Why NAMA Liberalisation is Good for Developing Countries

This paper reviews the criticisms that have been made of the view that trade liberalisation benefits developing countries. In particular, it focuses on mainstream NGOs’ criticisms of the NAMA negotiations. The paper firmly concludes that the belief that trade liberalisation hampers development opportunities is mistaken. Developing countries have a strong interest in a successful outcome to the NAMA negotiations and the Doha Round as a whole.     

Economic Implications of WTO Negotiations on Non‐agricultural Market Access

The economic implications of current WTO negotiations are likely to be far reaching. The World Bank and UNCTAD estimate annual global gains in agriculture and non‐agricultural products (including fish) of about $70−150 billion each under various scenarios and technical assumptions. Liberalising trade in services could be even more important, especially if agreement were reached to facilitate the temporary movement of labour (Mode 4 under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS). Some qualifications, however, are in order. First, gains are likely to be spread unevenly across countries and across sectors; and, second, short‐term adjustment costs might precede long‐term gains. Much depends on how ambitious liberalisation is and on policies to facilitate adjustment. This paper examines the Doha mandate in non‐agricultural market access (NAMA) and the current state of the WTO negotiations, in particular some key proposals being considered at the December 2005 Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong. We analyse various scenarios and their implications for trade, welfare, output, employment, revenues and preferences, as well as the distributional effects across countries and sectors. We note possible adjustment problems related to balance of payments and structural adjustment, as well as revenue and preference losses. These suggest the need for ‘aid for trade’ to help developing countries realise gains possible from WTO negotiations.     

Preference Erosion,Government Revenues and Non‐tariff Trade Barriers

Developing countries benefiting from developed country unilateral trade preferences fear that Doha Round tariff cuts will erode the value of those preferences. That these programmes confer significant benefits, however, is not clear. Studies indicate that the impact of preference erosion would be minimal for most developing countries. But for a small subset of middle‐income and least‐developed countries, concern may be warranted. WTO members, should address affected countries’ concerns, perhaps by tailoring WTO tariff negotiations to lessen adjustment pressures and providing development assistance. Developing countries also are anxious that lower tariffs will reduce government revenues. Dependence on tariff revenue is diminishing and trade liberalisation need not result in lower total tax revenues or even lower customs revenues. Much depends on a country's current tariff and trade regime, its tax structure and its overall economic structure. At some point, a country does need to broaden its tax base and look to other revenue sources to offset declining tariff revenues. Tax reform, therefore, complements trade reform. A third area of developing country concern is non‐tariff barriers (NTBs), which may limit market access even after tariffs are reduced. Despite prior WTO work in this area, NTBs remain a thorny issue for all WTO members.     

Enlarging the Vision for Trade Policy Space: Special and Differentiated Treatment and Infant Industry Issues

NAMA liberalisation alone will not be sufficient to make the Doha Round a pro‐development Round. It is important to enlarge the vision to include, for example, services and certain aspects of intellectual property rights. Further the ‘policy space’ notion often mentioned when discussing trade‐development relations should not be defined as limited to trade policy. It should include the many non‐trade instruments (e.g. subsidies or taxes on goods and factors of production) that a government could use for development purposes. Infant industry protection is the oldest, but most risky, use of trade policy as a development policy. As a policy it could be successful only in a very limited number of sectors and it has little chance of providing the broad impetus needed for development.     

Economic Partnership Agreements Between Sub‐Saharan Africa and the EU: A Development Perspective

