Net neutrality and inflation of traffic

Under strict net neutrality Internet service providers (ISPs) are required to carry data without any differentiation and at no cost to the content provider. We provide a simple framework with a monopoly ISP to evaluate the short-run effects of different net neutrality rules. Content differs in its sensitivity to delay. Content providers can use congestion control techniques to reduce delay for their content, but do not take into account the effect of their decisions on the aggregate volume of traffic. As a result, strict net neutrality often leads to socially inefficient allocation of traffic and traffic inflation. We show that piece-meal departures from net neutrality, such as transmission fees or prioritization based on sensitivity to delay, do not necessarily improve efficiency. However, the ISP implements the efficient allocation when allowed to introduce bandwidth tiering and charge for prioritized delivery.     

Surplus extraction by network providers: Implications for net neutrality and innovation

This paper looks at surplus extraction by network providers who control the medium of information transfer between application developers and consumers, and addresses the following questions: is net neutrality beneficial to society? and does providing network providers flexibility in pricing stunt innovation in the long run? To answer the first question, it looks at a market consisting of a monopoly network provider and two application providers with non-substitutable products, using a simple single period model. It shows that net neutrality is necessary to ensure maximal benefit to the society. To answer the second question, the paper shows that a monopoly network provider, if allowed complete flexibility in pricing, does not necessarily stunt innovation. Looking at a market that consists of one network provider and one application provider, and using a simple multi-period model, it shows that given maximum flexibility the network provider not only encourages innovation when the potential benefits are sufficiently high but also maximizes surplus. This paper takes the view that the topic of net neutrality is not only controversial but also complicated, and suggests that policy makers use a balanced approach based on sound analysis.     

Net Neutrality,Network Capacity,and Innovation at the Edges

We study how net neutrality regulations affect a high‐bandwidth content provider (CP)'s investment incentives to enhance its quality of services in content delivery to end users. We find that the effects crucially depend on whether the CP's entry is constrained by the Internet service provider's network capacity. If the capacity is relatively large, the prioritization reduces the investment as CP's investment and prioritization form substitutes. With limited capacity, however, they become complements and the prioritization can facilitate the entry of congestion‐sensitive content. Our analysis suggests that the optimal policy may call for potentially asymmetric regulations across mobile and fixed networks.     

Net Neutrality with Competing Internet Platforms

We propose a two‐sided model with two competing Internet platforms, and a continuum of Content Providers (CP's). We study the effect of a net neutrality regulation on capacity investments in the market for Internet access, and on innovation in the market for content. Under the alternative discriminatory regime, platforms charge a priority fee to those CP's which are willing to deliver their content on a fast lane. We find that under discrimination, investments in broadband capacity and content innovation are both higher than under net neutrality. Total welfare increases, though the discriminatory regime is not always beneficial to the platforms as it can intensify competition for subscribers. As platforms have a unilateral incentive to switch to the discriminatory regime, a prisoner's dilemma can arise. We also consider the possibility of sabotage, and show that it can only emerge, with adverse welfare effects, under discrimination.     

Network neutrality and difference in efficiency among Internet application service providers: A meta-frontier analysis

As Internet applications evolve and require wider and more stable bandwidth, Internet service providers (ISPs) try to maximize their profit by controlling application service providers (ASPs); this has caused a network neutrality debate. This article categorizes ASPs into four groups by bandwidth-usage attributes and latency sensitivity. By estimating the efficiency of these groups, their efficiency differences are estimated, indicating evidence of discrimination of ISPs when network neutrality is not maintained. Meta-frontier analysis is used to compare efficiencies across companies using different production function technologies. Finally, a Tobit regression model is used to determine which variables explain the difference of efficiencies. The estimation result indicates that the discrimination of ISPs against ASPs is not significant enough to decrease the efficiency of any application group.     

Law,Social Welfare,and Net Neutrality

Net neutrality generates wealth transfers from one type of internet content provider to another. In theory, these transfers might be socially desirable, and could be justified on the basis of informational externalities similar to those cited to justify fair use in copyright law. In practice, however, the conditions that justify fair use do not hold where net neutrality operates. Moreover, the internal subsidization required by net neutrality generates a regressive transfer. The welfare gains that might come from controlling anticompetitive abuse or government coercion through implementation of net neutrality can be achieved by alternative policies with less harmful consequences.     

