On the determinants of optimal border enforcement

We extend the current immigration-enforcement literature by incorporating both the practice of people smuggling and a role for non-wage income into a two-country, dynamic general equilibrium model. We use the model economy to examine three questions. First, how does technological progress in the smuggling industry affect the level of migration and capital accumulation for a given level of enforcement? Second, do changes in border enforcement affect the level of migration, capital accumulation, and smuggling activity? Third, is the optimal level of enforcement sensitive to technological progress in the smuggling industry? We show that the government chooses to devote resources to border enforcement only if the deterrent effect on smugglers is large enough. Otherwise, it is not worth taxing host-country natives as the taxes paid will more than offset any income gain resulting from fewer migrants.     

The short-term and long-term deterrence effects of INS border and interior enforcement on undocumented immigration

This paper analyzes the short-term and long-term deterrence effects of INS border and interior enforcement. Utilizing FY1983–FY1997 border and interior apprehensions and patrol hours data from the INS, we estimate a four-variable VAR model and find that Border Patrol enforcement has significant short-term deterrence effects. These effects are short-lived as undocumented migrants seemingly adjust to new information. Moreover, the non-existent long-term effects are apparently the consequence of basic economic fundamentals: our analysis employing microdata from both Mexico and the US suggests that the wage gap between Mexico and the US is sufficiently large to maintain the illegal migratory flow.     

Migrant smuggling when exploitation is private information

This study contributes to the small theoretical literature on human smuggling by assuming for the first time asymmetric information in analysis. The assumption raises the possibility of an adverse selection equilibrium where only exploitative smugglers are employed at a low fee even though migrants are willing to pay non‐exploitative smugglers a high fee. More important, I find that improved inland apprehension of migrants may increase the incidence of migrant exploitation while failing to decrease smuggling attempts. Furthermore, improved border apprehension of migrants and smugglers may not affect the market at all.     

Controlling Illegal Immigration: Border Control vs. Domestic Enforcement

This paper presents a two-country general equilibrium model where international mobility of labor is prohibited. Illegal immigration nevertheless occurs. The probability of success at illegal immigration depends on resources allocated to border control and domestic enforcements. We examine the effects of switching resources form border control to domestic enforcement on illegal immigration and on welfare levels. We characterize the allocation of resources between the two methods of immigration control, that minimizes illegal immigration, and find that, starting from this allocation, moving resources from border control to domestic enforcement is unambiguously welfare improving for the destination country.

     

Government policy under price uncertainty: A source of volatility in illegal immigration

This paper provides an alternative explanation for why illegal immigration can exhibit substantial volatility. We develop a model economy where migrants make decisions in the face of uncertain border enforcement and transfers from the host country. The uncertainty is extrinsic, a sunspot, and arises due to ambiguity regarding government policy; the sunspot manifests itself as uncertainty in the commodity price of money. Immigration volatility stems from both the trade‐off between the marginal benefits and costs (transfers and enforcement) to migrating and the existence of a sunspot. Finally, we examine the impact of changes in government policies on migration levels.     

A Model of Smuggling and Trafficking of Illegal Immigrants with a Host Country Policy

This paper deals with illegal immigration via two distinct activities—smuggling and trafficking of workers. A destination–source model determines economic pay‐offs and a standard labor market policy works as a deterrent. Tax paid by legal unskilled workers at the destination is determined endogenously and it finances inland monitoring against illegal immigration, holding the border patrol at a given level. The tax also finances unemployment benefit to legal workers at the destination. The number of immigrant smugglers and traffickers is also determined endogenously along with employer penalty and market wage for illegal immigrants. Higher unemployment benefits may reduce illegal wages, raise traffickers’ rent and reduce flow of illegal immigrants from the source countries.     

Illegal Immigration and Second-best Import Tariffs

A version of the small‐union Meade model is presented to analyze the illegal immigration problem in the context of import tariffs. Two possible host nation objectives are considered: (i) to control the level of illegal immigration to a given target; or (ii) to choose an illegal immigration level that maximizes national welfare. Available policy instruments are import tariffs/subsidies, border, and internal enforcement levels. The second‐best tariff on imports from the source nation (for illegal immigration) can be of either sign. It depends on the effect of the tariff on the wage rate and the pattern of substitutability in consumption. In scenario (ii), greater enforcement may be justified if it reduces labor inflow and thereby contracts the protected sector. If enforcement is too costly, tariff policy may substitute for it to exploit monopsony power in the labor market and to counter the distortionary effects of labor flows.     

What Do Networks Do? The Role of Networks on Migration and “Coyote” Use

While a large literature has established that migration experience among an individual's family and community networks tends to encourage migration, there is little research investigating the mechanism by which networks exert such effects. This paper aims to determine the relative importance of three potential benefits provided by networks: information on border crossing, information on jobs, and credit. We develop empirical tests of these effects based on a simple model that allows individuals to choose between migrating alone or with the help of a border smuggler. Using a dataset of undocumented Mexican migrants to the United States, we find that larger family networks encourage both migration and coyote use, consistent with the job information hypothesis. In contrast, community networks appear to provide crossing information. The finding that family networks have a smaller impact for asset holders indicates that some of the benefit the family network provides is a source of credit.     

