A Centennial of Anti‐dumping Legislation and Implementation: Introduction and Overview

A century has passed since the Government of Canada adopted the first recorded anti‐dumping law in 1904. The Canadian legislation was soon followed by similar legislation in most of the major trading nations in the industrialised world prior to and after World War I. Anti‐dumping provisions were later incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) following World War II. Nowadays, virtually all of the industrialised and developing countries in the world economy have adopted anti‐dumping legislation. In view of the long and increasingly widespread use of anti‐dumping measures, we marked the centennial of Canada's 1904 legislation with a symposium at the University of Michigan on 12 March, 2004. The symposium papers document the experiences with anti‐dumping and then ask whether and how anti‐dumping can be reformed. Although we all would probably agree that the best solution would be to retract all anti‐dumping legislation, this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. Anti‐dumping laws serve a variety of purposes, and powerful political forces stand in the way of eliminating these laws. Anti‐dumping provides a stronger and more focused means of safeguards protection against surges of imports than GATT‐legal safeguards laws permit. Anti‐dumping also formalises a meaning for ‘unfair trade’ that, though essentially meaningless from an economic standpoint, strikes a chord in public perception. And finally, in spite of its appearance of being constrained by objective administrative rules, anti‐dumping in practice is a potent political tool that governments are able to manipulate in order to satisfy powerful constituents. With all this going for it, anti‐dumping is unlikely ever to be relinquished as an economic policy tool by governments.     

Anti‐dumping at 100 Years and Counting: A Canadian Perspective

The world's first anti‐dumping measure was introduced by Canada as a ‘special duty’ that could be levied administratively rather than being enacted. This paper describes the features of this first measure in light of subsequent evolution of anti‐dumping practice and sets it in its historical context – an era that was a high season of globalisation but also an era marked by an awakening of economic nationalism in newly industrialising countries, and by growing angst over the power of large corporations that were emerging to exploit the economies of scale allowed by mass production, as evidenced by the concurrent evolution of anti‐combines legislation. Anti‐dumping's early integration into economic theory as an international counterpart of domestic competition policy has received some official ratification in international treaties, and governments see it as a legitimate policy, albeit one in need of international disciplines. However, analysis of the pattern of its use reveals it to be an instrument of political economy, as a convenient alternative to the WTO safeguard option. The paper explores contextual reasons why today, in another high season of globalisation, marked by concerns over corporate globalism that evoke those of the earlier era, anti‐dumping actions are proliferating where they did not then.     

An Analysis of Factors Influencing the Anti‐dumping Behaviour in India

The use of anti‐dumping measures as a trade protection tool, has increased phenomenally during the last decade. One significant aspect of this new trend is the increasing involvement of developing countries. India is one such country which has emerged as a very frequent user of anti‐dumping measures, surpassing even the traditional users. It had initiated more than 300 anti‐dumping cases by the end of 2002–03. Many of these cases are against developing countries. Most of the cases are concentrated in narrow range product groups, like chemicals and petrochemicals, iron and steel, pharmaceuticals and textiles. This study examines India's experience with anti‐dumping measures. The main objective of the study is to identify the factors which might have influenced the anti‐dumping behaviour in India. Discussion of these factors shows that imports have increased considerably. This is particularly true for a number of developing countries facing dumping charges in India. At the same time, many of the domestic producers of the like products have performed poorly during the last decade. Such trends may instigate the import‐competing industries to seek anti‐dumping protection and may also influence the authority to provide that. However, the results of our statistical exercise show that, although imports and performance of the domestic industry might have influenced the initiation of anti‐dumping cases, these factors did not seem to significantly influence the final decision of the authority. The results rather indicated a tendency on the part of the authority to provide anti‐dumping protection to industries, which are characterised by a large number of firms.     

Anti‐dumping: What are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha?

While tariff barriers have decreased worldwide through various GATT rounds, anti‐dumping has surged to play a crucial role as the most important non‐tariff barrier. After much debate and opposition, anti‐dumping is on the agenda of the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations and it is one of the most important issues, especially for developing countries as they are the main targets of this policy instrument. With this prospect, it is important to assess the relevance of anti‐dumping not only by focusing on traditional users but by analysing the experience of new users, which are now major players in the field. This paper improves upon existing studies by providing a comprehensive assessment on the use of anti‐dumping. First, data on the time pattern of worldwide implementations of anti‐dumping laws are presented. This time profile shows interesting relationships with legal developments in GATT and WTO dispositions. Second, usual sources of data are complemented with various other sources. This allows the inclusion of recent heavy users like China, Russia, Taiwan and Ukraine, which are ignored in similar studies but important for their trade volumes. This enlarged and updated dataset shows that new users are even more important than previously thought, with implications for the Doha negotiations.     

