燃油加油机防作弊技术分析与对策

随着科技不断发展,燃油加油机的作弊技术也随之科技化、广泛化。不法分子通过多种科技手段对加油站的燃油加油机进行作弊改造,从而为自身带来巨额收益。为了杜绝燃油加油机作弊情况,本文就当前常见的燃油加油机作弊方法与技术进行探讨,并依据作弊方法对防作弊技术进行理论分析,从而为防作弊措施的制定提供理论依据。     

燃油加油机防作弊技术分析与对策

随着科技不断发展，燃油加油机的作弊技术也随之科技化、广泛化。不法分子通过多种科技手段对加油站的燃油加油机进行作弊改造，从而为自身带来巨额收益。为了杜绝燃油加油机作弊情况，本文就当前常见的燃油加油机作弊方法与技术进行探讨，并依据作弊方法对防作弊技术进行理论分析，从而为防作弊措施的制定提供理论依据。     

燃油加油机防作弊系统的检测分析

文章首先介绍了燃油加油机的分类,并结合工作经验对旧式加油机所采取的电路模式的了解,分析其对应的一些作弊手段;然后介绍了新型防作弊系统加油机的工作原理及检测过程,并针对作弊系统提出了有效的预防措施,进而保证新型加油机数据的正确性,保证防作弊系统不被篡改。     

加油机作弊手段解决措施及检定中应注意的问题

由于近年来全球范围内能源的紧缺,燃油价格的上涨,人们对燃油加油机的准确度越来越关注。文章对加油机作弊手段解决措施及检定中应注意的问题进行探讨。     

如何识别加油机的作弊

1、各种作弊手段 目前，常见的燃油加油机的作弊手段主要有以下几种： （1）故意不回零。作弊者将加油机自动回零装置调至临界状态，不用油枪使劲压一下或手摇装置难以回零，致使累加前表数。     

燃油加油机的防作弊措施

随着我国经济高速发展,汽车保有量飞速提升,汽油用量大,加油机作弊问题已经引起方方面面的关注,JJG443-2006<燃油加油机>检定规程从根本上解决了此问题.规程规定2006年9月8日之后出厂的燃油加油机(以下简称"新型加油机")必须具有防作弊功能.对2006年9月8日之前出厂的燃油加油机(以下简称"旧型加油机"),采用相应的措施也可达到防作弊的目的.     

谈加油机的作弊手段及防范措施

燃油加油机是用于机动车加油的主要工具,市场经济下,利益驱使,一些不法经营者利用加油机作弊,以谋取不义之财,这既坑害了消费者,同时又给技术监督部门管理带来一定难度。如何识别诸多作弊手段并加以防范,笔者认为工作实践中必须把握好两个方面一、正视作弊手段目前,常见的燃油加油机的作弊手段主要有以下几种。1、故意不回零。作弊者将加油机自动回零装置调至临界状态,不用油枪使劲压一下或手摇装置难以回零,致使累加前表数。2、手拨计数器的数码盘。有的加油站将加油机同侧面上的玻璃及计数器挡板卸下,而面向顾客一面不卸。加油时,一人站在加油机旁,拨动计数器数码盘,加油量大时拨动十位数,少则拨动个位数。     

如何识别加油机的作弊

1、各种作弊手段目前,常见的燃油加油机的作弊手段主要有以下几种:(1)故意不回零。作弊者将加油机自动回零装置调至临界状态,不用油枪使劲压一下或手摇装置难以回零,致使累加前表数。(2)手拨计数器的数码盘。有的加油站将加油     

如何识别加油机的作弊

如何识别利用加油机作弊的诸多手段并加以防范，笔者认为在工作实践中必须把好两个方面。各种作弊手段目前，常见的燃油加油机的作弊手段主要有以下几种：(1) 故意不回零 作弊者将加油机自动回零装置调至临界状态，不用油枪使劲压一下或手摇装置难以回零，致使累加前表数。(2) 手拨计数器的数码盘 有的加油站将加油机内侧面上的玻璃及计数器挡板卸下，而面向顾客一面不卸。加油时，一人站在加油机旁拨动计数器数码盘，加油量大时拨动十位数，少则拨动个位数。(3) 调整计量器的排量调整装置 有的加油站将加油机计量器上的排量调整罩盖上的铅…     

有关新型燃油加油机的防作弊措施

本文针对油站加油机的作弊问题,讲解了有关新型燃油加油机技术上的防作弊措施。并阐明监管措施的重要性,加强执法检查中每个环节的工作,使得监管下的单位或部门的管理更具规范性。     

All time cheaters versus cheaters in distress: An examination of cheating and oil prices in OPEC

This paper investigates the OPEC quota share system and whether there is any pattern to “cheating”. Using threshold cointegration methods, we examine each OPEC member's cheating behavior in periods of rising and falling real oil prices. Most OPEC members behave differently in response to rising oil prices than falling oil prices. For shocks of typical historical size, most members overproduce their quotas regardless of the direction of the real oil prices in the medium to long run. However, in response to large real oil price shocks, most members conform to a “public finance argument” whereby they underproduce their quotas in response to rising oil prices and overproduce in response to falling real oil prices. In an extended model with cheating by Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members, we find no statistically significant relationship between Saudi Arabian cheating and other cheating. The impulse response functions reveal that for typical shocks, neither Saudi Arabia nor other OPEC members absorb cheating by the other party. However, when there is a large incidence of cheating by other OPEC members, Saudi Arabia responds in kind: this forceful response is in line with a tit-for-tat strategy when there is “too much” cheating.     

