The endogenous national minimum wage institution

This paper offers reasoning for the endogenous sustainability of the National Minimum Wage Institution (NMWI). In an economy with asymmetries in productivity among unionized firms, high-tech firms may often opt for minimum wage agreements covering all unionized workers, in order to raise the relative costs of their rival low-tech firms. Their workers’ unions as well as the unions of workers in low-tech firms share this interest, provided that the degree of product substitutability is not too low and the wage agreement is not too high. Hence, since economy-wide minimum wage agreements prove to be compatible with the interest of all unions and high-tech firms, the NMWI can be sustained in equilibrium under politically convenient circumstances.     

Firm ownership and internal labour practices in a transition economy

One feature common to many post‐socialist transition economies is a relatively compressed wage structure in the state‐owned sector. We conjecture that this compressed wage structure creates weak incentives for work effort and worker skill acquisition and thus presents adverse consequences for the entire transition economy if a substantial portion of the labour force works in the state sector. We explore firm wage incentives and worker training, as well as other labour practices and outcomes, in a transition setting with matched firm and worker data collected in one of the largest provinces of Vietnam – Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnamese state sector exhibits a compressed wage distribution in relation to privately owned firms with foreign ownership. State wage practices stress tenure over worker productivity and their wage policies result in flatter wage–experience profiles and lower returns to education. The state work force is in greater need of formal training, a need that is in part met through direct government financing. In spite of the opportunities for government financed training and at least partly due to inefficient worker incentives, state firms, by certain measures, exhibit lower levels of labour productivity. The private sector comparison group to state firms for all of these findings is foreign owned firms. The internal labour practices of foreign firms are more consistent with a view of profit‐maximizing firms operating with no political constraints. This is not the case for Vietnamese de novo private firms that exhibit much more idiosyncratic behaviour and whose labour practices are often indistinguishable from state firms. The exact reasons for this remain a topic of on‐going research yet we conjecture that various private sector constraints, including limited access to formal capital, play an important role.     

Product Quality,Informality, and Child Labor

This paper studies how the interactions between the structure of product demand and relative wages affect the incidence of child labor. One sector (the agrarian) produces a homogeneous good, and the other (the modern) produces a vertically differentiated product. The modern sector is segmented according to quality: high‐quality varieties are produced by formal firms which employ only adult labor, whereas low‐quality varieties are produced by informal firms which employ child labor as well. Differences in tastes and incomes across households generate demand for both high‐quality and low‐quality varieties. Stricter enforcement of child‐labor regulations and increases in minimum wages can have beneficial effects regarding the incidence of child labor and the size of the formal sector. However, since these policies have undesirable welfare effects among segments of wage‐earning households, they may not garner the necessary political support.     

Public firms' merger,employment, and welfare in developing countries: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper examines the effect of a merger of state‐owned firms on wage gap, employment, and social welfare in a general equilibrium setting. For a developing economy with state‐owned firms in the urban sector, a merger via a reduction in the number of the urban state‐owned firms can reduce the cost of capital. It then lowers the skilled wage rate through the factor‐substitution effect, while it raises the unskilled wage by the inflow of capital to the rural sector and hence lowers urban unemployment. In addition, the reduction in the number of the urban state‐owned firms can yield a scale effect to the firms. The beneficial effects on higher urban output and less urban unemployment can improve social welfare of the developing economy.     

MARKET POWER AND EFFICIENCY IN A SEARCH MODEL*

We build a theoretical model to study the welfare effects and policy implications of firms’ market power in a frictional labor market. The main characteristics of our environment are that wages play a role in allocating labor across firms and the number of agents is finite. The decentralized equilibrium is inefficient and the firms’ market power results in the misallocation of workers from the high to the low productivity firms. A minimum wage exacerbates the inefficiencies by forcing the low‐productivity firms to increase their wage. Moderate unemployment benefits can increase welfare by improving the workers’ outside option.     

The Distribution of Earnings in an Equilibrium Search Model with State‐Dependent Offers and Counteroffers*

We construct an equilibrium job search model with on‐the‐job search in which firms implement optimal‐wage strategies under full information in the sense that they leave no rent to their employees and counter the offers received by their employees from competing firms. Productivity dispersion across firms results in wage mobility both within and across firms. Workers may accept wage cuts to move to firms offering higher future wage prospects. Equilibrium productivity dispersion across ex ante homogeneous firms can be endogenously generated. Productivity dispersion then generates a nontrivial wage distribution which is generically thin‐tailed, as typically observed in the data.     

