A theory of cooperation in games with an application to market socialism

Abstract

Economic theory has focused almost exclusively on how humans compete with each other in their economic activity, culminating in general equilibrium (Walras–Arrow–Debreu) and game theory (Cournot–Nash). Cooperation in economic activity is, however, important, and is virtually ignored. Because our models influence our view of the world, this theoretical lacuna biases economists’ interpretation of economic behavior. Here, I propose models that provide micro-foundations for how cooperation is decentralized by economic agents. It is incorrect, in particular, to view competition as decentralized and cooperation as organized only by central diktat. My approach is not to alter preferences, which is the strategy behavioral economists have adopted to model cooperation, but rather to alter the way that agents optimize. Whereas Nash optimizers view other players in the game as part of the environment (parameters), Kantian optimizers view them as part of action. When formalized, this approach resolves the two major failures of Nash optimization from a welfare viewpoint – the Pareto inefficiency of equilibria in common-pool resource problems (the tragedy of the commons) and the inefficiency of equilibria in public-good games (the free rider problem). An application to market socialism shows that the problems of efficiency and distribution can be completely separated: the dead-weight loss of taxation disappears.     

吴门画派园林绘画中城墙的风景内涵： 以《东庄图》和《拙政园三十一景图》 为例

以《东庄图》和《拙政园三十一景图》中的城墙景 观为研究对象,采用图像和园林历史情境互证的方法,通过 由图到园和由园及城的系统分析,解译了这2套园林绘画中城 墙形象出现的画理依据、造园因素和城市风景文化情结,认 为城墙形象在沈周和文徵明为代表的吴门画派的园林题材绘 画作品中具有指示园林地望的作用,同时城墙也是当时城内 和城外园林的重要借景对象;随着城市的功能转移,城墙周 围的城市边缘区域对于园林的布局起到空间的牵引作用,究 其原因与被内外城河环绕区域丰富的园艺空地和良好的水运 交通分不开,最终形成了半村半城的园林和城市的空间耦合 关系。旨在为苏州古城历史上形成的园林和城市风貌关系的 传承和保护有所助益。