Manipulation Through Biased Product Reviews*

We study a signal-jamming model of product review manipulation in which rational consumers consult product reviews and price to better estimate a product's quality, and a firm, whose quality is either high or low, chooses its price and how much bias to insert into product reviews. We show that both firm types always exert positive effort to manipulate product reviews, and, depending on the equilibrium price level, one or both of them can increase its sales. When the high-type firm exerts more effort than the low-type, review manipulation benefits consumers by raising [lowering] their demand for the high-quality [low-quality] product.     

On two-part tariff competition in a homogeneous product duopoly

We explore aspects of two-part tariff competition between duopolists providing a homogeneous service when consumers differ with respect to their usage levels. Competition in only one price component (the fee or the rate) may allow both firms to enjoy positive profits if the other price component has been set at levels different enough between firms. Fixing one price component alters the nature of competition, indirectly introducing an element of product differentiation. Endogenous market segmentation emerges, with the heavier users choosing the lower rate firm and the lighter users choosing the lower fee firm. When no price component can be negative, competition becomes softer, profits tend to be higher but there is also a disadvantage for the firm that starts with a higher fee than that of its rival.     

Speed to Market for Innovative Products: Blessing or Curse?

The relationships among speed to market, quality, and costs are important to managers as they attempt to best establish incentives and set goals for new product development teams, allocate resources for new product development, or create positional advantage in the market. The existing literature suggests that the economic consequences of being late to the market are significant, including higher development and manufacturing costs, lower profit margins, and lessening of the firm's market value. Therefore, traditional logic has held that new product development managers need to manage the trade‐offs among speed to market, quality, and costs. While both scholars and managers have often acquiesced to performance trade‐offs among “faster, better, and cheaper,” this research attempts to improve understanding of the interrelationships between these objectives, and ultimately profit. Based on a survey of 197 managers, faster speed to market is shown to be related to better quality and lower costs; it is not necessary to sacrifice one of these outcomes. Further, the moderating roles of two dimensions of innovativeness (innovativeness to the firm and to the market) are examined on the relationships between speed and quality, as well as speed and profit. Both dimensions of innovativeness positively moderate the relationship between speed to market and quality. For more innovative products (both to the firm and the market), there is a stronger positive relationship between speed and quality than for less innovative products. Further, innovativeness to the firm negatively moderates the relationship between speed and profit. Thus, speed has a less positive impact on profit for highly innovative‐to‐the‐firm products compared with less innovative‐to‐the‐firm products. By being conscious of the projects’ levels of innovativeness (along with prioritizing various performance measures), managers can more rationally decide when to emphasize speed to market based on this study's findings.     

Speed-to-Market and New Product Performance Trade-offs

When pressed to accelerate a development effort, more than a few managers have responded in terms such as “Good, fast, cheap … Pick any two.” Time-to-market decisions clearly play an important role in determining the ultimate success or failure of a new product. Just as clearly, however, speed to market is not the sole determinant of success. The seemingly offhanded “Pick any two” response points to the tradeoffs that product development managers must make in their decisions about development time and costs. Barry Bayus discusses the relationship between product development time and costs, and he fomulates a mathematical model that simultaneously considers the decisions regarding time-to-market and product performance levels. He applies the model to two competitive scenarios, and he identifies the optimal entry timing and product performance decisions for various market, demand, and cost conditions. In the first scenario, a firm must decide whether to accelerate development efforts to catch a competitor that has just introduced a new product. Analysis of the tradeoffs among the various parameters in the model suggests that fast development of low-performance products is optimal under the following conditions: a relatively short window of market opportunity, a weak competitor, and relatively high development costs. For example, if the competitor is weak, high performance levels are not necessary and the firm can safely reduce time-to-market. Under the same scenario (that is, accelerating development to catch a competitor), the analysis suggests that fast development of products with high performance levels is optimal under conditions of relatively high sales and relatively flat development costs. In the second scenario, the firm must decide whether to speed development efforts to beat the competition to market. Analysis of the various tradeoffs for this scenario suggests that first-to-market status for a product with a high performnace level is optimal under the following conditions: a relatively long window of market opportunity, relatively high sales, and relatively flat development costs. With a long product lifecycle, stable margins, and high sales, the firm can generate sufficient revenue to offset the increased cost incurred in speeding a high-performance product to market. Beating a competitor to market with a low-performance product is never optimal for the cases considered here.     

