项目评价中净现值率法的优缺点

项目经济评价可以用不同的方法 ,这些方法有不同的优点 ,也有各自的不足。项目方案不外乎有两种 :独立方案和互斥方案。以下我通过分析净现值率法的优缺点 ,说明净现值法普遍适用于各种方案的评价。１净现值率法的优点１ １净现值率适用于投资额相等或相差不大的互斥方案比选净现值率是指项目净现值与全部投资现值之比率 ,即单位投资现值的净现值。它是相对指标 ,反映了单位投资现值所能实现的净现值大小 ,也就是投资的经济效益大小。它的表达式为ＮＰＶＲ＝ＮＰＶ／ＩＰ×１００%。对于独立方案 ,净现值大 ,净现值率也大 ;净现值小 ,净现值…     

“长期投资决策方案的分析评价”中的疑点与改进

1、净现值和净现值率究竟哪一个指标能做出互斥投资方案的正确选择《管理会计学》认为 ,“净现值法有一个主要的缺点 ,就是如不同方案的投资额不同 ,单纯看净现值的绝对量并不能做出正确的评价。因为在这种情况下 ,不同方案的净现值实际上是不可比的。而净现值率正可弥补这一缺陷”。因为“这个指标可以使不同方案具有共同的可比基础 ,因而有较广泛的适用性。”(参见《管理会计学》 ,余绪缨主编 )果真如此吗 ?恐未必 !因为《管理会计学》几乎同时又认为“互斥方案的选优 ,要用差量分析原理进行方案比较 ,增量投资如能获得要求达到的最低收益…     

关于净现值率的再投资理论

一、排序误差按净现值率给方案排队 ,有时与按净现值排得不一样 ,存在着“排序误差”。例 1、已知Ａ、Ｂ两个方案如图 1,基准折现率为 10 % ,试按净现值和净现值率进行比较。图 1　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　图 2　　经计算可得净现值ＮＰＶ和净现值率ＮＰＶＲ :Ａ　ＮＰＶＡ =42ＮＰＶＲＡ=1.0 5 　　　Ｂ　ＮＰＶＢ=99ＮＰＶＲＢ=0 .99但如果把基准折现率改为 2 0 % ,则 :Ａ　ＮＰＶＡ=35ＮＰＶＲＡ=0 .875 　　　Ｂ　ＮＰＶＢ=2 9ＮＰＶＲＢ=0 .2 9可看出排列顺序前者不一致 ,后者一致。二、排序误差分析为了便于讨论 ,把讨论的范…     

油价-操作成本相关性对油气项目评价的影响

系统分析了油价与操作成本之间的传导机制和相关性。利用蒙特卡洛模拟方法,建立了油价与操作成本的相关随机变量进行经济评价,分析了油价与操作成本的相关性对项目评价的影响。结果表明:当不考虑油价与操作成本的相关性时,净现值法会低估项目价值,导致项目净现值对油价变化更加敏感;当油价出现极端波动时,忽视两者的相关性可能导致错误的投资决策。     

企业新产品项目的财务评价特点及贴现率分析

企业新产品项目的财务收益分析是决策的重要依据,风险收益率和资金成本是两个必须要考虑的因素;贴现率将会影响到评价指标如财务净现值和财务内部收益率,并且影响方案的选择。     

对海外油气项目效益评估指标体系的探讨

目前,在油气项目投资效益评估领域,评估项目经济效益的核心指标为内部收益率、净现值和投资回收期等。随着研究的深入,传统投资效益评估指标的局限性逐步显现,累计净现金流客观表达出项目整体创造效益的规模,科学比选项目技术方案,准确反映年度资金缺口及资金富裕程度。通过研究,笔者认为应将累计净现金流指标补充成为油气项目经济效益评估的核心指标,可在该领域长期使用。     

财务评估在项目评估中的作用

财务评估是项目评估的一个重要环节，评价指标有内部收益率、投资回收期、净现值、借款偿还期和盈亏平衡分析等。     

论对常规投资项目净现值函数认识的误区

在投资项目的经济评价中,净现值是最常用的指标,而目前国内有些学者把常规投资项目净现值函数简单地认为是单调递减的凹函数。本文对两种不同类型的常规投资项目净现值函数进行了探讨,对函数的具体性质和图像做了明确说明,旨在纠正目前理论界对常规投资项目净现值函数的错误认识。     

从内含报酬率看深股投资价值

财务管理的内含报酬率是项目投资方案判断、比较和选优的最常用的一种方法。它是一个与净现值相联系的概念。净现值(Net Present Value)是把一项投资方案未来能获得的各种报酬按照资金成本折算为总现值,拿它与原投资折成现值进行比较,其差额作为方案取舍或方案选优的依据。内含报酬率(Internal Rate of Return)则是一种能使投资方案的净现值等于零的报酬率。根据这个报酬率对投资方案的每年现金净流量进行折现,使未来报酚     

基于实物期权的项目价值评估方法改进研究

在现有净现值方法的基础上,引入实物期权,从而更加准确地来计算项目的价值.通过分析战略工具识别确认出项目中蕴含价值较大的实物期权,进而运用布莱克--斯科尔斯模型等来计算其价值,最终将其汇总的项目价值中去.     

