The Agency Effect of Repurchases on Closed‐End Funds

Share prices rise after companies announce repurchases, but there are differing views as to why this happens. Repurchases are announced by closed‐end funds when their discounts are widening (market‐to‐book is falling). The immediate post‐announcement effect is a small jump in a fund's share price, but the main effect occurs over the next four years during which time there is significant outperformance both of the fund's price and of its investment portfolio. Liquidity of the shares does not change. Repurchases, if executed, reduce the size of a fund and therefore the manager's fees. Our findings are consistent with directors using the threat of repurchases to discipline managers whose investment performance has been poor, leading to a closer alignment of pay and performance.     

Managers' Trading Around Stock Repurchases

We analyze personal open market trades by managers around stock repurchases by tender offer. With the exception of Dutch auction offers, managers trade their firm's shares prior to repurchase announcements as though repurchases convey favorable inside information to outsiders. Prior to fixed price repurchase offers that do not follow takeover-related events, managers increase their buying and reduce their selling of their firm's shares. Prior to repurchases that follow takeover-related events, only a decrease in selling is found. No abnormal trading precedes Dutch auction repurchase offers.     

Front-running of mutual fund fire-sales

We show that a real-time trading strategy which front-runs the anticipated forced sales by mutual funds experiencing extreme capital outflows generates an alpha of 0.5% per month during the 1990–2010 period. The abnormal return stems from selling pressure among stocks that are below the NYSE mean size and cannot be attributed to the arrival of public information. While the largest stocks also exhibit downward price pressure, their prices revert before the front-running strategy can detect it. The duration of the anticipated selling pressure has decreased from about a month in the 1990s to about two weeks in the most recent decade. Our results suggest that publicly available information of fund flows and holdings exposes mutual funds in distress to predatory trading.     

Price Performance Following Share‐Repurchase Announcements by Closed‐End Funds

We investigate the price performance of closed‐end funds that announce share‐repurchase programs. Closed‐end funds experience positive average stock‐price reactions to the announcements. The long‐run buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns of repurchasing funds over the subsequent three years are significantly higher than a nonrepurchasing control sample matched by size, type, investment style and geographic diversification. Funds with larger discounts, international funds, equity funds, and funds that announce larger repurchases or frequently announce repurchases, experience more positive stock‐price reactions. Except for larger repurchases, the same characteristics are associated with more positive long‐run buy‐and‐hold returns.     

Optimal execution of open-market stock repurchase programs

This paper formalizes the following intuition about open-market share repurchases. Firms do open-market share repurchases to return free cash, which would otherwise be wasted. However, when the firm goes to buy its own shares with this cash, it has inside information and hence the actual execution is characterized by adverse selection. The market knows that the firm has inside information, and consequently the ask price is high to compensate for this adverse selection problem. This implies that, all else equal, the greater the adverse selection problem compared to the cash waste problem, the higher the ask price, and, therefore, the wider the bid–ask spread and the lower the share repurchase completion rate. We test this implication on a sample of U.S. firms and report evidence consistent with the model.     

Mutual fund herding its impact on stock returns: Evidence from the Taiwan stock market

Using quarterly ownership data which identify identity codes of mutual funds in Taiwan, we investigate mutual fund herding and its impact on stock price. We show that mutual funds tend to follow their own steps in trading rather than follow trades made by other funds. More importantly, evidence of price continuation following mutual fund herd buying suggests that such herding is based on value-relevant information and is consistent with the investigative herding hypothesis. Alternatively, evidence of return reversal following mutual fund herd selling suggests that such herding is non-informational and is consistent with the characteristic herding hypothesis.     

Share price performance following actual share repurchases

Using unique actual daily share repurchase data from Hong Kong, this paper investigates share price performance surrounding and following actual share repurchases. It is found that repurchasing firms buy back shares following price drops, suggesting that they behave opportunistically when implementing actual share repurchases. On average, the initial 3-day market response to actual repurchases is about 0.43%. Repurchasing firms do not seem to exhibit superior abnormal performance over long horizons when they make actual share repurchases. However, the price performance of repurchasing firms varies across firm size and market–book value ratios, and shows a clear and consistent pattern. The market responds the most favorably to repurchases that are made by small and value (high book-to-market value) firms. Over a long horizon, there is some evidence that repurchases made by value firms show superior performance. The three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return, which is measured against a portfolio of control firms that are matched by size and book-to-market value ratios, is over 20%. At least, repurchases made by high book-to-market value firms, for which undervaluation is more likely to occur, can benefit long-term shareholders.     