Should Firms Consider Employee Input in Reward System Design? The Effect of Participation on Market Orientation and New Product Performance

Will increasing employee participation in reward decisions increase new product performance by first increasing a firm's level of market orientation? Literature offers limited insight to the effects of listening to employees regarding reward system design and whether this may influence market orientation implementation and new product performance. This paper provides research to fill the gap by examining the relationship between participation‐based reward systems, market orientation, and new product performance. Based on expectancy theory, a conceptual model was developed suggesting that participation‐based rewards will increase market orientation by considering employees' desires regarding performance rewards. To test the model, a mixed method was used to collect data. First, in‐depth interviews were conducted with managers from 11 different firms to verify the proposed model. Then a multi‐industry sample of managers from 290 firms was surveyed to maximize generalizability of the results. Data were analyzed using structural equation modeling techniques to simultaneously fit the measurement and structural models. The findings show that market orientation significantly impacts objective new product performance and mediates the relationship between participation‐based rewards and objective new product performance. Participation‐based rewards positively affect market orientation but surprisingly affect new product performance negatively, while positively moderating the relationship between market orientation and new product performance. The results suggest that managers should include employee input in designing reward systems. However, managers should also be careful of how much input they allow employees in determining their rewards and goals as more input will improve market orientation or responding to information collected by, and disseminated throughout the firm, and that, in turn, will improve some types of new product performance. However, the direct effect of employee input can decrease new product performance suggesting that there may be a trade‐off between various success measures of new products developed and introduced by the firm.     

Quality differentiation and firms’ choices between online and physical markets

We study firms’ choices between online and physical markets with respect to product quality and competition, and examine consequences of transparency policies on price competition and market structure. We investigate two contrasting forces. First, since consumers cannot fully inspect an online product’s quality prior to purchase, conventional wisdom and some of the literature suggest that this attracts low-quality products to the online market (a pooling effect). On the other hand, the literature on vertical product differentiation indicates that a firm with a lower-quality product may prefer to reveal its product quality in the physical market because quality differentiation helps alleviate price competition (a differentiation effect). We show that an entrant firm with product quality lower than that of the offline incumbent may choose the physical market, whereas the entrant with a quality higher than the incumbent’s may sell online. More generally the two contrasting forces can give rise to a wide range of product quality—from low-end to high-end—in both markets.     

Progress and Challenges in Product Line Pricing

In recent years, there has been a substantial increase in research on product line pricing. Modelers in multiple disciplines have offered methods for the optimal design/selection and pricing of the products in new or modified product lines. Behavioral scientists have contributed insights on how consumers' perceptions of product line prices, attributes, and quality levels influence their evaluation of the alternative choices. Significantly, the work of both modelers and behavioral scientists is distributed across three types of product line contexts: price‐quality product lines, multi‐attribute product lines, and product lines that include a core product plus options. This paper reviews this literature, and assesses its usefulness for managers. One observation is that, while scholars have developed approaches to optimization that offer increased scope and tractability, the applicability of these models is constrained by the narrow specification of profit functions, and the limited consideration of competitive and other dynamic forces. A second conclusion is that the managerial usefulness of the behavioral science research on perceptions and product‐line choice has been limited by a dependence on attribute‐based estimation of utilities, uncertainty about possible interaction effects, and an excessive focus on the cannibalization aspects of product line pricing. Based on the review, a research agenda is identified for enhancing the applicability of research on consumer perceptions and choice to product line pricing decisions, and for building more complete product line price optimization models.     

