Antidumping and retaliation threats

We propose and test two ways in which retaliation threats may dampen the antidumping (AD) activity we observe. First, the threat of retaliatory AD actions may make a domestic industry less likely to name a foreign import source in an AD petition. Second, the prospect of a GATT/WTO trade dispute may make government agencies less likely to rule positive in their AD decision. Using a nested logit framework, we find evidence that both retaliation threats substantially affect US AD activity from 1980 through 1998.     

How do countries respond to anti‐dumping filings? Dispute settlement and retaliatory anti‐dumping

Empirical studies have found that countries may respond strategically to the anti‐dumping petition filed against their exporters through their own retaliatory actions. Although most previous studies have focused on retaliatory anti‐dumping filings, in this paper we explore another potential avenue for strategic response—filing a complaint under the World Trade Organization's (WTO ) dispute settlement understanding. Using a panel of global anti‐dumping filings between 1995 and 2011, we analyse under what conditions countries will choose to retaliate through either an anti‐dumping petition or a WTO dispute, and to what degree these two strategies are complementary or act as substitutes. We find statistical evidence that countries are more likely to file a WTO dispute when they have also filed a retaliatory anti‐dumping petition, suggesting that these two strategies may be complementary.     

Curbing Agricultural Exceptionalism: The EU's Response to External Challenge

From 1948 to 1994, the agricultural sector was afforded special treatment in the GATT. We analyse the extent to which this agricultural exceptionalism was curbed as a result of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, discuss why it was curbed and finally explore the implication of this for EU policy making. We argue that, in particular, two major changes in GATT institutions brought about restrictions on agricultural exceptionalism. First, the Uruguay Round was a ‘single undertaking’ in which progress on other dossiers was contingent upon an outcome on agriculture. The EU had keenly supported this new decision rule in the GATT. Within the EU this led to the MacSharry reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1992, paving the way for a trade agreement on agriculture within the GATT. Second, under the new quasi‐judicial dispute settlement procedure, countries are expected to bring their policies into conformity with WTO rules or face retaliatory trade sanctions. This has brought about a greater willingness on the part of the EU to submit its farm policy to WTO disciplines.     

Trade disputes and the implementation of protection under the GATT: an empirical assessment

This paper is a first attempt to empirically determine why countries choose to violate or adhere to GATT rules when making trade policy adjustments between negotiating rounds. We use a previously unexploited set of data in which countries implemented two ‘types’ of protection under the GATT system between 1973 and 1994: (i) ‘legal’ protection in which countries utilized the GATT’s safeguards provisions; and (ii) ‘illegal’ protection in which the protection was provided outside of the safeguards provisions, resulting in a formal trade dispute. We find substantial evidence that concerns for retaliation affect government policy decisions in ways which contribute to the explanation of the existence of trade disputes.     

WTO Dispute Settlement: An Economic Analysis of Four EU–US Mini Trade Wars—A Survey

Since its inception in 1995, more than 312 disputes have been raised under the WTO Dispute Settlement System. Despite the obvious success of this system, several shortcomings call for a revision under the auspices of the Doha Development Round. With a computable general equilibrium model we analyze the four most prominent trade disputes between the EU and the USA, which we call mini trade wars: the Hormones, the Bananas, the Foreign Sales Corporations and the Steel cases. The economic analysis revealed several flaws and peculiarities: As a rule, retaliatory tariffs are detrimental to welfare of the retaliating country and amount to shooting oneself in the foot. Trade wars can only be won by large countries. The WTO arbitrator's estimation of the trade loss in case of non-compliance never translates into equivalent damage to economic welfare. A mechanism to control the collection of retaliatory tariff revenues is missing as is a system to compensate the firms suffering the damage. The major conclusion therefore is that tariffs are very bad instruments for countermeasures. The sanctions mechanism of the Dispute Settlement System should be improved, maybe based on a mechanism of direct transfers.     

The WTO,the Environment and Health and Safety Standards

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a product of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO was created in the last round of negotiations (Uruguay Round, 1986‐94) to provide a stronger set of institutions to administer the various agreements negotiated under the GATT framework. Because the WTO is more powerful than its predecessors, critics claim that it poses a threat to national sovereignty. Concerns about the ability of nations to set their own environmental and health and safety agendas have figured prominently in these critiques. In addition, critics suggest that the WTO prioritises trade objectives at the expense of environmental and health and safety objectives. The article explores the extent to which the WTO has been able to reconcile trade, environmental and health and safety objectives by analysing its rulings on these matters. Overall, this analysis suggests that the WTO dispute resolution process has balanced all three sets of objectives. However, it is important to note the small number of disputes to date; only 21of the 175 disputes before the WTO involve environmental and health and safety matters. Further, the WTO has issued decisions in only six of these cases.     

