‘What problems you got?’: managerialisation and union organising in the voluntary sector

This article explores how government public service modernisation policies have impacted on management practices and employment conditions in voluntary sector welfare organisations and the problems unions have encountered in responding to such impacts in the context of public service modernisation. The study finds that employees encounter problems developing workplace union organisation and unions face problems developing a coherent strategy on support for the sector and for resisting public sector reform, which hinders trade union resistance. The implications of this may be important in strengthening managerial control over the public service labour process.     

Widening the ‘representation gap'? The implications of the ‘lobbying act’ for worker representation in the UK

The Transparency of Lobbying, Non‐Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 (the ‘Lobbying Act’) imposes tight restrictions on the campaigning and lobbying activities of civil society organisations in the UK, diminishing their capacity to represent the interests of working people and thus likely compounding the ‘representation gap’ within British workplaces. Along with austerity measures and employment law reforms, the legislation exemplifies the UK government's attempts to shift the balance of power further towards employers.     

‘Tuning Out' or ‘Tuning in'? Mobile Music Listening and Intensified Encounters with the City

Mobile music listening has become an increasingly pervasive part of urban life. Yet it represents an area of enquiry with which urban studies scholars have yet to engage meaningfully. This essay considers the role of mobile music devices in creating new sonic, emotional and social interactions with and within the city. While academic work in this area has emphasized the use of these devices as a ‘tuning out' of the physicality of the city, we suggest that they might also be used as part of a ‘tuning in' that enhances the meaning and intensity of engagements with the city. In making this case, the essay considers two areas of academic enquiry that highlight the use of mobile music devices in intensified engagements with the city: first, recent writing on the sonic ecologies of the city that emphasize ‘city sounds' as part of the urban experience; and secondly, recent advances in the field of urban computing that provide technologies for location‐aware music exchanges and mediated social interactions. The essay emphasizes mobile music listening as one area of critical enquiry that can help develop our understanding of the ways in which the pervasiveness of mobile devices is recalibrating the experience of urban spatiality.     

‘Who Knows What?’ in New Venture Teams: Transactive Memory Systems as a Micro‐Foundation of Entrepreneurial Orientation

The increasing importance of entrepreneurial behaviour has led scholars to embrace the idea that an entrepreneurial orientation (EO) is an important predictor of firm performance. While EO occupies a central position in strategic entrepreneurship research, scholars have yet to explore its origins in new ventures. Drawing on the knowledge‐based and cognitive views, we theorize that a new venture team's transactive memory system is a cognitive mechanism that spurs the development of an EO. In a field study of high‐tech new ventures in China, we examined the relationship between venture teams’ transactive memory systems (representing the distribution, integration, and utilization of the teams’ knowledge) and EO and the moderating influence of team‐, firm‐, and environment‐level factors. We found that the transactive memory system of a new venture team enhanced their EO and that this relationship was positively influenced by intra‐team trust, the structural organicity of a venture, and environmental dynamism. Our findings provide novel insights into the micro‐foundations of TMS in developing an EO in new ventures.     

Preventing the “Abuses” of Democracy: Hayek,the “Military Usurper” and Transitional Dictatorship in Chile?

Hayek famously claimed that he would prefer a “liberal” dictator to “democratic government lacking in liberalism.” While Hayek's views of the Pinochet regime have generated much controversy, surprisingly little has been written about Hayek's defense of transitional dictatorship. Making use of previously un‐translated foreign language archival material, this paper helps shed light on Hayek's views of authoritarianism, totalitarianism, transitional dictatorship, and the Pinochet regime as well as helping to separate Hayekian ‘fact’ from Hayekian ‘fiction’.     

Brexit — velvet divorce or messy breakup?

