The Meritocratic Elite vs. the Common Man: Income Inequality in the Affluent OECD Countries

Our goal is to highlight the relationship between vested interests of the meritocratic elite and the deteriorating situation of the common man. We provide an example of rising income inequality in selected OECD countries over the past thirty years. Income inequality is growing, despite the increase in labor productivity based on technological progress, which we prove by using robust panel regression models. Our findings could be explained by the effect of “extreme meritocracy” that describes a situation in which wages for “the working rich” are growing faster than their productivity, and creating wage stagnation for the middle-class workers.     

Economic inequality and paretian welfare economics: Some insinuating questions

This paper examines the academic soundness of the Pareto welfare criterion as a normative rule for evaluating alternative economic inequality scenarios and suggests that the criterion has several weaknesses, which weaken its usefulness. First, the Pareto principle is of limited use in the inequality debate because labor markets hardly satisfy the conditions of perfect competition, the pivotal assumption of the theory. Second, the proposition that competitive equilibrium leads to the “common good” of society is difficult to defend. Third, the Paretian welfare economics barely answers the questions society demands, because perfect competition does not guarantee fairness in the determination of relative prices in the initial situation of income distribution. Fourth, in the distribution theory, the marginal productivity principle determines the rewards to the factors of production. If we assume that rent, wage and interest incomes are determined by this theory, then questions arise about how profits, the potentially huge surpluses generated by the businesses, are distributed. Fifth, income distribution, being a public policy topic, is a political issue. However, Pareto's primary motivation in formulating the principle was to alienate the income distribution debate from political and policy discourses. Finally, by invoking the Pareto principle, economists are in fact avoiding the real issues of the public debate on personal distribution of income. Personal income distribution truly refers to division of income generated by a group of people working together and therefore, ought to be analysed with reference to the sector of employment. Thus, Tommy Franks' earning should be compared with that of a private, while an ordinary worker's salary should be compared with that of the CEO. History testifies that the public earning structure is much more equitable than that of the private sector. This poses a very serious question: Which earning structure reflects improvement in social welfare: public or private?     

Economic growth and poverty traps in sub-Saharan Africa: The role of education and TFP shocks

This paper investigates the “education-total factor productivity trade-off” in explaining income per worker differences between sub-Saharan (unlucky) and G7 (lucky) economies. First, we examine the dynamics of average years of schooling (i.e. education), capital per worker, income per worker, and total factor productivity (TFP) across sub-Saharan and G7 countries. We confirm that physical capital and education levels partially explain income per worker differences between lucky and unlucky economies. Second, we undertake a novel examination of the impact of technology shocks on income per worker, with the goal of understanding the role of technology variation in causing cross-country income per worker differences, and as a potential contributor to overall slow growth in the sub-Saharan region. In a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework, we show that the impact of “ad hoc” TFP shocks on income per worker is larger in unlucky economies than in lucky ones. We observe that average TFP volatility in the “unlucky world” is eight times higher than in the “G7 world”. We argue that the order of magnitude of the impact heavily depends on the level of the TFP volatility. Last, we suggest that the documented differences in the amount of physical capital and in the productivity of human capital between these two regions add conceptual support for the existence of poverty traps for sub-Saharan Africa.     

The Evolution of the Veblenian Dichotomy: Veblen,Hamilton, Ayres,and Foster

One of the most troubling developments in recent years has been widening income inequality in the United States and elsewhere. We argue Post Keynesian Institutionalism (PKI) provides insight into the causes of increasing income inequality and our contribution is threefold. First, we compare PKI to the “financialization” literature, noting key similarities and differences. Second, we examine changes in financial structure and income inequality for a sample of developed nations, showing that financialization has increased in nearly all the countries sampled and that this increase has generally been accompanied by a rise in income inequality. Third, we demonstrate that the development of modern financial structures does not preclude an expansive welfare state and egalitarian public policies. Our finding is congruent with Hyman Minsky's conception of PKI, which stressed both that “economic systems are not natural systems” and that capitalism comes in as many varieties as Heinz has of pickles.     

