The benefits and costs of geographic diversification in banking

We estimate the benefits of geographic diversification within states and across states for bank risk and return for all U.S. bank holding companies from 1994 to 2008, and assess whether such benefits depend on bank size. For small banks, only intrastate diversification increases risk-adjusted returns and reduces default risk while for very large institutions only interstate expansions are beneficial but only in terms of default risk. In all cases the relationship is hump-shaped indicating that at some point, the possible agency costs associated with banks getting wider and more geographically diversified outweigh the benefits. Our results indicate that small banks and very large banks could still benefit from further geographic diversification.     

Diversification and the cost of debt of bank holding companies

In this study, we investigate the relationship between various dimensions of diversification and the cost of debt for publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs). We find that both domestic geographic diversification of deposits and diversification of assets lead to a lower bond yield-spread. Diversification of non-traditional banking activities leads to a lower cost of debt only when yield-spread and diversification are estimated simultaneously. In addition, we find that medium-sized BHCs experience a greater reduction in bond yield-spread than small-sized and large-sized BHCs. This is consistent with the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) effects in the banking industry. Furthermore, we document that the association between diversification and yield-spread is bidirectional with higher yield-spreads being associated with greater asset and activity diversification and lower geographic deposit dispersion. The effect of diversification on bond yield-spread is robust after accounting for cross-sectional and serial correlation, and the endogeneity of diversification.     

Is bank diversification a linking channel between regulatory capital and bank value?

This study investigates the interrelationship between bank regulatory capital and bank diversification. We argue that regulatory capital might act as a substitutive mechanism of diversification to alleviate a bank's default risk. As a result, regulatory capital is likely to discourage firms from excessive diversification, which might in turn indirectly improve bank value. Using a sample of listed banks in developed countries from 2011 to 2017, we find that total regulatory capital is inversely associated with bank diversification. Narrower regulatory capital ratios only have a significant association with income-based but not with asset-based diversification. Our results also reveal an indirect effect of regulatory capital on bank value mediated by bank diversification (i.e. indirect-only mediation). Overall, our study provides novel insights into the complementarity of the institutional and strategic domains so as to understand the far-reaching implications of regulation reforms for the strategic behaviour of banking companies.     

Geographic diversification in banking

In the aftermath of the 2007–2009 crisis, banks claiming positive diversification benefits are being met with skepticism. Nevertheless, diversification might be important and sizable for some large internationally active banking groups. We use a universally applicable correlation matrix approach to calculate international diversification effects, in which bank subsidiaries are treated as individual assets of the banking group portfolio. We apply the framework to 49 of the world's largest banking groups with significant foreign business units over the 1992–2009 period. Focusing on the most important risk in banking, credit risk, we find that allowing for geographical diversification could reduce banks’ credit risk by 1.1% on average, with risk reduction ranging from negligible up to 8%.     

Should banks be geographically diversified? Empirical evidence from cross-country diversification of European banks

Using a sample of European bank, this paper investigates the impact of banks' geographic diversification on their cost of equity capital. Examining the geographic diversification of European banks gives an insight on the value of cross-border banking. To measure diversification between major geographic areas in which the bank operates, the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, based on revenues generated at home and abroad is constructed for each bank. To address the problem of endogeneity, system generalized method of moments estimator is used. The main finding of the analysis is that, other things equal, more geographic diversified banks have higher cost of equity capital than geographically focused ones. This result implies that the adverse market valuation effect of geographic diversification (increase in agency problem) dominates the positive ones (increase in efficiency and reduction in risk).     

Institutional Ownership,Diversification, and Riskiness of Bank Holding Companies

We examine the relationship among the level and stability of institutional ownership, diversification, and riskiness of publicly traded bank holding companies. We find that large and stable institutional ownership is associated with a higher (lower) level of geographic, revenue, and nontraditional banking (asset) diversification and lower risk, suggesting that institutional investors are prudent and favor risk‐reducing diversification strategies. The association between institutional ownership level and diversification is more pronounced under deregulation and during the crisis, suggesting a substitution effect between regulation and market discipline, and a greater level of monitoring and/or advising by institutional investors during the crisis, respectively.     