Illegal immigration: a supply side analysis

"This paper analyzes the supply-side determinants of illegal immigration using a three-sector general equilibrium model of the source country. Agricultural liberalization raises illegal immigration while liberalization of the high tech sector reduces it. In contrast, capital mobility in the source country renders trade policy ineffective for controlling illegal immigration. Paradoxically, increased enforcement (by the host country) may raise source country unskilled wages, although illegal immigration falls. Finally, under capital mobility, a rise in the source country restrictions on capital inflow raises the level of illegal immigration and reduces the effectiveness of border enforcement efforts by the host country."     

Transit migration

Unauthorized international migration to the advanced countries has become increasingly more costly and indirect. The hazardous land and sea routes that pass through one or more transit countries offer liquidity‐constrained individuals an opportunity to economize on the pecuniary cost of migration as well as to work along the way to pay for the next leg of the journey. This paper analyzes the optimal behavior of transit migrants and examines its implications for the effectiveness of immigration control measures of the transit and final‐destination countries in deterring unauthorized migration. Strengthening of border controls at the final destination is shown to increase the relative effectiveness of internal enforcement measures of the transit countries, while tougher internal enforcement in the transit countries increases the relative effectiveness of border controls at the final destination.     

Intentions to Return of Clandestine Migrants: Comment

We take issue with the reasoning of Coniglio et al. ( 2009 ) that whereas better‐skilled illegal migrants will prefer to return‐migrate, lower‐skilled illegal migrants will not. We argue that under asymmetric information, all the illegal migrants are initially paid a wage based on the average productivity of the group of illegal migrants. The better‐skilled illegal migrants thus face two “taxes:” being paid less than if they were legal, and being averaged down. Therefore, better‐skilled illegal migrants can be expected to expend more effort to become legal than lower‐skilled illegal migrants. And once legalized, there is no reason for the better‐skilled illegal migrants to want to return to their country of origin more than the lower‐skilled illegal migrants. Thus, it is the lower‐skilled illegal migrants that are likely to dominate the return migration flow. We argue that in other respects too, the model of Coniglio et al. is not based on reasonable assumptions, and that even under the postulated assumptions, the model suffers from several inconsistencies. In particular, when the rate of return to savings is an increasing function of skill level, we would expect there to be few better‐skilled individuals among illegal migrants in the first place. Also, an obvious distinction between savers and borrowers is ignored.     

CROSSING THE BORDER AND MIGRATION DURATION

Policies to deter illegal entry and reduce the number of undocumented immigrants have a complex impact on migration patterns, border crossings, and duration. However, studies generally assume the method of crossing into the United States is exogenous with respect to migration duration. Using data from the Mexican Migration Project, this paper finds that the migrant's decision to hire a coyote (smuggler) to cross the border is endogenous with respect to duration. Instrumental variable estimates provide evidence that migrants who incur the cost of hiring a coyote have longer migration durations as they need to work longer in the United States. The migrants most likely to hire coyotes have less education, little migration experience, and/or come from rural communities. Results suggest that continuing to increase guest worker programs could actually decrease the number of Mexican immigrants in the United States by eliminating the need for coyotes which would reduce migration durations. This would better utilize the immigrant population in the United States by encouraging immigrants to stay while employed and to migrate home when unemployed, with the knowledge they can later return. Reducing coyote use would also reduce income flowing to Mexican cartels which have profited from human smuggling. (JEL O15, J61, J64)     

Self-selection among undocumented immigrants from Mexico

This paper examines the effect of changes in migration determinants on the skill level of undocumented Mexican immigrants. We focus on the effect of changes in economic conditions, migrant networks, and border enforcement on the educational attainment of men who cross the border illegally. Results from hazard models using data from the Mexican Migration Project indicate that migrants are not negatively selected with regard to education. However, improvements in U.S. and Mexican economic conditions are associated with a decline in the average education of undocumented immigrants, while stricter border enforcement is associated with higher average skill levels.     

Risk preference,immigration policy and illegal immigration

The paper analyzes the effects of government policy upon illegal immigration. The model used as a vehicle for this analysis is an extension of Ethier's one-small-country model of illegal immigration to a two-country context. We distinguish between the cases of capital immobility and free capital mobility, and consider illegal immigration when there are border patrols by the government and when there are internal enforcement procedures in effect. Unlike previous researchers who have assumed risk neutrality, we examine the impacts of government policy when prospective illegal immigrants exhibit risk averse and risk loving behavior. The relaxation of the risk neutrality assumption leads to the possibility of multiple and unstable equilibria. Moreover, attitudes to risk and the probability of detection are shown to have implications for some equilibrium responses to tighter surveillance.     

