Payment shock and mortgage performance

The effect of payment shocks on subprime hybrid ARM mortgage prepayment and delinquency is examined. Using loan level data from private label securities, we modeled the effects of payment shocks on mortgage performance. Our study provided interesting empirical results in three main areas: First, we addressed the effect of payment shocks on subsequent mortgage delinquency. Second, we studied how the effect of payment shocks varies and decays over time. Third, we disentangled the impact of payment shocks based on the reason for the shocks: payment shock due to the expiration of a teaser rate (i.e. “teaser shock”) versus the payment shock due to index rate changes at the time of reset (i.e. “market rate shock”).We find that the effect of payment shock on loan performance varies by the delinquency status of the loan at the time of the shock. That is, the payment shock has the most significant effect on “current” loans rather than loans already in delinquency. Also of note, we find that the effect of a payment shock decays only gradually over time. We find that the impact of “teaser shocks” and “market rate shocks” on mortgage performance do not differ substantially, even though teaser shocks may be somewhat more predictable than market rate shocks. This suggests that either subprime ARM borrowers did not fully understand the product and the extent of the shock at the first reset date or that financially strapped borrowers used the product to speculate and were caught by the teaser shock when they were unable to refinance or sell (i.e. “flip”) their properties .The study suggests that any modification plan designed to eliminate potential payment shocks or to otherwise lower payments will be most effective for loans that are currently performing rather than loans that are already in delinquency.     

Accounting for the Political Uncertainty Factor

We build our analysis upon previous work by Bloom et al. (Measuring the Effect of Political Uncertainty. Working Paper, Stanford University, 2012) and Baker et al. (Political Uncertainty: A New Indicator. CentrePiece 2012; 16 (3): 21–23), who estimate the dynamic effects of a shock to a newly constructed surrogate measure of political uncertainty (PU) on the US economy. Comparable to their results we demonstrate that a shock to PU has pervasive effects on the dynamic evolution of the US economy. Using an estimated structural dynamic factor model we find that more globally integrated markets exhibit significantly more pronounced responses than other measures of real economic activity. Impulse responses reveal a small but statistically significant ‘flight‐to‐safety’ effect, depressing government bond yields across the entire term structure following a shock to PU. Forecast error variance decompositions are predominantly composed of supply, demand, and PU shocks over all horizons, with PU shocks contributing less and supply shocks contributing more to forecast errors at longer horizons. Technology shocks, by contrast, are found to affect forecast accuracy closer to impact with quickly decaying contributions over extended forecast horizons. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Identifying credit demand,financial intermediation,and supply of funds shocks: A structural VAR approach

In this paper, we identify three exogenous shocks to credit market: demand for credit, supply of funds into the financial system, and the willingness to lend of financial institutions (financial intermediation), and also, determine the contribution of these shocks to fluctuations in the credit market and overall economic activity. We estimate a structural vector autoregression model where the three credit shocks are identified with a set of sign restrictions motivated by a simple partial equilibrium model of financial intermediation. We find that the credit demand shock explains significantly the variations in the long-term loan rate proxied by the Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield, while the supply of funds shock contributes to most of the fluctuations in the short-term commercial paper rate. The financial intermediation shock drives most of the fluctuations in the quantity of loans as well as the spread between the Baa and commercial paper rates. Of the credit shocks, we find that the financial intermediation shock has the largest impact on real economic activity. In fact, our analysis implies that the sharp decline in output during the 2007–2009 financial crisis is largely attributable to the financial intermediation shock, along with shocks originating outside of the financial system.     

Macroeconomic responses of emerging market economies to oil price shocks: An analysis by region and resource profile

We analyze the impact of oil price shocks on the macroeconomic fundamentals in emerging economies in three regions that have different resource endowments. The existing literature on emerging economies remains inconclusive on how regional factors and resource characteristics affect the response of macroeconomic variables to oil price shocks. We show that (1) exports in Europe and Central Asia are driven by oil more than East Asia and the Pacific and that (2) policy makers in East Asia and the Pacific should be concerned about real exchange appreciation following a positive oil shock to mitigate losses in the non-oil export market. Analysis by resource endowment further reveals that, in less-resource-intensive economies, an oil price shock causes large variations in consumption and has a negative and persistent impact on the real gross domestic product (GDP). In mineral-exporting economies, real GDP and interest rates are driven largely by oil price shocks. The response of real GDP in mineral-exporting economies is short lived. In oil-exporting economies, only real GDP has a large variation in response to oil price shocks. Our findings highlight the need for customized policy responses to oil price shocks, depending on resource endowments, as we show that a “one size fits all" policy does not exist.     