CHANGES IN MARKET PERCEPTION OF RISKINESS: THE CASE OF TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL

In 1984, the Comptroller of the Currency stated that the eleven largest banking firms were “too big to fail,” implying they would receive de facto 100 percent deposit insurance. The question is whether this announcement altered the market's perception of the riskiness of all banking organizations, not just those included in the Comptroller's statement. We address this question with two tests. First, through the examination of changes in institutional equity ownership from 1980 through 1988, we find that the announcement is associated with increases in institutional ownership at a time when a comparable set of nonfinancial firms saw reductions in institutional holdings. Second, through the examination of stock returns behavior of bank holding companies around announcements of dividend cuts and omissions from 1974 through 1991, we find that the Comptroller's 1984 announcement altered the market's reaction to dividend cuts and omissions by bank holding companies not specifically included in the Comptroller's statement.     

Shareholder wealth effects of interstate banking: The case of Delaware's Financial Center Development Act

The Financial Center Development Act (FCDA) of Delaware was signed into law in March 1981, to permit out-of-state bank holding companies (BHCs) to establish special purpose banking subsidiaries within the state of Delaware. The FCDA can be viewed as part of the growing national trend toward interstate banking. If interstate banking is to succeed, the benefits from BHCs establishing interstate subsidiaries must be consistent with the welfare of the BHCs shareholders. The purpose of this study is to determine the impact on shareholder wealth of the decision by BHCs to establish subsidiaries within the state of Delaware. Using event study methodology, the results from this study show that the decision to establish a special purpose banking subsidiary within the state of Delaware under the FCDA is consistent with the maximization of shareholder wealth.Funding for this research was made available by the University of Delaware General Research Fund. The authors thank Paul Horvitz, Kevin Scanlon, Ron Watson, and David Walker for helpful comments.     

Credit supply and corporate innovation

We present evidence that banking development plays a key role in technological progress. We focus on manufacturing firms' innovative performance, measured by patent-based metrics, and employ exogenous variations in banking development arising from the staggered deregulation of banking activities across US states during the 1980s and 1990s. We find that interstate banking deregulation had significant beneficial effects on the quantity and quality of innovation activities, especially for firms highly dependent on external capital and located closer to entering banks. Furthermore, we find that these results are strongly driven by a greater ability of deregulated banks to geographically diversify credit risk.     

The Effect of Bank Debt Downgrades on Stock Prices of Other Banks

We find that debt downgrades of money center banks elicit negative stock price responses in nondowngraded money center banks. Stock prices of larger regional banks also react to these downgrades. Although downgrades of regional banks evoke negative stock price responses for regional banks in the same geographic region, the importance of geographic region as a factor determining the extent of intra‐industry reactions has diminished since 1989. Our results indicate that the merger and expansion activities triggered by interstate banking have blurred differences between regional and money center banks as interstate banking activity has moved towards nationwide banking     

(Interstate) Banking and (interstate) trade: Does real integration follow financial integration?

We conjecture that banks present in two regions charge the appropriate risk premiums for trade-related projects between these markets, whereas higher rates are charged for projects involving shipments to markets where they are absent. These differences affect regional trade flows. US interstate banking deregulation serves as a natural experiment to test our model's implication with the Commodity Flow Survey data. Difference-in-differences estimates suggest that the trade share of state-pairs that allowed pairwise interstate entry increased by 14% over 10 years relative to non-integrated state-pairs. Instrumental variables estimates suggest that an actual increase in bank integration from zero to 2.28% (the mean) increases trade 17% to 25%.     

