Competition in Research and Development: A Theory for Contradictory Predictions

This paper develops reasons for the many seemingly contradictory findings in the literature about competition and research and development (R&D) investment. The theory of R&D competition implies that increases in competitive pressure may increase R&D investment, decrease it, increase it initially but decrease it over greater levels of competitive pressure (an inverted-U relation), decrease it initially but increase it over greater levels (a U relation), or have no effect at all.      

Business R&;D and the Interplay of R&;D Subsidies and Product Market Uncertainty

This paper examines the effect of product market uncertainty and government research and development (R&D) subsidies on firm-level R&D investment. Using a sample of German manufacturing firms, we find that product market uncertainty reduces R&D investment and government R&D subsidies increase R&D investment. Moreover, our results indicate that R&D subsidies mitigate the effect of product market uncertainty on R&D investment. These findings suggest that public policies aimed at increasing business R&D investment can achieve this objective by reducing the degree of uncertainty in the product market.      

License to Be More Innovative

A patent holder may choose to give up its current leading position through patent licensing in order to increase its incentive to innovate further and thus avoid falling behind its rivals in future R&D races. We show that because of this “catching-up” effect, licensing may occur even when it reduces current industry profits. The overall effect of licensing is to slow down the pace of innovation, as it reduces the licensee's incentive to conduct R&D.     

Efficient division of profits from complementary innovations

Many products—including microprocessors, telecommunications devices, computer software, and on-line auction services—make use of multiple technologies, each of which is essential to make or sell the product. The owner of one technology benefits from the existence of complementary technologies. We show that, despite this externality, the structure of payoffs that support efficient R&D investment by duopolists racing to discover a single innovation generalizes to the structure that supports efficient investment for complementary innovations. The paper also examines how alternative intellectual property regimes and legal institutions affect R&D investment in complementary technologies. The results have policy implications for the organization of R&D, the assessment of damages for patent infringement, and allocations of value in patent pools.     

Standards,consortia, and innovation

The development of formal ICT standards is a challenging form of collaborative innovation, combining consensus decision making and R&D rivalry. To supplement this formal standard setting process, it has thus become frequent that part of the involved firms creates ad hoc consortia to better align positions on a common technology roadmap. This paper aims to assess whether such consortia can effectively mitigate R&D coordination failure through enhanced cooperation. We first develop a theoretical model showing that depending on the nature of firms' incentives to contribute proprietary technology, different types of R&D coordination failure – namely a Public Good or Rent Seeking problem – may occur in equilibrium. Using a large panel of standards, we then confirm empirically the prediction that consortia have different effects on innovation under a Public Good or Rent Seeking regime. Overall, we observe an increase in innovation after a firm joined a consortium. However, this effect is significantly weakened or even reversed for standards characterized by a strong Rent Seeking regime.     

R&D competition versus R&D cooperation in oligopolistic markets with evolving structure

This paper considers investment behavior of duopolistic firms subject to technological progress. It is assumed that initially both firms offer a homogeneous product, but after a stochastic waiting time they are able to implement a product innovation. Production capacities of both firms are product specific. It is shown that firms anticipate a future product innovation by under-investing (if the new product is a substitute to the established product) and higher profits, and over-investing (in case of complements) and lower profits, compared to the corresponding standard capital accumulation game. This anticipation effect is stronger in the case of R&D cooperation. Furthermore, since due to R&D cooperation firms introduce the new product at the same time, this leads to intensified competition and lower firm profits right after the new product has been introduced. In addition, we show that under R&D competition the firm that innovates first, overshoots in new-product capacity buildup in order to exploit its temporary monopoly position. Taking into account all these effects, the result is that, if the new product is neither a close substitute nor a strong complement of the established product, positive synergy effects in R&D cooperation are necessary to make it more profitable for firms than R&D competition.     

Modeling the firm's response to research & development tax credit policies

In this article, we develop a microeconomic model of normative firm behavior under the incentive of a research and development (R&D) tax credit. The model is based on the well-known concept of a two-factor learning model in which R&D expenditures and manufacturing capacity expansion are the principle determinants of cost reduction in a new technology product. We distinguish between the behavior of start-up firms and ongoing firms and study the potential impacts of progressively larger R&D tax credits. We find highly significant differences in the potential impact of the credit on start-up firms versus ongoing firms. We also find that the credit can significantly impact optimal product pricing of the technology when introduced into the marketplace. We examine the implications of this latter fact on the overall social cost of the R&D tax credit.     

Evolving technologies and standards regulation

The EU mandated a single standard for second generation wireless telecommunications, whereas the US allowed several incompatible standards to battle for market share. Motivated by this example, we argue that a single standard leads to a free riding problem, and thus to a significant decrease in marginal incentives for R&D investment. In this context, keeping two separate standards may be a necessary evil to sustain a high level of R&D expenditures. We also provide conditions such that a non-standardization equilibrium is better for consumers and for society as a whole.     