Economic Growth Evens Out Happiness: Evidence from Six Surveys

In spite of the great U‐turn that saw income inequality rise in Western countries in the 1980s, happiness inequality has fallen in countries that have experienced income growth (but not in those that did not). Modern growth has reduced the share of both the “very unhappy” and the “perfectly happy.” Lower happiness inequality is found both between and within countries, and between and within individuals. Our cross‐country regression results suggest that the extension of various public goods helps to explain this greater happiness homogeneity. This new stylized fact arguably comes as a bonus to the Easterlin paradox, offering a somewhat brighter perspective for developing countries.     

Income Inequality and Workers’ Powerlessness in Selected OECD Countries

Our goal is to show the effects of “elitization” on income inequality in affluent countries over the last two decades. By applying a robust regression model on a sample of twenty-one OECD countries, we observe that a high concentration of wealth by the richest “1%” of the population results in reducing the impact of trade unions on income redistribution through political institutions. Insufficient redistribution can be interpreted not only as the elites’ control over the resources that influence public policy and opinion, but also as affecting the evolutionary path of the economy. Moreover, this influence emphasizes the importance of traditional institutions and serves as an inspiration to reconsider the established social consensus regarding the welfare state.     

Can the link between functional and personal income distribution enhance the analysis of inequality?

The aim of this paper is to present a framework which links functional and personal income distribution. In the first part of the paper, Piketty’s book “Capital in the XXI Century” is briefly reviewed. Piketty’s framework is discussed arguing that it can only partially explain levels and changes within personal income distribution. Piketty links the returns from capital r to the rate of growth of national income g in a very innovative way comparing them within a macroeconomic framework. He claims that when returns on capital rise more quickly than the overall economy and taxes on capital remain low, a vicious circle of ever-growing dynastic wealth and growing concentration of wealth takes place. However, the rise in the inequality of personal income distribution cannot only be explained by the rise of capital incomes. An analysis of the generation of personal incomes, and consequently of inequality, requires a suitable framework that links incomes at the macroeconomic level (national accounts) and incomes at the level of the individual/household. It is possible to set up this framework starting from individual endowments and their link to the productive structure: that is to what can be called the “generating function of personal income.” This function transforms personal endowments into personal earnings, given the productive structure, the technologies, and the market rules that determine the functional distribution. Personal income distribution and its inequality are linked to the functional one through the shares of capital and labor owned by each individual. The framework introduced here seems to be a suitable tool to account for the fact that personal income distribution is inextricably tied up to different sources of inequality in the distribution of national income. Sources come from institutional and productive structures (matrix Y), but also from the distribution of endowments and of individual/household entitlements (matrix S). This approach, we argue, allows for the assessment and evaluation of the effects of “ambitious new policies,” aimed at reducing poverty and inequality ex-ante, as suggested by Atkinson in his last book.     

The role of human capital and innovation in economic development: evidence from post-Malthusian Prussia

The effect of human capital on growth involves multiple channels. On the one hand, an increase in human capital directly affects economic growth by enhancing labor productivity in production. On the other hand, human capital is an important input into R&D and therefore increases labor productivity indirectly by accelerating technological change. In addition, different types of human capital such as basic and higher education or training-on-the-job might play different roles in both production and innovation activities. We merge individual data on valuable patents granted in Prussia in the late nineteenth-century with county-level data on literacy, craftsmanship, secondary schooling, and income tax revenues to explore the complex relationship between various types of human capital, innovation, and income. We find that the Second Industrial Revolution can be seen as a transition period when it comes to the role of human capital. As in the preceding First Industrial Revolution, “useful knowledge” embodied in master craftsmen was related to innovation, especially of independent inventors. As in the subsequent twentieth century, the quality of basic education was associated with both workers’ productivity and firms’ R&D processes. In a final step, we show that literacy had also a negative effect on fertility which increased with innovation. In general, our findings support the notion that the accumulation of basic human capital was crucial for the transition to modern economic growth.     

INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITIES VS. INEQUALITY OF OUTCOMES: ARE WESTERN SOCIETIES ALL ALIKE?