The Evolution of Japan's Aggressive Legalism

Japan's recent trade policy is sometimes characterised as ‘aggressive legalism’ in the sense that it aggressively utilises the multilateral trade rules embodied in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation in dealing with disputes with its trade partners. This policy may appear to be a marked departure from Japan's past practice of favouring bilateral, non‐legal settlement of trade disputes. Upon closer examination, however, while Japan has been moderately active in using the WTO dispute settlement process for resolving its trade disputes, it behaves more like a country that resorts to surgical strikes on selected targets (usually the United States) under a powerful cover of the European Community. Compared to Japan, Korea's attitude in the WTO is more aggressive. While the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) is not content with the status quo and is seeking to expand its aggressiveness in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, it faces an uphill battle. One of the difficulties facing trade officials in Japan may be the lack of a national system for lodging WTO complaints, open to any citizens or firms, like Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974 or the European Trade Barriers Regulation. Nonetheless, in the historical context, Japan is far more aggressive than in the past in utilising the rules of the GATT/WTO to advance its national interests. It will never revert to the infamous practice of bilateralism and grey area measures.     

WTO争端解决机制改革效用的实证分析

WTO的争端解决机制是一个以规则为导向的组织,被认为是一个公正的国际贸易组织。这也使人们认为在这个进步的机制下,发展中国家的利益会得到好的保护。但是目前还很少有学者对此进行实证研究。文章以2001年至2006年的贸易争端为样本研究对象,研究争端解决机制改革的效用,发现发展中国家作为申诉方会比发达国家作为申诉方获得更多的应诉方让步。而且当应诉方为发达国家时,发展中国家获得让步的可能性较大。     

WTO贸易救济措施争端解决的绩效分析——基于动态非平衡面板数据模型系统GMM检验

文章在回顾相关研究的基础上考虑四阶段WTO争端解决程序,根据WTO争端案例结案时长不等的特点和多阶段策略选择难以量化的性质,建立WTO贸易救济措施争端解决绩效动态非平衡面板数据模型,运用系统GMM检验,对WTO贸易救济措施争端解决绩效进行了实证分析。结果表明：积极援引WTO争端解决机制是能够在一定程度上挽回贸易损失的,尤其是双方在争端解决过程中达成的磋商解决、请求专家组中止工作、相互满意解决或者败诉方执行WTO决定等均对申诉方出口贸易具有促进作用;尽快结案将有利于申诉方,而WTO争端解决案件的持续时间越长,越不利于申诉方。     

The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO: A Brief History and an Evaluation from Economic,Contractarian and Legal Perspectives

Any rule‐based system has to include a mechanism for the enforcement of its rules and a means for settlement of disputes about alleged violation of rules. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded in 1947, and its successor the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that subsumed it in 1995, embody rules governing the global trading system as specified in various agreements that their members have entered into over time. Naturally, both had a dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). It was a primarily political one in the GATT and was transformed into a largely legalistic one in the multilateral agreement that established the WTO. This paper reviews the history and evaluation of the two DSMs and examines their efficiency based on appropriate criteria. It views them from three alternative and overlapping perspectives: political‐diplomatic, legal‐economic and social. It concludes with a discussion of the unresolved problems in the operation of the WTO's DSM and the prospects of resolving them in the ongoing Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.     

Trade skirmishes safeguards: A theory of the WTO dispute settlement process

I propose a framework within which to interpret and evaluate the major reforms introduced to the GATT system in its transition to the WTO. In particular, I examine the WTO Agreement on Safeguards that has amended the GATT escape clause (Article XIX), and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) that resembles a court of law under the WTO. Using this framework, I interpret the weakening of the reciprocity principle under the Agreement on Safeguards as an attempt to reduce efficiency-reducing trade skirmishes. The DSB is interpreted as an impartial arbitrator that announces its opinion about the state of the world when a dispute arises among member countries. I demonstrate that the reforms in the GATT escape clause should be bundled with the introduction of the DSB, in order to maintain the incentive compatibility of trade agreements. The model implies that trade agreements under the WTO lead to fewer trade skirmishes but this effect does not necessarily result in higher payoffs to the governments. The model also implies that the introduction of the WTO court, which has no enforcement power, can improve the self-enforceability of trade agreements.     

The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly

This paper furnishes robust evidence that the WTO has had a strong positive impact on trade, amounting to about 120% of additional world trade (or US$ 8 trillion in 2000 alone). The impact has, however, been uneven. This, in many ways, is consistent with theoretical models of the GATT/WTO. The theory suggests that the impact of a country's membership in the GATT/WTO depends on what the country does with its membership, with whom it negotiates, and which products the negotiation covers. Using a properly specified gravity model, we find evidence broadly consistent with these predictions. First, industrial countries that participated more actively than developing countries in reciprocal trade negotiations witnessed a large increase in trade. Second, bilateral trade was greater when both partners undertook liberalization than when only one partner did. Third, sectors that did not witness liberalization did not see an increase in trade.     