• We use a ‘scenario tree’ approach to look at the possible outcomes of the negotiations around the UK's exit from the EU. Given how little common ground there is between the two sides, we find that a relatively loose relationship is the most likely outcome, with the UK set to leave the EU in early‐ 2019.
• The negotiating positions of the UK and EU are diametrically opposed. The UK wants to end the free movement of labour, cease making contributions to the EU budget and regain ‘sovereignty’ from Brussels, while retaining as much access to the single market as possible. But the EU's starting position is that single market access is dependent upon agreeing to the four freedoms and that this is non‐negotiable.
• So far all signs are that the UK will prioritise the ability to control immigration over single market access. Thus remaining a member of the EEA is very unlikely to be viable over the longer‐term – our scenario tree analysis gives it a probability of just 6% – although it may be adopted as an interim step. Remaining part of the customs union is also unlikely (18%) as it will preclude the UK from making FTA with third countries.
• If the EU takes a mercantilist approach, it will have little incentive to come to an agreement with the UK over single market access for services, given the UK's large trade surplus with the EU for these activities, implying that UK firms may face growing non‐tariff barriers after the UK has left the EU. The UK's large deficit on goods trade with the EU gives a better chance of agreeing a FTA for goods, though with any FTA requiring agreement from all 27 EU members, the UK would have to be prepared for lengthy negotiations and make extensive concessions. Therefore, we think that a reversion to WTO rules (37%) is slightly more likely than agreeing a FTA (36%).

     

“Why did I do this?”: Understanding leadership behavior through a dynamic five‐factor model of leadership

Leadership theories referring to complex adaptive system theory (CAS) describe leadership as a dynamic process of interdependent, cooperating agents. However, research on leadership behavior focuses mainly on the leader as an influencing, active agent. This article offers a different perspective by focusing on factors that influence leadership behavior. A dynamic five‐factor model of leadership is introduced, which identifies (1) the leader's individual competence, (2) the group, (3) the organization, (4) the context, and (5) the immediate situation as all influencing factors on leadership behavior. To address the problem of the procedural nature of leadership behavior, the dynamic five‐factor model is combined with a scenario‐based approach. The scenario approach focuses on situational developments in a given context, whereby a previous situation influences a leader's behavior in the subsequent situation. By integrating the dynamic five‐factor model into a scenario approach, one can understand a leader's behavior in its procedural nature. The practical usability of the dynamic five‐factor model and the scenario approach was assessed in a leadership development program with 81 military officers. Structured feedback from participants indicated that the model and the approach were perceived as helpful and relevant for understanding leadership behavior.     

The global bond sell‐off – why and where next?

• The rise in global bond yields since mid‐April has taken markets by surprise. Our analysis suggests that, on balance, some upward correction in yields was justified – especially in the Eurozone. For the US, the evidence is more mixed.
• A variety of explanations have been advanced to explain the bond sell‐off including Eurozone reflation/inflation, looming US rate hikes and associated uncertainty, liquidity and other technical factors, Chinese reflation and a simple reversal of yields overshooting to the downside.
• Some of these explanations are more convincing than others: in our view there is some modest evidence for increased uncertainty and liquidity effects but we also think bonds have corrected from overbought levels, especially in the Eurozone.
• Using some econometric models of bond yields suggests that the recent upward correction of German yields was probably justified; markets had pushed yields too low earlier in 2015. Indeed, the model implies a further ‘corrective’ rise in yields is possible.
• For the US, different models give slightly different results – a variant of the well‐known Shiller‐Modigliani model suggests yields should still be below 2%. However, a broader error‐correction model including factors such as fiscal variables and foreign flows into US bonds suggests the recent rise in yields was broadly justified.

     

“When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?”: New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete

We study a model of competing manufacturer/retailer pairs where adverse selection and moral hazard are coupled with promotional externalities at the downstream level. In contrast to earlier models mainly focusing on a bilateral monopoly setting, we show that with competing brands a ‘laissez‐faire’ approach towards vertical price control might not always promote productive efficiency. Giving manufacturers freedom to control retail prices is more likely to harm consumers when retailers impose positive promotional externalities on each other, and the converse is true otherwise. Our simple model also suggests that, with competing supply chains, consumers and manufacturers might prefer different contractual modes if promotional externalities have substantial effects on demands.     

Sudden Unintended Used‐Price Deceleration? The 2009–2010 Toyota Recalls

Using data from the vehicle resale market, I test consumer responsiveness to large‐scale product recalls that are caused by safety problems. The used‐vehicle prices of Toyotas are compared to the used‐vehicle prices of the other major domestic and foreign manufacturers. The results quantify the losses suffered by Toyota vehicle owners in secondary markets due to the 2009–2010 safety recalls of more than 9 million Toyota Motors vehicles. The treatment effect of a recall is measured using panel data with a difference‐in‐differences estimation approach that allows for time‐varying treatment effects and serial correlation. I find that this recall episode had negative effects in the resale market for automobiles that were quantitatively small (less than 2% of the vehicle’s resale value), statistically indistinguishable from zero, and short lived (did not persist beyond December 2009). A comparison with Audi’s recalls in the 1980s of vehicles with sudden unintended acceleration suggests that the extent to which a company’s reputation is established is more important than whether or not a company has a reputation for producing high‐quality products.     