This paper analyzes the relationship between income inequality and inequality of opportunities for income acquisition in nine developed countries during the 1990s. Equality of opportunity is defined as the situation where income distributions conditional on social origin cannot be ranked according to stochastic dominance criteria. We measure social origin by parental education and occupation and use the database built by Roemer et al. (2003 ). Stochastic dominance is assessed using nonparametric statistical tests. Our results indicate strong disparities in the degree of equality of opportunity across countries and a strong correlation between inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunity. The U.S. and Italy show up as the most unequal countries in terms of both outcome and opportunity. At the opposite extreme, income distributions conditional on social origin are almost the same in Scandinavian countries even before any redistributive policy. We complement the ordinal comparison by resorting to an original scalar “Gini” index of opportunities, which can be decomposed into a risk and a return component. In our sample, inequality of opportunity is mostly driven by differences in mean income conditional on social origin, and differences in risk compensate the return element in most countries.     

MEASURING SUB‐NATIONAL INCOME POVERTY BY USING A SMALL AREA MULTIVARIATE APPROACH

The present paper proposes a statistical strategy for the analysis of regional disparities in income poverty. For the EU countries, information on individual income has been collected until now by the European Community Household Panel survey, which only yields reliable estimates for very large regions within countries. In order to obtain reliable estimates for some of the poverty indicators suggested by the Laeken Council at the sub‐national level, we suggest the adoption of a multivariate small area estimation approach which enables us to reduce estimate variability. We concentrate on Italy, the country with the lowest degree of regional cohesion within the EU. Results show that disparity cannot be reduced to the so‐called “North–South divide,” with the “poor” South separated from the “affluent” North, as both these macro‐regions display large internal differences in terms of both poverty level and income inequality. The strategy we propose could also be adopted in order to measure poverty in other European regions, using information produced by the new EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions, which is replacing the European Community Household Panel.     

Sorting and inequality in Canadian schools

A student's peers are often thought to influence his or her educational outcomes. If so, an unequal distribution of advantaged and disadvantaged students across schools (“sorting”) in a community will amplify existing inequalities. This paper explores the relationship between the degree of sorting across schools within a community and educational inequality as measured by the variance of standardized high school exam scores within the community. Cross-sectional OLS estimates suggest that the variance of test scores is related to sorting by ethnicity, but not to sorting by income or parental education. We then implement two strategies for addressing endogeneity in the degree of sorting: a standard unobserved effects (first-difference) approach, and a first-difference/instrumental variables approach in which the structure of school choice (number and relative size of schools) is used to construct instruments for the degree of sorting. The results from both approaches indicate that the variance of test scores is related to sorting by home language and parental education, but not to sorting by income. Our results also suggest that reducing sorting would have little effect on inequality of outcomes in the typical Alberta community, but would have substantial effects in the larger cities.     

Perceptions of inequality

Individual perceptions of (income or wealth) inequality have strong effects on their decisions as economic agents or voters. It is therefore important to know more about the relation between perceived and measured inequality. We present a novel formal framework that is based on the assumption that people typically do not observe the entire income (wealth) distribution and that their guesses about the extent of inequality are based on “self-centered” reference groups. This framework predicts that perceptions of inequality will change along positions in the income distribution and that for a specific position various dimensions of inequality perception are related to each other. First, low (high) income individuals overestimate (underestimate) their own position. Second, subjective estimates of average earnings increase with the own income position. Third, high or low income people have different perceptions about the skewness and the “shape” of the income distribution (e.g. pyramid or diamond). Fourth, the subjective perception of inequality is lower for high-income individuals. Survey data from 40 countries provide strong support for the framework.     

Income Polarization of the U.S. Working Class: An Institutionalist View

We provide an institutional insight into the trend of income polarization within the U.S. working class. In contrast to the previous industrial waves, the current and ongoing industrial revolution is characterized by the replacement of “creative destruction” with jobless growth. Instead of replacing the lost jobs with new ones, new disruptive technologies eliminate more jobs in traditional labor and capital-intensive sectors than create jobs in new idea-intensive sectors. By examining the relationship between the income share of the bottom 50 percent, the middle 40 percent, and the top 10 percent and technological progress, we obtain robust econometric results. According to our results, the income polarization among U.S. workers can be associated with the shift of R&D activities from the public to the corporate sector. The concentration of innovations by corporate capital limits the power of society to reduce inequality and to provide greater social stability through “the incredible productivity” of technological progress.     