Declared essential patents and average total R&D expenditures per patent family

The sharp increase in SEP declarations and declaring firms emphasizes the necessity for understanding firms’ innovation investment behavior in standardization. This paper empirically investigates whether declared standard-essential patents (SEPs) and the declaring firm’s business model (operationalized as a firm’s location in the value chain) are associated with a firm’s innovation investment behavior. To this end, we measure firms’ innovation investment behavior through average total research and development (R&D) expenditures per filed patent family for publicly listed firms from 1999 to 2018. Our sample mainly includes major SEP family declarants. We rely on a binary business model taxonomy differentiating upstream and downstream firms. Within that setting, total R&D expenditures rise with increasing fragmentation of declared SEP families, suggesting that firms adjust their R&D investments to declaration developments in standard-setting organizations (SSOs). We also show that upstream firms have significantly lower total R&D expenditures than downstream firms, which could indicate structural differences in their intellectual property (IP) and R&D management processes. Our results can help SSOs and regulators better understand firms’ innovation investment behavior.     

Pharmaceutical innovation and parallel trade

This paper proposes a North–South model to study the interaction between price regulation policies and parallel trade, with a particular focus on the pharmaceutical sector. We show that, under parallel trade, R&D investment can rise only when the South government takes into full account its impact both on investment and on the firm's decision to supply the regulated country. This arises because of a complete withdrawal from price regulation. When policy choices are endogenized, indeed the South wants to achieve this level of full commitment when it is large in size. When instead it is smaller in size, the South chooses an intermediate form of commitment whereby it anticipates its effect only on local distribution and delivery, but not on global R&D investment. As a response to these credible levels of price control commitments, the North reacts by allowing parallel imports from the South.     

Complementary assets as pipes and prisms: Innovation incentives and trajectory choices

The issue of the failure of incumbent firms in the face of radical technical change has been a central question in the technology strategy domain for some time. We add to prior contributions by highlighting the role a firm's existing set of complementary assets have in influencing its investment in alternative technological trajectories. We develop an analytical model that considers firm heterogeneity with respect to both technological trajectories and complementary assets. Complementary assets play a dual role in incumbents' investment behavior toward radical technological change: they are not only resources (pipes) that can buffer firms from technology change, but also prisms through which firms view those changes, influencing both the magnitude of resources that should be invested and the trajectory to which these resources should be directed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

MARKET COMPETITION,R&D AND FIRM PROFITS IN ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLY*

We investigate a Cournot model with strategic R&D investments wherein efficient low‐cost firms compete against less efficient high‐cost firms. We find that an increase in the number of high‐cost firms can stimulate R&D by the low‐cost firms, while it always reduces R&D by the high‐cost firms. More importantly, this force can be strong enough to compensate for the loss that arises from more intense market competition: the low‐cost firms' profits may indeed increase with the number of high‐cost firms. An implication of this result is far‐reaching, as it gives low‐cost firms an incentive to help, rather than harm, high‐cost competitors. We relate this implication to a practice known as open knowledge disclosure, especially Ford's strategy of disclosing its know‐how publicly and extensively at the beginning of the 20th century.     

Inter-firm complementarities in R&D: a re-examination of the relative performance of joint ventures

We compare duopoly outcomes between two alternative modes of research and development (R&D), viz. independent R&D and non-cooperative research joint ventures (RJVs), when there are complementarities between firm-specific R&D resources. When complementarity is high, RJVs lead to higher technological improvement and the reverse holds for low complementarity. In the intermediate range, the comparison depends on the relative imperfection in spillovers afflicting independent R&D. In sharp contrast to results on cooperative RJVs, non-cooperative RJVs lead to higher technological improvement when spillovers affecting independent R&D are low; the reverse holds for high spillovers. When RJVs yield higher technological improvement, they also yield higher industry profit and social welfare.     

Creating relational rents: The effect of business groups on affiliated firms’ performance in Indonesia

This research attempts to extend the discussion of business groups in emerging economies by treating business groups as a form of interorganizational network that generates relational rents among affiliated firms by creating technological and managerial capabilities. Based on the relational view, this research investigates whether value created by business groups depends upon sharing, combining, and exchanging unique and specific resources or assets among affiliated firms. Results show that technological capabilities contribute to create relational rents in terms of affiliated firms’ investment in R&D and human capital. Managerial capabilities also contributed to generating relational rents through investment in managerial knowledge acquisition for affiliated firms without R&D units and in training for affiliated firms with R&D units. However, learning by exporting and learning from imported input do not yield relational rents within business groups. Overall, these findings reveal that business groups as interorganizational networks are contingent on their internal, unique, and specific capabilities, as social capital theory argues.

