对建设市场引入工程担保制度必要性的探讨

一、强化工程担保机制．防止公共工程建设的腐败 工程腐败主要是在公共建设工程中出现的不良现象。招投标是工程建设领域中可能发生腐败行为的一个重要环节．而复杂的招投标程序正是滋生腐败行为的温床。在强制性的工程担保制度下．投标人资格预审工作大大减化．只要有能力提交投标保函的承包商即可入围．减少了这一环节的腐败机会。目前在招标过程中之所以要设计投标资格审查、编制标底、制定综合评标办法等程序，     

对预防工程招投标中不正当竞争行为的建议

工程招投标是为了规范建筑市场交易行为,促进资源优化配置,保证建设工程的工期和质量,降低工程造价,特别是防止暗箱操作,加强权力制约,预防权钱交易等腐败行为。目前由于体制不健全、市场不规范、管理监督不到位等原因,建筑工程招投标在具体操作中还存在不正当竞争行为。本文分析了工程招投标中不正当竞争行为的主要表现形式,并从完善自身运行机制和改善外部环境两方面提出了预防工程招投标中不正当竞争的相关建议。     

12309，不看挤爆看“疗效”

开通全国统一举报电话并更新举报网站是一件得民心、顺民意的大好事．表明了最高检决策者开辟多种渠道查处腐败案件的决心与信心，也是利用现代电子信息和通讯手段减少中间环节的务实之举，无疑将激励公众参与，震慑腐败分子。     

基于博弈理论的建设领域寻租治理探讨

建设领域是腐败案件的高发区,近年来查处的发生在工程承发包、土地出让、房地产开发、物资采购等环节的腐败案件呈上升趋势。通过分析我国建设领域权力寻租的特点,探究寻租现象背后的根源,建立了建设领域经济体制改革的合作博弈模型,提出寻租治理的策略,为建设领域寻租治理提供了新的视角。     

从公共经济学视角分析腐败的根源

中国目前正处在体制转轨期,给政府官员带来很多的权利,寻租空间极大。从公共经济学角度看,政府官员是"理性的经济人",他们只有在利益大于成本的时候才会选择腐败。只要收益大于成本,腐败就不可避免。因为政府官员有任意处置权,这种公共权力的存在以及寻租空间很大,导致腐败行为严重。因此,应从各个方面遏止腐败的产生,从其根源上进行控制,最大限度地杜绝腐败。     

浅谈建设工程招标阶段的业主方项目管理

招投标管理是工程建设工程项目管理重要环节,其工作核心是围绕工程各管理目标,通过一系列法规性的经济技术活动,将工程建设任务发包给具有相应资质资格并较具施工实力的施工企业.本文阐述了业主在招标阶段项目管理的主要内容招投标管理的过程及采取的措施,为进一步提高业主的招投标专业管理能力进行了总结和探讨.     

关于规范税务机关举报案件工作的思考

文章就税务违法案件举报的受理、查处和管理等问题 ,提出了规范性的意见措施。     

建立和完善公共工程永续经营制度

国家为了应对国际金融危机,出台了扩大内需的十项措施,其中大部分属于公共工程建设。在这样大规模的公共工程建设趋势背景下,必须研究并建立公共工程的永续经营制度,对于应对公共工程建设"黄金期"之后的公共工程运营维护高峰期,具有重大而紧迫的现实意义。公共工程的永续经营是以公共工程的生命周期理念为基础的,强调对公共工程生命周期各个阶段对公共工程的各项经营活动的重视。     

标后管理：一个不容忽视的问题

在我国,招投标制度从无到有,从局部推进到普遍实施,促进了我国工程建设管理体制从计划经济向市场经济的转变,推动了工程建设水平的提高和建筑业发展。但建设工程招投标不同于政府采购。招标投标结束后,工程实施阶段仍需加强监管,才能保证整个工程的质量安全和顺利推进。目前,部分项目招标后,不能严格按合同履约、项目经理长期不到位、拖欠工程款等诸多不容忽视的问题依然存在,     

