最优关税和部分私有化战略-产品差异的混合寡头模型

本文通过构建一个双寡头垄断竞争的博弈模型,探讨了存在产品差异的混合寡头市场(mixed oligopoly)中,国内外企业的产品差异程度和公有企业私有化程度对最优关税的影响。研究结果表明:无论政府以收入极大化还是福利极大化为目标,其制定的关税税率都应随着私有化程度和产品差异程度的提高而提高,政府福利目标与关税收入目标都与产品差异程度成正比。与最近的其他研究发现不同,在不存在私有化或者当私有化程度相对较低而差异程度相对较高时,收入极大化关税税率总是高于福利极大化关税税率。同时本文还得出,福利极大化下的社会最优私有化比例总是大于关税收入极大化的社会最优私有化比例。因此,以社会福利极大化为目标的政府比以关税收入极大化为目标的政府更加倾向于私有化本国的公有企业。     

最优关税和部分私有化战略-产品差异的混合寡头模型

本文通过构建一个双寡头垄断竞争的博弈模型,探讨了存在产品差异的混合寡头市场(mixed oligopoly)中,国内外企业的产品差异程度和公有企业私有化程度对最优关税的影响.研究结果表明:无论政府以收入极大化还是福利极大化为目标,其制定的关税税率都应随着私有化程度和产品差异程度的提高而提高,政府福利目标与关税收入目标都与产品差异程度成正比.与最近的其他研究发现不同,在不存在私有化或者当私有化程度相对较低而差异程度相对较高时,收入极大化关税税率总是高于福利极大化关税税率.同时本文还得出,福利极大化下的社会最优私有化比例总是大干关税收入极大化的社会最优私有化比例.因此,以社会福利极大化为目标的政府比以关税收入极大化为目标的政府更加倾向于私有化本国的公有企业.     

最优关税和部分私有化战略——产品差异的混合寡头模型

本文通过构建一个双寡头垄断竞争的博弈模型，探讨了存在产品差异的混合寡头市场（mixed oligopoly）中，国内外企业的产品差异程度和公有企业私有化程度对最优关税的影响。研究结果表明：无论政府以收入极大化还是福利极大化为目标，其制定的关税税率都应随着私有化程度和产品差异程度的提高而提高，政府福利目标与关税收入目标都与产品差异程度成正比。与最近的其他研究发现不同，在不存在私有化或者当私有化程度相对较低而差异程度相对较高时，收入极大化关税税率总是高于福利极大化关税税率。同时本文还得出，福利极大化下的社会最优私有化比例总是大于关税收入极大化的社会最优私有化比例。因此，以社会福利极大化为目标的政府比以关税收入极大化为目标的政府更加倾向于私有化本国的公有企业。     

粤港如何合作共同培育区域环保市场

由于生产者追求生产总成本最小化不愿支付治理污染费用,便使社会承担产品的污染成本,因而损害消费者利益,生产外部不经济性是市场活动在社会总成本──效益方面的无效率,是市场失灵的典型的表现。通过政府管制或其他非市场制度安排,可以改善不合理的市场行为,解决外部不经济性,促进经济效率提高。强化政府行政管制和发展环境法的内在动因,可认为是遵循资源配置效率成本最小化、效益最大化的经济准则,是以效率为精髓,强调社会整体的经济合理性和社会成员福利最大化。粤港经济经过２０年的合作逐渐向区域经济一体化趋势发展,但从市…     

警惕改头换面的新自由主义——“国有企业股权多元化”辨析

我国宪法规定社会主义初级阶段的基本经济制度是以公有制为主体。但世行报告提出的所谓"国企股权多元化",是在国有企业现有资产存量基础上进行股权分散化,逐渐降低政府掌握的股份比例,直至将股份控制权转移出去。这实质上就是要将国企私有化、外资化,最终必将导致国际金融垄断资本集团控制中国经济,导致中国经济的殖民化。"国企股权多元化"将导致国有资产流失、收入分配差距拉大、政府宏观调控能力削弱和国际垄断资本控制国内经济等危害。必须警惕改头换面后的新自由主义,扭转经济学"西化"局面,正确认识"国企股权多元化"的本质和危害,采取切实有效的措施大力振兴公有制经济。     

私有化能否改善环境？

前言过去的二十年中,私有化已经成为一个全球性的现象。私有化对产出、效率和福利的影响也已经在文献中③得到广泛的研究。从包括利润和消费者剩余的社会福利来看,公众持有企业的生产倾向于无效率。所以,私有化将经理们的目标从社会福利转向了利润最大化,这     