Rent appropriation of knowledge‐based assets and firm performance when institutions are weak: A study of Chinese publicly listed firms

Research summary : A firm's strategic investments in knowledge‐based assets through research and development (R&D) can generate economic rents for the firm, and thus are expected to affect positively a firm's financial performance. However, weak protection of minority shareholders, weak property rights, and ineffective law enforcement can allow those rents to be appropriated disproportionately by a firm's powerful insiders such as large owners and top managers. Recent data on Chinese publicly listed firms during 2007–2012 were used to demonstrate that the expected positive relationship between knowledge assets and performance is weaker in transition economies when a firm's ownership is highly concentrated and its managers have wide discretion. Moreover, rent appropriation by insiders was shown to vary with the levels of institutional development in which a firm operates. Managerial summary : Investing in knowledge‐based intangible assets (e.g., R&D) is an important value‐creation activity for the firm. Such value creation process can be facilitated by large shareholders and powerful managers, who can then take an advantageous position with critical insider information on these valuable intangible assets and therefore enjoy more opportunities to appropriate more value from them, leaving less value for other minority shareholders. The value distribution becomes increasingly skewed against minority shareholders when the institutional protection for them is weak. Indeed, in a large sample of Chinese publicly listed firms, we found that R&D investment becomes less positively associated with firm financial performance with the presence of large shareholders, high managerial equity, or CEO/Chairman duality, especially in Chinese provinces with weak institutional development. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Determinants of Pharmaceutical R&D Expenditures: Evidence from Japan

During the past 20 years, the world pharmaceutical industry has experienced a dramatic increase in R&D intensity. We apply and extend a model developed by Grabowski and Vernon (2000, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 10, 201–215) with a pooled data sample of the 15 publicly listed Japanese drug firms for the period 1987–1998. As in the original study, we find expected returns to be an important determinant of R&D spending in the Japanese drug industry, albeit considerably smaller than in the U.S., which is particularly obvious in the case of returns from newly introduced drugs. However, our results are sensitive to econometric model specification, in particular to controlling for serial correlation and to a dynamic specification of the baseline model. Likewise, estimates on financial constraints are sensitive to model specification, indicating that Japanese drug firms face small or no financial constraints. Our results are consistent with the general literature on R&D investment behaviour, yet raise some methodological questions with regard to the original study.     

Transforming entrepreneurial posture into a superior first product market position via dynamic capabilities and TMT prior start-up experience

First product commercialization is the first entrepreneurial act of new technology ventures. However, little is known about mechanisms that transform these firms' entrepreneurial posture into first product advantage. Building on the dynamic capability view of the firm, this study examines the role of capabilities exploitation (i.e., in the form of complementarity), top management team start-up experience, cross-functional collaboration and information and communication technology assets in driving entrepreneurial posture toward first product advantage. A multi-informant study of 137 B2B new technology ventures was undertaken. The results show that entrepreneurial posture can contribute to first product advantage indirectly by fostering R&D-marketing capability complementarity. Furthermore, our results indicate that the entrepreneurial posture - capabilities complementarity relationship is augmented when top management team possess prior start-up experience. Finally, our findings indicate that the benefits of R&D-marketing capability complementarity for first product advantage are contingent on the exploitation of cross-functional collaboration and ICT capabilities.     

The path of R&D efficiency over time

In this paper we investigate the pattern of R&D efficiency in terms of the number of product innovations achieved by firms over time. Using a panel dataset of Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 1990–2006, we follow the innovative performance of R&D active firms and observe that innovation rates change over firms' R&D histories. To explain these facts we propose a model that explicitly acknowledges the twofold composition of firms' R&D expenditures, comprising spending on both physical capital for R&D projects and payments to researchers. We regard this latter component of R&D as a source for dynamic returns to firms' R&D investments. Consequently firms' innovation outcomes clearly depend on how long they have been investing in R&D and also on whether there have been any interruptions in the temporal sequence of R&D activities. Our results suggest that R&D activities exhibit dynamic returns that are positive but at a decreasing rate, and that interruptions in R&D engagement reduce R&D efficiency.     

Knowing when to leap: Transitioning between exploitative and explorative R&D

A common perspective is that consistent R&D investment facilitates innovation, while volatile spending implies myopic decision making. However, the benefits to exploiting extant competencies eventually erode, so firms must disrupt their R&D function and explore for new competitive advantage. We suggest that high‐performing firms recognize when extant competencies decline and increase exploratory R&D to develop new competencies at the appropriate time. We find that changes in R&D expenditure away from the firm's historic trend, in either direction, are indicative of transitions between exploitative and exploratory R&D and are associated with increased firm performance. Increases in R&D expenditure above the trend are associated with an increased likelihood of highly cited patents, suggesting that firms are making the leap between R&D‐based exploitation and exploration. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Complementarities and competition: Unpacking the drivers of entrants' technology choices in the solar photovoltaic industry

Entrants in new industries pursue distinct technologies in hopes of winning the technology competition and achieving sustainable competitive advantage. We draw on the complementary assets framework to predict entrants' technology choices in an emerging industry. Evidence from the global solar photovoltaic industry supports our arguments that entrants are more likely to choose technologies with higher technical performance and for which key complementary assets are available in the ecosystem. However, diversifying entrants are more likely to trade off superior performance for complementary asset availability whereas start‐up entrants are more likely to trade off complementary asset availability for superior performance. This difference is largely due to diversifying entrants with pre‐entry capabilities related to the industry. The study offers a novel illustration of how complementarities and competition shape entry strategies. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.