The Enforcement of Income Tax Laws: Efficiency Implications*

Complete enforcement of income tax laws, designed to reduce income tax evasion to zero, is shown to be inefficient. Starting from a 'full compliance' policy, it is shown that a marginal reduction in enforcement will always allow for tax reductions, hence increases in the ex-ante utility levels of taxpayers. Only if the tax structure is rigid can full compliance be optimal.     

New estimates of labour supply elasticities for married women in Canada 1996–2005

In this article, we estimate income and substitution labour supply and participation elasticities for Canadian married women using data from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics 1996–2005. We use the Canadian Tax and Credit Simulator (CTaCS) and detailed information on the structure of income at the household level to compute the marginal tax rates faced by each individual. We then use these marginal tax rates to compute net own-wage, spouse-wage, and nonlabour income. We show how the magnitude of the estimated elasticities varies depending on whether net or gross wages and income are used in the estimation procedure, and quantify biases caused by using average tax rates instead of marginal tax rates. Finally, because marginal tax rates vary significantly over the sample, we use quantile regressions to compare elasticities at different points of the hours distribution. Overall, our results show that public policies now have, on average, less scope for influencing hours of work than 10 years ago. However, the quantile results show that wives working fewer hours per week are more sensitive to changes in their own or spouses’ wages.     

Flat tax? Maybe not a bad idea after all

This work studies the actual degree of progressivity in the Italian tax and transfer system and examines possible reforms towards the optimum. It analyzes the distribution of personal income and effective tax rates across the Italian population, computing income and tax liabilities from survey data, and studies the optimal level of progressivity. To this end, it uses a model developed in Heathcote et al. (2017) with heterogeneous agents where skill investment and labor supply are endogenous and the government provides a public good under a balanced budget. All the main tradeoffs that shape optimal progressivity appear: the presence of inequality in initial conditions and imperfect private insurance push for positive progressivity, whereas labor supply and skill investment call for regressivity. The model suggests a drastic reduction in progressivity under both the baseline and the alternative specifications. In particular, it calls for substantial reductions in marginal tax rates above approximately 0.25 times the mean income along with increased tax rates at the lower end of the income distribution. These reforms may be approximated by a flat tax at 29% under the baseline and at 32.5% under the alternative specification, holding the required positive level of progressivity constant.     

Tax revenue and the marginal cost of public funds in Sweden

We assess the welfare cost of raising a marginal unit of tax revenue in a balanced-budget, general-equilibrium framework. The calculated social cost of an increment of public funds is sensitive to both the specific type of tax increase and the type of public spending used on the margin. ‘Best-guess’ assumptions on labor supply elasticities yield marginal costs of public funds for different fiscal mixes of between 0.67 and 4.51 at prevailing tax rates in Sweden. Alternative labor supply assumptions well within the range of current estimates substantially affect the results and can imply infinite marginal welfare costs. Marginal welfare costs are also sensitive to assumptions about both the income and substitution effects of labor supply.     

On the marginal excess burden of taxation in an overlapping generations model

We extend marginal excess burden (MEB) analysis in public finance literature to a dynamic general equilibrium model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous households. This extension allows us to quantitatively assess efficiency ranking and incidence of taxes. Our results indicate a disparity in welfare cost and distributional consequence of different forms of taxation on capital, labor and consumption. According to our MEB ranking, capital income taxation appears to be least efficient as it results in larger marginal excess burdens, compared to labor income tax and consumption tax. The tax incidence analysis shows variation of tax burdens across households, depending on their age, income type and generation. In particular, older households with higher income bear the highest burden of company income tax; meanwhile, future born households bear the highest burden of personal income tax. Hence, our MEB analysis demonstrates a fruitful approach to better understanding efficiency and incidence of tax reforms in one unified framework.     

Nonlinear Pricing, Redistribution, and Optimal Tax Policy

This paper examines the role of nonlinear pricing by public (or regulated) utilities as a redistributive mechanism in presence of an optimal nonlinear income tax. It models an economy with many types of persons who differ in two unobservable characteristics (earning abilities and tastes). We show that nonlinear pricing does have a redistributive role; it is not a substitute for an ill-designed tax policy. We prove, assuming separable preferences, that a person whose valuation of the public sector output is smaller than the average valuation of the population (all measured at the same consumption bundle) must face a marginal price for the good above its marginal cost. Further assuming that tastes and earning abilities are perfectly correlated, we prove that everyone must face a marginal price for the public sector's output which strictly exceeds its marginal cost if correlation is positive. These properties provide an economic rationale for the provision of "support for low-income consumers" as mandated by the universal service and similar regulatory policies. Finally, we show that with correlated characteristics, implementation can be achieved through two separate functions: a pricing function that depends only on the public sector output and a tax function that depends only on income.     