Fiscal Foresight,Limited Information and the Effects of Government Spending Shocks

We quantify the impact of government spending shocks in the US. Thereby, we control for fiscal foresight, a specific limited information problem (LIP) by utilizing the narrative approach. Moreover, we surmount the generic LIP inherent in vector autoregressions (VARs) by a factor‐augmented VAR (FAVAR) approach. We find that a positive deficit‐financed defence shock raises output by more than in a VAR (e.g. 2.61 vs. 2.04 for peak multipliers). Furthermore, our evidence suggests that consumption is crowded in. These results are robust to variants of controlling for fiscal foresight and reveal the crucial role of the LIP in fiscal VARs.     

Unemployment shocks and material deprivation in the European Union: A synthetic control approach

This paper analyzes how material deprivation responds to drastic changes in unemployment levels. We explore unemployment shocks registered in some European Union countries during the so-called Great Recession. To do so, we apply the synthetic control methodology, which has been rarely used in the field of distributive analyses. We use this approach to identify the impact of unemployment shocks on material deprivation and conduct different sensitivity analyses to test the results. We find that contrary to the traditional assumption of the low sensitivity of material deprivation measures to changes in the economic cycle, unemployment shocks have a significant and rapid impact on material deprivation. This conclusion holds even when extending the period of analysis, changing the indicator of material deprivation, or modifying the definition of unemployment shock.     

Direct and indirect oil shocks and their impacts upon energy related stocks

We attempt to consolidate (at least in part) the vast literature on oil shocks and stock returns by decomposing the influence of oil shocks into two channels of effect: ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’. Using a simple empirical asset pricing model, it is shown that oil shocks can affect stocks not only directly, but also indirectly through general market risk (which is shown to be due in part to oil shocks), or put another way that additional oil price risk exposure is embedded in the traditional market beta. As far as is known this is the first paper explicitly quantifying both effects together. By doing so we offer a more complete picture of when and how oil shocks impact stock returns, thus allowing investors to make more informed responses to oil shocks. The results are illustrated using daily data from all (active) listed energy related stock portfolios in the Asia Pacific Region, and are robust to structural instability and the specification of oil shock used.     

What are the effects of fiscal policy shocks?

We propose and apply a new approach for analyzing the effects of fiscal policy using vector autoregressions. Specifically, we use sign restrictions to identify a government revenue shock as well as a government spending shock, while controlling for a generic business cycle shock and a monetary policy shock. We explicitly allow for the possibility of announcement effects, i.e., that a current fiscal policy shock changes fiscal policy variables in the future, but not at present. We construct the impulse responses to three linear combinations of these fiscal shocks, corresponding to the three scenarios of deficit‐spending, deficit‐financed tax cuts and a balanced budget spending expansion. We apply the method to US quarterly data from 1955 to 2000. We find that deficit‐financed tax cuts work best among these three scenarios to improve GDP, with a maximal present value multiplier of five dollars of total additional GDP per each dollar of the total cut in government revenue 5 years after the shock. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political Tie Heterogeneity and the Impact of Adverse Shocks on Firm Value

Past research has recognized the contingent value of corporate political ties but largely neglects their heterogeneity. Drawing on the political embeddedness perspective and literature on emerging economy political institutions, we develop hypotheses regarding how political networks comprising managerial and government ownership ties may have different valuation effects in the face of adverse political shocks. Examining stock market responses to an unanticipated, high‐profile political event in China, we find a negative valuation effect of managerial ties to municipal government, but an insignificant effect of government ownership ties. Further, companies combining managerial and ownership ties experienced less post‐shock reduction in market value than those holding only managerial political ties. These findings shed light on the values of different configurations of corporate political ties and inform firms of potential ways to manage ubiquitous political hazards in emerging economies.     

The impact of the global business cycle on small open economies: A FAVAR approach for Canada

Building on the growing evidence on the importance of large data sets for empirical macroeconomic modeling, we use a large factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) model to analyze how global developments affect the Canadian economy. We focus on several sources of shocks, including commodity prices, foreign economic activity, and foreign interest rates, and evaluate the impact of each shock on key Canadian macroeconomic variables. Results indicate that Canada is primarily exposed to shocks to foreign activity and to commodity prices. In contrast, the impact of shocks to global interest rates and global inflation is substantially lower.     