The Politicisation of EC Anti‐dumping Policy: Member States,Their Votes and the European Commission

This paper examines one political‐economy aspect of the European Communities’ (EC) anti‐dumping policy that has tended to be overlooked in prior studies; namely, the role that member states play in deciding whether to impose definitive duties on imports that have been found to be dumped and that are deemed to have injured a European industry. We find that, in the late 1990s, numerous disagreements between member states occurred over the merits of imposing anti‐dumping duties. These disagreements may well have been partly responsible for the strong decline in the number of European anti‐dumping investigations initiated after 1999.     

The Rise of US Anti‐dumping Activity in Historical Perspective

Empirical studies of anti‐dumping activity focus almost exclusively on the period since 1980. This paper puts recent US anti‐dumping experience in historical context by studying the determinants of annual case filings over the past half century. The conventional view that few anti‐dumping cases existed prior to 1980 is not correct, although most did not result in the imposition of duties. The increased number of cases in recent decades largely reflects petitions that target multiple‐source countries; the number of imported products involved has actually fallen since the mid‐1980s. The annual number of anti‐dumping cases is influenced by the unemployment rate, the exchange rate, import penetration (closely related to the decline in average tariffs), and changes in the anti‐dumping law and its enforcement in the early 1980s.     

East Asia's Anti‐dumping Problem

East Asia accounts for a large and growing share of worldwide anti‐dumping (AD) activity. East Asian countries have long been the main targets of AD actions, accounting for about one‐third of all AD actions during the 1980s, more than 40 per cent of all AD actions during the 1990s, and almost 50 per cent of all AD actions in recent years. After controlling for factors that might influence filings such as the exchange rate and trade volume, it is found that East Asian countries are subject to about twice as many cases as either North American or Western European countries. Moreover, the trend in filings against East Asian countries is increasing, meaning that in recent years the propensity for countries to direct their AD filings against East Asian countries is growing. One concern is that the growing intensity of AD use against East Asia is driven by China‐PRC. Importantly, but a rising propensity is found even excluding China‐PRC.     

Anti‐dumping: A Growing Problem in International Trade

This paper discusses the issue of anti‐dumping (AD) proliferation. AD is used more frequently, by more countries, and against more products than ever in its history. I review AD filing patterns with an emphasis on the scope of countries and industries seeking protection. Recent trends suggest that the widespread embrace of AD protection makes the prospect for AD reform increasingly unlikely. AD is no longer being used solely by high‐income developed countries. It is increasingly being used by middle‐income and even lower‐income countries. New users have chosen to use AD very intensively. Per dollar of imports the new users have filed AD cases up to 15–20 times more frequently than the traditional AD users such as the US and EU. The evolving set of AD users complicates AD negotiations. In the near term, strong opposition by the US and EU makes reform a highly unlikely outcome. In the longer run, rising use of AD against the US and EU could conceivably weaken their support for AD; yet, the same trends that might finally cause the US and EU to realise AD is a failed policy will likely make reform impossible.     

Anti‐dumping duty circumvention through trade rerouting: Evidence from Chinese exporters

We study the evasion of US anti‐dumping duties by some Chinese exporters through trade rerouting via third countries or regions. Using detailed monthly trade data reported by China and the US Customs during the period of 2002–06, we find that US anti‐dumping actions against China lead to a stronger positive correlation between US imports from third countries and Chinese exports to the same third countries. Such a positive correlation is more pronounced for the products subject to anti‐dumping duties (treatment groups) than similar products not subject to these duties (control groups). The evidence is stronger for less‐differentiated products whose certificates of origins are easier to be modified and is stronger for third countries where the rerouting cost is low. These findings are consistent with a trade rerouting story, rather than a simple story of trade diversion (i.e., increase in some third countries' imports from China) and trade deflection (i.e., increase in some third‐country exports to the US). We also rule out other alternative stories, consider prior production in third countries and concurrent anti‐dumping actions against China or third countries, pay a particular attention to the many zero trade flows in the monthly level data and check the robustness to using an alternative control group and quarterly data, etc.     