What are ‘unpopular causes’ and how can they achieve fundraising success?

• Recent efforts to grow and strengthen the culture of philanthropy in the UK have largely focused on two dimensions: the total amount of money donated and the effectiveness of philanthropic spending. This paper explores a third dimension: the destination and distribution of donations. A defining characteristic of charitable giving is that it is voluntary rather than coerced, and the resulting respect for donor autonomy makes people wary of promoting one cause above another or implying that any beneficiary group is more or less ‘worthy’ of support. However, the absence of much comment on, or significant research into, the destination of donations does not alter the fact that some groups succeed in attracting significant philanthropic funds whilst others struggle to secure many—or any—donations. This paper explores the concept of ‘unpopularity’ in the charity sector, especially in relation to its impact on fundraising. We unpack what this loaded phrase means, identify good practice by those seeking support and present case studies of charities that have overcome perceived unpopularity to achieve success in raising voluntary income. We suggest that by investing organisational resources and effort in fundraising, by framing the cause to maximise the arousal of sympathy and minimise concerns about beneficiary culpability and by avoiding the unintended negative consequences of self‐labelling as ‘unpopular’ no charity need assume it is their destiny to languish at the bottom of the fundraising league tables.

Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Eco’ For Whom? Envisioning Eco‐urbanism in the Sino‐Singapore Tianjin Eco‐city,China

Eco‐cities have attracted international attention from governments, corporations, academics and other actors seeking to use sustainable urban planning to reduce urban environmental impacts. China has devoted significant political will and economic resources to the development of new‐build eco‐city projects, reflecting the Chinese government's goals to build a ‘harmonious society' in which environmental sustainability and social stability are mutually reinforcing. We critically analyse the case of the Sino‐Singapore Tianjin eco‐city to demonstrate that the eco‐city's ecologically modernizing visions of eco‐urbanism construct a protective environment for its residents that constrains broader consideration of social sustainability. Through analysis of the marketing and presentation of specific domestic and other spaces of the eco‐city, we examine the application of ecologically modernizing construction and technology to the design of the city. We argue that the eco‐city is discursively constructed as ecologically beneficial for its inhabitants rather than for the broader socio‐environmental landscape. Our analysis of residential spaces in Tianjin eco‐city introduces the question of what ‘eco’ means when considering the construction of eco‐urban environments for the city's residents.     

Brexit and world growth – what are the risks?

• The initial global market reaction to the UK Brexit vote was very negative and in our view overdone. Nevertheless, we expect the uncertainty to linger for a while, with the vote having refocused investors on existing vulnerabilities in the world economy. Our new forecasts see the main negative impacts on growth being in the UK, the Eurozone and Japan. Risks to our new forecasts remain skewed to the downside, with a significant danger of world growth dropping below 2% this year.
• Our new forecasts see UK growth dropping to 1.4% a year in 2017–18, down from 2.2–2.3% a year before. In the Eurozone, growth will be around 0.2% a year weaker in 2017–18 and Japan is also a loser as a result of the risk aversion‐driven stronger yen, with growth at just 0.3% in 2017 from 0.5%.
• The size of the initial global market sell‐off makes no sense in the context of the likely impact from a weaker UK. In part, it seems to have reflected the pricing in of very negative scenarios in the Eurozone. But investors may also be worrying about other global problems glossed over in recent months.
• One risk to our forecast is that confidence effects on businesses and consumers are larger than we expect – but such effects are often overstated. Another danger is that more of the recent financial market weakness will ‘stick’ than our new baseline forecasts assume.
• Our world recession indicator is already at elevated levels and suggests a significant danger of world growth slipping below 2% this year; not a recession, but it might feel like one. Global policymakers need to act quickly to head off the risks.

     

The ‘Company with Committees’: Change or Continuity in Japanese Corporate Governance?