This paper draws on Hinkle and Schiff (2003). It analyses the planned Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and Sub‐Saharan Africa (SSA) from a development perspective. It does not take a position on whether SSA should enter into EPAs with the EU. Rather, it starts from the notion that the process of forming EPAs is unlikely to be reversed and examines the conditions that will maximise SSA's benefits from the EPAs. If this notion is correct, then the analysis presented in the paper applies. On the other hand, Pascal Lamy, the EU Trade Commissioner, made a proposal at the May 2004 G‐90 summit in Dakar that might lead to a change in the EPA process. He proposed that the G‐90, a group consisting of ACP and non‐ACP LDC countries, should not have to make concessions at the WTO Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, i.e., he proposed a ‘free round’ for the G‐90. This proposal opens the door to the possibility that the same might apply to the ACP countries in the EU‐ACP negotiations and that the EPA process might be reversed. The paper considers the key issues raised by the planned EPAs, their relationship to the WTO's Doha Round and the EU's Everything‐but‐Arms Initiative, the changes needed to make the EPAs internally consistent, the domestic reforms in SSA that would need to accompany trade liberalisation in both goods and services, and the potential effects of the EPAs on regional integration in SSA. The EPAs will pose a number of policy challenges for SSA countries, including: restructuring of indirect tax systems, reduction of MFN tariffs, liberalisation of service imports on an MFN basis and related regulatory reforms in the services sector, and liberalisation of trade in both goods and services within the regional trading blocs in SSA. The paper also finds that the EPAs provide an opportunity to accelerate regional and global trade integration in SSA. To realise the potential development benefits of the planned EPAs, two steps are essential. First, the EU must, as it has stated, truly treat the EPAs as instruments of development, subordinating its commercial interests in the agreements to the development needs of SSA. Second, the SSA countries need to implement a number of EPA‐related trade policy reforms. However, the latter is far from certain, given the lack of reform momentum in SSA.     

Developing Countries in the WTO System: Applying Robert Hudec's Analysis to the Doha Round

In his 1987 Developing Countries in the GATT System, Robert Hudec concluded that the identity of developing countries in the GATT system was primarily a matter of their demanding non‐reciprocal and preferential treatment, developed countries responding grudgingly to those demands and that this situation had been unfruitful either to support developing country reforms or to discipline developed country restrictions aimed at developing countries. Hudec was pessimistic about the relationship becoming more productive, but his expression of despair offered a glimmer of hope: ‘There are those who believe that the GATT has become so committed to the current policy that the only way to change it would be to start a new organization’. A new organisation was started, the World Trade Organization, but has the WTO achieved what Hudec hoped a new organisation might? At the 1987–95 Uruguay Round, developing country leaders acted as Hudec had hoped. They used international rules and bindings as leverage to support their own internally‐driven reforms; to overcome generations of accumulated protection, to lock in reforms against the backsliding that had undone previous reforms. Dealing with the Uruguay Round's ‘unbalanced outcome’ and the overlapping ‘implementation problem’ have shaped the Doha Round, but the negotiations have misconceived and mismanaged both issues. Rather than seeking to identify their real economics, the negotiations have gone back to the traditional idea of special and differential treatment. Perhaps the largest cost of this mismanagement is that in many developing countries the unilateral momentum for liberalisation has waned. To the extent that the Doha negotiations have drawn attention away from the domestic issues that were the basis of developing country liberalisation – and enhanced the status of negotiators relative to the leaders who fought at home for reform – they have contributed to that waning.     

Multilateral Agricultural Trade Liberalisation: The Contrasting Fortunes of Developing Countries in the Doha Round

An applied general equilibrium model is used to assess the impact of multilateral trade liberalisation in agriculture, with particular emphasis on developing countries. We use original data, and the model includes some specific features such as a dual labour market. Applied tariffs, including those under preferential regimes and regional agreements, are taken into account at the detailed product level, together with the corresponding bound tariffs on which countries negotiate. The various types of farm support are detailed, and several groups of developing countries are distinguished. Simulations give a contrasted picture of the benefits developing countries would draw from the Doha development round. The results suggest that previous studies have neglected preferential agreements and the binding overhang (in tariffs as well as domestic support), and have treated developing countries with a high level of aggregation and been excessively optimistic about the actual benefits of multilateral trade liberalisation. Regions like sub‐Saharan Africa are more likely to suffer from the erosion of existing preferences. The main gainers of the Doha Round are likely to be developed countries and Cairns Group members.     