上市公司会计舞弊治理探析

文章在列举传统会计舞弊手法的基础上,分析了公司会计舞弊手法的一些新的变化,揭示了公司会计舞弊的原因与动机,并对完善会计舞弊的治理措施提出了自己的一点看法与体会。     

高职院校学生考试作弊原因及对策分析

考试作弊是一个由来已久、且没有办法消除的弊病,高职院校学生考试作弊是习以为常的事情,文章结合所在高职院校学生的学习状态,尝试分析考试作弊的原因并提出相应的对策。     

The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctions on Cheating: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia

Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we investigate whether the level of monitoring and both the nature (monetary versus moral) and magnitude of sanctions influence cheating levels. Our findings show that the introduction of weak monetary sanctions and monitoring is likely to increase cheating. However, a perfect monitoring is found to decrease the level of cheating. Moreover, when combined with a perfect monitoring, moral sanctions matter and may be even more effective than strong monetary sanctions in reducing cheating. We draw some policy implications regarding cheating in various domains. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

大学生作弊现象的行为经济学假说

对大学生考试作弊的控制程度已成为衡量高校管理工作的一个重要指标,而研究大学生作弊行为的特点、探究其作弊的真实行为动机是寻求科学管理途径的重要一步。近年来,大量统计和调查数据显示大学生作弊呈现出很多新特点,但已有的基于传统经济学理性人假设的模型很难解释这些特点出现的原因。从行为经济学中的前景理论出发,建立模型假说可以有力的弥补传统经济学的这些不足,并以此提出切合实际的理论解释。     

对利用衡器作弊的一点认识

对于衡器作弊,相关部门需要加大打击力度,进一步维护消费者的合法权益。本文通过阐述衡器的基本知识,分析衡器作弊现象,同时提出相应的政策建议,对于治理衡器作弊问题,为相关部门提供参考依据。     

Self-reported cheating in web surveys on political knowledge

Measuring citizens’ political knowledge is important for understanding public opinion formation. In view of the increasing popularity of Web surveys, this paper examines the limitations of this interviewing facility when measuring factual political knowledge. We show that Web surveys contain a source of measurement error as respondents can “Google” the correct answers. This cheating activity is our principal concern. Past efforts are extended by: (1) offering a self-reported estimate of the share of Googling cheaters, (2) showing that the positive effect of education on factual political knowledge is most probably underestimated when cheating occurs, and (3) showing that self-reported cheating activity is inversely related to actual response time. In the concluding section, we discuss the implications of these results and the extent to which cheating can be reduced. The empirical analyses are based on a Danish Web sample from 2012 (N \(=\) 1,509).     

大学生考试作弊现象分析及对策研究

近年来,大学生考试作弊已经成为各大高校的一个普遍现象,一直被高校视为毒瘤的作弊之风不但没有得到有效制止,反而大有愈演愈烈之势,给高校教学质量、教学管理带来了很大冲击。本文旨在通过分析大学生考试作弊这一现象,深刻剖析形成作弊之风的大学生自身原因及社会原因,并就高校应该如何有效地应对大学生作弊现象提出了几点对策。     

Do congressional leaders detect and deter cartel cheating? Evidence from committee assignments

Abstract. The present study extends recent work in the public choice literature that suggests that monopoly legislators form cartel-like organizations in an effort to extract greater benefits in the political process. With any cartel organization cheating is expected to arise. If any political cartel (or business cartel) is to be successful, cheating must be detected and punished. Previous work examining the voting behavior and committee placement of Congressional Black Caucus members presents observable evidence of cartel success, but it fails to examine how cheating by individual Congressional Black Caucus members is detected and deterred. This study points out that (1) use of ADA voting records by Democratic House leaders renders “cartel cheating” easily detectable, (2) any observed cheating is punished by Democratic leaders through placement on less desirable House committees, and (3) such a punishment diminishes the “legislative” level of representation that an individual Representative can provide. Received: 29 May 2001 / Accepted: 29 July 2002 The authors thank two anonymous referees of this journal, Amihai Glazer, David Hobson and Troy Gibson for helpful comments. This work was supported through a Business Advisory Council Faculty Scholars Grant.