Corporate governance practices are arguably diffusing across the world. This paper examines the adoption of the committee‐based governance system (i.e. audit, nomination, and remuneration) in Japanese firms, a practice common in Anglo‐American capitalism but potentially contestable in Japan. The study finds that firms that are internationally exposed through cross listing are more likely to adopt the committee system. Moreover, more experienced and highly cross‐held firms, with larger proportions of foreign ownership, are more likely to adopt the committee system. On the other hand our study finds partial support for the hypothesis that larger proportions of bank ownership are negatively associated with the adoption of the committee system, suggesting a gradual withdrawal by banks from the traditional monitoring of firms. This paper adds to the longstanding debate on the convergence on or persistent divergence from the Anglo‐American corporate governance system. The study thus provides insights into corporate governance changes in non‐Anglo/American countries that face a struggle between global capital market forces for change and deep‐seated institutional practices of continuity.     

Secular stagnation ‐ are we stuck in Summers' long winter?

• Stunningly low global long‐term bond yields provide some credence to a secular stagnation view of the world. We present an analytical framework – culminating in a simple scorecard – for assessing the extent to which purported drivers and manifestations of secular stagnation match global economic and financial developments and we compare with a complementary narrative focusing on balance sheet boom and bust. We find some support for each, but think global rates will not stay as low for as long as markets price in.
• Larry Summers has used the term to refer to a situation where demand and supply for savings deliver very low equilibrium real interest rates. The bulge in middle‐aged savers, falling prices of investment goods, and flows of savings ‘uphill’ from emerging markets may have all led to real rates trending much lower in recent decades.
• Another version of the story is that slow technical progress depresses demand for borrowing, and pushes down on real rates. This is less compelling, and based more on anecdote than anything else. There are as many reasons to be optimistic, as pessimistic, about the supply side.
• There are holes in the secular stagnation narrative. Until very recently, G7 savings rates have trended down rather than up, partly because of another decades‐long trend of financial innovation. Furthermore, few economists, nor the Fed or the BoE, expect policy rates in the US or UK to stay low for as long as is priced in to markets.
• A complementary narrative would stress the role of the credit‐fuelled mega‐boom and subsequent balance sheet blow out and Great Recession, and then the long road to financial repair. This is more consistent with the path of savings rates over recent decades, and the policy response – including QE – can explain much of the rest.
• We see the two explanations as complementary and reinforcing. In global terms, they appear no better or worse than each other. Comparing across countries, Japan comes closest to resembling secular stagnation, followed by EZ, US and UK, according to our scorecard.
• We think ultra‐low long rates will not be borne out by the future path of short rates, but acknowledge a significant risk they might, for example, if monetary policy remains too tight on average because of zero bound effects on interest rates and limited scope for fiscal accommodation.

     

Secular stagnation – are we stuck in Summers' long winter?

• We estimate that the UK has a relatively large output gap of around 2¾% of potential output. With the legacy of the financial crisis fading, the UK should see healthy growth in potential output of around 2.1% a year from 2015–24. Usually this would drive a period of strong economic growth, but we expect GDP growth to average a relatively underwhelming 2.4% a year over this period, largely due to the drag from aggressive fiscal consolidation.
• There is significant disagreement amongst economists about the size of the output gap. Estimation of the output gap has been problematic since the financial crisis because of the depth of the recession and relatively slow pace of the subsequent recovery, while sizeable revisions to the national accounts data have been an added complication. Our estimate of the output gap is towards the top of the range of independent forecasters surveyed by HM Treasury, but it is consistent with the literature on the impact of financial crises on potential output.
• We expect potential output growth of 2.1% a year from 2015–24, a faster pace than that seen since the financial crisis, but some way short of the experience of the pre‐crisis decade. The shortfall relative to the pre‐crisis period is largely due to a smaller contribution from growth in labour supply, which reflects the impact of an ageing population. However, labour is set to make a much stronger contribution to potential output growth in the UK than in most other major European countries over the next decade.
• The combination of a large output gap and healthy growth in potential output will provide the conditions for firm growth and low inflation over the medium term, with GDP growth expected to average 2.4% a year from 2015 to 2024. Growth could be stronger were it not for the sizeable drag from fiscal consolidation over the next four years and the dampening effect that this will have on activity. This will ensure that the output gap closes very slowly. The government's fiscal plans are heavily influenced by the OBR's view that there is limited scope for stronger growth to drive an improvement in the public finances. But if our view turns out to be correct, it will become apparent that the government has pursued a more austere path than is strictly necessary in order to comply with its fiscal rules.