Financing decisions when managers are risk averse

Leverage raises stock volatility, driving a wedge between the cost of debt to shareholders and the cost to undiversified, risk-averse managers. I quantify these “volatility costs” of debt and examine their impact on financing decisions. I find that: (1) the volatility costs of debt can be large for executives exposed to firm-specific risk; (2) for a range of empirically relevant parameters, higher option ownership tends to increase, not decrease, the volatility costs of debt; and (3) for managers with stock options, a stock price increase typically raises volatility costs. For a large sample of US firms, I find evidence that volatility costs affect both the level of and short-term changes in debt, and that volatility costs help explain a firm's choice between debt and equity.     

Ironing out the kinks in executive compensation: Linking incentive pay to average stock prices

Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces volatility by about 42%, making the incentive pay more attractive to risk-averse executives. Holding the cost of the option grant to the firm constant, Asian stock options are more cost effective than traditional stock options and provide stronger incentives to increase stock price. More importantly, the improvement is achieved with little impact on the option grant’s risk incentives (after adjusting for option cost). Finally, averaging also improves the value and incentive effects of indexed stock options.     

Incentive Compensation and the Stock Price Response to Dividend Increase Announcements

Linking executive compensation to stock price performance is predicted to decrease the usual positive price response to dividend increases for two reasons. One, increasing pay‐performance sensitivity (PPS) exacerbates managers' optimistic bias regarding future firm performance, reducing the credibility of dividend signals. Two, increasing pay‐performance sensitivity reduces the need for dividends as a means of reducing agency costs. Consistent with behavioral and agency theories of corporate finance, we find that price response does decrease as pay‐performance sensitivity increases and that this effect is concentrated in firms with low market‐to‐book ratios. Additional findings are most consistent with the agency cost explanation.     

Executive Financial Incentives and Payout Policy: Firm Responses to the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut

We test whether executive stock ownership affects firm payouts using the 2003 dividend tax cut to identify an exogenous change in the after‐tax value of dividends. We find that executives with higher ownership were more likely to increase dividends after the tax cut in 2003, whereas no relation is found in periods when the dividend tax rate was higher. Relative to previous years, firms that initiated dividends in 2003 were more likely to reduce repurchases. The stock price reaction to the tax cut suggests that the substitution of dividends for repurchases may have been anticipated, consistent with agency conflicts.     

Free Cash Flow,Issuance Costs,and Stock Prices

We develop a dynamic model of a firm facing agency costs of free cash flow and external financing costs, and derive an explicit solution for the firm's optimal balance sheet dynamics. Financial frictions affect issuance and dividend policies, the value of cash holdings, and the dynamics of stock prices. The model predicts that the marginal value of cash varies negatively with the stock price, and positively with the volatility of the stock price. This yields novel insights on the asymmetric volatility phenomenon, on risk management policies, and on how business cycles and agency costs affect the volatility of stock returns.     

Corporate social responsibility and the wealth gains from dividend increases

This study examines whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) influences the stock price response to dividend increase announcements and changes in subsequent operating performance. We find that dividend increasing firms with lower CSR scores elicit higher abnormal announcement returns and greater improvements in industry‐adjusted operating performance. These findings support the argument in the literature that socially responsible firms are more transparent and commit to higher ethical standards than other firms, suggesting that they suffer fewer agency and informational problems (Kim, Park, & Wier, 2012). Consequently, larger dividend payouts reduce agency costs in firms with lower CSR commitments, thereby generating higher wealth gains for shareholders.     

Executive compensation and dividend policy

This study examines the use of dividend provisions in executive compensation contracts to influence dividend policy. A sample is constructed with the largest companies in the oil and gas, defense/aerospace and food processing industries, where dividend-related agency costs are expected to be high. The results indicate that the existence of a dividend incentive in the compensation plan is positively associated with higher dividend payouts and yields, and higher annual changes in dividend levels. Evidence is also provided on firm characteristics associated with the use of a compensation contract with a dividend provision. The results are consistent with the theory that firms link compensation incentives to dividend payments to reduce conflicts between shareholders and management over dividend decisions.     