Multilateral,Regional and Bilateral Trade‐Policy Options for the United States and Japan

We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to simulate the economic effects on the United States, Japan, and other major trading countries/regions of the Doha Round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations and a variety of regional/bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) involving the United States and Japan. We estimate that an assumed reduction of post‐Uruguay Round tariffs and other barriers on agricultural and industrial products and services by 33 per cent in the Doha Round would increase world welfare by $686.4 billion, with gains of $164.0 billion for the United States, $132.6 billion for Japan, and significant gains for all other industrialised and developing countries/regions. If there were global free trade with all post‐Uruguay Round trade barriers completely removed, world welfare would increase by $2.1 trillion, with gains of $497.0 billion (5.5 per cent of GNP) for the United States and $401.9 billion (6.2 per cent of GNP) for Japan. Regional agreements such as an APEC FTA, an ASEAN Plus 3 FTA, and a Western Hemisphere FTA would increase global and member country welfare but much less so than the Doha multilateral trade round would. Separate bilateral FTAs involving Japan with Singapore, Mexico, Chile and Korea, and the United States with Chile, Singapore and Korea would have positive, though generally small, welfare effects on the partner countries, but potentially disruptive sectoral employment shifts in some countries. There would be trade diversion and detrimental welfare effects on some non‐member countries for both the regional and bilateral FTAs analysed. The welfare gains from multilateral trade liberalisation are therefore considerably greater than the gains from preferential trading arrangements and more uniformly positive for all countries.     

Failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference at Cancun: Reasons and Remedies

This paper first discusses four general developments in the world trading system that have made it increasingly difficult in recent years for nations to reach multilateral agreements aimed at further liberalising international trade, namely: (1) the increased technical complexity and disruptive domestic economic effects of the issues being negotiated; (2) the shift in relative bargaining power among the negotiating participants in favour of the developing countries; (3) the proliferation of bilateral and regional free trade agreements in contrast to multilateral agreements, and (4) the increased emphasis on achieving ‘fairness’ rather than reciprocity in trade liberalisation. Differences in negotiating positions of the participants on the major specific negotiating subjects of the Doha Round, such as new rules covering investment, competition policy, government procurement policy, and trade facilitation, agricultural liberalisation, changes in anti‐dumping and countervailing duty rules, the tariff‐cutting rule to increase access to non‐agricultural markets, and further liberalisation in the services sector, are then considered as well as the likelihood of reaching compromises on these matters. Finally, the possibilities of reaching acceptable balances of concessions and gains are considered for such key participants as the Group of 20 developing countries, the European Union, the United States and other industrial countries.     

What is at Stake in the Doha Round?

In this study the key elements of the WTO Doha Round are simulated and the main implications for international trade and national income are analysed. Based on negotiation information, three scenarios are designed. All scenarios encompass goods, services and agricultural liberalisation as well as trade facilitation. For goods liberalisation, a so‐called Swiss formula is used to cut bound tariff rates. Agricultural tariffs are cut according to a tiered linear formula. Attention has been given to the modelling of trade facilitation. Indirect as well as direct trade transaction costs are modelled. For simulation of the services liberalisation quantitative estimates of indirect trade barriers are used. The simulation results show that all regions in the aggregation gain in the simulated Doha scenarios, with a particularly strong result for developing countries. A conservative estimate is that global income increases with 0.2–0.7 per cent of initial GDP, depending on the level of liberalisation. Trade facilitation contributes the most to these results, with increased market access for non‐agricultural goods coming in second place. Overall, simulations indicate the importance of countries’ own liberalisation for their national income gains, and the importance of a broad‐based round.     

Developing Countries at Doha: A Political Economy Analysis

This paper offers a political economy analysis of the Doha Ministerial Conference with special reference to developing countries. One of my key objectives is to understand the politics underlying the negotiations with a view to assessing the influence developing countries exerted on the outcome and the success they achieved in relation to the Uruguay Round Agreement, which is widely perceived as favouring mainly if not exclusively the developed countries. The main conclusions of the paper may be summarised as follows. First, with trade liberalisation as its central focus, the Doha negotiating agenda is to be welcomed from the viewpoint of developing countries. Second, the opposition by developing countries to the inclusion of at least some of the Singapore issues at Doha is defensible. Among other things, the countries lack the necessary negotiating and implementation capacity. Third, while the UR Agreement benefited both developing and developed countries, on balance, it benefited the latter more. The Doha outcome offers a better balance when taken by itself but does not go so far as to significantly correct the imbalance in the UR Agreement. Fourth, despite this better balance, the Doha negotiations offer little evidence of a shift in the relative bargaining powers of developing and developed countries. Nor can the superficially development friendly language of the Doha Declaration be viewed as signalling the softening of the tough negotiating stance developed countries took during the UR Round. Fifth, much of the negotiating power continues to reside with developed countries. Relatively equal levels of incomes gives greater coherence to interests of developed countries on issues that divide along North–South lines. Moreover, the presence of three large players – the USA, EU and Japan – allows them to exploit their bargaining power more effectively. Finally, to negotiate more effectively in the future, developing countries must improve their research capacity, think strategically and forge coalitions with other influential WTO members – whether developed or developing.     

Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda

This paper examines the extent to which various regions, and the world as a whole, could gain from multilateral trade reform over the next decade. The World Bank's Linkage model of the global economy is employed to examine the impact first of current trade barriers and agricultural subsidies, and then of possible outcomes from the WTO's Doha Round. The results suggest moving to free global merchandise trade would boost real incomes in sub‐Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia (and in Cairns Group countries) proportionately more than in other developing countries or high‐income countries. Real returns to farmland and unskilled labour, and real net farm incomes, would rise substantially in those developing‐country regions, thereby helping to reduce poverty. A Doha partial liberalisation could take the world some way towards those desirable outcomes, but more so the more agricultural subsidies are disciplined and applied tariffs are cut, and the more not just high‐income but also developing countries choose to engage in the process of reform.     

More or Less Ambition in the Doha Round: Winners and Losers from Trade Liberalisation with a Development Perspective

What is at stake in the standoff and suspension of the Doha Round of trade talks? What impact would an agreement based on greater or lesser levels of ambition have on developing countries, whose economies are relatively dependent on agriculture? Using the MIRAGE computable general equilibrium model of the global economy, in this article we compare different scenarios for the Doha agricultural and NAMA negotiations, taking real numbers from the proposals on the table from the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) in December 2005. The results for both scenarios demonstrate the high stakes for successful completion of this negotiation given the positions articulated by the countries involved. A cooperative reform outcome by the US and the EU – based on the most ambitious components of their negotiating proposals – delivers noticeably more benefits than an unambitious outcome. We measure the degree of ambition in each scenario by the construction of a Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index and focus the analysis on the impacts on developing countries.     

Beyond Border Barriers: The Liberalisation of Services Trade in Tunisia and Egypt

Tunisia and Egypt have both recently undertaken significant steps toward trade reform. They have committed to a partnership agreement with the European Union. Both countries have also joined the WTO and are participating in Doha Round discussions on the liberalisation of non‐tariff barriers on both goods and services trade. These developments provide an interesting context within which to investigate not only the changes in welfare associated with reforms affecting the trade in goods, but also the impacts of services liberalisation. Using open‐economy computable general equilibrium models for both Tunisia and Egypt, this paper explores the reasons why structural differences in these two economies imply different opportunities and challenges with trade reform and services liberalisation. The gains from eliminating barriers at the border for goods trade are significantly greater for Tunisia than Egypt. Both countries, however, gain substantially from liberalisation of foreign direct investment in services. Furthermore, economic growth is more evenly distributed across sectors than with liberalisation of trade in goods alone. In addition to reporting on the impact of alternative policies on income, output, employment and trade, sector‐level effects are also considered.     

Doha Development Round Perspectives

The Doha round got back on track in the summer of 2004. Where does it stand today? Has market access policy gained predominance over market regulation policy? Is the promotion of economic and social development becoming the “mainstream” of negotiations? What role does trade facilitation in developing countries play in this context? Is multilateral liberalisation compatible with the regional and bilateral opening of markets? Is further institutional reform of the WTO beyond the Doha agenda necessary? If so, what form could this take?*This article is based on a contribution made by the author to the International Policy Dialogue “Doha Development Round: Status and Prospects for Success” organised by the InWEnt gGmbH’s Development Policy Forum (Entwicklungspolitisches Forum, EF) in Berlin on 7/8 June 2005.     