Top marginal taxation and economic growth

The article explores the relationship between top marginal tax rates on personal income and economic growth. Using a data set of consistently measured top marginal tax rates for a panel of 18 OECD countries over the period 1965–2009, this article finds evidence in favour of a quadratic top tax–growth relationship. This represents the first reported evidence of a nonmonotonic significant relationship between top marginal income tax rates and economic growth. The point estimates of the regressions suggest that the marginal effect of higher top tax rates becomes negative above a growth-maximizing tax rate in the order of 60%. As top marginal tax rates observed after 1980 are below the estimated growth-maximizing level in most of the countries considered, a positive linear relationship between top marginal tax rates and GDP growth is found over the sub-period 1980–2009. Overall, results show that raising top marginal tax rates which are below their growth maximizing has the largest positive impact on growth when the related additional revenues are used to finance productive public expenditure, reduce budget deficits or reduce some other form of distortionary taxation.     

Optimal top marginal tax rates under income splitting for couples

This paper provides formulas for optimal top marginal tax rates when couples are taxed according to income splitting between spouses, consumption is taxed, and the skill distribution is unbounded. Optimal top marginal income tax rates are computed for Germany using a dataset that includes the tax returns of all German top taxpayers. We find that the optimal top marginal tax rate converges to about 2/3 and convergence obtains at income levels that are substantially higher than those currently subject to the actual top tax rate.     

The Cost of Public Funds in Australia*

A model of labour supply is used to calculate Australia's marginal cost of public funds, which is the appropriate cut-off benefit/ cost ratio for an additional public project. The labour supply model incorporates effective average and marginal tax rates faced by the representative household in each gross income decile. These rates are estimated from the ABS 1988–89 Household Expenditure Survey. A simulation analysis is performed to calculate the effect on labour supply of a 1 per cent increase in marginal tax rates. The estimated changes in tax revenues and deadweight loss in each decile are used to estimate the marginal cost of public funds.     

The political economy of contributive pensions in developing countries

This paper sheds light on the role of public institutions as a way to reduce tax evasion through a close link between payroll taxation and pension benefits. We use a political economy model in which agents have the possibility to hide part of their earnings in order to avoid taxation and, where the public system is more efficient in providing annuitized pension benefits than the private sector. We show that in the absence of evasion costs, agents are indifferent to the tax rate level as they can always perfectly adapt compliance so as to face their preferred effective tax rate. There is unanimity in favour of the maximum tax rate and, the public pension system is found to be partially contributive in order to increase tax compliance and thus the resources collected. This, in turn, enables higher redistribution toward the worst-off agents. When evasion costs are introduced, perfect substitutability between compliance and taxation breaks down. At the majority-voting equilibrium, individuals at the bottom of the income distribution who are in favour of more redistribution, and those at the top who want to transfer more resources to the old age, form a coalition against middle-income agents, in favour of high tax rates. In addition to the previous tax base argument, the optimal level of the Bismarkian pillar is now chosen so as to account for political support.     

Fairness in tax compliance: A political competition model

This paper analyzes the political economy of income redistribution when voters are concerned about fairness in tax compliance. We consider a two‐stage model where there is a two‐party competition over the tax rate and over the intensity of the tax enforcement policy in the first stage, and voters decide about their level of tax compliance in the second stage. We find that if the concern about fairness in tax compliance is high enough, a liberal middle‐income majority of voters may block any income redistribution policy. Alternatively, we find an equilibrium in which the preferences of the median voter are ignored in favor of a coalition formed by a group of relatively poor voters and the richest voters. In this equilibrium income redistribution prevails with no tax enforcement.     

Identifying Laffer Bounds: A Sufficient‐Statistics Approach with an Application to Germany

We derive a simple sufficient‐statistics test for whether a nonlinear tax‐transfer system is second‐best Pareto efficient. If it is not, then it is beyond the top of the Laffer curve and there exists a tax cut that is self‐financing. The test depends on the income distribution, extensive and intensive labor supply elasticities, and income effect parameters. A tax‐transfer system is likely to be inefficient if marginal tax rates are quickly falling in income. We apply this test to the German tax‐transfer system, and we find that the structure of effective marginal tax rates is likely to be inefficient in the region where transfers are phased out.     

Old‐age Social Security versus Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision

This paper introduces an overlapping‐generations model with earnings heterogeneity and borrowing constraints. The labour income tax and the allocation of tax revenue between social security and forward intergenerational public goods are determined in a bidimensional majoritarian voting game played by successive generations. The political equilibrium is characterized by an ends‐against‐the‐middle equilibrium where low‐income and high‐income individuals form a coalition in favour of a lower tax rate and less social security while middle‐income individuals favour a higher tax rate and greater social security. Government spending then shifts from social security to public goods provision if higher wage inequality is associated with a borrowing constraint and a high elasticity of marginal utility of youth consumption.     

