Strategic pattern recognition—experimental evidence

The repeated play of an asymmetric Battle of the Sexes is analyzed from the perspective of “strategic pattern recognition.” Convergence to equilibrium patterns (in finite histories) and related concepts like breaking-an-equilibrium-pattern are defined and applied to the data. More than half of 202 pairs of subjects are characterized as weakly converging to a fixed equilibrium pattern. The results also show that subjects tend to break their best pattern in cases where their partners' payoffs are relatively low and that convergence initiation does not pay off. While female subjects frequently reject the males' best equilibrium with anonymous matching, behavior gets more cooperative when pairs are introduced to each other before the beginning of the game.     

Let׳s talk it over: Coordination via preplay communication with level-k thinking

This paper reconsiders Farrell׳s (1987) and Rabin׳s (1994) analyses of coordination via preplay communication, focusing on Farrell׳s analysis of Battle of the Sexes. Replacing their equilibrium and rationalizability assumptions with a structural non-equilibrium model based on level-k thinking, I reevaluate Farrell and Rabin׳s assumptions on how players use language and their conclusions on the limits of communication in bringing about coordination. The analysis partly supports their assumptions about how players use language, but suggests that their “agreements” do not reflect a full meeting of the minds. A level-k analysis also yields very different conclusions about the effectiveness of communication.     

产业内贸易中的企业行为与贸易政策——基于古诺双寡头垄断模型的分析

20世纪60年代以后,学者研究发现,传统的贸易理论无法解释大量工业化国家之间的贸易,从而使产业内贸易的研究成为国际贸易的核心问题之一。本文建立古诺双寡头垄断模型对同质产品产业内贸易中的企业行为与贸易政策进行了博弈分析,通过研究发现：寡头垄断企业之间即使在比较优势和报酬递增都不存在的条件下也会互相向对方市场销售商品;追求社会福利最大化的政府很容易陷入贸易保护的囚徒困境,从而导致双方社会福利恶化。本文认为,政府之间应该加强交往,深化合作,通过谈判解决贸易争端,避免陷入贸易保护的囚徒困境。     

A Post-Keynesian Response to Piketty's ‘Fundamental Contradiction of Capitalism’

In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty presents a rich set of data that deals with income and wealth distribution, output-wealth dynamics and rates of return. He also proposes some ‘laws of capitalism’. At the core of his argument lies the ‘fundamental inequality of capitalism’, an empirical regularity stating that the rate of return on wealth is greater than the growth rate of the economy. This simple construct allows him to conclude that increasing wealth (and income) inequality is an inevitable outcome of capitalism. While we share some of his conclusions, we will highlight some shortcomings of his approach based on a Cambridge post-Keynesian growth-and-distribution model. The paper makes four points. First, r?>?g is not necessarily associated with increasing inequality in functional distribution. Second, Piketty succumbs to a fallacy of composition when he claims that a necessary condition for r?>?g is that capitalists save a large share of their capital income. Third, post-Keynesians can learn from Piketty's insights about personal income distribution and incorporate them into their models. Fourth, we reiterate the post-Keynesian argument that a well-behaved aggregate production function does not exist and cannot explain income distribution.     

吴门画派园林绘画中城墙的风景内涵：以《东庄图》和《拙政园三十一景图》为例

以《东庄图》和《拙政园三十一景图》中的城墙景观为研究对象,采用图像和园林历史情境互证的方法,通过由图到园和由园及城的系统分析,解译了这2套园林绘画中城墙形象出现的画理依据、造园因素和城市风景文化情结,认为城墙形象在沈周和文徵明为代表的吴门画派的园林题材绘画作品中具有指示园林地望的作用,同时城墙也是当时城内和城外园林的重要借景对象;随着城市的功能转移,城墙周围的城市边缘区域对于园林的布局起到空间的牵引作用,究其原因与被内外城河环绕区域丰富的园艺空地和良好的水运交通分不开,最终形成了半村半城的园林和城市的空间耦合关系。旨在为苏州古城历史上形成的园林和城市风貌关系的传承和保护有所助益。     

Doing a Monty: Who Opened the Door to This Game for Economists?

The Monty Hall three-door, "Let's Make a Deal" game, named after the 1970s television show, is used widely in economics, econometrics, statistics, and game-theory-based teaching, as well as in many other disciplines. Its solutions and underlying assumptions arouse great passion and argument, in both the academic and popular press. Most economists believe that the first popular elucidation of the game was presented by Nalebuff in the Journal of Economic Literature. However, the game and its controversial solution were spelled out in The American Statistician years earlier by Selvin, at the time a young biostatistician at the University of California at Berkeley. Mathematicians give him due credit. The author argues that economists should also recognise his contribution.