Risk preference,immigration policy and illegal immigration

The paper analyzes the effects of government policy upon illegal immigration. The model used as a vehicle for this analysis is an extension of Ethier's one-small-country model of illegal immigration to a two-country context. We distinguish between the cases of capital immobility and free capital mobility, and consider illegal immigration when there are border patrols by the government and when there are internal enforcement procedures in effect. Unlike previous researchers who have assumed risk neutrality, we examine the impacts of government policy when prospective illegal immigrants exhibit risk averse and risk loving behavior. The relaxation of the risk neutrality assumption leads to the possibility of multiple and unstable equilibria. Moreover, attitudes to risk and the probability of detection are shown to have implications for some equilibrium responses to tighter surveillance.     

Migrant smuggling

We analyze a model of the migrant smuggling market where smugglers differ in the capacity to exploit their clients' labor at the destination. We suggest that destination countries with limited resources may prefer to improve the apprehension of smugglers and their clients at the border rather than inland, although either one of these anti-smuggling measures would reduce migrant exploitation. The reason is twofold. First, even if the resulting improvement in border apprehension alone cannot eliminate smuggling, it can do so when combined with a severe penalty for smuggling. Second, even if it is impracticable to set the penalty for smuggling sufficiently high, improved border apprehension reduces smuggling by discouraging existing exploitative smugglers from smuggling, whereas improved inland apprehension either maintains or even increases it by inducing them and those who are not currently smuggling to take up nonexploitative smuggling.     

Work Effort, Moderation in Expulsion, and Illegal Migration

Illegal migrants supply a valuable productive input: effort. But their status as illegals means that these migrants face a strictly positive probability of expulsion. A return to their country of origin entails reduced earnings when the wage at origin is lower than the wage at destination. This prospect induces illegal migrants to exert more work effort than comparable workers who face no such prospect. The lower the probable, alternative earnings, the harsher the penalty that illegal migrants will be subjected to upon their return, for a given probability of expulsion, and the higher the level of effort they will exert at destination. While the home‐country wage that awaits the illegal migrants upon their return is exogenous to the host country, the probability of their return is not. Given the home‐country wage, a higher probability of expulsion will induce illegal migrants to supply more effort. Hence, different combinations of probabilities of expulsion and home‐country wages yield the same level of effort. Thus, variation in the extent to which receiving countries undertake measures aimed at apprehending and expelling illegal migrants can be attributed not to characteristics of the illegal migrants themselves but to a feature that pertains to the illegal migrants’ country of origin.     

Fear,Loathing and the Everyday Geopolitics of Encounter in the Arizona Borderlands

This paper argues for the importance of attending to both affective and emotional experience in analysing the origins and effects of border and immigration efforts in the US/Mexico border region. We do so by engaging with theoretical understands of the politics of affect and emotion among cultural and feminist geographers and social scientists. We then examine Arizona's SB 1070 and its connection to a larger history of border and immigration enforcement in Arizona. Drawing from ethnographic work, interviews, and media and policy analysis, we engage with narratives provided by border area ranchers to unpack how these ranchers' encounters with unauthorised migrants have changed over time. We then examine how the everyday fear and anxiety associated with these encounters drive political activism and state intervention in the region. We conclude by discussing how this intervention, in turn, reproduces racial and gender hierarchies, hierarchies that are themselves affectively mediated.     

Migrant networks and foreign direct investment

Although there exists a sizeable literature documenting the importance of ethnic networks for international trade, little attention has been devoted to studying the effects of migrants on foreign direct investment (FDI). The presence of migrants can stimulate FDI by promoting information flows across international borders and by serving as a contract enforcement mechanism. This paper investigates the link between the presence of migrants in the US and US FDI in the migrants' countries of origin, taking into account the potential endogeneity concerns. The results suggest that US FDI abroad is positively correlated with the presence of migrants from the host country. The data further indicate that the relationship between FDI and migration is stronger for migrants with tertiary education.     

From Smart Borders to Perimeter Security: The Expansion of Digital Surveillance at the Canadian Borders

Since 2001, border security policy between Canada and the US has morphed from “smart borders” to the present “beyond the border” (perimeter security) agreement resulting in the expansion of new techniques of border surveillance including pre-emptive profiling of travellers and biometric data sharing. In this paper, we argue that these border agreements have increasingly resulted in a changing experience of sovereign power for those crossing the border. This is demonstrated through a discussion of: the major border policies between Canada and the US since 11 September 2001, developed under the influence of US hegemony; how these policies perpetrate a generalised state of exception; and how these policies affect refugees, migrants, and citizens. Reading Agamben’s insights from a sociological perspective, we argue that the presumption of security-through-surveillance erodes border crossers’ human rights, and that some people – those from disadvantaged race/class backgrounds – are more affected than others by the implementation of the evolving border regime. We also emphasise the contingencies and unintended consequences of the ongoing projects. The conclusion offers brief comments on the consequences of these developments on Canadian identity and points out the directions for future research in this domain.