On the European Responsibility in the Agricultural Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Modelling the Impacts of the Common Agricultural Policy

The present round of multilateral trade negotiations is still deadlocked over agricultural trade. The European Union (EU) is urged by its trading partners to open its agricultural markets. Economic evaluations of trade liberalisation scenarios unanimously conclude that a substantial opening of agricultural markets is required for a successful (welfare‐improving) Doha Round. In this paper, we perform new evaluations to identify precisely the contributions of the European farm policy and to examine the robustness of these evaluations in the representation of this complex policy. Using the same specifications as in major previous studies, our first simulations show that the EU has a major responsibility in delivering significant gains to the developing countries. On the other hand, when we conduct the same experiments with a more relevant calibration and modelling of the European farm policy instruments, the gains that these developing countries may reap from the EU liberalisation are considerably reduced. Accordingly the current charge against the EU is simply inopportune.     

Liberalising Trade in the Agriculture Sector of a Small Island State: The Case of Fiji

This paper uses Fiji as a case study to investigate the impacts of three trade liberalisation policies – removal of sugar price subsidies, unilateral trade liberalisation and multilateral trade liberalisation, implied by the successful completion of the Doha Round. Removal of the sugar price subsidies has an adverse effect on real output, real national welfare and employment, but promotes growth of non‐agricultural exports in the long run. Unilateral trade liberalisation, in the form of tariff cuts in the agricultural sector, increases real output, real national welfare and non‐agricultural exports in the medium term. However, this growth is not sustained in the long term. The best outcome for Fiji is multilateral trade liberalisation which increases real output, real national welfare, non‐agricultural exports and employment. It is argued that reform of trade policies in less developed countries could come at a cost, therefore highlighting the need for compensating mechanisms to deal with the adverse impacts. Other measures to assist farmers to expand output in response to a rise in prices could include measures to reduce transport, storage and packaging costs, as well as institutional measures to enhance the functioning of input and factor markets.     

多哈回合中的农业问题对中国的影响

多哈回合的谈判结果对于多边贸易体制的稳定、经济全球化的进程、贸易自由化给各成员国带来的福利增进而言,具有极其重要的意义。世贸组织承诺,多哈回合要给发展中国家带来真正的好处。作为世界上最大的发展中国家,中国所受到的影响更是引人注目。     

Bargaining Coalitions in the WTO Agricultural Negotiations

This paper aims to understand the structural features of bargaining coalitions in the Doha Round of the WTO. We provide an empirical assessment of the preferences of each negotiating actor considering general economics indicators, development levels, structure of agricultural sectors and trade policies. Bargaining coalitions are analysed by grouping countries using a cluster analysis procedure. The clusters are compared with existing coalitions in order to assess their degree of internal homogeneity as well as their common interests. Such a comparison allows the identification of possible ‘defectors’, i.e. countries that, according to their economic conditions and policies, seem to be relatively less committed to the positions of the coalition they join. In addition, the ex‐post analysis of the counterfactual coalitions sheds light on the ‘distance’ between different coalitions as well as between individual countries and the best alternative group available. Empirical results confirm our research hypothesis: clusters of structurally homogeneous countries well represent existing bargaining coalitions. In particular, the G‐20 shows a high degree of internal coherence, which, in our framework, may provide a clue to the ‘sustainability’ of this coalition and to its relevance in the Doha Round negotiations.     

Trade‐Policy Issues and Policy Options for Japan and the United States: Introduction and Overview

This symposium includes papers that analyse a number of issues that are likely to play a key role in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations. These issues are analysed from the perspective of US‐Japanese economic relations. In these papers, the economic effects of the WTO negotiating options available to both countries are explored. A final paper examines the important issues raised by the free trade agreements (FTAs) that have or will soon be negotiated by the United States and Japan. Brief summaries of the papers are provided. With all the advantages that have accrued to Japan from the multilateral trading system, it is not surprising that for many years Japan, alone among the world's major economies, stayed aloof from regional trading arrangements. The very past success of the multilateral trading system has made further progress at this level far more complex and has pushed many countries, Japan included, to look to new and deeper regional trading agreements as a more productive path. But it should not be forgotten that while FTAs may be easier to conclude, their benefits are modest compared with what can be gained from a successful Doha Round, and the costs from new distortions imposed on regional trade can be very significant for some of the world's poorer economies. Every good reason remains for Japan to continue to wish to be a pillar of the WTO and of the new Doha Round.