Canada's Anti‐dumping and Safeguard Policies: Overt and Subtle Forms of Discrimination

Like many countries in the international trading system, Canada repeatedly faces political pressure from industries seeking protection from import competition. I examine Canadian policymakers’ response to this pressure within the economic environment created by its participation in discriminatory trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In particular, I exploit new sources of data on Canada's use of potentially WTO‐consistent import‐restricting policies such as anti‐dumping, global safeguards and a China‐specific safeguard. I illustrate subtle ways in which Canadian policymakers may be structuring the application of such policies so as to reinforce the discrimination inherent in Canada's external trade policy because of the preferences granted to the United States and Mexico through NAFTA.     

How do countries respond to anti‐dumping filings? Dispute settlement and retaliatory anti‐dumping

Empirical studies have found that countries may respond strategically to the anti‐dumping petition filed against their exporters through their own retaliatory actions. Although most previous studies have focused on retaliatory anti‐dumping filings, in this paper we explore another potential avenue for strategic response—filing a complaint under the World Trade Organization's (WTO ) dispute settlement understanding. Using a panel of global anti‐dumping filings between 1995 and 2011, we analyse under what conditions countries will choose to retaliate through either an anti‐dumping petition or a WTO dispute, and to what degree these two strategies are complementary or act as substitutes. We find statistical evidence that countries are more likely to file a WTO dispute when they have also filed a retaliatory anti‐dumping petition, suggesting that these two strategies may be complementary.     

Trade Policy Flexibilities and Turkey: Tariffs,Anti‐dumping,Safeguards and WTO Dispute Settlement

The commitment to lower import tariffs and to maintain tariffs at low levels entails political‐economic trade‐offs. Empirical work examining the relationship between such commitments and the ‘flexibilities’ that policymakers exercise to get around them is still relatively nascent, especially for emerging economies. This paper provides a rich, empirically based assessment of ways that Turkey exercised trade policy flexibilities during the global economic crisis of 2008–11. First, and despite multilateral and customs union commitments that might limit changes to its applied tariffs, Turkey exercised flexibilities during 2008–11 by making changes to both its applied MFN and preferential tariffs that could affect nearly 9 per cent of its manufacturing imports. Second, Turkey's cumulative application of temporary trade barrier (TTB) policies – that is, anti‐dumping, safeguards and countervailing duties – is estimated to impact an additional 4–6 per cent of Turkey's manufacturing imports by 2011. Other surprising results include Turkey's lengthy extensions to the duration of previously imposed anti‐dumping and safeguards beyond expected removal dates, conversion of product coverage from one TTB policy to another, extensive coverage of upstream and downstream segments of important industries and potential deepening of discriminatory preferences already inherent in existing preferential trade agreements.     

The EU Anti‐dumping Policy Towards Russia and China: Product Quality and the Choice of an Analogue Country

This paper uses the theory of international trade in vertically differentiated products in order to assess whether the EU has calculated disproportionately high dumping margins in its anti‐dumping policy towards the two non‐market economies (NMEs) Russia and China since 1992. Specifically, the investigation concerns cases in which the level of economic development in and the quality of the products from the chosen analogue country are higher than in the two NMEs. The conclusion drawn here is that, even when the EU chooses analogue countries at a higher level of economic development than Russia and China, the differences in product quality and in the levels of economic development between the dumpers and the analogue countries provide no systematic explanation of the size of dumping margins.     

Subsidy‐induced Dumping

More than two‐thirds of all anti‐subsidy investigations in the EU are paired with an anti‐dumping investigation against the same non‐EU producers. The outcome may be a two‐component duty where one duty addresses the ‘unfairness’ of the subsidy and the other the dumping behaviour. The philosophy behind this practice is that, at least to some extent, the observed dumping has been induced by the subsidy, and as the GATT Treaty, Article VI commits the claimant not to impose double remedies for the same ‘misbehaviour’, it is necessary to make an assessment of the hypothetical dumping without the subsidy. The EU quantification of the hypothetical dumping margin assumes that an export subsidy translates fully to the dumping margin, while a domestic subsidy leaves the dumping margin unchanged. Using an oligopoly model, we show in this paper that in case of an export subsidy, the EU anti‐dumping duty is lower than the predicted hypothetical dumping margin from the oligopoly model. For a domestic subsidy, the results are ambiguous, and the difference between the size of the duty following the EU procedure and the model predictions is relatively small.     