United States income inequality: The concept of countervailing power revisited

This article uses some of the conceptual infrastructure associated with J.K. Galbraith’s “countervailing power” argument to explore the deep history of U.S. income inequality. Two explanatory variables—institutional power and distributive conflict—have played an integral role in the shifting patterns of U.S. income inequality since the late nineteenth century. The “commodified” power of large firms, manifested in aggregate concentration and the markup, exacerbates inequality while the “countervailing” power of organized labor, manifested in union density and strike activity, mitigates inequality. One implication of this research is that U.S. income inequality is unlikely to diminish unless the labor movement (or a comparable social movement) is strengthened.     

LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION, RACE AND HUMAN CAPITAL: INFLUENCE ON EARNINGS DISTRIBUTIONS ACROSS STATES

In this paper we analyze the level of income inequality across states in 1970 and 1980 for several demographic groups. Furthermore, we examine the impact of labor force participation (LFP), education and other variables on inequality. We find that for tshe whole population, states with high LFP by females are states with low income inequality. The same holds true for states with high LFP for men. When we disaggregate by race, the results are quite consistent for whites, but not for blacks. States with relatively high education levels are associated with high inequality levels for the white cohort and the whole population, but there appears to be no similar association between education and inequality across states for blacks.     

Progressive Tax and Inequality in a Unionized Economy*

In this paper, we develop a heterogeneous-agent, endogenous growth model of a unionized economy with distinct progressive tax schedules on labor and capital income. With time preference heterogeneity, the effective labor force, balanced growth, and income inequality are endogenously determined, and these interact with each other. A reduction in the degree of progressive labor tax yields a “double-dividend” in terms of reducing income inequality and boosting economic growth, while capital income progressivity displays the usual growth–inequality trade-off. Particularly, the double-dividend effect becomes more pronounced when unionization is declined or trade unions become more wage-oriented, leading to the so-called “Cheshire cat” phenomenon.     

中国农村的收入差距与健康

随着收入差距的扩大,收入分配对健康和健康不平等的影响日益受到关注。本文利用中国健康营养调查(CHNS)1997年和2000年农村的面板数据回答两个问题:收入差距对健康的影响以及影响健康的方式;收入差距的扩大是否会导致健康不平等的加剧,尤其是低收入人群的健康是否受到更为不利的影响。研究发现,首先收入差距对健康的影响存在滞后效应;其次,收入差距对健康的影响呈现“倒U”型,在收入差距较高时,收入差距对健康的影响主要为负向的,一个可能的原因是收入差距影响到公共卫生设施的供给。再次,收入差距的扩大会加强收入效应,其含义是如果低收入人群的收入更容易受到负向冲击,那么收入差距对低收入人群的健康更为不利。     

The Inequality of Incomes in the UK: an essay in memory of Professor Sir Henry Phelps Brown

Using Henry Phelps Brown's distinction between discrimination before and within the labour market, this paper first reviews the inequality of achievements and incomes of an imaginary cohort of people passing through the life cycle of birth, infancy, schooling, further education and into the labour market. At each stage appropriate policies for reducing inequality by “levelling up"” are examined. Secondly, it summarises the unprecedented increase in income inequality in the 1980s and 1990s (after the period studied so extensively by Henry Phelps Brown) and discusses the role of a progressive taxation policy in the “leveling up” process.     

Does income inequality sand or grease the wheels of entrepreneurial activity? International evidence

Using a large panel of countries, this research examines the influence of income inequality on entrepreneurship. The impact of income disparities on entrepreneurship is not clear a priori—with a positive effect when inequality encourages entrepreneurship (“greasing effect”) or a negative effect when entrepreneurship discourages entrepreneurship (“sanding effect”). Our findings, across alternative measures of income inequality and even allowing for simultaneity, are consistent with the motivation or greasing effect. An equally insightful finding is that the effect of inequality switches across the prevalence of entrepreneurship—the sanding effect exists in nations with a low prevalence of entrepreneurship, and switches to a greasing effect as the prevalence of entrepreneurship increases. This is suggestive of positive network externalities from entrepreneurship—it takes a threshold level of entrepreneurship in a nation for greasing from income inequality to take hold.