Excess funds and agency problems: an empirical study of incremental cash disbursements

This study investigates the excess funds hypothesis using samplesof special dividends, regular dividend increases, and self-tenderoffers. All three types of firms tend to have funds in excessof industry norms before the events. The excess funds are largelynonrecurring for special dividend and self-tender offer firmsand recurring for regular dividend increase firms. The analysisof the stock price reaction suggests that large incrementaldisbursements mitigate the agency problem associated with excessfunds. In particular, the stock price reaction is positivelyrelated to excess funds for self-tender offers and large specialdividends, but not for regular dividend increases (which tendto be smaller) or small special dividends.     

Regime shift,speculation, and stock price

We investigate the impacts of speculation on stock price and return volatility in a framework with regime shifting. We find that greater difference in beliefs about the probability of bad state leads to higher stock prices. The intuition is that in periods of higher dispersion of beliefs, the investors perceive greater speculative opportunities, leading to increased demands and valuations of the stock. When investors agree with each other on the state of dividend growth, they have a stronger incentive to invest in the riskless bond, when becoming more pessimistic about the dividend growth. As a result, the demand and the valuations of stock decrease. Moreover, higher level of heterogeneity in beliefs gives rise to higher volatility of the stock returns, even in the absence of dividend shocks. Furthermore, with homogeneous beliefs, return volatility with respect to investors’ beliefs follows an inverted-U shape.     

Secured debt and managerial incentives

Financial theory holds that firms can control agency costs through the use of short-term and secured debt. We examine the relation between the use of secured debt and the incentive of the manager to increase the risk of the firm, as measured by vega. We find that firms utilize secured debt to a lesser extent when managerial volatility sensitivity is higher. Our results suggest that these same firms employ short-term debt as the primary tool to control risk-shifting. Managers with a high risk appetite avoid secured debt, but appear to do so without compromising the interests of the shareholders.     

FURTHER EVIDENCE ON DIVIDEND YIELDS AND THE EX-DIVIDEND DAY STOCK PRICE EFFECT

Ex-dividend day stock price behavior supports a tax clientele effect. This effect is still found after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Results reflect an effective tax advantage for capital gains taxes payable at realization, versus dividend taxes due quarterly. Evidence also supports short-term trader participation in the ex-day phenomenon when the difference between dividend income and the ex-dividend-day price decrease exceeds transactions costs to trade. Results contradict prior research where a tax clientele effect is not found, but align with this prior research when including a small number of contaminated observations.     

Dividends, Asymmetric Information, and Agency Conflicts: Evidence from a Comparison of the Dividend Policies of Japanese and U.S. Firms

We compare dividend policies of U.S. and Japanese firms, partitioning the Japanese data into keiretsu, independent, and hybrid firms. We examine the correlation between dividend changes and stock returns, and the reluctance to change dividends. Results are consistent with the joint hypotheses that Japanese firms, particularly keiretsu-member firms, face less information asymmetry and fewer agency conflicts than U.S. firms, and that information asymmetries and/or agency conflicts affect dividend policy. Japanese firms experience smaller stock price reactions to dividend omissions and initiations, they are less reluctant to omit and cut dividends, and their dividends are more responsive to earnings changes.     

An Investigation of the Dynamic Relationship between Agency Theory and Dividend Policy

Agency theory posits that the dividend mechanism provides an incentive for managers to reduce the costs associated with the principal/agent relationship. Distributing resources in the form of cash dividends forces managers to seek outside capital, thus causing them to reduce agency costs as they subject themselves to the scrutiny of the capital marketplace. Under this scenario the optimum level of dividend payout is that which minimizes the agency cost structure relative to the cost of raising needed funds. A test of this theory employing time-series cross-sectional analysis and more direct measures of the agency cost structure shows that these tenets of agency theory may be valid. Managers do appear to adjust the dividend payout in response to the agency cost/transaction cost structure, both through time as well as across firms.     