Dispute Settlement at the WTO: Impacts of a No Deal in the US‐Brazil Cotton Dispute

On the day before Brazil was to start imposing retaliatory sanctions against the United States in the WTO dispute settlement case regarding unfair domestic and export upland cotton subsidies, the parties have reached a preliminary concession aimed at settling this eight‐year‐long trade dispute. In this paper, we explore the economywide impacts of a no deal with specific emphasis on intellectual property retaliation in a computable general equilibrium framework. As awarded by a WTO dispute settlement panel, Brazil would have been entitled to $591 million in retaliatory sanctions in goods sectors and $238 million in intellectual property sanctions. We find that retaliation by Brazil would have led to welfare gains for all countries except the United States. Most importantly, however, had Brazil not been allowed to retaliate in the form of suspension of intellectual property rights, the impact of trade retaliation alone would have been negative for both Brazil and the United States, a case of shooting oneself in the foot to shoot at the other person's foot.     

从贸易争端中获得利益是关键——中国影响汽车零部件进口措施案分析

2008年7月18日,世界贸易组织(WTO)争端解决机构专家组公布了中国影响汽车零部件进口措施案的裁决报告,我国在此次争端中败诉。我们认为,不应以贸易争端胜诉或败诉作为判断中国应对WTO是否成功的关键,从贸易争端中获得经济利益是最重要的,我国应该继续利用WTO争端解决机制为我国汽车整车产业和零部件产业提供支持。同时我们也应注意采取更有策略性的贸易措施来保护国内产业。     

Trade disputes,quality choice,and economic integration

Recent work demonstrates the importance of developing high quality output in order to compete in export markets and other recent studies verify the prevalence of fixed and ongoing trade costs while participating in those markets. I consider the joint choice of quality and export promotion costs when trade relationships are subject to temporary disputes. When transparency is low and macroeconomic instability is high, disputes arrive more frequently and, therefore, firms may inefficiently choose lower levels of quality and export promotion. These, in turn, build shallower trading relationships with less trade volumes and higher tariffs, and generate greater trade reductions during the more common trade disputes. Several institutional features of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism that are generally lacking in preferential trade agreements such as improved transparency, dispute investigation, and the provision to recommend asymmetric continuation payoffs can ameliorate these inefficient quality choice outcomes. Hence, lower quality output and lower quality trading relationships may be more endemic to countries that depend on preferential trading areas as opposed to the WTO.     

Do WTO members have more liberal trade policy?

This paper uses 68 measures of trade policy and liberalization to ask if membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is associated with more liberal trade policy. Almost no measures of trade policy are significantly correlated with GATT/WTO membership. Trade liberalizations, when they occur, usually lag GATT entry by many years, and the GATT/WTO often admits countries that are closed and remain closed for years. The exception to the rule is that WTO members tend to have slightly more freedom as judged by the Heritage Foundation's index.     

试析WTO争端解决机制

WTO自建立以来,其争端解决机制为多边贸易体制的有效运转提供了重要保障,对国际贸易争端的顺利解决起到了积极的作用。WTO争端解决机制是在GATT争端解决机制的基础上产生和发展起来,有着诸多不可比拟的优点,但同时不可避免地继承和包含GATT争端解决机制"先天性"的不足,其在实践中也暴露出不少问题,从具体的规则程序到实际运行的效果和作用都还存在不足之处。     

多边贸易摩擦演进模式的经济学文献述评

争端解决机制是世界贸易组织的中心支柱和在实际运行中最活跃的部分。本文从多边贸易摩擦演进模式这一新视角切入,就当前经济学领域有关多边贸易摩擦的提起模式、推进模式和解决模式的文献进行了述评。这对处在国际经济摩擦高发期、多边贸易摩擦频率不断提高的我国而言,无疑具有重要的现实意义和参考价值。     

日本与WTO争端解决机制

在GATT时代,日本在争端解决机制中比较被动,败诉相对较多。到了WTO时代,日本开始积极参与WTO争端解决机制,积极运用这一机制维护日本的国际贸易利益,并取得了较大的成功,出现了胜多败少的局面。日本这一变化的内在动力来自日本以入世为契机成功实现了贸易政策从以往的保护主义向自由贸易转换,可以在WTO争端解决机制舞台上以自由贸易的形象示人,并为此进行了WTO争端解决机构上诉机构大法官的人事布局,一直保持了日本人的上诉机构大法官的席位。日本的这一成果可以为我国所借鉴。     

中美欧贸易报复制度的比较研究

WTO体制下,贸易报复是争端解决的最后保障,但WTO争端机制旨在解决成员之间的争端,因此,要赋予私人请求本国政府对另一国家进行贸易报复的权利,仍然需要国内立法.目前,各主要大国都通过国内立法赋予本国国民权利,以请求本国政府对另一国家进行贸易报复,为争端解决的国内程序和国际程序的衔接提供了基础,使得本国国民可以通过国内程序启动WTO的争端解决程序.与美欧相比,我国关于贸易报复的立法和实践经验均不甚丰富,确实需要借鉴较为完备的美欧立法,完善我国的有关法律制度.