Prioritization vs zero-rating: Discrimination on the internet

This paper analyzes two business practices on the mobile internet market, paid prioritization and zero-rating. These practices allow the internet service provider to discriminate different content types. With prioritization, the ISP delivers content at different speeds; with zero-rating, the ISP charges different prices. In recent years these practices have attracted considerable media attention and regulatory interest. When the asymmetry between content providers is limited, in particular with regard to their ability to attract traffic or to monetize it, we first show that the ISP can extract more surplus from consumers by privileging the relatively weaker content and restoring symmetry between content providers. Next, we show that the ISP chooses prioritization when traffic is highly valuable for content providers and congestion is severe, and zero-rating in all other cases. Finally, we find that a policy banning prioritization can lead to zero-rating and a reduction in consumer surplus.     

Multihoming, content delivery networks, and the market for Internet connectivity

Peering points between different Internet service providers (ISPs) are among the bottlenecks of the Internet. Multihoming (MH) and content delivery networks (CDNs) are two technical solutions to bypass peering points and to improve the quality of data delivery. So far, however, there is no research that analyzes the economic effects of MH and CDNs on the market for Internet connectivity. This paper develops a static market model with locked-in end users and paid content. It shows that MH and CDNs create the possibility for terminating ISPs to engage in monopolistic pricing towards content providers, leading to a shift of rents from end users and content providers to ISPs. Implications for future innovations are discussed.     

The (Unknown) Providers to Other Firms' New Product Development: What's in It for Them?

For every inbound activity by a firm in open innovation, a reciprocal outbound activity by another firm must be generated. The reciprocal outbound activities range from transferring of knowledge and ideas to solutions delivered to other firms' new product development projects. This paper names the firms that produce the reciprocal outbound activity for “providers,” and is the first to empirically investigate such providers of ideas, solutions, and technologies for other firms' open innovation activities. The literature review shows a surprising shortage of research on who the providers are, how they engage with other firms, and not least what potential benefits can be achieved from supporting other firms' innovation activities. The paper uses a quantitative survey on Danish small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) carried out in 2010 to identify the providers, the role they take on, and the main benefits the providers gain. This paper finds that firms that are providers are indeed an under‐researched and important phenomenon for firms' innovation activities. Compared to receivers of knowledge, the providers are younger, have a higher R&D intensity, adopt more open innovation practices, have higher absorptive capacity, and fewer barriers toward knowledge sharing as demonstrated by the NIH and NSH syndromes. Finally, although only tentatively, the paper finds that the provider firms are more product innovative compared to nonproviders. The paper further finds that more projects, more embedded relationships, and mutual rather than one‐way exchange relationships significantly raise the probability that a firm experiences a substantial benefit from providing to other firms' new product development projects. The overall ambition of the paper at this point is to inspire other researchers to pursue the agenda on the provider perspective for future research. To support such research, the paper suggests a broadening of the research perspectives from the receiver of knowledge, in the literature on interorganizational relationships and open innovation, to include the provider, and even suggests some preliminary ideas for such research. Hence, the contribution of this paper lies not only in opening a new research topic but also in identifying some first characteristics of the phenomenon adding a substantial perspective to the literature on open innovation and interorganizational relationships. The paper formulates three indicative recommendations for managers that consider becoming a provider to other firms' NPD.     

Net neutrality and market power: The case of South Africa

Net neutrality rules have been implemented in many developed countries, often in response to concerns over network operator market power and potential blocking or throttling of content. However, developing countries typically have significantly lower levels of internet penetration and usage. Market power in respect of internet access looks quite different given that mobile is the predominant means of connection and there are often three or more mobile operators. In South Africa, there is a quasi-monopoly in the paid satellite broadcasting market and broadband providers zero-rating content from third parties (such as Netflix) may bring about more competition. We test the main theories of harm arising in the net neutrality debate, including network operator market power and exclusion among content providers using data on the number of announced prefixes and peers and IP addresses and considering examples of bundling and zero-rating conduct by operators. We find that net neutrality rules are less likely to be required in South Africa and other developing countries and that strict enforcement of such rules could in fact hinder competition in markets for content, telecommunications networks and other related markets.     