How Does the Minimum Wage Affect Firm Investments in Fixed and Human Capital? Evidence from China

This paper empirically analyzes the impact of Chinese minimum wage regulations on the firm decision to invest in physical and human capital. We exploit the geographical and inter‐temporal variations of county‐level minimum wages in a panel data set of all state‐owned and all above‐scale non‐state‐owned Chinese firms covering the introduction of the new Chinese minimum wage regulations in 2004. In our basic regressions including all Chinese firms, we find significant negative effects of the minimum wage on human capital investment rates and no overall effects on fixed capital investment rates. When grouping firms by their ownership structure, we find that these results hold for most firms. Foreign‐owned firms are an exception to some extent, because the likelihood that they invest in human capital has not decreased in response to the policy.     

An Efficiency Enhancing Minimum Wage

We consider an economy with a tax on all labor earnings. We discover that a slightly binding minimum wage on one sector can enhance efficiency. The minimum wage attracts high‐reservation wage workers into the minimum‐wage sector. If the labor demand curve in the free sector is quite flat, the vast majority of workers displaced by the minimum wage find employment in the free sector, raising aggregate employment. This displacement of workers by the only slightly binding minimum wage has negligible effects on efficiency. So efficiency and tax revenue rise as the minimum wage pulls labor out of untaxed leisure, where too much of the labor force is lurking, into taxed work.     

Male–female wage discrimination in Chinese industryInvestigation using firm‐level data1

We use firm‐level data to analyze male–female wage discrimination in China's industry. We find that there is a significant negative association between wages and the share of female workers in a firm's labour force. However, we also find that the marginal productivity of female workers is significantly lower than that of male workers. Comparing wage gaps and productivity gaps between men and women, we notice an intriguing contrast between state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms. The wage gap is smaller than the productivity gap in SOEs, while the converse is true for private firms. These results suggest that women in the state sector receive wage premiums, whereas women in the private sector face wage discrimination.     

The Dynamics of Poverty and the Promotion of Transition from Non‐Regular to Regular Employment in Japan: Economic Effects of Minimum Wage Revision and Job Training Support

Comparison between Japan and other advanced countries shows that the relative poverty rate is high in Japan, and that many of the poor households are those with a non‐regular worker. As for mobility between income classes, the proportion of households remaining in the poor class for a long period of time in Japan is close to the average for EU countries. The panel estimation of its effect on wages shows that the raising of the minimum wage is statistically significantly associated with an increase in wages of non‐regular workers, in particular, female, but does not seem to decrease employment. The result shows that for male non‐regular workers, firm‐provided training promotes their transition to regular employment, and that for female non‐regular workers, occupational training promotes their transition to regular employment at different firms.     

A post‐Keynesian model of output,employment and monetary demand

This paper presents a simple model based on three broad Post‐Keynesian hypotheses: (1) the economic process develops over time; (2) money is endogenous; and (3) producers are price setters. To make the analysis easier we also assume (4) that firms are vertically integrated. Producers assess the expected demand and ask banks for credit in order to start production; banks create credit at the request of producers to finance the wage bill; workers buy goods sold by firms; firms must repay banks the amount borrowed plus interest and earn a target rate of profit. Since firms have created only as much purchasing power as they have advanced to workers in the form of the wage fund, equilibrium requires that there is an amount of autonomous monetary demand equal to profits and interest. Furthermore, in order to make the value of supply equal to the value of effective demand, firms will employ the number of workers necessary to create the purchasing power which, when added to the anticipated autonomous demand, enables all costs to be covered and the planned rate of profits to be attained.     

Lower coverage but stronger unions? Institutional changes and union wage premia in Central Europe

In this paper we use the national samples from the European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) to analyze the evolution of the wage premium of firm- and industry-level agreements in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (the CE3) around the time of their accession to the EU. We find that despite a generalized reduction in union coverage in these countries, the union wage premium after accession to the EU became bigger and statistically more significant for Poland and Hungary, particularly for industry-level agreements. We interpret these findings in terms of the institutional reforms that occurred in the CE3 between 2002 and 2006. These reforms, which were prompted by the EU Commission's requirements for EU accession, increased the social partners' ability to bargain and enforce wage agreements, and made industry-level unions more effective in guaranteeing the protections provided by labor standards. Results are less conclusive for the Czech Republic, probably due to factors that attenuate the effect of bargaining coverage upon wages, e.g. a smaller effect of institutional reforms, a greater use of mandatory extension mechanisms, the more radical firm restructuring during transition in that country.     

Tax Policies,Regional Trade Agreements and Foreign Direct Investment: A Welfare Analysis

In this paper, we develop a partial equilibrium three‐country model to examine the relationship between regional trade agreements (RTAs) and foreign direct investment (FDI) in an environment with double taxation. Our analysis shows that FDI is welfare‐improving for at least one or both of the two regional countries if wage asymmetry is significantly large. FDI and an RTA are also welfare‐improving for the high‐wage country and the region if the wage differential is not small. We also examine the role of repatriation taxes in affecting the determination of firm location under an RTA. Our results suggest that the signing of an RTA may induce relocation from the high‐wage country to the low‐wage country unless an increase in the repatriation tax rate also occurs.     