Signaling Quality: An Examination of the Effects of Marketing‐ and Nonmarketing‐Controlled Signals on Perceptions of Automotive Brand Quality

When introducing new products to market, firms often leverage marketing signals in an effort to increase perceptions of product quality. While prior research mostly focuses on marketing‐controlled signals that firms can directly influence to affect consumer perceptions of product quality, the proliferation of nonmarketing‐controlled signals in the form of third‐party product reviews introduces a new layer of complexity to a consumer's inference process. Given the fact that propagation of marketing signals and third‐party reviews has made the marketplace more interactive, it is no longer diagnostic to analyze the impact of various quality signals on consumer perceptions, separately. The purpose of this study is twofold. There has been extant research on the individual effects of marketing‐controlled signals on quality perception, but research providing a simultaneous examination of multiple signals is scarce. The first purpose is to examine interaction effects between various marketing signals on consumer perceptions of quality. Firms may be able to control the communication strategy of internal signals (e.g., price, advertising), but third‐party signals are external to the firm, and hence are often perceived as being more credible and less biased than marketing signals. Despite the popularity of third‐party product reviews, there is scarce empirical research about how they impact perceptions in the presence of marketing‐controlled quality signals. Thus, the second purpose is to examine the interaction effects between marketing signals and independent third‐party reviews on perceived product quality. This study advances existing models of market signaling to account for the potential interactions between various types of quality signals. Hypotheses are tested using a longitudinal data set comprising all car brands that have existed in the U.S. automotive industry between 1990 and 2007. The automotive industry provides an ideal context for the analyses as quality is an indispensable yet not easily discernible attribute of cars. Furthermore, consumer perceptions of the quality of new vehicle introductions can have a profound effect on product performance. Data are compiled from various secondary sources, including Harris Interactive's Equitrend, Consumer Reports, and TNS Media Intelligence, among others. Econometric techniques are used to estimate the empirical model. Findings show that effects of quality signals are codependent such that third‐party quality ratings reduce the effectiveness of pricing and advertising, whereas they enhance the credibility of warranty signal. Furthermore, warranty positively interacts with price and advertising. It is also demonstrated that car sales in the previous period and the country of origin of the car brand significantly impact perceived quality. Overall, the research findings can help car manufacturers better understand how their initial product configurations and marketing strategies impact the perception of new vehicle introductions.     

A MULTI‐TASK PRINCIPAL‐AGENT APPROACH TO ORGANIZATIONAL FORM*

This paper studies the choice of organizational forms in a multi‐task principal‐agent model. We compare a functional organization in which the firm is organized into functional departments such as marketing and R&D to a product‐based organization in which the firm is organized into product lines. Managers' compensation can be based on noisy measures of product‐line profits. Measures of a functional area's contribution to total profits are not available, however. This effect favors the product organization. However, if there are significant asymmetries between functional area contributions to organizational success and cross‐product externalities within functions, organizing along functional lines may dominate the product organization. The functional organization can also dominate when a function is characterized by strong externalities while the other is not.     

Best Practices for New Product Pricing: Impact on Market Performance and Price Level under Different Conditions

To date, research on new product pricing has predominantly been approached as a choice between market skimming and penetration pricing. Despite calls for research that addresses other complexities in new product pricing, empirical research responding to these calls remains scarce. This paper examines three managerial price‐setting practices for new products, i.e., value‐informed, competition‐informed, and cost‐informed pricing. By engaging in these practices, managers can develop and compare quantifications in order to attain an introduction price for the product. The authors draw on consumer price perception literature, Monroe's pricing discretion model, and numerical cognition literature to develop hypotheses about the impact of price‐setting practices on new product market performance and price level. By studying the effects on market performance and price level, the paper provides insights that may help explain the growth of new products and address the problems of underpricing. The hypotheses are tested in a management survey of 144 production and service companies. The results indicate which pricing practices are superior for the achievement of either higher market performance or higher prices in specific product and market conditions. Whereas value‐informed pricing has an unambiguous positive impact on relative price level and market performance, the results also suggest that in many cases engaging in value‐informed pricing is not enough. The effects of cost‐informed and competition‐informed pricing may differ depending upon the objective (market performance or higher prices), product conditions (product advantage and relative product costs), and market condition (competitive intensity). Engaging in inappropriate pricing practices leads to a decline in new product performance. Moreover, bad pricing practices make the positive effect of product advantage on the outcome variables disappear. The latter finding suggests that companies can jeopardize their efforts and investments in the new product development process if they engage in the wrong price‐setting practices. The findings imply that managers should consider different factors in new product pricing. First, when launching a new product, they should determine their explicit pricing objective, either stressing market performance or a higher price level. To determine the most appropriate pricing practices, however, they should next assess their situation in terms of product advantage, relative product costs, and competitive intensity. Together with the pricing objective, these conditions determine the best pricing practice. On a higher level, the findings imply that companies should invest in knowledge development in order to engage in the appropriate pricing practices for each product launch.     