Innovation patterns and policy implications of ADSL penetration in Korea: A case study

Korea has been leading the world in broadband Internet access services since 1999. Based on an in-depth case analysis of the penetration of asymmetric digital subscriber line (ADSL) in Korea, the present study explores the patterns of decision making and interactions among key innovation actors, such as the government, Internet service providers, equipment providers, and content providers, using a conceptual framework wherein models of innovation systems and decision making under uncertainty are combined. The results revealed that the Korean government played a pivotal role in the creation of the ADSL-based Internet service market by providing a strong vision for this emerging service, building a coalition among various key actors, and stimulating initial market needs and supply of necessary equipment during the early period of higher uncertainty. As the level of uncertainty decreased with market evolution, however, the role of industrial actors and their market competition became more important to the rapid growth of the ADSL market. Based on these findings, policy and managerial implications are proposed.     

5G networks: Will technology and policy collide?

Despite being still under development, it is envisaged that 5G networks will provide a ‘fibre-like’ experience to mobile users. As such, they are expected to accommodate services with very different requirements in terms of latency, bandwidth and reliability, among others, for the vertical sectors. However, the European Union has just approved the Telecommunications Single Market Regulation, which enshrines the network neutrality principle and guarantees that ‘all traffic through the Internet is treated equally’. This article explores the potential conflict between net neutrality regulation and future 5G services, particularly regarding network virtualisation. We present a discussion on the challenges of building net neutrality upon judgements on whether traffic optimisation is objectively necessary. This proves complex in a technological environment that envisions network ‘slices’ created and priced on-demand according to the Quality of Service (QoS) required by specific applications at any given time. In addition, we argue that the ‘anything-as-a-service’ paradigm might turn into an important source of innovation for the future Internet infrastructure layer, and thus for the ecosystem as a whole.     

Differences in consumer loyalty and willingness to pay for service attributes across digital channels: A study of the Japanese digital content market

In this paper, the impact that the Internet access device has on consumer loyalty behaviors relative to Internet content was explored. To do so, a mixed logit demand function for mobile and PC subscribers to digital content was estimated and consumers’ willingness to pay for attributes related to specific content providers and their levels of service quality were measured. It was found that significant differences in loyalty and willingness to pay for service quality factors existed between mobile and PC Internet content subscribers, suggesting that while content may be developed as device independent, consumers interact differently with similar Internet content accessed through different devices. Specifically, the willingness to pay for more robust and more frequently updated content was on average higher in the mobile segment than in the PC segment. In addition, the overall switching costs consumers attributed to specific content providers via the mobile channel were far higher than through the PC channel. These results suggest that more robust content management systems must be developed to accommodate for such differences in consumer behavior.     

A fresh look at zero-rating

We provide an economic assessment of zero-rating offers in the context of mobile internet access services and draw six lessons: (1) Zero-rating can have several different characteristics that crucially affect their economic and welfare assessment. Thus, regulatory interventions must be based on a careful case-by-case analysis. (2) In the context of zero-rating offers, it is often crucial to evaluate the extent to which users are able to activate and deactivate a (throttled) zero-rated tariff option. If activation/deactivation is easy and instantaneous, a sound economic theory of harm for consumers will in many cases be hard to establish. (3) Similarly, if access to zero-rated partner programs is non-discriminatory and entails low barriers to entry, a sound theory of harm for content providers will usually not be given. (4) Zero-rating can be beneficial for consumers and (legal) content providers alike by contributing to a reduction of illegal content. Combined with throttling it can mitigate congestion problems. However, by requiring all content belonging to the same content category to be treated equally with respect to throttling, independent of whether a content provider opted for zero-rating or not, the existing regulation creates a negative externality on those content providers that do not wish to be zero-rated for some reason. (5) Particular attention should be paid to the impact of throttled zero-rating tariffs on the competition between mobile network operators (MNOs) and MVNOs. The latter may not be able to compete on equal footing with MNOs, because they benefit less from the traffic management aspects of zero-rating. (6) Competition among (infrastructure-based) ISPs provides a safeguard against severe rent extraction and, thus, an abuse of throttling and zero-rating as an exploitative device. Therefore, regulators should carefully account for the competitive environment and the existing tariff portfolio and options before deciding to intervene. Competition policy, rather than ex-ante regulation, may be more suitable for this task.     