Anti‐dumping Reform: Time to Go Back to Basics

This paper traces and analyses both the legal and economic history of the US anti‐dumping regime, and sets forth the shortcomings of the current system, both in regards to efficiency and equity. It then presents and explains a series of proposals for reform of the system, ranging from abolition of anti‐dumping laws and regulations and their replacement with competition laws, down to less drastic but specific changes within the existing system to render it less onerous to consumers and exporters. The paper finally details the case for substituting safeguards actions for anti‐dumping actions.     

Accounting for Stylised Facts about Recent Anti‐dumping: Retaliation and Innovation

Recent work has found certain stylised facts about anti‐dumping (AD) actions. (i) AD actions are mostly between industrial and developing countries; (ii) developing countries use AD to retaliate against industrial countries; and (iii) AD is concentrated in R&D‐intensive industries. This study develops an analytical framework that can account for these empirical findings. The model suggests that market expansions and/or improvement in R&D capability in the South are essential in avoiding AD wars with the North. Interestingly, stricter enforcement of intellectual property rights in the South has little effect on stopping AD wars between the North and the South.     

Anti‐dumping's Happy Birthday?

The purpose of this paper is to highlight and discuss recent developments in the worldwide use of anti‐dumping (AD) policy as a possible strategic counterpoint to trade liberalisation. First, we review briefly the original intended purpose of AD policy, and reflect on its secondary position on the agenda of current international trade negotiations. Second, we discuss the escalating – and perhaps strategic – use of AD policy, particularly in the developing world, and highlight the roles of both interest groups and the state in determining policy outcomes. Next, we review the state of affairs of AD policy with the world's most active user, the US. In particular, we introduce and discuss the latest important development, the implementation of the ‘Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000’, which incorporates monetary compensation for petitioners, potentially offering more opportunities for strategic policy behaviour by firms, industries and the state. We conclude the article with a short discussion of directions for future research and some general concerns about the use of AD policy.     

EU Anti‐dumping and Tariff Cuts: Trade Policy Substitution?

The world trading system in its current form aims at reducing multilateral trade barriers across the board. Indeed, the last successfully concluded multilateral trade negotiations led to substantial tariff concessions on the part of most developed economies. What, however, happened to other forms of import protection? Have substantial tariff concessions subsequently been replaced by the use of alternative forms of import protection? In this paper we empirically investigate the relationship between negotiated external tariff cuts and the subsequent use of anti‐dumping actions by the EU. Evidence is found for larger Uruguay Round tariff cuts increasing the probability of subsequent anti‐dumping investigations.     

Empirical evidence on surrogate country method for non‐market economy: US anti‐dumping policy towards China

Whether the non‐market economy (NME) treatment on China can be maintained even after the expiry date under Section 15 of China's World Trade Organization (WTO) Accession Protocol is one of the most controversial issues in the WTO. In fact, the key issue of the NME status in the anti‐dumping (AD) proceedings turns out to be how surrogate countries are selected in relation to dumping margin calculation. This paper reviews the US practices concerning the application of the surrogate country method. Despite the general perception of capricious and random selection of surrogate countries, the Department of Commerce has maintained a consistent pattern for applying the criteria. This seemingly consistent practice, however, raised systematic problems—but not at a significant scale—in dumping margin calculation concerning Chinese products. This result sheds an interesting light on the current WTO disputes concerning the China's NME status. At least in terms of the US AD practices, the result of the WTO dispute settlement process may not have a significant impact on the China's exportation.     

The Trade Effects of US Anti‐dumping Actions against China Post‐WTO Entry

Since China's entry into the WTO, US anti‐dumping (AD) actions against China have increased, particularly with respect to multiple petitions. Distinguishing between US single and multiple petitions, we examine the trade effects of US AD actions against China based on an unbalanced panel of quarterly trade data. The results show that a US single petition investigation greatly restrains US imports of the filed products from China but also causes more significant import diversion from non‐named countries. In the short run, a preliminary AD duty imposed on China via a US multiple petition not only restrains US imports of the filed products from China but also prevents trade diversion from non‐named countries. In the long run, a final AD duty on China resulting from a US multiple petition creates a larger destructive effect on China and causes US import diversion from non‐named countries. Thus, a final AD duty imposed on China following a US multiple petition not only harms China's exports but also fails to help the US achieve import substitution. Furthermore, we have been able to reveal the negative trade effect of a preliminary AD duty even in cases where the ultimate decision is not to impose a final duty.