corporation's use of back-to-back loans in 1988-89 to siphon $1.2 billion from Bell Resources resulted in this fraud being transfomed from ingenious to well-known. Detection processes have been developed for well-known frauds and this paper identifies certain "red flags'" associated with the back-to-back loan fraud that should facilitate its detection.     

Chief financial officer demographic characteristics and fraudulent financial reporting in China

We investigate whether management's cognitions, values and perceptions are associated with fraud for 18 863 firm‐years for Chinese listed firms from 2000 to 2014. Demographic characteristics of the chief financial officer (CFO) are used as proxies for management's cognitions, values and perceptions. We find that fraudulent financial reporting is higher when CFOs are younger, male, and have lower education backgrounds. An analysis of inflated earnings, fictitious assets, material omissions and other material misstatements provide similar results, with the exception that CFOs with higher education levels are associated with more inflated earnings.