Common stock repurchases and market signalling: An empirical study

This paper examines the pricing behavior of securities of firms which repurchase their own shares. The results are consistent with a market in which investors price securities such that expected arbitrage profits are precluded. The results are also consistent with the hypothesis that firms offer premia for their own shares mainly in order to signal positive information, and that the market uses the premium, the target fraction and the fraction of insider holdings as signals in order to price securities around the announcement date. The observation that repurchases via tender offer are followed by abnormal increases in earnings per share and that mainly small firms engage in repurchase tender offers, provides further support for the signalling hypothesis.     

Share repurchases and institutional supply

Consistent with the predictions of Brennan and Thakor's (1990) model of shareholder preferences, we find that, on average, institutional shareholders are net sellers during share repurchases. After controlling for liquidity provision and characteristics investing, we find that a one standard deviation increase in share repurchases during a given quarter is associated with a 0.11 standard deviation decrease in institutional investor demand. We estimate that 37% of the inverse relation is attributed to institutional investors executing liquidity provision strategies, 8% is explained by institutions reacting to the investment characteristics signaled by a repurchasing firm. We attribute the majority, 55%, to the information asymmetry between institutions and individual investors. This work is one of the first to exploit the SEC mandate requiring firms to report the actual number of shares they repurchase each quarter, beginning in 2004. Using actual number of shares repurchased, we find evidence of institutional investors increasing their selling as firms increase their repurchasing. This finding is robust to models of endogeneity and autocorrelation in share repurchases and institutional investor trading.     

OPEN MARKET REPURCHASES: THE VALUE FROM BUYING SHARES AT A DISCOUNT

This article shows that share repurchase announcements create value for shareholders when the shares of the industrial firm sell at a discount from the value of the underlying assets, even when shareholders and managers share full information about the firm's prospects and the firm's operating performance is not expected to improve. The value created by capturing the discount on the repurchased shares is a function of only two variables: the percentage discount prior to the announcement and the proportion of shares to be repurchased.
For a sample of 100 companies selling below net asset value, the authors report that the excess stock returns surrounding their announcements of open market repurchases are (significantly) positively associated with the authors' estimates of the value captured from buying shares at a discount. Moreover, the stock market's response to repurchase announcements by companies that are selling at a discount is considerably more positive than to announcements by firms selling at a premium.     

Do fire sales create externalities?

We develop three novel measures of the incentives of equity mutual funds to internalize the price impact of their trading. We show that mutual funds with stronger incentives to internalize their price impact accommodate inflows and outflows by adjusting their cash buffers instead of trading in portfolio securities. As a result, stocks held by these funds have lower volatility, and flows out of these funds have smaller spillover effects on other funds holding the same securities. Our results provide evidence of meaningful fire sale externalities in the equity mutual fund industry.     

Repurchasing Shares on a Second Trading Line

This paper studies a unique buyback method allowing firms toreacquire their own shares on a separate trading line whereonly the firm is allowed to buy shares. This share repurchasemethod is called the Second Trading Line and has been extensivelyused by Swiss companies since 1997. This type of repurchaseis unique for two reasons. First, unlike open market programs,the repurchasing company does not trade anonymously. Second,all transactions made by the repurchasing firm are publiclyavailable in real time to every market participant. This isa case of instantaneous disclosure which contrasts sharply withother markets characterized by delayed or no disclosure. Wedocument that the daily repurchase decision is statisticallyassociated with short-term price changes and the release offirm-specific news. We also find that repurchases on the secondtrading line have a beneficial impact on the liquidity of repurchasingfirms. Exchanges and regulators may consider the second tradingline an attractive share reacquisition mechanism because ofits transparency and positive liquidity effects.     

Insider Trading and Option Grant Timing in Response to Fire Sales (and Purchases) of Stocks by Mutual Funds

Mutual funds experiencing large outflows (inflows) tend to decrease (expand) their positions, creating downward (upward) price pressure in the stocks held in common by them ( Coval and Stafford [2007] ). This study shows that corporate insiders exploit the resulting mispricing by buying (selling) their company's stock if it is subject to such fire sales (purchases) by funds. We also show that the likelihood of option grants is greater for stocks that are subject to mutual fund fire sales. Finally, we show that both the insider trading and the option granting activities help speed up the correction of the flow‐driven mispricing. Overall, this study illustrates that insiders enhance personal benefits by trading on their personal account and influencing the timing of option grants in response to mispricing due to flow‐driven fund trading. Moreover, these activities help improve the informational efficiency of stock price.     