公众反腐举报制度亟待完善

所谓公众反腐举报制度，是指受理举报的机关和组织对公民举报公职人员腐败案件的线索，依照法律或者其他有关规定进行调查处理，保障公民依法行使民主权利的一种制度。从上世纪80年代末我国检察机关设立经济罪案举报中心开始，为引导和促进反腐举报工作的深入、健康发展，我国相继出台了一系列举报方面的政策法规。     

Fiscal transparency,government effectiveness and government spending efficiency: Some international evidence based on panel data approach

The global financial crisis and the debt crisis of the EU countries revealed serious weaknesses in fiscal reporting. As a consequence, uncertainties regarding the real situation of the public accounts of the countries raised doubts in relation to the effectiveness of government policies. Since then, countries are undertaking reforms in order to improve fiscal transparency. This paper analyzes whether countries are making efforts to enhance fiscal transparency, and whether fiscal transparency affects government effectiveness and government spending efficiency. We consider two channels through which this effect occurs. The first channel is indirect and it works through public debt. The second channel is the direct effect that transparency has on government effectiveness and government spending efficiency once transparency enhances accountability and thus the task of resource allocation. We use a sample of 82 countries (68 developing and 14 developed) for the period 2006–2014, and panel data analysis. Comparing the scores of fiscal transparency between 2006 and 2014, we observe that approximately 80 per cent of the countries made efforts to improve fiscal transparency. The results suggest fiscal transparency is important to reduce public debt and to improve government effectiveness and government spending efficiency.     

论我国政府财务报告制度的构建——基于财政透明度的考察

政府向公众提供政府财务报告,是提高财政透明度、强化政府公共受托责任的内在要求.目前,我国尚未建立真正意义上的政府财务报告制度,财政透明度与国际货币基金组织的基本要求相比尚存在较大差距.为了提高财政透明度,必须要建立和完善政府财务报告制度.具体而言,应当从报告目标、报告主体、会计基础、核算范围等方面对现有的预算会计制度进行全方位的改革,以逐步建立我国的政府会计和政府财务报告制度.但是,政府会计改革和政府财务报告制度的构建是一项综合性的改革工程,应当采用分阶段、逐步推进的方法来进行.     

Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students

We report results from a corruption experiment with Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students. Our results suggest that the Indonesian public servant subjects have a significantly lower tolerance of corruption than the Indonesian students. We find no evidence that this is due to a selection effect. The reasons given by the subjects for their behaviour suggest that the differences in behavior across the subject pools are driven by their different real life experiences. For example, when abstaining from corruption, public servants more often cite the need to reduce the social costs of corruption as a reason for their actions, and when engaging in corruption, they cite low government salaries or a belief that corruption is a necessary evil in the current environment. In contrast, students give more simplistic moral reasons. We conclude by emphasizing that results obtained from different subject pools can complement each other in illuminating different aspects of the same problem. We would like to thank Charles Noussair and the participants of the Experimental Economics Workshop (2006) at the University of Melbourne for their comments. Daniel Piccinin and Revy Sjahrial have provided excellent research assistance. We are grateful to the Australian Research Council and the World Bank for their financial assistance.     

论政务公开中存在的问题及对策

把国家行政机关办理的有关事宜及其办理情况,通过适当的形式向社会公众公开,实行政务公开是行之有效的方式。政务公开对于健全社会主义法制,加强社会主义民主,使政府与人民群众的联系更为紧密,促进建立公平竞争的经济发展软环境,积极预防和治理腐败,有着十分重要的现实意义和深远的历史意义。     

Corruption and re-election: how much can politicians steal before getting punished?

Can corruption be used to improve re-election chances of politicians in office? What is the optimal level of corruption for doing so? In this paper I use suspicious patterns of public procurement allocations in local government as a proxy measurement of corruption, based on combining quantitative and qualitative evidence on corrupt practices in local government. I then tie suspicious procurements to re-election probabilities of mayors in Croatian cities and municipalities from 2009 to 2017, and find that due to a rent-extracting relationship formed between firms and political elites, local politicians can engage in potential corruption and still win elections. There is an optimal level of suspicious procurements for which politicians maximize their re-election chances. When a mayor surpasses the cut-off level of around 20% of suspiciously allocated funds from public procurement his or her probability of re-election starts to decline, while he or she loses office for at least one half of all procurements allocated suspiciously. In order to address potential endogeneity issues I apply a fuzzy regression discontinuity design based on population thresholds that determine the size of the local council, where the intensity of the treatment (potential corruption) increases with increasing council size. The results overall confirm the hypothesized nonlinear relationship between corruption and re-election.     