Oil price shocks and economic growth: The volatility link

This paper shows that oil shocks impact economic growth primarily through the conditional variance of growth. Our comparison of models focuses on density forecasts. Over a range of dynamic models, oil shock measures and data, we find a robust link between oil shocks and the volatility of economic growth. We then develop a new measure of oil shocks and show that it is superior to existing measures; it indicates that the conditional variance of growth increases in response to an indicator of the local maximum oil price exceedance. The empirical results uncover a large pronounced asymmetric response of the growth volatility to oil price changes. The uncertainty about future growth is considerably lower than with a benchmark AR(1) model when no oil shocks are present.     

Monetary policy,housing rents,and inflation dynamics

In this paper we study the effect of monetary policy shocks on housing rents. Our main finding is that, in contrast to house prices, housing rents increase in response to contractionary monetary policy shocks. We also find that, after a contractionary monetary policy shock, rental vacancies and the homeownership rate decline. This combination of results suggests that monetary policy may affect housing tenure decisions (own versus rent). In addition, we show that, with the exception of the shelter component, all other main components of the consumer price index (CPI) either decline in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock or are not responsive. These findings motivated us to study the statistical properties of alternative measures of inflation that exclude the shelter component. We find that measures of inflation that exclude shelter have most of the statistical properties of the widely used measures of inflation, such as the CPI and the price index for personal consumption expenditures, but have higher standard deviations and react more to monetary policy shocks. Finally, we show that the response of housing rents accounts for a large proportion of the “price puzzle” found in the literature.     

The shale revolution and shifting crude dynamics

Oil price fluctuates in response to both demand and supply shocks. This paper proposes a new methodology that allows for timely identification of the shifting contribution from the two types of shock through a joint analysis of crude futures options and stock index options. Historical analysis shows that crude oil price movements are dominated by supply shocks from 2004 to 2008, but demand shocks have become much more dominant since then. The large demand shock following the 2008 financial crisis contributes to the start of this dynamics shift, whereas the subsequent shale revolution has fundamentally altered the crude supply behavior.     

The impact of credit supply shocks and a new Financial Conditions Index based on a FAVAR approach

This paper investigates the impact of credit supply shocks on the macroeconomy and estimates a new financial conditions index. We calculated two credit supply factors using a time-varying parameter FAVAR model. The first factor is identified as the willingness to lend, while the second factor is the lending capacity. The impact of these two types of shocks and their changes over time is examined using Hungarian data. The two types of lending shocks affect macro variables rather differently: a positive lending capacity shock (in a banking system mostly owned by non-residents) influences GDP through a decrease in country risk and the easing of monetary policy, while willingness to lend primarily increases lending activity. The two financial shocks also differ in terms of their evolution over time: deviations from the average in the impact of a willingness to lend shock usually occur for short periods of time and are of a small degree between the various quarters. However, in the case of lending capacity, certain trends can be observed: before the crisis, the stability of the banking system played an increasing role in country risk, whereas after 2008 it appears that monetary policy paid increasing attention to financial stability. Finally, a new type of financial conditions index is quantified based on our estimates, which measures the impact of the banking system’s lending activity on GDP growth.     

The effects of oil price shocks on inflation in the G7 countries

This study examines the effects of three types of oil price shocks on inflation in the G7 countries with a new method of isolating oil price shocks. Based on monthly data from January 1997 to January 2019, we find that each oil price shock has the largest effect on U.S. inflation among the G7 countries and each country’s response to oil price shocks is different. Moreover, a rolling-window analysis shows that supply shocks, demand shocks and risk shocks have dynamic effects on inflation. The effect of supply shocks on inflation is strong before the financial crisis, but weakens during the crisis. However, the effect of demand shocks increases sharply in this time. The effect of risk shocks mainly occurs during the financial crisis and the European debt crisis. In addition, this study uses two ways to verify the robustness of the results. Our empirical results have important implications for policymakers and manufacturers, since the results provide a good explanation for the response of inflation in the G7 countries to the oil price shocks from different sources.     