Benefit and cost analysis of mariculture based on ecosystem services

As a life-supporting system, marine ecosystem provides various services for human being. Based on ecosystem services, we developed a Benifit and Cost Analysis model to balance the conflicts between economic income and environmental loss caused by mariculture activities. This model not only calculates market income of mariculture but also monetizes the positive and negative effects of mariculture activities on ecosystem services. In this model, three indices, the NPV (Net Present Value), BCR (Benefit to Cost Ratio) and RC (Relative Coefficent) with consideration of discount rate, are developed to assess and prioritize the candidate mariculture modes. This Benefit and Cost Analysis model was applied to Sanggou Bay, one typical mariculture bay in China, to identify sustainable mariculture mode. In this paper, we find that benefit and cost analysis based on ecosystem services value provides a convenient and effective tool to compare different exploitation modes of marine ecosystem.     

建设项目多目标评标的决策分析

建设项目的招标投标在我国应用已经非常广泛,评标的方法也越来越完善,但评标指标的权重不明确仍然是限制评标过程公平公正、科学合理的关键因素。本文通过研究在评价指标的权重不确定的条件下,提出了先优化每个投标方案的综合属性值,确定评标指标权重,再进行组合赋权并对投标方案进行排序的评标多目标决策方法。该方法避免了获取偏好信息的困难,有利于科学、公平、公正地进行评标,确定中标人,且易于计算机上实现。     

石油销售企业配送网络优化研究

我国石油销售企业的配送网络运营效率较低,亟需对其进行重新规划和整合,以降低成品油流通成本。通过构建一个混合规划模型,得到配送可行方案集及其流通成本集;再运用模糊综合评判法,对可行方素进行定性评价;最后利用数值变换将两种评价结果相结合,以此确定配送网络的最优化布局。     

上大压小项目的投资经济评价

本文分别运用折现现金流法和基于实物期权的经济评价方法,采用案例分析的形式,对“上大压小”政策执行中部分尚未达到寿命期的20万千瓦机组的关停时机及其经济性问题进行了分析,并时折现现金流法以及基于实物期权的评价方法的结果及其适用性进行了对比;同时,在采用折现现金流法时,对发电企业进行了财务经济评价和国民经济评价,并对机组单位造价、上网电价、煤价等因素进行了敏感性分析,在评价过程中量化了案例中各备选方案的环境成本。本文还应用实物期权理论研究了大机组滞后投资问题。两种方法的评价结果均表明,从全社会的福利角度出发,对尚未达到寿命期的小机组不应该立即关停,而应该使其继续运行到寿命期末再上大机组。本文所采用的经济评价方法能够为“上大压小”项目的执行提供辅助决策支持。     

Life-cycle economic model of small treatment wetlands for domestic wastewater disposal

Total system life costs (capital cost and ecological based on released pathogens) were modeled for two-cell domestic treatment wetland systems and compared to costs of traditional and emerging technology systems. Small treatment wetlands that were operationally effective for 20-years had net present value (NPV) costs $500–3000 less than those of sand filter systems. The same treatment wetlands were modeled as releasing ∼4 times pathogens, thus having a much higher ecological cost than sand filter systems. Wetland systems modeled using the highest possible pathogen treatment efficiencies still released ∼2 times the pathogens of sand filter systems. Treatment wetlands must function a minimum of 10 years before replacement in order to remain equivalent in cost to a sand filter lasting 20-years using a 6.25% discount rate. The maximum allowable installation costs for any alternative system (with no annual expenses) were $6675–7700 if required to be equal in total system NPV costs to wetlands. NPV costs were found to be particularly sensitive to uncertainties in installation and maintenance costs. Modeling indicated that the capital savings realized using wetland systems could be used to modify the simple 2-cell design such that both capital and ecological loads delivered to the environment could be minimized. Wetlands may provide a more sustainable option for communities if effluent is centralized and treated in an appropriately scaled wetland system.     

实物期权方法在房地产投资项目评估中的运用

随着我国房地产市场的不断发展与壮大,房地产类投资项目评估作为为企业带来利润、推动房地产市场发展的一项重要工作,越来越受到投资人士的重视.在房地产类投资项目的评估过程中,房地产类项目投资的不可逆、可延迟等特性使得传统的净现值法出现了自身难以克服的缺陷,而实物期权在评估过程中的运用能够使项目评估更加全面、充分、科学.     

用交叉列表评价法解决企业技术经济效益评价问题

针对技术经济效益评价的指标测算法所存在的问题进行了探究,创建了交叉列表评价方法。在选择评价指标(变量)时,首次尝试了引用软指标(变量),通过T检验证明交叉列表评价方法选择指标具有代表性,且在分类的基础上对企业的技术经济效益进行评价。采用量表分析方法是对以往技术经济分析中一贯使用的指标测算、数学模型、图表说明几种传统方法的创新。     

The self-enforcing provisions of oil and gas unit operating agreements: theory and evidence

This article extends the existing theory and empirical investigationof unitization contracts. It highlights the importance of incentive-compatibilityand self-enforcement and the bargaining problems faced in achievingviable, long-term contracts. We argue that only if the partiesto a unitization contract have unit production shares that arethe same as their cost shares will the contract be incentivecompatible. Using a database of 60 unit operating agreements,we measure the industry's actual behavior against the principlesof production from a common pool. Our survey of units that haveonly one production phase and that are relatively homogeneousreveals that such equal sharing rules are always found and theyappear to encourage the parties to behave optimally. In morecomplex units with multiple production phases and/or separateconcentrations of oil and gas (gas caps) we find deviationsfrom the theoretical ideal. In the case of multiphase units,we find equal cost and production shares within phases, butnot across phases. A preset trigger for shifting from one productionphase to the next helps to maintain optimal behavior. For gascap units, however, we generally do not find the equal sharingrule. Conflicts and rent dissipation follow as illustrated bythe case of the Prudhoe Bay Unit. The article describes thedesirable contract rules for avoiding moral hazard. It alsoshows how the effects of those rules can be replicated in difficultsituations.