Consequences of Deregulation for Commercial Banking

In recent years, many of the restrictions on banking activities adopted following the banking collapse of the 1930s have been eroded by improvements in technology and high interest rates, which led to increasing direct competition from unregulated institutions. Beginning in the 1970s, the regulatory agencies, state legislatures, and the Congress have moved to liberalize these restrictions. Based on research on economies of scale and scope, the experience of the conglomerate merger movement of the 1950s and 1960s, the observed effects of changes in state laws governing branches and holding companies, foreign experience, and experience in other industries that underwent deregulation, banking deregulation is likely to lead to reductions in the number of banks and increases in their efficiency, geographic scope, and product diversification. Such an outcome is consistent with the survival of a large number and variety of financial institutions and need not endanger the safety of the banking system.     

Are there diversification benefits of increasing noninterest income in the Chinese banking industry?

This paper assesses the potential diversification benefits of the increasing reliance on nontraditional business activities based on data from the Chinese banking industry in 1986–2008. At the aggregate level, there are diversification benefits of the increase in noninterest income. However, noninterest income has higher volatility and cyclicality than net interest income, and the marginal benefit of diversification decreases with the increase in noninterest income. At the bank level, the correlation coefficients of the growth rates of net interest income and noninterest income are mostly negative, which also suggests that there are diversification benefits of increasing the noninterest income. However, further model analysis indicates that the effect of the noninterest income share on the Chinese banking industry's revenue and risk is not significant. Overall, our findings suggest that noninterest income diversifies bank revenue, but increased reliance on noninterest income may worsen the risk/return trade-off for the Chinese banking industry.     

Diversification of the Banking Firm

Diversification of banks and bank holding companies into nonbank product lines may reduce the risk to banking returns or cash flows provided appropriate portfolio conditions are satisfied. This study of bank and nonbank financial-service firms and nonfinancial corporations over the 1966–1985 period finds evidence consistent with the proposition that individual banking firm risk may be reduced through selected product-line diversification, particularly in the insurance and data processing fields. Moreover, there is evidence of less cash-flow sensitivity of selected nonbank product lines to exogenous economic and financial-market variables compared to banking firms. While public policy continues to insulate banking firms from most nonbank product and service lines, the potential benefits of risk reduction suggest that a careful review of current policy is needed.     

A new multi-factor risk model to evaluate funding liquidity risk of banks

The present paper investigates funding liquidity risk of banks. We present a new statistical multi-factor risk model leading to three new funding liquidity risk metrics, thanks to liquidity gap's probability distribution analysis. We test our model on a large sample composed of 593 US banking companies, this allows us to identify some stylized facts regarding the evolution of liquidity risk and its relationship with the size of banking companies. Our main motivation is to develop ‘the contractual maturity mismatch’ monitoring tool proposed within the Basel III reform.     

The interstate banking and branching efficiency act of 1994: A wealth event for acquisition targets

The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) represented a significant step in the deregulation of interstate banking and branching. The IBBEA's passage had a positive wealth effect on a sample of large Bank Holding Companies (BHCs). Cross-sectional tests of abnormal returns reveal that BHCs having characteristics associated with acquisition targets and BHCs headquartered in states that prohibited interstate branching experienced significantly higher returns. Collectively, the evidence suggests that investors anticipated that the IBBEA would provide for increased corporate control activities among banks and that a large portion of the BHC gains stems from the relaxation of interstate branching restrictions.     

地理分散化降低了多少保险经营风险?

本文定量分析了地理分散化对中国保险公司经营风险的影响。收集我国1998~2017年间各省市区的财产保险业和人身保险业的收入和支出数据,基于投资组合原理,比较了三种地理布局战略下保险公司的赔付风险。研究发现:无论是财产保险业还是人身保险业,各省区市之间赔付风险的差异性较大,在华北、东北、华东、中南、西南和西北这六大区域内部经营并不能显著地分散风险,但扩大到全国范围内经营,便能够较好地分散风险。进一步,采用Bootstrap随机模拟方法分析发现:财产保险公司在约10个省区市经营能够分散掉约80%的赔付风险,而人身保险公司在约5个省区市经营能够分散掉约40%的赔付风险。鉴于财产保险公司经营的各条产品线之间的风险差别较大,本文还发现:农业保险的地理分散化效果最强,短期健康险的地理分散化效果最弱。研究结果既支持保险公司跨地域经营以降低风险,也为监管资本设计中考虑地理分散化效应提供了经验证据。     