Optimal Nonlinear Redistributive Taxation and Public Good Provision in an Economy with Veblen Effects

This paper deals with the consequences of the assumption of negatively interdependent preferences for the shape of the optimal nonlinear income tax and the efficient level of public good provision in a setting where the agents' market ability is private information. The analysis points out that the terms added in the tax formulas due to the presence of Veblen effects might justify a reduction in the optimal marginal tax rates faced by the different individuals. Also, the desirability of negative marginal tax rates cannot be ruled out. With respect to the issue of the optimal level of public good provision, I derive a modified Samuelson rule and highlight the fact that the Veblen‐based part of the formula might require to distort downwards the efficient level of public good provision.     

‘Flattening’ tax evasion?

We analyze the response of tax evasion to the introduction of a flat tax in several transition economies. Using a novel estimator based on household level data, we show that in most of the countries studied there was no discernible effect on the measured size of unreported income following a flat tax reform. This may imply that decreases in marginal tax rates may frequently have been accompanied by a parallel deterioration in attitudes towards public services and the government in general. The countries that show a response to the flat tax reform appear to be those where satisfaction with government services increased.     

INCOME TAXES AND THE COMPOSITION OF PAY: EVIDENCE FROM THE BRITISH HOUSEHOLD PANEL SURVEY

According to the standard principal‐agent model, the optimal composition of pay should balance the provision of incentives with the individual demand for insurance. Do income taxes alter this balance? We show that the relative share of Performance‐related pay (PRP), on total pay is reduced by higher average and marginal income taxes. Empirical evidence based on the British Household Panel Survey is consistent with the theoretical predictions of the tax–augmented principal‐agent model. Our estimates suggest that a 10% reduction in the marginal income tax rate, holding the average tax rate constant, increases the share of PRP in total pay by 2.25–3.02%, depending on the empirical specification. Similarly, a 10% reduction in the average income tax rate, holding the marginal tax rate constant, increases the share of PRP in total pay by 5.10–5.27%.     

Tax Havens,Growth, and Welfare

This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring tax havens, and uses it to examine how the existence of tax havens affects the economic growth rate and social welfare in high‐tax countries. We show that the presence of tax havens generates two conflicting channels in determining the growth effect. First, the public investment effect states that tax havens may erode tax revenues and in turn decrease the government's infrastructure expenditure, thereby reducing growth. Second, the tax planning effect of tax havens reduces marginal cost of capital and hence encourages capital accumulation so as to spur economic growth. The overall growth effect is ambiguous and is determined by the extent of these two effects. The welfare analysis shows that tax havens are more likely to be welfare‐enhancing if the government expenditure share in production is low, or the initial income tax rate is high. Moreover, the welfare‐maximizing income tax rate is lower than the growth‐maximizing income tax rate if tax havens are present.     

Conspicuous Leisure: Optimal Income Taxation When Both Relative Consumption and Relative Leisure Matter*

In previous studies on public policy under relative‐consumption concerns, leisure comparisons have been ignored. In this paper, we consider a two‐type optimal non‐linear income tax model, in which people care about both their relative consumption and their relative leisure. Increased consumption positionality typically implies higher marginal income tax rates for both ability types, whereas leisure positionality has an offsetting role. However, this offsetting role is not symmetric; concern about relative leisure implies a progressive income tax component (i.e., a component that is larger for the high‐ability type than for the low‐ability type). Leisure positionality does not modify the policy rule for public‐good provision.     

Comparing Tax and Tax Reallocation Payments in Financing Rail Noise Abatement Programmes: Results from a Stated Choice Valuation Study in Italy

The paper examines the use of stated choice experiments (SC) to assess the economic value of alternative rail noise reduction interventions on the Brennero railway in Italy. The paper formally tests the econometric robustness of the SC estimates under three payment regimes: (a) a regional tax, where consumers must trade off welfare gains due to noise reduction for part of their income; (b) a transport tax reallocation scheme, where consumers must trade off a part of the tax payments that are currently spent on the public transport sector; and (c) an administration tax reallocation scheme, where consumers must trade off a part of the tax payments that are currently spent on the administration sector. The test results are varied. On the one hand, the SC estimates are found to be statistically different for the tax reallocation and the tax introduction regimes. This confirms previous valuation research results, and thus reiterates the hypothesis that states the inequality between marginal values of private income and public money. On the other hand, the SC estimates are not found to be statistically different for the two proposed tax reallocation regimes, suggesting that, in the case study investigated here, the marginal value of public money does not depend upon the budget source.     

The Social Marginal Valuation of Income: Australian Estimates from Government Behaviour*

Alternative public policies frequently incorporate distributional goals. The elasticity of the social marginal valuation of income, ε, can help to derive welfare weights for different individuals in different income groups. Estimates are presented of the elasticity of the social marginal valuation of income implied by the Australian personal income tax, in the period 1968–69 to 1975–76. Both equal absolute (EAS) and equal proportional sacrifice (EPS) models are used to infer the elasticity values. Using taxable income as a proxy for income, the consistent value of ε under EAS was found to range from 2.07 to 2.57; the EPS range was 1.76 to 2.40. A number of considerations suggested a best-guess magnitude of about 2.2. Caution is urged in the interpretation and use of these results.