Price Discrimination with Demarketing

We study how demarketing interacts with pricing decisions to explain why and when it can be employed as the seller's optimal strategy. In our model, a monopolistic seller offers different price‐quality bundles of the product. A consumer's preference is private information. With demarketing, consumers must make a costly effort to purchase and/or utilize the product, whereas with marketing, the seller instead makes the effort so that the consumer's purchasing decision is independent of the cost of effort. Our result suggests that, for small or large effort costs, it is optimal for the seller to engage in marketing. For intermediate effort costs, however, demarketing can be optimal. With demarketing, the seller induces only the consumers with high valuation to make transaction effort. By doing so, the seller can price discriminate more effectively, thus extracting more surplus. We extend our analysis to the case where the seller can offer special deals through exclusive sales channels along with demarketing. Then, demarketing can be optimal even for large costs of effort.     

How New Product Introductions Affect Sales Management Strategy: The Impact of Type of "Newness" of the New Product

How do firms adjust sales management strategy for new product launch? Does sales management strategy change more radically for different types of new products such as new‐to‐the‐world products versus product revisions? Because firms introducing a new product rely considerably on their sales force in the product launch effort, the types and degree of changes made in managing the selling effort are important issues. Past studies have demonstrated that firms make substantial adjustments in their sales management strategy when they introduce a new product. This study expands on previous investigations by examining whether sales management strategy changes are conditioned by the type of newness of the new product to the market and to the firm. Australian sales managers were asked to respond to a mail questionnaire concerning pre‐ and post‐new product launch sales management activities. Three groups of firms were compared: (1) those with new‐to‐the‐market and new‐to‐the‐firm products (i.e., new‐to‐the‐world products); (2) those with products new to the firm but not new to the market; and (3) those with products that are revisions to the firm and not new to the market. The study finds that firms do not make the most adjustments for products with the greatest degree of market newness—the new‐to‐the‐world types of products—except in the sales management strategy categories of compensation and supervision. In the other sales management strategy categories defined for study—organization, training, quotas and goals, and sales support as well as for all categories in the aggregate—sales management strategy changes were greatest in incidence, as measured both by the percent of firms making changes and the average number of changes per firm, when the new product was new to the firm but not new to the market. These results suggest that, because different types of new products face different competitive environments, there may be greater incentive for a not‐new‐to‐the‐market new‐to‐the‐firm product to make changes in sales strategy. Uncertainties about market size and customer location with new‐to‐the‐world products may limit the understanding of what changes to make in the strategy categories of quotas and territories. Similarly, uncertainties about product use and customer acceptance of new‐to‐the‐world products may limit the development of training and sales support materials by these firms. Instead, these firms may rely more on compensation and supervision to direct sales efforts for new‐to‐the‐world products. However, observing the market experience and performance of the first‐to‐market product can benefit firms launching a not‐new‐to‐market and new‐to‐the‐firm product, allowing them to rely more on strategy changes in training, sales support materials, organizational adjustments such as redeployments, and quotas.     

Organizing for knowledge generation: internal knowledge networks and the contingent effect of external knowledge sourcing

Research summary : When faced with a new technological paradigm, incumbent firms can opt for internal development and/or external sourcing to obtain the necessary new knowledge. We explain how the effectiveness of external knowledge sourcing depends on the properties of internal knowledge production. We apply a social network lens to delineate interpersonal, intra‐firm knowledge networks and capture the emergence of two important firm‐level properties: the incumbent's internal potential for knowledge recombination and the level of knowledge coordination costs. We rely on firm‐level internal knowledge networks to dynamically track the emergence of these properties across 106 global pharmaceutical companies over a 25‐year time period. We find that a firm's success in developing knowledge in a new technological paradigm using external knowledge sourcing is contingent on these internal knowledge properties . Managerial summary : Incumbent firms in high‐tech industries often face competence‐destroying technological change. In their effort to adapt and develop new knowledge in a novel paradigm, incumbent firms have several corporate strategy options available to them: internal knowledge development and a wide array of external knowledge sourcing strategies, including alliances and acquisitions. In this study, we make an effort to address a critical question: How effective is external knowledge sourcing under different internal knowledge generation regimes? We find that external sourcing strategies are less effective when firms can already internally generate new knowledge or if they have high internal coordination costs. Therefore, when considering external sourcing, managers must carefully weigh the benefits of it vis‐à‐vis its commensurate costs as the benefits of external sourcing may be overstated . Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competitive targeted online advertising