Beyond death: The impact of a population-wide health shock on life insurance

Population-wide health shocks, for example, pandemics, affect life insurance owners beyond their health impact. This paper considers joint impacts of their surrender behavior adaptions and mortality rise following a population-wide health shock on insurance pricing. We build a model that captures both more surrenders of contracts to meet unexpected liquidity needs and less financially beneficial surrenders to keep insurance protection after the shock. Unlike the systemic mortality rise impact that turns out to be negligible, we find that policyholders’ surrender behavior adaptions substantially devalue policies with increasing emergency surrenders being the main driver. Regulatory solvency protection partly restrains the devaluation.     

The macroeconomic impact of economic uncertainty and financial shocks under low and high financial stress

External financial frictions might increase the severity of economic uncertainty shocks. We analyze the impact of aggregate uncertainty and financial condition shocks using a threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) model with stochastic volatility during distinct US financial stress regimes. We further examine the international spillover of the US financial shock. Our results show that the peak contraction in euro area industrial production due to uncertainty shocks during a financial crisis is nearly-four times larger than the peak contraction during normal times. The US financial shocks have an influential asymmetric spillover effect on the euro area. Furthermore, the estimates reveal that the European Central Bank (ECB) is more cautious in implementing a monetary policy against uncertainty shocks while adopting hawkish monetary policies against financial shocks. In contrast, the Fed adopts a more hawkish monetary policy during heightened uncertainty, whereas it acts more steadily when financial stress rises in the economy.     

Budgetary shocks and revenue adjustment: How governments respond to unexpected fiscal shocks

This paper uses panel data from seven Canadian provinces which received Equalization payments over the period 1980/81 to 1995/96 to examine how provinces adjust own-source revenue in response to past budget shocks. Governments respond symmetrically to past own-source revenue shocks: they increase or reduce own-revenue by $0.75 for every unexpected dollar shock in own-source revenue last year. In contrast, revenue responses to past grant shocks are asymmetric. Provinces lower own-source revenue by $0.87 in response to an unexpected extra dollar from Equalization last year. But, they make no adjustment following an unexpected Equalization shortfall. The magnitude of these responses suggest that provinces see a significant component of these shocks to be persistent. Lastly, the results with respect to past spending shocks are mixed. In contrast to recent empirical results on asymmetric responses to changes in grants, the results in this paper suggest that, at least in the short run, unexpected increases in Equalization are unlikely to have a large, stimulative effect on government spending.Received: February 2003, Accepted: November 2003, JEL Classification: H71, H77T. Snoddon: The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Ron Kneebone, participants at the CPEG conference, Calgary, June 2002, and seminar participants in the Department of Economics and Finance, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia, September 2002. I would also like to thank the two anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments.     

Temperature shocks and welfare costs

This paper examines the welfare implications of rising temperatures. Using a standard VAR, we empirically show that a temperature shock has a sizable, negative and statistically significant impact on TFP, output, and labor productivity. We rationalize these findings within a production economy featuring long-run temperature risk. In the model, macro-aggregates drop in response to a temperature shock, consistent with the novel evidence in the data. Such adverse effects are long-lasting. Over a 50-year horizon, a one-standard deviation temperature shock lowers both cumulative output and labor productivity growth by 1.4 percentage points. Based on the model, we also show that temperature risk is associated with non-negligible welfare costs which amount to 18.4% of the agent’s lifetime utility and grow exponentially with the size of the impact of temperature on TFP. Finally, we show that faster adaptation to temperature shocks results in lower welfare costs. These welfare benefits become substantially higher in the presence of permanent improvements in the speed of adaptation.     

Asymmetry in the effects of us government spending shocks: evidence and implications

Using quarterly data for the United States, the evidence differentiates the effects of expansionary and contractionary shocks to government spending around an anticipated steady-state trend over time. While interest rates increase in the face of expansionary government spending shocks, there is no evidence of a reduction in the face of contractionary shocks. Consequently, the increased government spending crowds out private investment. Moreover, there is evidence of a reduction in private consumption as agents anticipate a future increase in taxes to finance the increased government spending. As a result, output growth and price inflation are decreasing despite expansionary government spending shocks, on average, over time. In view of this evidence, public finance considerations ought to dominate attempts to stimulate demand using government spending near full-equilibrium capacity utilization in the economy. In contrast, contractionary government spending shocks are not offset by an increase in private spending. Hence, demand contraction is pronounced, slowing output growth and price inflation in the face of a reduction in government spending. The implication is that concerns over the pronounced contractionary effects of a reduction in government spending ought to dominate public finance considerations near full-equilibrium.