我国国企私有化的必要性

国企私有化的问题由来已久,对于国有企业是否需要改革,改革的程度及方式,一直是人们争论不休的话题。本文试图从真正区分私有化的含义、私有化给我们带来的益处等方面阐述了国企私有化的重要性和必然性。     

邱兆祥：产权改革不是万能的

在前不久召开的全国深化国企改革研讨会上，著名经济学家邱兆祥对国企的产权改革提出自己的看法，他认为，综合起来看，国企问题并不单纯是进行产权改革和进行股份制改造所能解决的。国内有些学者认为，现在国企存在的诸多问题，都是由单一的产权带来的，他们认为抓好了产权改革，进行一些单纯的产权制度改革，现在的问题就能解决。有些学者提出要进行国企民营化的改制。国有企业几十年来搞不好，而私企老板短时间就能救活?如果私有化就能解决所有问题，为什么美国每年还有许多私营企业破产之后重组呢?俄罗斯推进私有化的初衷是克服国有企业的低效率，然而在私有化以后，至今私有化的企业并没有显示出更好的效率，在很多领域还不如原来的国企。其实国企老总当中也有经营行家，只是由于经营体制的关系．我们疏忽了他们．私企老板中尽管有不少的优秀企业家，     

动物福利认知与居民食品安全

农场动物福利不仅是伦理问题,还关乎食品安全。文章将农场动物福利纳入食品安全议题之内,考察了消费者的农场动物福利认知对其支付意愿及政策诉求的影响。研究表明,尽管当前我国消费者对农场动物福利认知还不充分,但仍有81.42%的消费者对农场动物福利存在一定的支付意愿,平均支付溢价达19.24%,消费者关于农场动物福利的认知对其农场动物福利支付意愿及政策诉求存在显著影响。这一结论表明,我国已存在通过市场激励手段或是政府规制手段改善农场动物福利,进而提升居民食品安全的基础条件。     

财政转移支付的目标取向——公平和效率

财政转移支付是解决市场失灵的一项重要的制度安排。分税制改革以来,中央政府根据不同的经济形势安排对地方政府的转移支付,追求的目标是不同的,总体来看就是在公平与效率目标之间做出选择。本文对公平与效率目标做定量描述,验证不同发展阶段我们财政转移支付目标取向差异,并据此提出提高财政转移效率的基本途径。     

SOE Reform under Oligopolistic Market Structure: The Optimal Choice of State Shares

This paper examines the effect of the change of state shares in a state-owned enterprise (SOE) on the efficiency of the whole society and the payoff of the government. This issue is addressed by setting up a mixed oligopolistic competition model and dividing the analysis into two cases: closed economy and open economy. The basic results are as follows: If the relative production efficiency of an SOE is too low, complete state ownership is not optimal, and privatization will be a necessary step; however, if the relative production efficiency of an SOE is not too low, complete privatization is not optimal both for the government and from the perspective of social welfare. The results can, to a certain extent, provide theoretical support to the governments idea on the SOE reform. Translated from Economic Research Journal, 2004, 1 (in Chinese)     

Entry decision of a vertically integrated foreign firm with downstream subsidization and upstream privatization

This study considers a vertical structure model in which an upstream state-owned enterprise (SOE) and a downstream domestic firm compete with a vertically integrated foreign firm (VIFF). We consider the cost-inefficiency of the SOE and examine the entry decisions of a VIFF under downstream subsidization. We find that without upstream privatization, the VIFF's entry decision might not be socially desirable unless it enters both markets and the cost inefficiency is intermediate. Additionally, a policy to reduce the cost inefficiency might cause a drastic welfare increase or loss when the VIFF changes its entry decision. We then examine upstream privatization and show that a substantial improvement in cost efficiency can increase welfare with privatization. When the SOE maximizes welfare, however, lesser (greater) cost efficiency improvement is necessary to increase welfare with privatization if the ex-ante cost inefficiency is high (low).     

Does Autonomy Matter in State Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Performance Contracts in India

Empirical evidence on the effect of managerial autonomy on the performance of state‐owned enterprises (SOE) is surprisingly scant despite autonomy being a preferred reform instrument over partial privatization in many countries. Using longitudinal data on performance contracts of state‐owned enterprises in India, this paper finds that managerial autonomy is associated with significant increases in enterprise profitability and efficiency. Further, using India's unique reform experience where both managerial autonomy and partial privatization were pursued side by side, the paper finds that while the positive effects of autonomy continue post‐partial privatization, the effects of partial privatization on performance are ambiguous. Specifically, once autonomy is controlled for, partial privatization has a positive effect on SOE profitability only after it crosses a critical level of government disinvestment. The findings suggest that organizational reforms such as granting managerial autonomy can be an important policy instrument in improving SOE performance particularly in cases where governments are unable to make substantial disinvestments.     