The Icahn Manifesto

The title of this opening chapter in the author's new book on activist investors refers to Carl Icahn's solution to the “agency” problem faced by the shareholders of public companies in motivating corporate managers and boards to maximize firm value. During the 1960s and '70s, U.S. public companies tended to be run in ways designed to increase their size while minimizing their financial risk, with heavy emphasis on corporate diversification. Icahn successfully challenged corporate managers throughout the 1970s and 1980s by buying blocks of shares in companies he believed were undervalued and then demanding board seats and other changes in corporate governance and management. This article describes the evolution of Icahn as an investor. Starting by investing in undervalued, closed‐end mutual funds and then shorting shares of the stocks in the underlying portfolio, Icahn was able to get fund managers either to liquidate their funds (giving Icahn an arbitrage profit on his long mutual fund/short underlying stocks position) or take other steps to eliminate the “value gap.” After closing the value gaps within the limited universe of closed‐end mutual funds, Icahn turned his attention to the shares of companies trading for less than his perception of the value of their assets. As the author goes on to point out, the strategy that Icahn used with such powerful effect can be traced to the influence of the great value investor Benjamin Graham. Graham was a forceful advocate for the use of shareholder activism to bring about change in underperforming—and in that sense undervalued—companies. The first edition of Graham's investing classic, Security Analysis, published in 1934, devoted an entire chapter to the relationship between shareholders and management, which Graham described as “one of the strangest phenomena of American finance.”     

Does Credit Competition Affect Small‐Firm Finance?

While relaxation of geographical restrictions on bank expansion permitted banking organizations to expand across state lines, it allowed states to erect barriers to branch expansion. These differences in states' branching restrictions affect credit supply. In states more open to branching, small firms borrow at interest rates 80 to 100 basis points lower than firms operating in less open states. Firms in open states also are more likely to borrow from banks. Despite this evidence that interstate branch openness expands credit supply, we find no effect of variation in state restrictions on branching on the amount that small firms borrow.     

EVOLUTION OR EXTINCTION: WHERE ARE BANKS HEADED?

The banking industry represents an interesting and important case study of how changes in technology and regulation influence business strategy and organizational design. A narrow focus on traditional bank products and performance measures would lead one to conclude that banking is a declining industry. Such a focus, however, would miss most of the innovations in banking–most notably, the move to “off-balance-sheet” activities–that have been taking place in recent years. A broader perspective shows banks evolving in ways that are enabling them to provide the same basic functions as before, but in new, more efficient ways. In the past, most banks thought of themselves as delivering a set of specific, largely unrelated products to different sets of customers. Today many banks are pursuing strategies that aim to strengthen their ability to perform various functions–for example, financial planning for retail clients, or raising capital for middle market companies–that tend to cut across the old product boundaries. As a result, and in contrast to most industrial firms, many banks are offering a more diversified range of products and services than ever before with the aim of exploiting potential synergies among those products. Such major changes in banks' strategies are in turn leading to fundamental changes in their “organizational architecture.” Some banking activities that were once controlled by a rigid management hierarchy are now being decentralized, whereas other functions that were largely decentralized are being subjected to more central coordination to help realize potential economies of scale and scope. Along with these changes in decision-making authority, banks are also being forced to rethink their internal performance evaluation and incentive compensation systems. As an ever larger portion of their activities continues to move off balance sheet, more and more banks are deciding that conventional accounting measures of bank operating performance such as ROA and ROE are inadequate, and that economic measures of performance like RAROC and EVA are needed to reflect the new reality of where banks are putting their capital at risk, and whether the rates of return they are earning on their different activities are high enough to reward their shareholders.