This paper examines how an online publisher utilizes its information about consumer preference to target advertising. In our model, two firms first bid for a prominent ad position in a publisher-organized position auction, and then compete on price in the subsequent product marketplace. We consider two dimensions of consumer heterogeneity. First, consumers are heterogeneous in product preference. Based on their tastes, some consumers prefer one product over the other, whereas other consumers may rank the products in an opposite order. Second, consumers differ in search preference, i.e., “nonshoppers” only consider the advertised product, while “shoppers” always search both firms’ products before buying. We show that targeted advertising based on product preference will mitigate price competition in product markets as well as competition in position auctions, the latter to the detriment of the publisher. In contrast, targeted advertising based on search preference always benefits the publisher, as the winning firm can charge monopoly prices to nonshoppers. We show that the publisher’s optimal choice is to utilize only the information about consumer search preference. We also explore the welfare implications of targeted advertising based on different types of consumer preference.     

Cooperation and the Ability to Minimize the Time and Cost of New Product Development within the Spanish Automotive Supplier Industry

New product development (NPD) cycle time has become a strategic competitive weapon for corporations and a focus for research on product development management. Reducing NPD cycle time may create relative advantages in market share, profit, and long‐term competitiveness. This article follows recent research that already has moved beyond anecdotes and case studies to test factors empirically and variables that are associated with the company's NPD time and cost minimization abilities. One emerging research area is the impact of comprehensive lists or sets of firm variables (not project variables) on the ability to speed up NPD. At the same time, several authors' findings suggest a contingency approach to speeding up innovation. Contingency theory argues that there is not one “best answer” to a particular problem: Instead, the appropriateness of managerial interventions is dependent on the prevailing conditions that surround that problem. On the issue of NPD, several scholars point out that cooperation accelerates learning and product development: Firms that combine resources can gain a competitive advantage over firms that are unable to do so, and this is viewed as one of the key benefits of interfirm cooperation. A firm's network of cooperations represent a valuable resource that can yield differential returns in the same way as other tangible and intangible assets such as product brands or R&D capabilities. Combining both lines of research, this study seeks to add to the growing literature and further to inform practicing managers in speeding up NPD by analyzing the relationship between cooperation and the use of some NPD firm practices. This article shows the results of a survey of 63 Spanish automotive suppliers to test the moderation effect of cooperation in the relationship between the use of NPD firm practices and the company's NPD time and cost minimization abilities. Factor and regression analyses were used to test the article's hypotheses. It was found that high‐cooperation companies used more intensively sets of firm practices than low‐cooperation companies. It also was found that two out of four identified factors of NPD firm practices—Design‐Manufacturing Interface and Cross‐Functional Design—were related positively to the company's NPD time and cost minimization abilities in the subsample of high‐cooperation companies but not in the low‐cooperation companies. These results support late research in the area of speeding up NPD. The article discusses some implications for managers.     

Knowledge complexity and the performance of inter‐unit knowledge replication structures