Asset fire sales (and purchases) in equity markets

This paper examines institutional price pressure in equity markets by studying mutual fund transactions caused by capital flows from 1980 to 2004. Funds experiencing large outflows tend to decrease existing positions, which creates price pressure in the securities held in common by distressed funds. Similarly, the tendency among funds experiencing large inflows to expand existing positions creates positive price pressure in overlapping holdings. Investors who trade against constrained mutual funds earn significant returns for providing liquidity. In addition, future flow-driven transactions are predictable, creating an incentive to front-run the anticipated forced trades by funds experiencing extreme capital flows.     

Actual Share Reacquisitions in Open-Market Repurchase Programs

Unlike Dutch auction repurchases and tender offers, open-market repurchase programs do not precommit firms to acquire a specified number of shares. In a sample of 450 programs from 1981 to 1990, firms on average acquire 74 to 82 percent of the shares announced as repurchase targets within three years of the repurchase announcement. We find that share repurchases are negatively related to prior stock price performance, suggesting that firms increase their purchasing depending on its degree of perceived undervaluation. In addition, repurchases are positively related to levels of cash flow, which is consistent with liquidity arguments.     

Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substitution Hypothesis

We show that repurchases have not only became an important form of payout for U.S. corporations, but also that firms finance their share repurchases with funds that otherwise would have been used to increase dividends. We find that young firms have a higher propensity to pay cash through repurchases than they did in the past and that repurchases have become the preferred form of initiating a cash payout. Although large, established firms have generally not cut their dividends, they also show a higher propensity to pay out cash through repurchases. These findings indicate that firms have gradually substituted repurchases for dividends. Our results also suggest that before 1983, regulatory constraints inhibited firms from aggressively repurchasing shares.     

Do firms follow GAAP when they record share repurchases?

This paper examines U.S. firms' accounting for share repurchases and the accounting choice provided to Delaware-incorporated firms between the treasury and retirement methods. This accounting choice does not affect income, cash flows, or net assets, but it nevertheless affects financial reporting transparency and the allocation of equity between retained earnings and contributed capital. According to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), the accounting choice to record share repurchases should reflect management's intended disposition of the repurchased shares. We compare characteristics of Delaware-incorporated treasury and retirement firms and find that the choice between the two accounting methods is not always consistent with GAAP, but neither is it random; rather, this choice is related to a number of firm characteristics including firm growth, industry membership, trading exchange, and price–earnings ratio. We also find that a firm's accounting method for share repurchases is associated with a firm's propensity to make future share repurchases.     

Managerial motivation and timing of open market share repurchases

There are two major mechanisms by which managers distribute cash to shareholders: through dividends and share repurchases. Historically, dividends have been the preferred method, but in recent years, share repurchases have become more popular, with more firms using repurchases than dividends to distribute cash. During the sample period of 2004–2006, 6.5 billion shares were repurchased for a total dollar volume amount of $222 billion. Using a unique dataset on actual monthly share repurchases, this paper investigates when and why managers repurchase shares in the open market. The paper finds evidence that firms which make repurchases are jointly timing their repurchases to perceived undervaluation and the presence of discretionary cash flow. In addition, the paper finds evidence which supports that (1) firms in competitive industries tend to repurchase less, (2) firms tend to substitute repurchases for anti-takeover provision adoption, and (3) firms attempt to manage earnings upward through the use of repurchases.     

Insider trading and share repurchases: Do insiders and firms trade in the same direction?

Signaling undervaluation is often considered a primary motive for repurchasing stock, but insider trading activity by repurchasing firms is not always consistent with undervaluation. Net insider buying and selling are both more frequent in quarters when firms are repurchasing non-trivial amounts of stock, with the odds of observing a repurchase the highest in quarters with net insider selling. In multinomial logit models, share repurchases associated with net insider selling are positively related to illiquidity, option exercises by insiders, and pre-repurchase returns and negatively correlated with industry-adjusted book to market ratios when compared to other repurchases. Hence, repurchases when insiders are selling stock are more likely done to support share prices or avoid dilution and are less likely undervaluation signals. We find that insider trades either validate or mitigate the undervaluation signal of the repurchase. Abnormal returns of repurchasing firms with net insider buying versus net insider selling in a given quarter are significantly higher for the quarter immediately after the repurchase and the three subsequent years. For repurchases accompanied by net insider selling, abnormal returns are negligible after only one year.     

Flexibility in share repurchases: Evidence from UK

Although firms cite flexibility as important when repurchasing shares, we know little about how or why firms vary repurchases. We use an extensive sample of daily repurchase transactions from the United Kingdom to investigate how the number of repurchase days and volumes of shares repurchased change based on several known motivations. We find that stock price changes, liquidity, leverage, takeover activity and earnings per share targets impact share repurchasing patterns. Further, we compare actual repurchases to alternative share accumulation strategies and find that firms utilize flexibility without paying higher costs.