Wither U.S. Net Neutrality Regulation?

I examine the (lack of) economic logic that underlies the U.S. Federal Communications Commission’s latest iteration of network neutrality regulations. I explore potential unintended consequences and find a substantial tension between the regulations and the objective of promoting consumer choice and sovereignty. I also identify market developments that could largely neutralize the regulations unless they are expanded to constrain Internet access providers’ actions further.     

The Digital Divide and Other Economic Considerations for Network Neutrality

In its 2016 Broadband Report, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recognizes that a rural/urban digital divide remains prevalent—especially with respect to broadband adoption. It also highlights several policies that the FCC has undertaken purportedly to reduce the divide, including the 2015 Open Internet Order (OIO)—in which the stated intent is to enforce “network neutrality.” However, long before the OIO, studies have raised concerns that network neutrality policies will discourage investment by internet service providers (ISPs) in broadband infrastructure, to the detriment of broadband accessibility, and may increase average consumer costs—both of which would only further exacerbate the digital divide. In this paper, we provide a holistic analysis of the effects of net neutrality on the digital divide; in doing so, we draw from recent economic research on this issue. Our goal is to present a range of economic considerations that should be taken into account when evaluating the overall impact of the OIO, with particular attention to its impact on the digital divide.     

Behavioral and Attitudinal Customer Loyalty in the Power Sector

The emergence of smart grids changes the customer-utility relationship. To facilitate the transition towards a sustainable, reliable and economically viable energy system, utilities need to develop smart grid products and services that have strong customer acceptance and enable different customer segments to engage in energy efficiency. Thus, integrating customer feedback on innovative smart grid services early in the innovation process is of crucial importance. Further, energy providers need to increase customer loyalty and invest in relationship marketing in order to survive and be successful in a competitive market environment.This article presents the findings of a five-month field experiment that investigated the effectiveness of different reward programs in increasing customer loyalty and customer feedback provision in the energy sector. The results demonstrate that reward programs have a positive effect on behavioral (customer feedback provision) and attitudinal (e.?g. satisfaction with the energy provider) aspects of customer loyalty. The reward type matters, however. While monetary reward programs are effective in increasing customer feedback provision, only social reward programs can improve attitudinal aspects of customer loyalty. Energy providers should therefore consider tailoring the reward type to meet their program objectives when employing reward programs.     

Value networks and two-sided markets of Internet content delivery

The volume and importance of content is increasing in the Internet, whereas the ability of the Internet architecture to scale to the growing demand for transport capacity is uncertain. Even though the natural growth in the demand continues, the growth in traffic volumes can be limited by reducing unnecessary content copying and redundant transportation of the same content. Information-centric networking (ICN), featuring globally unique naming of content and optimized in-network caching, has been suggested as a potential future solution to significantly reduce unnecessary traffic, but its economic feasibility has not been widely studied. This paper evaluates the economic feasibility of ICN by using the two-sided markets theory to analyze four Internet content delivery models: the client-server model, content delivery network (CDN) model, peer-to-peer model and ICN model. Value networks and two-sided markets of these content delivery models are identified in the process. The results suggest that content providers can be willing to pay for the lower delay of content delivery in ICN, if ICN can solve its coordination problems related to cost-allocation, contracting, quality of service guarantees, and content usage statistics. These incentive challenges are essentially the same as in-network web caching originally faced and could not overcome. Internet access providers may also consider investing in the deployment of ICN due to reduced interconnection costs. However, the ICN model may require a revenue-creating business model to make it more attractive to Internet access providers than the CDN model that provides similar cost savings.