Research Summary: Intra‐firm replication of complex knowledge is difficult yet critical to firm growth and the exploitation of competitive advantage. Inter‐unit organizational structures can facilitate the replication of complex knowledge between a source unit and a recipient unit. This study examines how inter‐unit organizational structures perform at different levels of knowledge complexity. We dimensionalize the patterns of information‐processing interactions according to three specific factors: the degree of inter‐unit connectivity, the extent of mirroring between the structure and the knowledge configuration, and coordination mechanisms. Simulation analyses offer a set of novel findings on how the information‐processing and bounded‐rationality concerns of organizational design impact the replication performance of the structures. We derive optimal structures for different levels of knowledge complexity, and articulate their theoretical and practical implications. Managerial Summary: The growth of firms often involves redeployment of their complex knowledge to new subunits or markets, in the context of acquisitions, alliances, or the creation of multinational subsidiaries. Complex knowledge is difficult to imitate, and thus, serves as a source of competitive advantage. However, it is also challenging to replicate within a firm, which limits firms’ ability to redeploy their capabilities in pursuit of new opportunities. A proper design of inter‐unit structures can facilitate the replication of complex knowledge between intra‐firm units. This study examines how the design of inter‐unit structures affects the outcome of this replication. Our results suggest that managers in charge of redeployment efforts should be mindful of the connectivity among units, coordination mechanisms, information overload, and the level of knowledge complexity.     

Intra‐industry diversification and firm performance

We study how intra‐industry product diversity affects firm performance by analyzing the implications of expanding a firm's product line within its core business. We conjecture that increases in product diversity initially undermine performance because of negative transfer effects but then improve it due to economies of scope. We further theorize that this U‐shaped effect of product diversity becomes more pronounced as the firm increases the intensity of its technology investment, yet is likely to be attenuated by the firm's accumulated experience with intra‐industry diversification. Data on 156 U.S.‐based software firms operating from 1990 to 2001 furnish support for these conjectures. Our study advances emerging research on intra‐industry diversification by underscoring some of its contingent performance effects. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate capital allocation: a behavioral perspective

Previous research on capital investment has identified a tendency in multibusiness firms toward cross‐subsidization from well‐performing to poorly performing divisions, a phenomenon that has previously been attributed to principal‐agent conflicts between headquarters and divisions (Stein, 2003 ). In this paper, we argue that cross‐subsidization reflects a more general tendency toward even allocation over all divisions in multibusiness firms that is driven, at least in part, by the cognitive tendency to naïvely diversify when making investment decisions (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001 ). We observe that this tendency also leads to partition dependence in which capital allocations vary systematically with the divisions and subdivisions into which the firm is organized or over which capital is allocated. Our first study uses archival data to show that firms' internal capital allocations are biased toward equality over the number of business units into which the firm is partitioned. Two further experimental studies of experienced managers examine whether this bias persists when participants are asked to allocate capital to various divisions of a hypothetical firm. This methodology eliminates the possibility of agency conflicts. Nevertheless, allocations varied systematically with the divisional and subdivisional structure of the firm and with a centralized or decentralized capital allocation manner. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal pricing and advertising strategy for introducing a new business product with threat of competitive entry

The problem of optimal joint pricing and advertising decision making for a new product facing potential competitive entry has received inadequate attention. We propose a model that attempts to find the optimal price-advertising frontier in the face of potential competitive entry that maximizes total discounted profits for pre- and post-entry periods. We find that a firm would charge the price that equates price elasticity to marginal revenue product of advertising (as predicted by [Dorfman, R. and Steiner, P.O. (1954), Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality, American Economic Review, 44(5), 826-836.]) only when the potential effects of pricing and advertising on its market share are not considered. Under optimal conditions, aware that market share is subject to erosion, the firm charges a somewhat lower price than the profit maximizing price, and sets an advertisement expense that is somewhat higher than the profit-maximizing advertising level as predicted by Cournot's monopolistic setting. We illustrate the applicability of our model using business product examples taken from several industries including operating systems, software, pharmaceutical, and telephone switching. Directions for future research with implications for B2B managers (for example, the possible effects of preannouncement to forestall competitive entry) are discussed.     

INPUT PRICE DISCRIMINATION WHEN BUYERS OPERATE IN MULTIPLE MARKETS*

This paper revisits third‐degree price discrimination when input buyers serve multiple product markets. Such circumstances are prevalent since buyers often use the same input to produce different outputs, and even homogenous outputs are routinely sold through different locations. The typical view is that price discrimination stifles efficiency (and welfare) by resulting in price concessions to less efficient firms. When buyers serve multiple markets, price discrimination leads to price breaks for firms in markets with lower demand. When lower demand markets also have less competition, price discrimination can provide welfare gains by shifting output to less competitive markets.