经济转轨、跨国公司进入与国有企业改革

任何转轨国家向市场经济过渡都要面临改革与开放的问题.因此,本文在经济开放的背景下,着重突出跨国公司与转轨国家之间经济的紧密联系,建立跨国公司、转轨国家政府、国内企业三者之间的混合寡占博弈模型,并以市场开放、自由化、私有化等政策变量作为影响转轨进程的外生变量,分析开放程度和经济调控手段以及跨国企业的投资策略等对转轨国家国有企业民营化进程和转轨国家国有企业竞争力的影响.研究表明,转轨国家在经济开放的条件下,对国有企业完全民营化并非是改革的最优方案,而对国有企业的部分民营化效果反而会更好,也符合社会福利最大化的原则.而税率、技术、转移价格等也是影响转轨国家社会福利和转轨国家企业产量和竞争能力的重要因素.     

Export rivalry,vertically-related markets,and optimal public ownership policy

This paper considers the optimal public ownership policy of an upstream firm which competes with a foreign private rival. Both firms supply a produced input to the domestic and foreign downstream firms that compete in an export market. The paper shows that complete privatization of the domestic upstream firm is never optimal. It will likely be fully nationalized if its market share is high, the domestic downstream firms' market share is low, and the total number of firms in the downstream is large. Simulation results reveal that the public firm's optimal profit margin may be negative and that the government ownership level may exhibit a reswitching phenomenon as the number of domestic downstream firms keeps growing. The paper sheds light on the possibility of using government ownership policy as a pseudo-trade and industrial policy.     

An efficient privatization mechanism

We consider the privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) of which markets can be opened to competition once privatization takes place and competitors can compete successfully against them in a few years. The currently used “Revenue Maximization (RM)” scheme maximizes the government revenue from privatization but does not provide incentives for the privatized SOE to charge a price lower than the monopoly price until competition arises. We propose the “Welfare Maximization (WM)” scheme, which induces the privatized SOE to charge a competitive price without resorting to regulation. Also, WM provides greater incentives for post-privatization cost reduction.     

The political economy of tariff protection in China: evidence from the WTO accession

We analyze China's tariff rates at WTO accession using a political economy approach. A model drawing on Branstetter and Feenstra ( 2002 ) is used to derive an optimal tariff rate for each industry. The model predicts that a government would set a high tariff rate if an industry is of large state‐owned enterprise (SOE) share, multinational share, or small foreign import share. From the model we reveal the Chinese government's preference towards different interest groups under the binding tariff constraint from the WTO commitments. The estimated structural parameters imply that the political weights on both the SOE profits and consumer income diminish with the economic opening. More important, the government still favours SOEs over consumer income. Our findings are consistent with the special features of China's economy.     

An analysis of entry-then-privatization model: welfare and policy implications

This study formulates a new model of mixed oligopolies in free entry markets. A state-owned public enterprise is established before the game, private enterprises enter the market, and then the government chooses the degree of privatization of the public enterprise (termed the entry-then-privatization model herein). We find that under general demand and cost functions, the timing of privatization does not affect consumer surplus or the output of each private firm, while it does affect the equilibrium degree of privatization, number of entering firms, and output of the public firm. The equilibrium degree of privatization is too high (low) for both domestic and world welfare if private firms are domestic (foreign).     

TO LIST OR TO MERGE? ENDOGENOUS CHOICE OF PRIVATIZATION METHODS IN A MIXED MARKET

When and how to privatize a public firm? This paper suggests that a welfare‐enhancing privatization may be triggered by a negative demand shock. When the shock is relatively mild, it is optimal to privatize a public firm by means of stock market listings; when the shock is sufficiently large, a public–private‐firm merger becomes optimal. This paper also considers a government that cares about privatization revenues and about social welfare. It characterizes how the weight attached to privatization revenues and the improvement in production efficiency of the privatized public firm through a stock market listing may affect the government's choices concerning privatization.     

Price control and privatization in a mixed duopoly with a public social enterprise

We explore the issue of the optimal degree of privatization for a public firm that does not need to care about its rival’s profit completely. We find that the optimal privatization of a public social enterprise under exogenous price control depends on the level of the regulated price. Namely, when the regulated price is low (medium, high), the optimal privatization is partial privatization (complete privatization, completely public owned). If the price control is optimized by maximizing social welfare, then the optimal privatization is complete privatization. For the case of the traditionally defined public firm, its optimal privatization is completely public owned when the price control is exogenously given. If the price control is endogenously determined, then privatization policy is redundant.