Executive incentives and payout policy: Empirical evidence from Europe

We investigate how corporate payout policy is influenced by executive incentives, i.e. stock and option holdings, stock option deltas and stock-based pay-performance sensitivity for 1,650 publicly listed firms from the UK, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, over the period from 2002 to 2009. Our results show that executive stock option holdings and stock option deltas are associated with lower dividend payments in our sample of European countries, where we do not observe any presence of dividend protection for executive stock options. We find that this relationship is mainly driven by exercisable stock options and by options that are in the money. Additionally, we observe that executive stock option holdings and stock option deltas have a negative impact on total payout, suggesting that executives do not substitute share repurchases for dividends. Furthermore, the fraction of share repurchases in total payout increases as executive stock option holdings and stock option deltas increase. Finally, our results show that executive share ownership and stock-based pay-performance sensitivity may mitigate agency conflicts by significantly increasing the level of total payout.     

The information content of cash dividend announcements in a unique environment

Due to its distinctive institutional background, Oman offers a valuable opportunity to examine stock price reactions to dividend announcements. In Oman, (1) there are no taxes on dividends and capital gains, (2) there is a high concentration of share ownership, (3) there is low corporate transparency, and (4) firms frequently change their dividends. Our results show that announcements of dividend increases are associated with increased stock prices, while announcements of dividend decreases cause decreases in stock prices. Firms that do not change their dividends experience insignificant negative returns. These results contradict tax-based signaling models, which argue that higher taxes on dividends relative to capital gains are a necessary condition for dividends to be informative.     

The Volatility and Price Sensitivities of Managerial Stock Option Portfolios and Corporate Hedging

We use estimates of the Black–Scholes sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility and the sensitivity of managers' stock and stock option portfolios to stock price to test the relationship between managers' risk preferences and hedging activities. We find that as the sensitivity of managers' stock and stock option portfolios to stock price increases, firms tend to hedge more. However, as the sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility increases, firms tend to hedge less.     

The Impact of Large Portfolio Insurers on Asset Prices

We develop a simple model in which the presence of portfolio insurers in a market of risk-averse traders leads to multiple equilibria for the pricing of financial assets and can cause an increase in volatility, including insurance-induced price drops. We demonstrate, however, that centralized portfolio insurance firms may actually reduce, not increase, volatility, even if the existence of these firms increases the total amount of funds under insurance.     

New Evidence That Taxes Affect the Valuation of Dividends

This paper uses British data to examine the effects of dividend taxes on investors' relative valuation of dividends and capital gains. British data offer great potential to illuminate the dividends and taxes question, since there have been two radical changes and several minor reforms in British dividend tax policy during the last 30 years. Studying the relationship between dividends and stock price movements during different tax regimes offers an ideal controlled experiment for assessing the effects of taxes on investors' valuation of dividends. Using daily data on a small sample of firms, and monthly data on a much broader sample, we find clear evidence that taxes affect the equilibrium relationship between dividend yields and market returns. These findings suggest that taxes are important determinants of security market equilibrium and deepen the puzzle of why firms pay dividends.     

Optimal Incentive Contracts for Loss‐Averse Managers: Stock Options versus Restricted Stock Grants

This paper provides an explanation for the widespread use of stock option grants in executive compensation. It shows that the optimal incentive contract for loss‐averse managers must contain a substantial portion of stock options even when it should consist exclusively of stock grants for “classical” risk‐averse managers. The paper also provides an explanation for the drastic increase in the risk‐adjusted level of CEO compensations over the past two decades and argues that more option‐based compensation should be used in firms with higher cash flow volatility and in industries with a higher degree of heterogeneity among firms.     

Stock liquidity and dividend policy: Evidence from an imputation tax environment

This paper investigates the impact of stock market liquidity on firms' dividend payout policy in the Australian market. The finding suggests that stock liquidity positively relates to firm dividend payouts. The result holds after controlling for different model estimations and different measures of stock liquidity/dividend. To address endogeneity issue, I use the removal of broker identities by the ASX in 2005 as an exogenous shock to stock liquidity. The result suggests that there is an increase in stock liquidity around this shock, leading to an increase in firm dividend, suggesting a causal effect of stock liquidity on firm dividend. I further document that stock liquidity enhances firm dividend through reducing cash-flow volatility and the effect of stock liquidity on firm dividend is weaker for firms reporting imputation tax credit.