Corruption: what are the effects on government effectiveness? Empirical evidence considering developed and developing countries

This study analyses the impact of corruption on government effectiveness for a sample of 130 countries. The findings suggest that less-corrupt countries have better quality of public service, better quality in the formulation and adoption of policies and greater credibility and government's commitment to such policies. The findings also suggest that the effect of corruption on government effectiveness is higher in developed countries. Moreover, the estimates also reveal that countries with the most indebted governments and with higher inflation rates have less-efficient governments, and an increase in rule of law represents a good strategy to improve government effectiveness. In turn, regarding developing countries, the findings show that countries with more democratic regimes have a higher degree of government effectiveness.     

The power of negative thinking: corruption,perception and willingness to bribe in Ukraine

This study provides an empirical analysis of the association between corruption perception and the willingness to offer bribes, as well as of the influence of different sources of information on corruption perception in the Ukraine. The higher the perceived corruption in an organization, the more probable it is that a person dealing with that organization will offer a bribe, therefore supporting corruption. Since corruption scandals in Ukraine seldom result in legal action, information about corruption in the mass media might actually encourage people to give bribes. This study found that corruption perception is one of the key factors in giving a bribe and that its positive/negative effects strongly depend on institutions and government policies.     

Leadership selection, internal promotion, and bureaucratic corruption in less developed polities

The establishment of a professional government bureaucracy in place of political appointees is an important component of an enabling environment for private enterprise. I show that internal promotion can help to bring to power individuals who highly value (relative to income) imposition of their preferences over collective goods on the public. Such individuals restrain the corruption of their subordinates as a byproduct of their efforts to implement their preferences using tax revenue. As a result, large-scale and petty corruption tend to move together and both tend to be lower the longer the practice of internal promotion has been in place. JEL Classification: D73
Sélection des leaders, promotion interne, et corruption bureaucratique dans les pays en voie de développement. La mise en place d'une bureaucratie gouvernementale professionnelle pour remplacer les nominations politiques constitue un élément important pour créer un environnement porteur pour l'entreprise privée. On montre que la promotion interne peut aider à porter au pouvoir des personnes qui valorisent beaucoup la possibilité d'imposer au public leurs préférences quant aux biens collectifs (par opposition à la simple recherche de revenus personnels accrus). De telles personnes vont limiter la corruption de leurs subordonnés en cherchant à imposer leurs préférences dans l'usage des rentrées fiscales. En conséquence, la grande et la petite corruption tendent àêtre co-reliées, et toutes deux tendent à décroître à proportion que l'on pratique la promotion interne.     

Corruption governance and its dynamic stability based on a three-party evolutionary game with the government,the public,and public officials

The current state of corruption in China is still worrisome. Corruption among public officials depends not only on their subjective will, but also on the success rate of government investigations and public whistleblowing. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this study constructs an evolutionary game model with the government, the people, and public officials and solves the dynamic model. The authors also provide a numerical simulation of the proposed model to confirm theoretical predictions. The results reveal that when the government’s success rate reaches a certain threshold, public officials will trend to a strategy of no bribery, and at this threshold, raising the cost of bribing public officials can quickly prevent them from corruption. At the equilibrium, the public will trend toward a strategy of no whistleblowing. The findings of this study are of great significance to the current anti-corruption debate in China.     

Intermediaries in corruption: an experiment

Anecdotal evidence suggests that intermediaries are ubiquitous in corrupt activities; however, empirical evidence on their role as facilitators of corrupt transactions is scarce. This paper asks whether intermediaries facilitate corruption by reducing the moral or psychological costs of possible bribers and bribees. We designed bribery lab experiment that simulates petty corruption transactions between private citizens and public officials. The experimental data confirm that intermediaries lower the moral costs of citizens and officials and, thus, increase corruption. Our results have implications with respect to possible anti-corruption policies targeting the legitimacy of the use of intermediaries for the provision of government services.