Corporate profit tax,firm entry with unemployment,and income inequality

In this paper, we provide a general equilibrium analysis of corporate profit tax on income distribution, unemployment, and wage inequality. With firm dynamics in industrial sector, we identify a new channel through which profit tax affects income and wage inequality: profit tax cut will widen not only the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor, but also exacerbate the wage inequality of unskilled labor among different sectors. The welfare effect of profit tax cut depends on unemployment deepening (labor-distortion effect) and more manufacturing firms enter the market (business-creation effect), eroding the market share of incumbent firms (business-stealing effect).     

The impact of minimum wages on employment of low‐wage workers

This study provides empirical evidence on the impact of a minimum wage increase on employment of workers in the formal sector who have wages below the minimum level in Vietnam. Using the difference‐in‐differences with propensity score matching and the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys of 2004 and 2006, the article finds that the minimum wage increase in 2005 reduced the proportion of workers having a formal sector job among low‐wage workers. Most workers who lost formal sector jobs became self‐employed.     

RESIDUAL WAGE DISPARITY AND COORDINATION UNEMPLOYMENT*

How much of residual wage dispersion can be explained by an absence of coordination among firms? To answer, we construct a dynamic directed search model with identical workers where firms can create high‐ or low‐productivity jobs and are uncoordinated in their offers to workers, calibrated to the U.S. economy. Workers can exploit ex post opportunities once approached by firms, and can conduct on‐the‐job search. The stationary equilibrium wage distribution is hump‐shaped, skewed significantly to the right, and, with baseline parameters, generates residual dispersion statistics 75–90% of those found empirically. However, the model underestimates the average duration of unemployment.     

Capital tax,minimum wage,and labor market outcomes

Often an increase in the minimum wage is accompanied by a reduction in the capital tax. This paper analyzes the effects of interactions between the minimum wage and the capital tax in the general equilibrium framework. The analysis is conducted in an inter-temporal search model in which firms post wages. A (binding) minimum wage provides a lower support for the distribution of wages. The paper finds that the interaction of these two policy instruments significantly modify labor market outcomes and welfare cost. In the presence of a binding minimum wage, a decrease in the capital tax leads to an increase in wage dispersion. In contrast, when it is not binding, a lower capital tax may reduce the dispersion in wages. A binding minimum wage magnifies the positive effects of a lower capital tax on labor supply, employment, and output. It also enhances the welfare cost of capital tax. A policy change which involves an increase in the minimum wage and a fall in the capital tax such that employment level remains constant increases welfare and output.     

COMPETITIVE SEARCH,EFFICIENCY, AND MULTIWORKER FIRMS*

I study competitive search equilibrium in an environment where firms operate a decreasing‐returns production technology and hire multiple workers simultaneously. Firms post wages, possibly several of them. The equilibrium can feature wage dispersion even though all firms and workers are ex ante identical. Unlike the benchmark where firms hire a single worker, hiring is constrained inefficient. Efficiency requires that firms commit to the number of hires, pay all applicants, or pay wages that depend on the number of applicants. Under wage‐posting, the inefficiency is highest at intermediate levels of labor market tightness.     

The Vietnam reforms,change in wage inequality and the role of the minimum wage

The Vietnam ‘renovation’ reforms were implemented during the 1990s, but their full effect was only felt several years later. We present evidence on the developments in real wage growth and inequality in Vietnam from 1998 to 2008. Using a variety of approaches (traditional measures of inequality, comparison of density functions, decomposition of the change in real wage by sector as well as a detailed decomposition of the change in the Gini), we present a consistent picture: contrary to what one might have expected given the nature of the reforms, inequality declined sharply in the private sector (but not in the state sector). This study links these developments to the policy of aggressively increasing the minimum wage over the past several years, differences in implementation by sector as well as variation in the over‐time changes in minimum wage.     

Trade liberalization,firm entry,and income inequality

This paper examines the short‐ and long‐run effects of trade liberalization via tariff reductions on income inequality in an economy, which is characterized by an imperfectly competitive urban manufacturing sector and a perfectly competitive rural agricultural sector. Tariff reductions reduce domestic output in the importable urban manufacturing sector, leading to shifts of capital from the urban sector to the rural agricultural sector. This can narrow the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor in the short run. However, the lowered capital cost attracts new firms, and subsequently excessive entry of firms, to the urban manufacturing sector. This firm entry effect can mitigate the favorable effect of tariff reductions on wage inequality in the long run. Empirical study confirms the findings.